Razo v. Andersson CA4/3

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Testo completo

Filed 3/6/26 Razo v. Andersson CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ALEXANDER RAZO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents, G063747

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-01158055)

MELISSA ANDERSSON, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Craig L. Griffin, Judge. Reversed. Appellant’s request for judicial notice
denied. Respondents’ motion to strike denied.
Horvitz & Levy, Frederic D. Cohen, Jason R. Litt; Carney Mehr
and Kendra L. Carney Mehr for Defendant and Appellant.
Plante Huguenin Lebovic Kahn, Brian C. Plante and Gregory M.
Golino for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
* * *
This is a dispute between homeowners, Melissa Andersson on the
one hand, and Alexander and Danielle Razo (the Razos) on the other, who
live in adjoining spaces and who are the only two members of a homeowners
association (the Association). Andersson wanted to make changes to her patio
that would have required changes to the Razos’ walkway. The Razos were not
agreeable, but Andersson proceeded anyway. The Razos filed the instant
action claiming Andersson’s changes violated the Association’s Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs). The CC&Rs prohibited an owner from
making changes to the “exterior appearance” of their home without
Association approval. However, the CC&Rs allowed an owner to unilaterally
make changes to certain areas, including a patio. The trial court expansively
interpreted the “exterior appearance” language to include changes to
Andersson’s patio and, thus, it entered judgment in favor of the Razos.
We conclude the trial court erred, in part. Andersson could
change her patio, but not in a way that affected the Razos’ walkway. We,
therefore, reverse the judgment and remand.
FACTS
The CC&Rs were recorded in 2001. Their recital stated their
purpose was to “enforc[e], protect[] and preserv[e] the value, desirability and
attractiveness of the Project.” The CC&Rs defined the “‘Project’” as a
“‘Condominium Project,’” and the “‘Property’” as a “‘Common Interest
Development.’” The “‘Property’” included the real property (Property) upon
which the Razos’ and Andersson’s “Units” were situated. The CC&Rs defined
a “‘Unit’” by reference to former Civil Code section 1351, subdivision (f). That

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section defined a “Unit” as a “separate interest in space . . . the boundaries of
which are described on a recorded final map.” (Former Civ. Code, § 1351,
subd. (f), amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 26, § 1, and repealed by Stats. 2012,
ch. 180, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2014.) Their description may refer to “physical
boundaries, either in existence, or to be constructed, such as walls, floors, and
ceilings.” (Ibid.) On the recorded final map here, the boundaries of each Unit
were depicted by lines identified as “walls.” The Property also contained
“‘Common Area’” and “‘Exclusive Use Common Area(s).’” Everything on the
Property, other than a Unit, was Common Area. Exclusive Use Common Area
sat within Common Area, but was space designated for an owner’s exclusive
use, such as a patio.
The Property and Units were built in approximately 2002. The
Razos purchased their Unit in 2017. Andersson purchased her Unit in
January 2020. The Units and Property were located between a street and an
alley. Andersson’s Unit faced the street, while the Razos had the rear Unit.
Andersson’s Unit included an outdoor patio which was visible from the street
and was designated her Exclusive Use Common Area.
A walkway began at the street’s sidewalk, meandered along the
left side of the Property, and ended at the entrance to the Razos’ Unit. A
separate walkway also started at the sidewalk but led to Andersson’s patio
and ultimately to her front door. Each walkway had its own gate. The
walkways were adjoined by and separated by pilasters which were connected
by a wrought-iron fence. On the right of the wrought-iron fencing was
Andersson’s patio and walkway; immediately to the left was a decorative
planter, and to the left of that was the Razos’ walkway.
According to the recorded final map, Andersson’s Exclusive Use
Common Area was supposed to begin 50 inches from the left-side Property

