Hyde v. The Grove La Mesa CA4/1

CourtListener 10801152Calctapp26 feb 2026

Testo completo

Filed 2/26/26 Hyde v. The Grove La Mesa CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID HYDE, D085362

Plaintiff,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
00005732-CU-PO-CTL)
THE GROVE LA MESA, INC et al.,

Defendant,

BENJAMIN PAVONE,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert C. Longstreth, Judge. Affirmed.
Pavone & Fonner and Benjamin Pavone for Objector and Appellant.
Purdy & Bailey and Micah L. Bailey for Defendant.

The defendants in the underlying lawsuit brought a motion for
sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure sections 128.5 and 128.7 after
Benjamin Pavone and his law firm, Pavone & Fonner, LLP, filed a meritless
motion asserting defendants’ counsel had engaged in unethical conduct.1
The trial court granted the motion against Pavone and his firm, but not their
client. The court imposed sanctions in favor of the defendants in the amount
of $11,725 for the attorney’s fees and costs incurred by them to respond to
Pavone’s baseless motion and sanctions of $5,000 payable to the court as an
additional deterrent to prevent further misconduct. On appeal from the
orders, Pavone argues his motion prompting the sanctions was meritorious
and urges this court to reverse the sanctions for various reasons. As we
explain, we reject Pavone’s arguments and affirm the trial court’s orders. In
addition, we conclude Pavone’s appeal is frivolous and impose additional
sanctions on Pavone in another effort to deter such conduct in the future.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
In the lawsuit that underlies this appeal, David Hyde sued his former
employer, The Grove La Mesa, Inc., and one of its owners, Sean Patrick
McDermott. In his initial complaint, filed in February 2021, Hyde alleged
McDermott assaulted, falsely imprisoned, and threatened to kill him. The
Grove, McDermott, and another later-added defendant, Sandra Ledesma,

filed special motions to strike some of Hyde’s claims under section 425.16.3

1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

2 In his briefing, Pavone refers extensively to his representation of a
litigant in an unrelated probate case in which a member of this court’s bench
was the judicial officer, and which resulted in an opinion of this court (Law
Offices of Benjamin Pavone, PC v. Willis (D075817, Nov. 18, 2021)).

3 Section 425.16 is commonly referred to as the anti-SLAPP (strategic
lawsuit against public participation) statute. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v.
LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 732, fn. 1.)
2
The trial court granted the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions on June 30,
2023.
On July 14, 2023, Hyde brought a motion for reconsideration of the
anti-SLAPP order. The Grove and McDermott opposed the motion and also
brought a motion for sanctions against Hyde under section 128.7. On August
14, 2023, Hyde filed an ex parte application seeking an order requiring
McDermott to sit for a deposition “to bolster the case for reconsideration,” to
shorten time on his pending motion for reconsideration, and for leave to file a
supplemental brief in support of the motion. The defendants opposed the ex
parte application.
On September 5, 2023, the parties entered a stipulated order awarding
the defendants $44,199.55 in attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection
with the anti-SLAPP motions under the statute’s fee-shifting provision. On
January 26, 2024, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration,
finding Hyde had “not presented new or different facts, circumstances, or law
sufficient to justify reconsideration of the court’s June 30, 2023 ruling
granting Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motions.” The trial court also granted
McDermott and The Grove’s motion for sanctions, and imposed sanctions of
$4,750 against Hyde and Pavone.
Shortly after, on January 29, 2023, counsel for The Grove and
McDermott, Micah L. Bailey, sent Hyde’s counsel, Pavone, an offer to settle
the litigation. The offer included an agreement to release the attorney’s fees,
costs, and sanctions that were still owed by Hyde to McDermott and The
Grove as a result of the defendants’ successful anti-SLAPP and sanctions
motions. The offer did not include attorney’s fees incurred as a result of

