CourtListener 10800986•People v. Machleit CA2/6
Testo completo
Filed 2/26/26 P. v. Machleit CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335082
(Super. Ct. No. 20CR06771)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v. ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION AND DENYING
KIMBERLY LYNN REHEARING
MACHLEIT, [NO CHANGE IN
JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on February 3,
2026, be modified as follows:
1. On page 3, the third sentence of the fourth full paragraph,
commencing with “On one occasion,” is deleted. In its place the
following sentence is inserted:
On occasion he would scream, “You’re all going to die.”
2. On page 4, the first sentence of the second full paragraph,
commencing with “Machleit told Anderson,” is deleted. In its
place the following two sentences are inserted:
Machleit told Anderson about a threat that Govey made
at the end of November which allegedly involved stabbing
Anderson. In response, Anderson started carrying a
firearm with him.
3. On page 6, the last sentence of the third full paragraph,
commencing with “He also testified,” is deleted. In its place the
following sentence is inserted:
He also testified that Anderson pocketed the firearm, but
could not say whether Govey was still holding the knife.
There is no change in the judgment.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
____________________________________________________________
YEGAN, Acting P. J. BALTODANO, J. KELLEY, J.*
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
2
Filed 2/3/26 P. v. Machleit CA2/6 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B335082
(Super. Ct. No. 20CR06771)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
KIMBERLY LYNN
MACHLEIT,
Defendant and Appellant.
Kimberly Lynn Machleit appeals the judgment after a jury
convicted her of murder in the first degree (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187,
subd. (a); 189, subd. (a)). The jury also found true, the allegation
that Machleit personally discharged a firearm causing death
within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). The trial
court sentenced Machleit to 25 years to life for the murder. The
court also imposed an additional 10 years pursuant to section
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references
1
are to the Penal Code.
12022.53, subdivision (b) for the firearm enhancement, and
struck the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement.
Machleit was prosecuted for the December 3, 2018,
shooting of Joseph Govey in the kitchen of a home they shared.
Govey was an acknowledged gang member and he was arguing
with Donald Anderson, another gang member and Machleit’s
boyfriend, when she retrieved a shotgun she had hidden in the
attic, returned to the kitchen and shot Govey in the head.
Machleit’s only defense at trial was that she acted in self-defense
or in defense of Anderson. In support of that defense, she
presented extensive evidence of Govey’s violent conduct towards
her and other residents of the homes they shared. Machleit was
also permitted to introduce evidence of Govey’s long history of
violence and his affiliations with violent gangs.
Machleit asserts four errors. She contends the trial court
erred in precluding evidence that the prison gang Govey belonged
to was the Aryan Brotherhood (AB). She also contends the trial
court erred in refusing a pinpoint jury instruction she offered to
supplement CALCRIM 352 regarding evidence of a victim’s
violent character. She also claims the court erred in admitting
evidence of her involvement in a fraud scheme as impeachment
and evidence of her involvement in a jail fight to show her own
violent character. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Events Prior to the Shooting
Machleit, originally from Orange County, began dating
Anderson in 2017 and soon learned he was a member of the
Public Enemy Number 1 gang (also known as PEN1 or PEN1
Death Squad) a gang with roots in Orange County. In 2017,
Machleit moved with Anderson into a house in Oceano. In May
or June of 2018, Govey, who was Anderson’s older “homeboy,”
2
began living with them. Govey was also a PEN1 member and
was also known by his gang nicknames, “Evil” or “Evil One.”
Machleit testified that she knew that Govey had a
reputation as a violent man with a history of stabbing people and
that he had been charged with solicitation to commit murder.
Govey bragged about his violence, including that he had stabbed
people in prison and had beaten up the last person who had
called the police about him “within an inch of his life.”
In the Oceano home, Govey was angry, violent, and would
go into rages. He also kept an eight-inch knife in his belt holster
and would threaten other residents with it. Govey’s specific
violence towards Machleit prompted her to tell Anderson she
wanted Govey to leave.
In August of 2018, Anderson and Machleit moved to Santa
Maria. They moved in with two others -- Tiffany and Uncle T.
Govey was not supposed to join them because Machleit was
scared of him. Machleit gave Govey her Lexus so he could go
back to Orange County.
Two to three weeks after they moved, Govey showed up in
the Lexus. After Anderson allowed Govey to move into the
garage Govey continued to be violent. On one occasion he
screamed, “You’re all going to die.” Anderson talked with Govey
about leaving, but Govey convinced him to let him stay by
mentioning their gang connection and Govey’s status as
Anderson’s gang “homeboy.” Machleit testified that she started
staying in her room soon after Govey arrived in Santa Maria
because she was scared of him due to his reputation and his past
violence. She also testified that she did not call the police for
protection from Govey because of Anderson’s gang affiliation and
Govey’s history.
Uncle T. died in December of 2018, and when Machleit
cleaned out his bedroom she found a shotgun with ammunition.
3
Machleit testified that she didn’t want Govey to get it, so she put
the shotgun and ammunition in the attic. Govey took over Uncle
T.’s first-floor bedroom without anyone’s permission.
At some point, Benjamin Mersai moved in to the home,
which Machleit testified was “for protection” against Govey.
Mersai testified that he worked with Anderson and he had been
asked to move in because “there was this feeling that they
wanted extra hands around in case Joseph Govey was extra
destructive one day.” Mersai was a former bouncer and trained
in martial arts.
Machleit told Anderson about a particular violent incident
with Govey around Halloweeen and in response Anderson started
carrying a firearm with him. Anderson and Machleit often
stayed in the locked bedroom. Mersai testified that in early
November or early December, Anderson, Machleit, and he
discussed how to get rid of Govey.