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line. However, as it was at the time Andersson purchased her Unit, the
Razos’ walkway, including the planter, pilasters, and wrought-iron fencing,
reached 85 inches from the left-side Property line and, thus, encroach on
Andersson’s Exclusive Use Common Area.
A month after moving in, Andersson met with Eric Fenmore and
his company, DIG Landscape Construction, Inc., dba Garden Studio with the
hopes of remodeling her patio. She wanted to change the aesthetic from a
“traditional Mediterranean design” to a “clean coastal look.” As part of the
remodel, Andersson wanted a walkway which led right to her door. However,
this would have required returning the size of Andersson’s patio to its
originally delineated starting point of 50 inches from the left-side Property
line, thus requiring a narrowing of the Razos’ walkway and the destruction of
the pilasters, planter, and wrought-iron fencing.
In addition to this, Andersson wanted to remodel her patio to
remove an outdoor fireplace, install an outdoor firepit with seating, replace
doors and windows, change the stucco and paint on her Unit, install a
barbeque, change the planting and hardscape, and change the style of the
wrought-iron fence, amongst other things.
Andersson signed a contract with DIG whereby she agreed to
indemnify DIG from any claims, including attorney fees.
The Razos were not agreeable to Andersson’s proposed changes to
their walkway. Notwithstanding, Andersson instructed DIG to commence
work. DIG ultimately completed the remodel including installing a fireplace,
new stonework, a bench, new fencing, a new barbeque, and new landscaping.
However, DIG did not change the paint or stucco on Andersson’s Unit. But
DIG did alter the Razos’ walkway and removed the planter, pilasters, and
wrought-iron fencing.

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In August 2020, the Razos sued Andersson, DIG, and Fenmore
for breach of the CC&Rs, prescriptive and equitable easements, and
nuisance. DIG filed a cross-complaint against Andersson asserting causes of
action for breach of contract, contractual indemnification, and equitable
indemnity. Prior to trial, DIG and the Razos settled, and DIG assigned its
claims to the Razos.
At the heart of the Razos’ complaint were two CC&Rs:
section 2.04(d), which prohibited an owner from changing “the exterior
appearance of a Unit” without Association approval and section 2.04(e),
which allowed an owner to unilaterally make “any improvement or
alteration” to the owner’s Exclusive Use Common Area.
Andersson and the Razos proceeded to a court trial where they
each introduced experts who testified to the meaning of the CC&Rs at issue.
Andersson’s expert, an attorney specializing in homeowner associations,
testified that, based on his reading, the Association was not required to
approve changes to an owner’s Exclusive Use Common Area. He did not
believe section 2.04(d) had any application to the dispute between the Razos
and Andersson because, in his opinion, Andersson did not make changes to
her Unit’s “exterior appearance.”
The Razos’ expert, a real estate lawyer, interpreted the phrase
“exterior appearance,” to refer broadly to the exterior appearance of the
Property, including Exclusive Use Common Area, not just the Unit itself.
Thus, the CC&Rs barred Andersson’s changes to her patio, as well as the
Razos’ walkway, because they altered the Property’s exterior appearance.
The trial court agreed with the Razos’ expert and concluded that
because the “express purpose of the CC&Rs [was] to ‘protect[] and preserv[e]
the value, desirability and attractiveness of the [Property],’” then it would be

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unreasonable to conclude that the drafter intended to give owners the power
to unilaterally change the appearance of their Exclusive Use Common Area
because such lack of uniformity within the Property would diminish its
“value, desirability, and attractiveness . . . .” Because, the court continued,
“[s]ection 2.04(d) is the only provision expressly addressing [Association]
approval for exterior changes,” then it must be interpreted “expansively to
require [Association] approval for changes to any portion of the exterior of the
[Property].” As such, all of Andersson’s changes breached the CC&Rs.
Alternatively, the court ruled the Razos had an easement over
their walkway, the pilasters, the planter, and the wrought-iron fencing.
Section 10.04(a) of the CC&Rs stated that if, when the Property was
originally constructed, an improvement was placed in such a way that it
encroached on an owner’s Exclusive Use Common Area, an easement was
created over the encroaching area. The court found the Razos’ walkway, the
pilasters, the planter, and the wrought-iron fencing were part of the original
construction.
Finally, the court ruled that Andersson was responsible for
defending and indemnifying DIG and Fenmore.
In February 2024, judgment was entered ordering Andersson, at
her expense, to undo the changes and to pay the Razos $762,822.24.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Andersson argues the trial court erred in concluding
that “exterior appearance” included the changes made to the appearance of
her Exclusive Use Common Area. On this point, we agree. However, we
disagree with Andersson’s contentions that the Razos did not have an
easement over their encroaching walkway, planter, pilasters, and wrought-