Hyde alleged that McDermott conspired with Ledesma to concoct false
allegations that Hyde had sexually harassed her to provide McDermott with
a reason to terminate Hyde’s employment.
3
Hyde’s motion for reconsideration, which prompted Pavone to ask defense
counsel, Micah L. Bailey, for the amount of attorney’s fees incurred opposing
the motion for reconsideration so Pavone could “stipulate to that figure.”
Bailey responded the amount was $13,565, which included “the time [he]
spent following [the] filing of the sanctions motion, including in connection
with opposing [an] ex parte application to compel discovery” Pavone had
asserted was necessary to support his motion for reconsideration.
Pavone responded that the amount seemed too high and asked Bailey
to provide “exact billing records.” Bailey stated that he would allow Pavone
to view the billing records during a “screen share” but would not e-mail his
billing records to Pavone as an attachment. On February 7, 2024, Bailey
showed Pavone his billing records over a Zoom video conference. Pavone
describes the records as 112 Excel spreadsheet entries that totaled $13,565.
The next day, February 8, 2024, Pavone filed a “Motion to Enforce
Ethical Violations Against” Bailey. Therein, Pavone asserted Bailey had
committed 12 “ethical violations,” including violating Civil Code section 1710,
Business & Professions Code sections 6068, subdivision (a), and 6106, and
Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 1.1(a), 4.1(a), and 8.4(c) by “attempt[ing]
to defraud Hyde and Pavone by proposing to charge them” $13,565 for
expenses related to Hyde’s motion for reconsideration of the anti-SLAPP
order. Pavone’s motion asked the court to make factual findings in
connection with the motion, to require Bailey to produce billing records for
the $13,565 in fees he claimed to have incurred, to enjoin Bailey from seeking
such fees, “to issue an OSC for Bailey to produce his billing records with
respect to the previous anti-SLAPP motion,” and to impose sanctions on
Bailey of $12,420.

4
In response to Pavone’s motion, on March 14, 2024, Bailey sent Pavone
a letter in accordance with the notice provisions of sections 128.5 and 128.7,
asserting Pavone’s motion was frivolous and brought without any reasonable
legal basis or evidentiary support, and was filed with the express intent to
cause unwarranted expense. The letter attached an unfiled motion for
sanctions and demanded Pavone withdraw his baseless motion within the 21-
day grace period afforded by sections 128.5, subdivision (f)(1)(B) and 128.7,
subdivision (c)(1). Pavone did not withdraw his motion, and on April 10,
2024, McDermott and The Grove filed their second motion against Pavone
and Hyde for sanctions under sections 128.5 and 128.7.
On July 5, 2024, the court denied Pavone’s motion asserting ethical
violations against Bailey. The court found Hyde and Pavone had “presented
no legitimate evidence that [Bailey] engaged in ethical misconduct in this
case.” The court noted that “[d]espite accusing [Bailey] of fraud based on his
own assessment of [the Excel] spreadsheet, [Pavone] admits he ‘did not have
time or logistic ability to check the math’ on the entries.” Further, the court
stated that Pavone failed to cite any applicable legal authority for the
requests in his motion, and that while the court had authority to address
ethical misconduct that occurs before it, this authority “does not authorize
attorneys to bring adjudicatory motions against opposing counsel accusing
them of fraud.”
The court also stated that, “[t]o the extent Plaintiff felt the amount of
attorney fees sought in a settlement offer was inflated, the appropriate step
was to communicate that to Defendants’ counsel and respond to the offer
accordingly. To the extent Plaintiff believed the amount of sanctions that the
court awarded to Defendants was unwarranted or that the attorney fees
sought in Defendants’ sanctions motion were unreasonable, Plaintiff had an