The Shooting
Machleit and Mersai were the only witnesses who testified
directly to the events related to the shooting. Machleit testified
that she awoke at 10:00 a.m., Govey was downstairs yelling about
the internet, demanding that it be turned on. Machleit and
Anderson were in their bedroom. Govey broke down the door of
the bedroom holding a knife and saying, “turn the fucking
internet on,” while “waving his knife around.” Machleit testified
she was shaking in fear, hyperventilating, and that Anderson
picked up a firearm to protect them, but it wouldn’t fire.
Machleit stated that Anderson froze, and the color drained from
his face. She described Govey’s eyes as dilated and that he
looked like “an evil possessed demon” and he looked like he was
going to hurt them.
Machleit also testified that Mersai came to the bedroom
behind Govey and told him “it’s time to leave” to which Govey
4
responded “I’m not going anywhere. This is my fucking house.”
Govey then went down the stairs. Anderson followed after Govey
with the firearm in his back pocket, but Machleit testified she
took the firearm and put it on the bed because she was concerned
that a live round in a firearm that had misfired might go off.
Anderson and Govey were downstairs and Machleit believed that
Govey was going to leave the house finally. She stated she went
to Mersai and said “I need to get in the attic.” Machleit also said
that things were moving fast, and she just knew that Govey was
going to stab Anderson.
Machleit retrieved the shotgun by having Mersai boost her
up into the attic. She told Mersai, “we need to save [Anderson],”
and claimed that Mersai didn’t talk her out of it. Machleit placed
one “slug” in the shotgun. She had played with it before, enough
to know it would hold several slugs, but had never fired it.
Machleit then went downstairs to the landing between the two
floors and peaked into the kitchen where Govey and Anderson
were arguing. She saw Govey with “his knife out” and Anderson
“plastered” to the side of the oven. Anderson was not moving or
saying anything. She described him as “scared for his life.”
Govey became aware of Machleit at some point and said to
Anderson, “Is your bitch going to shoot me?” Machleit turned
back to Mersai, who was still on the third floor and said “we need
to save [Anderson].” Mersai said he would set off a fire alarm,
which he did. Machleit then went back to the kitchen. Govey
had moved, but Anderson was still near the oven. Machleit gave
conflicting testimony about how far away Govey was from her
when she fired. She first said it was seven to 12 feet and then
gave an estimate based on a distance in the courtroom that was
established as 20 feet. Machleit also testified that Govey did not
move towards her before she shot him.
5
Machleit said that at the time she pulled the trigger, she
was thinking that she had to save Anderson and that Govey was
going to kill Anderson, her and Mersai. She believed Govey was
going to kill them because he “had kicked in a locked bedroom
door. He looked possessed and demonic. His eyes were glassed
over. He was being the aggressor. He had the knife, he wasn’t
putting it away, and he wasn’t leaving.” Machleit also testified
that Govey was not calming down and “it was escalating.”
Mersai’s testimony differed from Machleit’s version in some
material respects. He testified that he, Machleit, Govey, and
Anderson were all home on December 3, 2018, and they had all
used methamphetamines recently and had not slept. Mersai was
in the third-floor office area. Machleit and Anderson were in
their third-floor bedroom. Around 7:00 a.m., Mersai, heard
Govey loudly go up the third floor, scream at Machleit and
Anderson that he wanted drugs from them, and then kick in the
closed door to their bedroom. Mersai then heard Govey say,
“You’re trying to shoot me.”
Mersai entered the bedroom and saw Govey facing Machleit
and Anderson while brandishing a knife. Anderson was holding
a firearm. Mersai had a wooden baton and told Govey to leave,
but Govey refused and said it was his house. Govey threatened
to kill Mersai, tie Mersai up, and make him watch while Govey
killed his family. Govey backed out of the room and was followed
by Anderson. Mersai saw Govey and Anderson go downstairs to
the kitchen. He said they were “try[ing] to calm each other
down.” He also testified that Anderson pocketed the firearm and
Govey was no longer holding the knife.
Mersai returned to his living area on the third floor. He
watched as Machleit peered into the kitchen and said that Govey
and Anderson were talking in the kitchen. Mersai heard Machleit
say she “couldn’t handle it anymore.” She walked away and
6
returned holding a firearm and said she was “tired” of Govey and
was “going to go take care of it.” Mersai had never before seen
Machleit with a shotgun, but he testified that she appeared
comfortable with it.
Machleit went down to the second floor, but returned, and
said she could not do it because Anderson was positioned in such
a way that she could not get a clear shot. Knowing there were
laborers working nearby, Mersai suggested setting off the smoke
alarm to disguise the sound of a gunshot, and did so. As soon as
it went off, Machleit ran downstairs. Mersai heard a gunshot a
moment later. When Mersai went downstairs, he saw that Govey
was dead from a gunshot wound. When Govey’s body was moved,
Mersai saw a knife under Govey “near his seat area where he was
sitting.” Mersai also acknowledged that when he first spoke to
law enforcement, he reported that the knife was in Govey’s back
pocket and it slipped out when he lifted the body.
Disposal of Govey’s Body
According to Mersai, he, Anderson, and Machleit moved
Govey’s body down to the garage and the three of them wrapped
Govey’s body up and put him in the trunk of the Lexus. They
discussed disposing of Govey’s body at Black Lake Golf Course,
where Mersai used to work. According to Mersai, Machleit
participated in that discussion, asking how easy it would be to
find the body if it were hidden in the tall reeds of the pond.
Mersai said that Anderson removed both of Govey’s legs
with a reciprocating saw he purchased for cash for that purpose.