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iron fencing, and that she is not responsible for defending and indemnifying
DIG.
I.
ANDERSSON COULD ALTER HER EXCLUSIVE USE COMMON AREA
We interpret CC&Rs in the same manner as any contract, “with a
view toward enforcing the reasonable intent of the parties.” (Harvey v. The
Landing Homeowners Assn. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 809, 817.) “The language
of the CC&R’s governs if it is clear and explicit, and we interpret the words in
their ordinary and popular sense unless a contrary intent is shown.” (Ibid.)
Such contrary intent may be shown by extrinsic evidence shedding light on
the “‘“facts, circumstances and conditions surrounding the execution of the
[CC&Rs].”’ [Citations.]” (Falkowski v. Imation Corp. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
499, 506.)
If the parties offered extrinsic evidence, and that evidence was
not in conflict, we review the CC&Rs de novo. (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle
Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 531.) If the extrinsic evidence was in conflict
and required credibility determinations by the trial court, we defer to the
trial court’s interpretation if substantial evidence supports it. (Id. at pp. 531–
532.)
The Razos argue the experts’ testimony constituted extrinsic
evidence and, thus, we are bound by the court’s reliance thereon if
substantial evidence supports it. But the experts did not testify to the facts,
circumstances, or conditions surrounding the execution of the CC&Rs. (See
e.g., Wolf v. Superior Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1357 [evidence of
trade usage and custom at time of contract admissible].) Instead, the experts
just presented their interpretations of the CC&Rs, a solely legal function.
This is not extrinsic evidence. (Gilkyson v. Disney Enterprises, Inc. (2021)

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66 Cal.App.5th 900, 920–921 [experts testifying to their interpretation of
agreement is not extrinsic evidence].)
As such, the experts’ conflicting interpretations, whether relied
on by the trial court or not, are not binding on us, even if substantial evidence
supports one of the interpretations. Instead, we interpret the CC&Rs de novo.
Section 2.04(d) is not ambiguous. The Units are bound by their
walls. Walls have an interior and an exterior. “[E]xterior appearance” just
refers to the appearance of the Unit’s exterior walls. For example, the owner
could not paint the exterior walls a different color or change their texture, nor
could an owner install windows or add a balcony, without Association
approval.
Similarly, section 2.04(e) is not ambiguous. By its plain terms, it
means what it says—an owner can alter their Exclusive Use Common Area
without Association approval. It would be nonsensical to require an owner to
get Association approval before placing plants on their patio or hanging
decorative décor.
Additional support is found elsewhere in the CC&Rs.
Section 2.04(c), for example, requires an owner to “notify the Association of
any substantial improvements to the Unit and Exclusive Use Common
Area(s), if any, in consideration of any effect of such improvements on the
Association’s insurance policy.” Thus, per section 2.04(c), the CC&Rs
contemplate a scenario in which the owner of a Unit makes “substantial
improvements” to their Exclusive Use Common Area without the approval of
the other owner, i.e., without Association approval.
Moreover, section 2.05 provides that “the Association (not
individual Owners) is responsible for maintaining, repairing, modifying, and
altering Common Areas (not including Exclusive Use Common Areas).” Thus,

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the Association has no power to alter Exclusive Use Common Areas—that
domain lies with the owner.
The Razos disagree and urge us to focus on the CC&Rs’ recital
which explains that the purpose of the CC&Rs is to maintain the desirability
and attractiveness of the Units and Property. They believe section 2.04(e)
must be read in such a way that it limits an Owner’s ability to change their
Exclusive Use Common Area if doing so would decrease the “value,
desirability and attractiveness” of the Property. Such an interpretation would
inevitably embroil the owners in endless disputes over minor changes.
In any event, recitals are not covenants. Nor can they affect
unambiguous covenants within the contract, such as 2.04(d) and (e).
(Carolina Beverage Corp. v. FIJI Water Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 977,
990.) This is why we give recitals “‘limited effect[,] even as between the
parties.”’ (Sabetian v. Exxon Mobil Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1069.)
II.
THE RAZOS HAD AN EASEMENT
The recorded final map depicted Andersson’s Exclusive Use
Common Area as starting 50 inches from the left-side Property line. However,
during construction of the Property, the builder installed a larger walkway to
the Razos’ Unit, by an additional 35 inches. This included the pilasters,
planter, and wrought-iron fencing that encroached Andersson’s originally
delineated Exclusive Use Common Area.
Sections 10.04(a) and (b) state that if, during original
construction, an improvement is placed in such a way that it encroaches on
an owner’s Exclusive Use Common Area, an easement is created in favor of
the encroaching owner. Andersson argues substantial evidence does not
support the trial court’s conclusion that the walkway, pilasters, planter, and