5
opportunity to be heard before the court made its ruling. To the extent
Defendants’ accrued attorney fees become relevant in some future motion in
this case, Plaintiff will have an opportunity to be heard at that time.”
After this ruling, on September 13, 2024, Pavone filed an opposition to
McDermott and The Grove’s second sanctions motion. Therein, Pavone
argued again that Bailey had attempted to defraud him of $13,565. Pavone
also argued the trial court misunderstood his “ethics motion” in its denial
order and that, contrary to the court’s determination, the motion was
“comfortably within the court’s authority to adjudicate.”
On September 25, 2024, the trial court issued a tentative ruling
granting in part and denying in part McDermott and The Grove’s motion for
sanctions. The court found that Pavone’s motion to enforce ethical violations
against Bailey was “totally devoid of merit and thus frivolous within the
meaning of” section 128.5, subdivision (b)(2), and “the motion’s legal
contentions were not ‘warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law,’ nor did many of the factual contentions have
evidentiary support. (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7(b)(2), (3).)” The court
continued, “Plaintiff and his counsel presented no legitimate eviden[ce] to
support the claim that Defendants’ counsel had engaged in ethical
misconduct in this case. Indeed, Plaintiff’s counsel admitted he reviewed the
documentation relating to the billing issue only cursorily before filing the
motion, consciously deciding to forego the opportunity for a more detailed
review. As Defendants point out in this motion, Plaintiff and his counsel
accused Attorney Bailey of ‘billing fraud’ in a situation in which no ‘bill’ had
been issued.”

6
The trial court also stated that Pavone’s opposition to the motion for
sanctions focused on relitigating Hyde’s motion for reconsideration, “claiming
the court ‘misunderstood the true nature of the motion.’ ” The court found
that to the extent the motion could be construed as a motion for
reconsideration, it was untimely. In addition, the court found Pavone bore
sole “responsibility for the violations of sections 128.5 and 128.7” and denied
the motion as against his client, Hyde. The court imposed sanctions jointly
and severally on Pavone and his law firm, Pavone & Fonner, LLP, in the
amount of $11,725 for the attorney’s fees and costs incurred by McDermott
and The Grove to respond to Pavone’s baseless motion. In addition, the court
imposed sanctions of $5,000 on Pavone and Pavone & Fonner, LLP payable to
the court. Finally, the court ordered Pavone to report the sanctions to the
State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6068,
subdivision (o)(3).
Pavone failed to appear at the September 26, 2024 hearing on the
sanctions motion. That day, the trial court issued an order confirming its
tentative ruling and ordering defendants to submit a proposed judgment
within five days. The defendants sent a proposed order to all parties the

same day, which quoted in its entirety the court’s final order.4 The court
entered the proposed order as a formal, final order on October 16, 2024.
Pavone filed a timely notice of appeal from that order on December 16, 2024.

4 On October 3, 2024, Pavone filed a “Supplemental Objection To
Proposed Order,” which did not address the order. Instead, the objection
asserted Pavone had been in contact with the San Diego Superior Court’s
clerk about the court’s budget prior to the trial court’s imposition of the
$5,000 sanction order and suggested that the clerk had been in contact with
the judge in this matter prior to that decision. The objection also attached
Pavone’s e-mail communications with the clerk.
7
DISCUSSION
Pavone’s arguments on appeal are difficult to discern and rife with

repetition, obscure references, and baseless allegations.5 He asserts that
Bailey “engaged in a complex of ethical misconduct in relation to his position
that Hyde owed an additional $13,565 in attorney’s fees, where there was no
possibility that such an amount was owed.” Pavone appears to argue that for
this reason, his “Motion to Enforce Ethical Violations Against” Bailey was
supported by facts and the law, and that the court’s determination that the
motion was frivolous and contained baseless factual and legal contentions
was an abuse of discretion. Thus, according to Pavone, the sanctions imposed
against him and his law firm must be reversed. We disagree.
I
“Under ... section 128.7, a court may impose sanctions for filing a
pleading if the court concludes the pleading was filed for an improper purpose
or was indisputably without merit, either legally or factually. (Guillemin v.
Stein (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 156, 168.) The court here imposed sanctions
based on its finding that the claims [asserted by Pavone in his ethics motion]
were legally and factually frivolous. A claim is factually frivolous if it is ‘not
well grounded in fact’ and it is legally frivolous if it is ‘not warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law.’ (Id. at p. 167.) In either case, to obtain sanctions,
the moving party must show the party’s conduct in asserting the claim was
objectively unreasonable. (Ibid.) A claim is objectively unreasonable if ‘any