According to Mersai, Machleit helped Anderson by holding a leg
so that Anderson could saw it off. Machleit testified she didn’t
know the legs were taken off until years later when she was
questioned by law enforcement. Govey’s legs were put in a
suitcase and placed put in a dumpster. The rest of Govey’s body
was put in a tote and put in the trunk of the Lexus. Mersai drove
7
the Lexus, and Anderson drove his Porsche to a friend’s home in
Black Lake Golf Course. Machleit was with them. There, they
took a golf cart to the maintenance yard, placed Govey’s body in a
golf cart, and Anderson and Machleit drove the golf cart to the
lake where they hid the body in the reeds. Machleit testified that
she wanted to call the police after the shooting, but Mersai and
Anderson told her not to.
Recovery of Govey’s Body and Machleit’s Arrest
In September 2020, Mersai reported the shooting to law
enforcement. He brought law enforcement to Black Lake Golf
Course where the body was recovered. The following day,
Machleit and Anderson were arrested together and placed in the
rear seat of a patrol vehicle. Machleit told Anderson, in a
conversation that was recorded, “We’re going away for a long
time. We’re fucked. [Mersai] told them everything.”
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court Properly Excluded Evidence of the White
Supremacist Ideology of the AB
Machleit contends that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence of Govey’s membership in the AB and that our review of
that decision should be de novo. We disagree.
Standard of Review
Evidentiary rulings, including decisions to exclude evidence
under Evid. Code Section 352, will not be overturned on appeal
absent an abuse of discretion. (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th
56, 87. “[A] trial court’s discretionary ruling under [Evid. Code
§ 352] ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that
the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or
patently absurd manner . . . .’ ” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.
4th 584, 634-635.)
Machleit’s reliance on People v. Albarran (2007) 149 Cal.
App.4th 214 (Albarran) is misplaced. Machleit argues that
8
“where a defendant’s constitutional rights are affected by the
error, an appellate court applies a de novo standard of review,
according the trial court no deference.”
In Albarran, the trial court had granted a new trial on a
gang enhancement because of a lack of evidence, but denied a
motion for new trial on the charged offenses, even though
extensive inflammatory gang evidence had been admitted that
was irrelevant to the charged crimes. The Court of Appeal
concluded that the case was “one of those rare and unusual
occasions where the admission of evidence has violated federal
due process and rendered defendant’s trial fundamentally
unfair.” (Albarran, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 232.) The court
expressly acknowledged that it was departing from the general
rule that evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(Id. at pp. 224-225.) That general rule applies in this case.
Self Defense and Defense of Others
A homicide is considered justified as self-defense where the
defendant actually and reasonably believed the use of deadly
force was necessary to defend herself (or others) from imminent
threat of death or great bodily injury. Under such circumstances,
the killing is not a crime. (§§ 197, 199; People v. Elmore (2014) 59
Cal.4th 121, 133-134.) “ ‘[T]he defendant must have an
honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be
inflicted on him.’ . . . The threat of bodily injury must be
imminent . . . ‘and any right of self-defense is limited to the use of
such force as is reasonable under the circumstances. . . . ’ ”
(People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064-1065, citations
omitted.)
The Violent Victim Rule
“It has long been recognized that where self-defense is
raised in a homicide case, evidence of the aggressive and violent
character of the victim is admissible.” (People v. Rowland (1968)
9
262 Cal.App.2d 790, 797.) Such evidence may tend to show “the
defendant’s apprehension of danger” as well as “that the victim
was probably the aggressor.” (People v. DelRio (2020) 54
Cal.App.5th 47, 55-56 (DelRio).) Under Evidence Code section
1103, such character traits can be shown by evidence of specific
acts of the victim on third persons as well as by general
reputation evidence. (People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 587-
588.)
Evidence Code Section 352 and Gang Affiliation
Under Evidence Code section 352, “court in its discretion
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of
misleading the jury.” To assess “probative value” the court
considers the “relevance, materiality and necessity” of the
evidence. (People v. Shader (1969) 71 Cal.2d 761, 774 (Tobriner,
J.).) “The ‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352
applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional
bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very
little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, ‘prejudicial’ is
not synonymous with ‘damaging.’ ” (People v. Karis, (1988) 46
Cal.3d 612, 638.)
Gang affiliation evidence is widely recognized as presenting
significant risks of prejudice. “We recognize that gang-related
evidence ‘creates a risk the jury will improperly infer the
defendant has a criminal disposition’ and that such evidence
should therefore ‘be carefully scrutinized by trial courts.’ ”
(People v. Mendez (2019) 7 Cal.5th 680, 691.) Such evidence
potentially has a “highly inflammatory” impact on juries. (People
v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193.) “To guard against the
prejudicial effect of gang evidence, the Legislature recently
10
enacted, which requires courts to try gang enhancements
separately from the underlying offense upon a defendant’s
request. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 2, subd. (f).)” (People v. Hin
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 477.)
Applying these principles here, we conclude that that the
trial court did not err by narrowly excluding the AB evidence.
The trial court allowed extensive evidence of Govey’s gang
activities that were relevant to his history of violence and to
Machleit’s defense that killing him was justified as self-defense.
However, through four rulings over the course of the trial, the
court properly excluded specific evidence of the white
supremacist ideology of the AB prison gang.
Prior to trial, Machleit filed a motion to introduce evidence
of Govey’s character. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal,
Machleit sought to admit evidence that Govey was a “validated
member of the notorious [PEN1] – a hybrid racist skinhead gang,
street gang and prison gang out of Southern Orange County that
falls under the umbrella of the murderous [AB] conglomeration.”