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fence were part of the Property’s original construction and, even if they were,
“the record does not support the conclusion that the entire walkway was an
easement that encroached on Andersson’s Exclusive Use Common Area.” We
disagree.
We review a trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence,
a highly deferential standard. (Ridley v. Rancho Palma Grande Homeowners
Assn. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 788, 800.) We will not reweigh the evidence,
resolve evidentiary conflicts, or evaluate the credibility of witnesses. (Ibid.)
Instead, we review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
factual findings, giving the trial court the benefit of every reasonable
inference. (Ibid.)
Prior to trial, the parties stipulated that the Property and the
Units were constructed in “approximately 2002.” The Razos presented a
photograph from 2003 which depicted the disputed area in a similar fashion
to when they purchased their Unit in 2017. Although the picture is blurry
and subject to interpretation, the trial court concluded that it was consistent
with how the Razos’ walkway stood at the time of purchase; we take no issue
with that conclusion. In addition, there was evidence that the same style of
wrought-iron fence was used throughout the Property, that the pilasters had
the same stucco finish as the Units, and that the age and look of all the
improvements in the encroaching area were consistent with the rest of the
Property. This constitutes circumstantial evidence that the encroaching
improvements were part of the original construction. (LaMarr v. Regents of
University of California (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 671, 676 [circumstantial
evidence is substantial evidence].)
Andersson also argues that because neither owner could walk
through the planted areas, the area did not encroach on Andersson’s

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Exclusive Use Common Area. Andersson’s argument belies the point of a
fence—to separate two areas and to delineate a border. Andersson’s Exclusive
Use Common Area was to the right of the fence and everything to the left was
the encroaching improvements, including the planter and the 85-inch
walkway.
Because there was an easement in favor of the Razos over the
wider entryway, pilasters, planter, and wrought-iron fencing, Andersson
could not remove or modify those areas without Association approval.1
III.
ANDERSSON WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENDING AND INDEMNIFYING DIG
Last, Andersson argues the trial court erred in concluding that
she was responsible for defending and indemnifying DIG. She claims DIG
was not licensed when DIG performed the work at issue. Because of this,
according to Andersson, DIG’s contract, including its indemnity provision,
was illegal.
However, Andersson did not raise this defense at trial. “‘“As a
general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the
first time on appeal; appealing parties must adhere to the theory (or theories)
on which their cases were tried. This rule is based on fairness—it would be
unfair, both to the trial court and the opposing litigants, to permit a change
of theory on appeal.” [Citation.] “New theories of defense, just like new

We need not reach the question of whether Andersson’s actions
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in removing the planter, pilasters, and fencing violated section 2.04(e)’s
prohibition on an owner changing their Exclusive Use Common Area in a way
that affects the structural integrity of the Property. The pilasters, planter,
and wrought-iron fencing were not Andersson’s Exclusive Use Common Area.

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theories of liability, may not be asserted for the first time on appeal . . . .”’”
(Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.)
This rule is especially apt here because resolving this issue would
require us to make factual determinations utilizing evidence that Andersson
did not present at trial. As part of her appeal, Andersson submitted a request
for judicial notice pertaining to DIG’s licensing documentation. But she did
not present these materials to the trial court. We are not a fact-finding
tribunal. Our role is limited to reviewing “‘the correctness of a judgment as of
the time of its rendition.’” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405), Thus, we
will not take notice of documents not presented to the trial court. (Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3.)
For these reasons, Andersson cannot assert this defense for the
first time on appeal.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed
to enter a new judgment, consistent with this opinion. The trial court is also
ordered to reassess the amount of attorney fees the Razos are entitled to
receive. (Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 358–
359.)

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All parties to bear their costs incurred on appeal.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

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