5 After the respondent’s brief was filed, Pavone brought a motion to
strike a portion of the brief on the grounds that it failed to provide sufficient
citations to the record or case citations. A ruling on the motion was deferred
to this panel. The motion to strike is denied.
8
reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and completely without

merit.’ ”6 (Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 440 (Peake).)
“ ‘A court has broad discretion to impose sanctions if the moving party
satisfies the elements of the sanctions statute.’ [Citation.] [However,]
section 128.7 should be utilized only in ‘the rare and exceptional case where
the action is clearly frivolous, legally unreasonable or without legal
foundation, or brought for an improper purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘Because our
adversary system requires that attorneys and litigants be provided
substantial breathing room to develop and assert factual and legal
arguments, [section 128.7] sanctions should not be routinely or easily
awarded even for a claim that is arguably frivolous’ (Peake, supra, 227

Cal.App.4th at p. 448), and instead ‘should be “made with restraint.” ’ ”7
(Kumar v. Ramsey (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1110, 1120 (Kumar).)

6 “Section 128.7 was modeled on rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (28 U.S.C.), and many of the provisions of the statute and rule are
identical. [Citation.] Accordingly, federal case law construing rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ‘is persuasive authority’ with regard to the
meaning of section 128.7. [Citation.] Thus, under section 128.7 and rule 11
‘there are basically three types of submitted papers that warrant sanctions:
factually frivolous (not well grounded in fact); legally frivolous (not warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law); and papers interposed for an improper purpose.’ ”
(In re Marriage of Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 124, 133,
fn. 4 (Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb).)

7 In contrast to sanctions available under section 128.7, under
section 128.5 “ ‘[t]here must be a showing not only of a meritless or frivolous
action or tactic, but also of bad faith.’ ” (Sahafzadeh-Taeb & Taeb, supra, 39
Cal.App.5th at p. 136.) Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that Pavone’s motion asserting ethical violations by
Bailey was unsupported by fact or law under section 128.7, we do not reach
the issue of whether the sanctions were also appropriate under section 128.5.
9
“ ‘We review a section 128.7 sanctions award under the abuse of
discretion standard. [Citation.] We presume the trial court’s order is correct
and do not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. [Citation.]’
[Citation] ‘The scope of discretion,’ however, ‘always resides in the particular
law being applied, i.e., in the “legal principles governing the subject of [the]
action ....” ’ (City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1297.)
‘Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is
outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an “abuse” of
discretion.’ ” (Kumar, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.)
II
Pavone’s motion asserted that Bailey violated his ethical obligations to
his clients and opposing counsel by agreeing to Pavone’s request to see billing
records that might support a subsequent request for attorney’s fees under the
anti-SLAPP statute. As the trial court concluded, Pavone’s allegation that
this conduct was a violation of Bailey’s ethical obligations was both factually
and legally without merit, and objectively unreasonable. As the trial court
found, “ ‘any reasonable attorney would agree that [it] is totally and
completely without merit.’ ” (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.)
As discussed in the background section of this opinion, after the trial
court adjudicated McDermott and The Grove’s motion for sanctions related to
Pavone’s motion for reconsideration of the court’s order granting the anti-
SLAPP motion, Bailey communicated a settlement offer to Pavone. In the
context of this offer, and in response to Pavone’s question, Bailey clarified
that the offer did not encompass all attorney’s fees incurred by his clients in
opposing the motion for reconsideration, leaving open the possibility that his
clients might attempt to recover additional fees under the fee-shifting
provision of the anti-SLAPP statute. This clarification prompted Pavone to