Machleit proposed presenting the testimony of an expert,
retired Orange County probation officer Lowell Smith, because he
“supervised probationers associated with white supremacist
gangs, skinheads, and Neo-Nazis” and was “considered an expert
on the Orange County white supremacist group [PEN1].” Smith
also “supervised Govey in his capacity as a probation officer for
high-risk offenders and is intimately familiar with Govey’s
character of violence.”
At the hearing, Machleit’s counsel asserted that Govey’s
association with the AB showed he was an “enforcer” willing to
engage in extreme acts of violence to pursue the objectives of the
AB and PEN1. In response, the prosecution contended that there
was no evidence that Govey’s actions at issue in the case were on
behalf of the gang. Machleit’s counsel conceded that the events
11
at issue were not gang-related, but that the gang affiliation was
why Machleit, Anderson, and Mersai could not use the normal
recourse of going to the police.
The trial court observed that the proposed gang evidence
was highly inflammatory and noted that such evidence was
commonly bifurcated in gang cases. The court also expressed
concern that if evidence of Govey’s gang affiliation were admitted,
it would open the door to evidence of gang affiliation for all of the
residents, including Machleit.
The prosecution argued the AB evidence was remote in
time whereas the links of Govey and Anderson to the PEN1 gang
was more current. The prosecution also argued that there were
avenues to introduce evidence of Govey’s violent character
without “inflaming the jury” with evidence of his affiliation with
the [AB].
In considering these issues, the trial court balanced
Machleit’s right to present her defense and the prosecution’s
right to exclude inflammatory evidence about the victim by
inviting both counsel to articulate where the “analytical line”
should be drawn. The court also recognized that the application
of Evidence Code section 352 to the AB issue was “fraught” and
that a more developed understanding of the evidence was
necessary to “use [Evidence Code] 352 like a scalpel.” In this
respect, the court properly assessed the probative value of the AB
evidence (i.e. its necessity in light of the other evidence the jury
would hear about Govey’s violent character and gang affiliations)
as well as the potential for undue prejudice if the evidence were
admitted.
After several sessions of pretrial argument, the trial court
ruled that it would allow targeted voir dire on gangs but would
not allow voir dire about the AB. The court explained, “[w]hether
or not [AB] related evidence will be allowed will be determined by
12
two things: One, exactly what [Mersai] testifies to; two, a
[Evidence Code] 402 [review] of the defense expert, or at least
further consideration of how far up the gang tree we need to go if,
in fact, [Govey] and others at that address were members of a
street gang-affiliated with a prison gang, the [AB].”
Before opening statements, the trial court gave further
consideration to the AB issue when it conducted the Evidence
Code 402 hearing of the defense gang expert. After hearing
Smith’s testimony, the court ruled that counsel could not address
gangs, including the AB, in opening statements.
Right before Machleit took the stand, the trial court ruled
that she could not identify the AB as Govey’s prison gang, but she
could testify about the identity of the PEN1 gang if it was
relevant to the reasonableness of her fear of Govey. The court
considered the relevance of the AB evidence to be “very slight”
and its “prejudicial impact potentially great.” Because the name
of the gang “implies the ideological component” of white
supremacy, the court ruled that neither the ideology, nor name of
the gang could be mentioned.
In response to the defense contention that the exclusion
violated Machleit’s “due process and Constitutional right to
present material and relevant evidence in her defense” the trial
court reiterated that its ruling was intended to be narrow. “The
Court made a [Evidence Code] 352 ruling as to that particular
small portion of the evidence, and it did so in consideration of the
rulings or potential rulings that’ll come shortly. It represents an
analysis of all of the [Evidence Code sections 1101 and 1103]
issues and striking the balance in considering [Machleit’s]
Constitutional right to present evidence and the People’s due
process right to a fair trial. It’s a minimal evidentiary
exclusion . . . .”
13
Machleit filed an additional motion arguing that Smith
should be able to testify about the “reputation for violence and
reach” of the AB as well as the “sociological and psychological
underpinnings of those in a prison gang like the [AB].” Much of
the argument in the motion linked Smith’s testimony to both
PEN1 and the AB. On October 27, 2023, the trial court made its
final ruling on the scope of Smith’s testimony as it relates to
white supremacist gangs. Smith was precluded from mentioning
“gang ideology as it relates to supremacy.” The court also ruled
that Smith could not “indicate that he’s an expert on white
supremacist gangs [and could not] mention the [AB].”
The trial court explained its reasoning: “The issue is not
the [AB]. It adds nothing to the case other than prejudice to the
People’s case. Its probative value in this case is extremely low. . .
A gang expert’s particular expertise as to a specific gang is often
relevant. It isn’t here. It does not hamstring the defense from
presenting an expert who’s an expert in gangs. The gangs in
Orange County, statewide, whatever, motorcycled gangs, I’m not
stopping him from saying. But the issue of a gang’s ideology
given the players in this case, given the lack of gang motivation
or any gang issue other than [Machleit’s] fear, he can testify that
[Govey] was in [PEN1], he can testify that [Govey] was in a
prison gang, he can testify to the specific acts of violence [which
had been ruled admissible from Govey’s prison file].”
Machleit has not demonstrated that anything in this ruling
precluded Smith from testifying about the violent nature of
Govey’s prison gang, including its “reputation for violence and
reach” provided its name and white supremacist ideology were
not mentioned.
Smith was permitted to testify at length about Govey’s
history of violence and his membership in both the PEN1 gang
and another gang (unnamed but referring to the AB), which
14
Smith described as a “very, very severe, serious prison gang.” He
repeated that “it’s a prison gang, very, very structured prison
gang and very serious.” Smith also testified that the prison gang
Govey was associated with was considered a violent one and that
Govey was a “validated” member of it with monikers of “Evil” and
“The Evil One.” That moniker, Smith testified, “tells you a lot
about what his reputation and history is,” which is “[b]eing prone
to violence, being unpredictable, very unstable.” Smith further
testified that lower subordinate gang members and associates
feared Govey and that Govey was known to carry shanks, a
homemade knife-edged weapon. Smith had read Govey’s
confidential prison file and found that there were specific
instances of Govey engaging in violent and threatening behavior,
including threats to correctional officers. There was also a
history of Govey threatening people in the general community.
Smith also testified that, if someone like Govey was “throwing
out his gang association and moniker,” that would be a form of
intimidation.
Finally, Smith was allowed to testify to the ramifications of
calling law enforcement on an individual associated with a
violent prison gang and with PEN1 were serious for another gang
member and could result in serious retribution. The discipline
for such snitching, he explained, could include a beating,
shanking in “non-vital areas,” or gang leadership could determine
that the discipline could “go lethal.”
During the defense closing argument, Govey’s gang
affiliation was mentioned at least 20 times, and on seven
occasions he was referred to as an “enforcer” of a “violent prison
gang.” The fact that he was feared by members of his own gang
was also mentioned multiple times. And throughout the closing,
counsel referred to Govey by his gang moniker – “Evil”. The end
of the closing aptly encapsulates the corpus of evidence counsel
15
was able to refer to in support of Machleit’s contention that it was
reasonable for her to believe she acted in self-defense due to
Govey’s violent character. “When [Machleit] pulled that trigger,
she was terrified and defending against a volatile, vicious and
violent enforcer of a prison gang who went by the name of Evil.”
In light of this record, we conclude that the trial court’s
rulings, individually and collectively, sit well within an
appropriate exercise of discretion. Machleit was able to present
substantial evidence of Govey’s violent past conduct including
membership in violent street and prison gangs. The excluded
evidence related to the AB and its white supremacist ideology
had little probative value considered in the context of all the
other evidence of Govey’s violent propensity that was introduced.
The trial court’s assessment of prejudice was also
reasonable. The highly inflammatory nature of any gang
evidence is well established. Machleit conceded as much in her
trial court briefing. She acknowledged “it is a rare instance
where a defendant actually wishes to introduce evidence of
gangs. Especially in light of potentially prejudicial effect such
testimony can have on jurors particularly when there is not a
gang enhancement charged.” (Italics added.) The court properly
found the narrow category of evidence it excluded to be highly
prejudicial. This conclusion is supported by the broad recognition
in our caselaw and statutes that gang evidence can be prejudicial.
It is also supported by an additional critical consideration
here – that the white supremacist ideology of the AB would
compound the inflammatory impact of the gang evidence. The
issue for the jury here was whether Machleit was justified in
killing Govey because of her reasonable belief he presented an
imminent threat. If the admitted gang evidence were
supplemented with the fact Govey was part of a gang notorious
for its white supremacist views, it would create an obvious risk
16
that the jury might factor into its deliberations the general
repugnance of such ideology and use it to decide that Govey’s
killing might be “justified” in some broad moral sense untethered
to the legal principles of self-defense recognized in the law.
Finally, the fact that the anticipated prejudice might
benefit the defendant by creating an emotional bias against the
victim, as opposed to the more typical case in which a defendant’s
gang affiliation is at issue and the concern is that the gang
evidence may create an unwarranted inference of guilt, does not
negate the risk that the jury would decide the contested question
of Govey’s actions and Machleit’s response based on emotion.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence
of the AB.
Even if we were to conclude the trial court erred, such error
would not require reversal because Machleit has not shown a
reasonable probability that she would have obtained a more
favorable result if the AB evidence had been admitted. (People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) The jury was
presented with substantial evidence of Govey’s violence and
prison gang affiliation and still rejected Machleit’s defense, a
conclusion that was supported by substantial evidence. This
included her own narrative about how she left the kitchen to
retrieve the shotgun and coordinated with Mersai to set off an
alarm to mask the sound of shooting she planned to execute when
she returned to the kitchen; Mersai’s testimony undermining the
contention that Govey was wielding a knife when he was shot;
and Machleit’s admissions when arrested. Also, Machleit’s
contention that excluding the AB evidence rises to the level of a
constitutional violation lacks merit and thus the standard of
“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” in Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, does not apply.
17
The Trial Court Did Not Err in Declining to Give a Pinpoint
Instruction
With respect to Machleit’s instructional challenge, “[w]e
determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law
under the independent or de novo standard of review. . . . Review
of the adequacy of instructions is based on whether the trial court
‘fully and fairly instructed on the applicable law.’ . . . ‘ “In
determining whether error has been committed in giving or not
giving jury instructions, we must consider the instructions as a
whole . . . [and] assume that the jurors are intelligent persons
and capable of understanding and correlating all jury
instructions which are given. ” [Citation.]’ . . . ‘Instructions
should be interpreted, if possible, so as to support the judgment
rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such
interpretation.’ . . . ” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1082, 1088, citations omitted.)
“Under appropriate circumstances, ‘a trial court may be
required to give a requested jury instruction that pinpoints a
defense theory of the case by, among other things, relating the
reasonable doubt standard of proof to particular elements of the
crime charged. [Citations.] But a trial court need not give a
pinpoint instruction if it is argumentative [citation], merely
duplicates other instructions [citation], or is not supported by
substantial evidence [citation].’ [citation]” (People v. Coffman
and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 99, as modified (Oct. 27, 2004).)
Where a standard instruction “adequately covered the valid
points in the proposed pinpoint instruction” it is not error for the
trial court to have declined to give the pinpoint instruction.