10
request Bailey’s billing records. Bailey consented to the request by showing
the records to Pavone during a video conference. Inexplicably, this meeting
prompted Pavone’s “ethics” motion underlying the sanction awards at issue
in this appeal.
As the trial court found, there was no ethical violation by Bailey in his
conduct in agreeing to show his billing records related to his client’s
opposition to Pavone’s failed motion for reconsideration. Indeed, Bailey was
under no obligation to provide this information in the first instance. As in
the trial court, on appeal, Pavone fails to provide any factual or legal basis to
support this foundational problem with his motion. Instead, he repeats his
arguments that Bailey’s act of showing him the billing spreadsheet was an
attempt to perpetrate a fraud on Pavone and his client. Pavone, however,
has provided no factual or legal basis to show that Bailey’s actions were
fraudulent or unethical in any way.
As Bailey explains in his appellate brief, the record does not show
Bailey concealed or misrepresented the attorney’s fees his clients paid him in
connection with the case. At Pavone’s request, Bailey voluntarily gave
Pavone the opportunity to view his billing records. The records were shown
to Pavone in the context of a settlement negotiation between counsel for
opposing parties. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Bailey’s
assertion that his clients might be able to recover some or all of the fees in
further litigation was a false statement or attempt to defraud either Bailey’s
clients or the opposing party. As Bailey explains, it was “an asserted legal
entitlement made in an adversarial setting, one which Appellants were free
to reject and contest,” and which “never came to fruition because
Respondents never ... filed an additional Motion to recover those additional

11
fees.” Additionally, Pavone makes no claim that Bailey did not bill his client
for the hours or that his clients did not pay the fees.
The only evidence Pavone points to in support of his assertion of ethical
misconduct is his own declaration, submitted in support of his motion,
recounting the e-mail conversation between himself and Bailey, describing
the subsequent video conference concerning the attorney’s fees, and attaching
the e-mail conversation itself. Again, this was not evidence of any
wrongdoing by Bailey and did not factually support Pavone’s motion that
resulted in the sanctions at issue in this appeal. Pavone also argues that “a
party being asked to pay the other side’s legal fees is entitled to a copy of the
billing detail; more commonly, counsel obtains one automatically when the
opposing attorney files the fee motion.” This statement highlights the flaw in
Pavone’s argument. Contrary to his assertion, neither Pavone nor his client
was asked to pay the fees that Pavone requested to see; nor did Bailey or his
clients file a motion to recover those fees.
Pavone next argues that the trial court’s finding that he did not submit
relevant legal authority in support of his motion was “false” because he
“tendered an extensive set of ethics rules and cases to support” his theory.
Pavone, however, does not explain what rules or cases he proffered in support
of his motion or the arguments therein. Rather, he asserts only that the
attorney’s fees shown to him during the video conference were “a fabricated
debt ... subject to ethical regulation under Rules 4.1 and 8.4., as per well-
established case law.”
Pavone also asserts that the trial court’s determination that there was
no evidence of billing fraud because there was no bill at issue, “is an
unserious legal argument,” and contends billing fraud includes “situations
when [a lawyer’s] time sheets are inaccurate, when he inflates his time, or

12
other ways.” Pavone then provides citations to several cases from other
jurisdictions involving claims of billing fraud. Pavone does not explain how
these cases relate to this one, likely because none provide support for
Pavone’s contention that Bailey engaged in any unethical conduct that would
support his motion. (See e.g., Tadros v. City of Union City (D.N.J. 2011, No.
10-CV-2535 (DMC)(JAD)) 2011 U.S. Dist. Lexis 35714, at pp. *24-25
[dismissing claim of “billing fraud” asserted by former client against
defendant attorneys at the pleading stage]; Stancil v. First Mt. Vernon Indus.
Loan Ass’n (D.D.C.App. 2014) 131 A.3d 867, 870 [dismissing fraud claim by
borrower based on payment of attorney’s fees against bank for failure to
adequately state claim]; DeLeo v. Nusbaum (Conn. 2004) 49 Conn. Supp. 366,
387–388 [affirming directed verdict for claim for negligent legal
representation based on statute of limitations]; Henry v. United States
(C.D.Ill. 2022, 21-3244) 2022 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16740, at p. *6 [dismissing
claim of legal malpractice and billing fraud]; In re Appler (D.C.App. 1995) 669
A.2d 731, 734 [attorney disciplinary proceeding, which addressed claims of
billing fraud among other malfeasance]; and Office of Lawyer Regulation v.
Maynard (Wis. 2009) 2009 WI 106, 322 Wis.2d 53, 58 [same].)
In sum, Pavone has failed to present any authority to show a basis in
the law for his motion. Rather, the record before this court supports the trial
court’s determination that the motion was “ ‘not warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.’ ” (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.) The court’s determination
that Pavone’s motion was frivolous was not an abuse of the court’s discretion.
Finally, Pavone also complains the trial court’s decision to treat his
ethics motion as a motion for reconsideration reflects a misunderstanding of
the law. This argument is also without merit. The court stated simply and

13
correctly that Pavone’s opposition to the sanctions motion asserted the court
misunderstood the arguments of his ethics motion. The court then noted that
to the extent Pavone was attempting to relitigate the court’s denial of that
prior motion, the time for such a reconsideration had passed. This was an
accurate statement of the law and facts, and it provides no basis for this court
to overturn the trial court’s ruling on the motion for sanctions. (See Okorie v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600, disapproved
on another ground in Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th
995, 1011 [“it is not this court’s role to construct theories or arguments that
would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.
Rather, an appellant is required to present a cognizable legal argument in
support of reversal of the judgment”].)
III
In a separate section of his briefing, Pavone challenges the $5,000

sanction imposed and made payable to the court.8 Without further
explanation, he asserts that because his “ethics motion was appropriate
under the circumstances, there was no foundation for the trial court to
impose an additional $5,000 penalty on top of its $11,725 sanction” to Bailey.

8 Prior to the parties’ briefing, this court issued an order noting that a
sanction award “for $5,000 is appealable ‘after the entry of final judgment in
the main action’ ” and requesting “the parties address in their briefings on
the merits the appealability of the order directing payment of the $5,000
penalty to the court.” Neither party complied with this request. However,
given the circumstances of the case, we exercise our discretion to treat
Pavone’s appeal from this sanction order as a petition for extraordinary writ.
(See Manlin v. Milner (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1022 [“[T]he monetary
sanctions issue is final between the parties ... and the record on them is
sufficiently developed to afford adequate appellate review. To dismiss the
appeal rather than exercising our power to reach the merits through a
mandate proceeding would, under the unusual circumstances before us, be
‘ “ ‘unnecessarily dilatory and circuitous.’ ” ’ ”].)
14
Further, he argues, “given the wide body of case law supporting the ethical
enforcement of false statements by attorneys, the broad applications of these
rules themselves, and Bailey’s obvious ethical malfeasance ... the underlying
motion was not only not frivolous, it was accurate.”
As discussed, Pavone has not shown the trial court abused its
discretion by imposing sanctions on him and his law firm with respect to the
attorney’s fees and costs incurred by McDermott and The Grove to respond to
Pavone’s baseless ethics motion. Rather, the court’s finding that there was
no legal or factual basis for Pavone’s motion was supported by the record
before the court. Because Pavone presents no other argument to challenge
the separate $5,000 sanction, his appeal with respect to this sanction also
fails.
In addition, we agree with McDermott and The Grove that the court did
not abuse its discretion by imposing the $5,000 sanction payable to the court.
Section 128.7, subdivision (c) provides authority for the imposition of
sanctions when a motion is brought for an improper purpose, the “legal
contentions therein are” not “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;” or “[t]he allegations and other factual
contentions” do not “have evidentiary support ....” The sanctions imposed by
the court must be “limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of this
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated” and “the
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an
order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for
effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of some or all
of the reasonable attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred as a direct
result of the violation.” (§ 128.7, subd. (d), italics added.) The trial court’s