(People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1145.) Machleit
contends that the trial court “deprived [her] of her right to have
the jury instructed on her defense to the charge of murder”
18
because it rejected a pinpoint instruction. This contention lacks
merit.
The pinpoint instruction Machleit sought was as follows:
“Character Evidence of the Decedent: You may consider evidence
of the aggressive and violent character of the decedent. You may
consider whether the decedent had a propensity for violent
aggression and on the date of the incident conformed to his
character, forcing the defendant to resort to deadly self-defense.
If you conclude the defendant knew that the decedent had
previously engaged in violent acts, that may show the defendant’s
fear of the decedent was legitimate. On the other hand, if you
conclude the defendant did not know the decedent had previously
engaged in violent acts, that may show the decedent was
probably the aggressor. A person who is turbulent and violent
may more readily provoke and be the aggressor in an encounter.”
This instruction was requested to supplement the
CALCRIM 352 instruction that the trial court had determined to
give, which, in pertinent part stated: “You have heard evidence
that [Govey] was a violent person and had a character trait for
violence . . . . A person’s character for violence may be shown by
evidence of reputation, opinion or specific acts. Evidence of a
person’s character for violence may tend to show the person acted
in conformity with that character trait.”
In addition, the Court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
505 which in relevant part provided:
“Justifiable Homicide. . . . The defendant is not guilty of
murder or manslaughter if she was justified in killing someone in
defense of another. The defendant acted in lawful defense of
another if: [¶] (1) The defendant reasonably believed that
[Anderson] was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering
great bodily injury or that she, [Anderson], and [Mersai] were in
imminent danger of being victims of assault with a deadly
19
weapon under circumstances in which she reasonably believed
that she or they would suffer great bodily injury or death; [¶] (2)
The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of
deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger; and [¶]
(3) The defendant used no more force than was reasonably
necessary to defend against the danger.
“Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great
or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must
have believed there was imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury to someone else. Defendant’s belief must have been
reasonable and she must have acted only because of that belief.
“When deciding whether the defendant’s beliefs were
reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to
and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable
person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have
believed. If the defendant’s beliefs were reasonable, the danger
does not need to have actually existed.
“The defendant’s belief that she or someone else was
threatened may be reasonable even if she relied on information
that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and
reasonably have believed that the information was true.
“If you find that [Govey] threatened or harmed the
defendant or others in the past, you may consider that
information in deciding whether the defendant’s conduct and
beliefs were reasonable. If you find that the defendant knew that
[Govey] had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may
consider that information in deciding whether the defendant’s
conduct and beliefs were reasonable.
“Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person
in the past is justified in acting more quickly or taking greater
self-defense measures against that person.”
20
The Court declined to give the proposed pinpoint
instruction, finding that it was both duplicative and
argumentative.
In addition to Evidence Code section 1103, Machleit relies
on DelRio, supra, Cal.App.5th 47, People v. Rowland (1968) 262
Cal.App.2d 790, and People v. Smith (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 395.
However, none of these cases involved jury instruction issues;
they all dealt with the admissibility of character evidence. The
rationale for permitting the introduction of character evidence
cannot be translated directly into an instruction to the jury on
how it should consider that evidence in reaching a verdict. Yet
that is what Machleit’s proposed pinpoint instruction attempted
to do, which made the proposed instruction both unnecessary and
argumentative.
Machleit’s principal authority on this issue is DelRio,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 47. There, the defendant was charged
with murder arising from a gunfight in which he and the victim
were the only witnesses. Both had fired their weapons multiple
times, with 17 cartridge casings found at the scene of the
shooting. The trial court excluded character evidence of the
decedent which defendant contended would show his “propensity
for violent aggression.” (Id. at p. 54). In discussing why the
evidence should have been admitted under Evidence Code section
1103, subdivision (a)(1), the court stated, “This rule allows [a
defendant] to try to prove the conduct of [a victim] conformed to
his character. Specifically the exception allows what is usually
forbidden: It permits [the defendant] to introduce evidence [that
the victim] had a propensity for violent aggression. This evidence
would aid [the defendant’s] effort to prove that, at the crime
scene, [that the victim] was violently aggressive, which forced
[the defendant] to resort to deadly self-defense. [Citation.].”
(Ibid.)
21
That the DelRio court chose to articulate its rationale for
why propensity evidence should have been admitted in the
particular circumstances of that case, by tying it to the defense
argument of being “forced . . . to resort to deadly self-defense”
does not support incorporating such language into a jury
instruction. This is particularly so because the court in Del Rio
emphasized the unique “factual context” in that case: “We are
uncertain what happened at the scene. We have a gunfight with
no independent witnesses and with no motive for murder. We
know both men had loaded guns, both men fired at each other,
and [the defendant] killed [the victim]. We know [the
defendant’s] version but a person on trial for murder has motive
to fabricate. Who drew first? That question is key.” (DelRio,
supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 56-57.)
Here, the trial court properly concluded that the proffered
pinpoint instruction was unnecessary and argumentative. Taken
together, the instructions given by the court adequately covered
the valid elements of Machleit’s proffered pinpoint instruction.
The jury was instructed through CALCRIM 352 that it
could consider evidence that Govey “was a violent person” and
“had a character trait for violence” and that such “[e]vidence of
[Govey’s] character for violence may tend to show [he] acted in
conformity with that character trait.” The jury was also
instructed through CALCRIM 505 that, if it found that Govey
“threatened or harmed the defendant or others in the past, you
may consider that information in deciding whether defendant’s
conduct and beliefs] were reasonable.” That same instruction
also told the jury that if it found “the defendant knew that Govey
had threated or harmed others in the past, you may consider that
information in deciding whether the defendants conduct and
beliefs were reasonable.”
22
The trial court also properly concluded that the proposed
pinpoint instruction was argumentative. An argumentative
instruction is “ ‘of such character as to invite the jury to draw
inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of
evidence.’ ” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437.) For
example, People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137, discussed
an instruction that was deemed argumentative because it
“ ‘direct[ed] the attention of the jury to specific testimony and
[told] the jury it may look to that testimony for the purpose of
forming a reasonable doubt on an issue.’ ”
Here, CALCRIM No. 505, as given, referred to Govey
possibly threatening or harming Machleit or others in the past
and told the jury that they could consider such evidence in
deciding whether Machleit’s conduct and beliefs were reasonable.
In contrast, the proposed instruction was not neutral, but defined
Govey’s prior conduct for the jury in terms of aggressiveness and
violence without letting the jury itself make that determination.
Moreover, CALCRIM No. 505 as given, told the jury that
they could use evidence of Govey’s violent character in
determining whether Machleit’s conduct and beliefs were
reasonable. In contrast, the proposed pinpoint instruction said
that the jury could consider whether the Govey had a propensity
for violent aggression but used language suggesting that the
mere evidence of such propensity would be considered to have
“forc[ed] the defendant to resort to deadly self-defense.” The
proposed instruction thus took from the jury the determination,
based on all of the evidence, whether Machleit’s conduct and
beliefs were reasonable.
Additionally, CALCRIM No. 505 as given, instructed the
jury that it could consider Govey’s past violent threats or harm to
others, whether Machleit knew of it or not, and could use that
information in deciding whether Machleit’s conduct was
23
reasonable. Machleit’s proposed instruction did not use such
neutral language. Instead, it told the jury that evidence of past
violence that Machleit was aware of may show Machleit’s fear
was “legitimate.” Again, this improperly narrowed the jury’s
focus from the totality of the circumstances that would be
relevant to determining if her conduct was reasonable. The
reasonableness of any “fear” she held was only one part of that
assessment. The proposed instruction also added a gloss to how
the jury might consider Govey’s past violence that Machleit was
unaware of by telling the jury it “may show the decedent was
probably the aggressor.” This also rendered the instruction
argumentative by overly emphasizing the issue of who was the
aggressor and disconnecting it from the question of whether
Machleit’s actions were based on a reasonable fear of imminent
harm.
Finally, the proposed instruction referred to a person “who
is turbulent and violent” and told the jury that such a person
“may more readily provoke and be the aggressor in an
encounter.” This language was an alternative formulation of the
argumentative proposition it followed. It suffered from the same
flaws, but with the added defect that it was redundant.
For all these reasons, the trial court did not err when it
denied Machleit’s proposed pinpoint instruction.
Even if the rejection of the instruction was error, it would
not require reversal because there was no reasonable probability
of a different result in light of the other instructions provided to
the jury. (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 825
(Gutierrez I).)
24
Admission of Evidence of Machleit’s Involvement in Fraudulent
Conduct with Anderson was not Error
Machleit contends that the trial court committed error in
allowing evidence related to her involvement in a pending case
regarding automobile theft by fraud.
The evidence was the subject of a pretrial motion by the
prosecution which argued for its admission as impeachment.
The specific evidence related to purchased vehicles using false
identification. Machleit’s trial counsel argued the evidence was
highly prejudicial and lacked any probative value.
Prior to Machleit’s testimony, the trial court found that
the evidence of automobile fraud involved moral turpitude,
was not similar to the charged offense, but was “directly
probative to the issue of credibility.” The court found that the
consumption of time would be minimal to present such
evidence and that the probative value was not substantially
outweighed by the prejudicial effect.
On cross-examination of Machleit, the prosecution was
also allowed to introduce a photograph of a fake driver’s
license and a picture from the automobile dealership of
Machleit disguised with a fake blonde wig and fake pregnant
belly. In objecting to the photographs, defense counsel
argued the evidence was prejudicial and “[it] is not narrow,
it’s not brief, it’s not sanitized, and it’s to inflame the jury
against [Machleit].” Defense counsel also argued the fraud
was remote in time (a year and a half after the shooting) and
that Anderson had pled guilty while she had not been
convicted.
The prosecution argued that the evidence was directly
relevant to credibility “which is extremely significant in this
trial.” The prosecution also argued “[Machleit] has also
made an issue of her affiliation with [Anderson] and him as
25
a gang member. So whether or not she’s committing crimes
with this gang member is significant because she is
identifying herself as the only person in [the Santa Maria]
house who isn’t of that ilk.”
The trial court allowed two photos (while excluding
three others) finding that the evidence was directly related
to Machleit’s credibility, was narrow and tailored, and the
conduct depicted was not inflammatory, particularly in
relation to the charges in this case. Machleit makes four
arguments for reversal on this point. First, she had not been
convicted of any fraud. Second, the photos added nothing to
the allegations of fraud, were inflammatory and likely to
elicit an emotional response. Third, the conduct occurred
after the killing of Govey. Fourth, the conduct was very
different from what was charged in this case.
All of these arguments lack merit. Machleit testified to
her conduct and the circumstances were further evident from
the photographs. Prior conviction was not a prerequisite for
admitting the evidence. (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th
284, 297 [immoral conduct admissible for impeachment may
be shown by evidence of the acts without any conviction].)
Also, the planning entailed in the automobile fraud depicted
by the photos showing false identification and the Machleit in
a disguise at the dealership was probative of Machleit’s
dishonesty. Her credibility was a critical issue for the jury.