15
imposition of this sanction was authorized by section 128.7, subdivisions (c)
and (d), and the sanctions were appropriate to deter additional conduct of
this kind by Pavone in the future.
IV
After completion of briefing, we issued an order advising Pavone we
were considering imposing sanctions against him for prosecuting a frivolous
appeal and provided Pavone an opportunity to file a written opposition.
(§ 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276.) Pavone filed an opposition the same
day our order was issued stating only, “A motion imposing almost $17,000 in
sanctions, premised on the employment of meaningless jargon at the trial
level and defended on appeal by vacuous generalities, leaves no room for a
court to honestly find the appeal frivolous. As detailed by the briefs, it was
the trial ruling that lacked any merit, not Appellants’ motion.” The
opposition also attached Pavone’s opening and reply briefs.
Ten days later, Pavone filed a “supplemental response” consisting of a
declaration in which he asserts, “it appears that the California Supreme
Court has in fact suspended operation of the discipline system at its level.
Now 2/3 of the way through the month, no substantive discipline orders have
been issued since revelations I disclosed on December 25, 2025 to the Review
Department.” Pavone continues that he has “inventoried 2,080 decisions” of
the Supreme Court and concluded that it “always imposes the fines,” and
goes on to cite a series of “statistics” presumably about the State Bar’s
disciplinary system.
Pavone then states, “I would note for this specific court’s benefit,
however, that I have not forgotten that its referral of me to a corrupted
discipline system after the Willis appeal resulted in my being charged with
2,017 ethics offenses. So, the members of this Court who signed any orders

16
during the Willis appeal can be fairly and accurately accused of being
involved in one of the most massive abuses of judicial power in California
legal history.” He ends the declaration, “I reserve the right to file an action to
shut down the entire State Bar discipline system – and I currently possess
the evidentiary horsepower to accomplish exactly that – in light of the Court’s
threat to further administratively prosecute me via that system implied by
its order of January 13, 2026.”
A
This court has the express power to impose monetary sanctions on
appeal. Under section 907, “[w]hen it appears to the reviewing court that the
appeal was frivolous or taken solely for delay, it may add to the costs on
appeal such damages as may be just.” In addition, California Rules of Court,
rule 8.276(a) gives this court the authority to “impose sanctions … on a party
or an attorney for: [¶] (1) Taking a frivolous appeal or appealing solely to
cause delay; [¶] (2) Including in the record any matter not reasonably
material to the appeal’s determination; [¶] (3) Filing a frivolous motion; or [¶]
(4) Committing any other unreasonable violation of these rules.” “[A]n
appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an
improper motive—to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse
judgment—or when it indisputably has no merit—when any reasonable
attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without
merit.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650 (Flaherty).)
“In determining whether an appeal indisputably has no merit,
California cases have applied both subjective and objective standards. The
subjective standard looks to the motives of the appealing party and his or her
attorney, while the objective standard looks at the merits of the appeal from a
reasonable person’s perspective. [Citation.] Whether the party or attorney

17
acted in an honest belief there were grounds for appeal makes no difference if
any reasonable person would agree the grounds for appeal were totally and
completely devoid of merit.” (Kleveland v. Siegel & Wolensky, LLP (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 534, 556–557 (Kleveland).)
When sanctions are warranted, we determine the amount by
considering “ ‘ “the amount of respondent’s attorney fees on appeal; the
amount of the judgment against appellant; the degree of objective
frivolousness and delay; and the need for discouragement of like conduct in
the future.” ’ ” (Kleveland, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 558.) Importantly
here, respondents “are not the only parties damaged when an appellant
pursues a frivolous claim. Other appellate parties, many of whom wait years
for a resolution of bona fide disputes, are prejudiced by the useless diversion
of this court’s attention. [Citation.] In the same vein, the appellate system
and the taxpayers of this state are damaged by what amounts to a waste of
this court’s time and resources. [Citations.] Accordingly, an appropriate
measure of sanctions should also compensate the government for its expense
in processing, reviewing and deciding a frivolous appeal.” (Finnie v. Town of
Tiburon (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 17; see also Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at
p. 650 [“An appeal taken for an improper motive represents a time-
consuming and disruptive use of the judicial process. Similarly, an appeal
taken despite the fact that no reasonable attorney could have thought it
meritorious ties up judicial resources and diverts attention from the already
burdensome volume of work at the appellate courts.”].)
B
As discussed, Pavone’s motion in the trial court prompting the
sanctions he now appeals was frivolous and the court’s decision to impose
sanctions for that conduct was appropriate. We also find that his appeal to

18
this court from that ruling is frivolous. Although we recognize our power to
impose sanctions should be used sparingly to deter only the most egregious
conduct (see Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at pp. 649–650), we find that
sanctions are fully warranted here.
From an objective perspective, the arguments Pavone asserts have no
merit whatsoever. There is no basis in the record to support his assertion
that Bailey engaged in any inappropriate conduct. As discussed, the trial
court properly found Pavone’s motion was “ ‘not warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.’ ” (Peake, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 440.) Moreover, Pavone’s
appellate filings show an attempt to litigate in this court the disciplinary
proceedings against him that are currently before the California State Bar.
This is unquestionably an improper forum for such arguments, and this
conduct supports a finding of subjective bad faith on Pavone’s part. (See e.g.,
Weber v. Willard (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010 [“Repeated litigation of
matters previously determined by final judgment constitutes harassment and
should be penalized.”].) For these reasons, and in an effort to prevent future
misconduct by Pavone, we impose sanctions against him for prosecuting this
frivolous appeal. (§ 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276.) The respondents
have not requested an award of sanctions payable to them, but we will
impose sanctions payable to the clerk of this court to compensate the state for
the cost to the taxpayers of processing a frivolous appeal. (In re Marriage of
Gong & Kwong (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 510, 520 (Gong & Kwong).)
A cost analysis undertaken by the clerk’s office for the Second District
estimated that the cost of processing an appeal resulting in an opinion was
approximately $8,500 in 2008, while another calculation made in 1992 gave a
conservative estimate of $5,900 to $6,000. (Gong & Kwong, supra, 163

19
Cal.App.4th at p. 520.) According to the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics inflation calculator, these figures are equivalent to approximately
$13,000 in today’s dollars. (CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2025) <https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm> [as of
February 26, 2026], archived at: <https://perma.cc/YM2U-5MH3>.) We will
therefore impose sanctions against Pavone in the amount of $13,000, payable
to the clerk of this court. This opinion shall serve as a written statement of
reasons for imposing the sanctions.

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. As sanctions for prosecuting this frivolous
appeal, appellant’s counsel Benjamin Pavone is ordered to pay $13,000 in
sanctions payable to the clerk of this court no later than 30 days after the
remittitur issues. As required by Business and Professions Code
section 6086.7, subdivision (a)(3), the clerk of this court is directed to forward
a copy of this opinion to the State Bar of California upon issuance of the
remittitur. This disposition serves as notice to counsel that the imposition of
sanctions will be reported to the State Bar of California. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 6086.7, subd. (b).) Attorney Benjamin Pavone is also ordered to personally
report the sanctions to the State Bar of California. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 6068, subd. (o)(3).) The costs of appeal are awarded to Respondents.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, J.

CASTILLO, J.

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