Machleit has not articulated any reasoned explanation
for why a photo showing Machleit in a disguise at an auto
dealer would be “inflammatory” and we can discern none,
particularly in the context of this case as a whole. The record
was riddled with violence, including violence by street gangs
and prison gangs. There was also evidence of widespread
26
methamphetamine use, including by Machleit. And, of course,
there was evidence of the shooting of Govey, the gory clean-up
of the kitchen that followed and the ensuing mutilation and
disposal of Govey’s body. Against this backdrop, the disguise
evidence was not likely to provoke an emotional bias against
the Machleit.
Finally, the contention that the fraud evidence was
unrelated to the crime being tried, misses the point. The
evidence was offered for impeachment. The trial court did not
err in finding that it had sufficient probative impeachment
value to be admitted and was not unduly prejudicial.
Even if the admission of the evidence was error, reversal
would not be required as Machleit has not demonstrated a
reasonable probability that she would have obtained a more
favorable result if the evidence had been excluded. (Watson,
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Admission of Evidence of Machleit’s Involvement in a Jail
Fight was not Error
Machleit contends that evidence of her involvement in a jail
fight should have been excluded.
The prosecution proffered evidence under Evidence Code
section 1103 subdivision (b), of a fight between Machleit and
another inmate on November 20, 2021. Evidence Code section
1103, subdivision (b) permits the prosecution to present rebuttal
evidence of a defendant’s “character for violence (in the form of …
evidence of specific evidence of conduct).” A predicate for such
rebuttal evidence is that the defendant has adduced “evidence
that the victim had a character for violence or trait of character
tending to show violence.” Here, Machleit had shown extensive
evidence of Govey’s past violence.
27
The prosecution proffered testimony from Anita Arteaga, a
custody deputy in the Santa Barbara jail. She was examined at a
402 hearing and testified to hearing a commotion in the jail and
then observing Machleit and another inmate arguing. It
appeared to Arteaga that Machleit and the other inmate, Anna
Arevalos, had just fought. Arevalos was upset and said “that
bitch just hit me for no reason” pointing to Machleit. Arteaga
also testified that Arevalos had a swollen left eye. The trial court
concluded that the statement by Arevalos was a spontaneous
statement and the testimony would be allowed.
Arteaga then testified to the incident before the jury. On
cross-examination, Arteaga acknowledged that she did not see
how the fight had started and that during the time she was
supervising Machleit’s unit, Machleit was “not known to be a
troublemaker or violent person.”
Machleit cites Gutierrez I, supra, 45 Cal.4th 789, for the
proposition that even a prior conviction for battery can be
excluded if it arose from an unrelated incident. She attempts to
reason that, because the jail fight was unrelated to the murder
and she has not been convicted of the alleged battery, the
evidence should have been excluded. We are not persuaded.
In Gutierrez I, supra, 45 Cal.4th 789, the trial court
excluded evidence that a murder victim had been convicted of
battery in a situation where the “defendant’s only defense was an
alibi” which rendered the evidence of the prior battery conviction
irrelevant. (Id. at 827.) There, the defendant contended that he
quarreled with his girlfriend when he arrived to pick up his son,
she scratched him, cursed at him, they kicked each other, but he
ultimately walked away. The defendant also argued that, after
he left with his son, two unnamed cohorts, who had accompanied
him, murdered his girlfriend. On appeal, the defendant argued
that the jury should have been instructed on manslaughter and
28
that the victim’s prior conviction for battery showed “propensity
for violence [that] was relevant to show that he was engaged in
mutual combat with the victim and committed voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder because he killed her in the
heat of passion.” (Id. at p. 828.) The Court of Appeal rejected the
defendant’s provocation argument entirely. (Id. at p. 827 [“rather
than causing defendant to become enraged, defendant testified
that he simply walked away”].)
Gutierrez I, supra, 45 Cal.4th 789 is distinguishable from
the instant action, where Machleit’s defense put the victim’s
propensity for violence at the forefront, thus establishing the
predicate for rebuttal evidence of the defendant’s own propensity
for violence. In Gutierrez I, the victim’s propensity for violence
was completely irrelevant.
Machleit also argues that the jail fight took place three
years after the killing and “is irrelevant to [her] state of mind at
the time of the shooting.” But there is no bright-line rule that
violent propensity evidence has to predate the crime being tried
to be relevant. (People v. Shoemaker (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 442,
448.) The remoteness of time, either before or after the charged
crime, may affect the probative value of the evidence, and is a
factor properly to be weighed by the trial court.
We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the evidence of the jail fight.
Even if the admission of the evidence was error, reversal
would not be required as Machleit has not demonstrated a
reasonable probability that she would have obtained a more
favorable result if the evidence had been excluded. (Watson,
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
29
No Cumulative Prejudicial Error
Finally, Machleit contends that, regardless of whether the
asserted errors were individually prejudicial, the “combined effect
of multiple trial errors” rendered the trial fundamentally unfair
creating a due process violation or alternatively establishes
prejudice. (Citing Parle v. Runnels (9th Cir. 2007) 505 F.3d 922,
928; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844.)
We do not find these contentions persuasive. The trial
court afforded Machleit the opportunity to present substantial
evidence of Govey’s violent actions and character, including gang-
related evidence and it exercised its discretion under Evidence
Code 352 “with a scalpel” to preclude only evidence of the white
supremacist ideology of the AB. Even if we were to find that the
exclusion of the AB evidence and the rejection of her pinpoint
instruction was error, there was nothing close to a deprivation of
her right to present evidence and have the jury instructed on her
defense.
“[T]he routine application of provisions of the state
Evidence Code law does not implicate a criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights.” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899,
957.) “Although completely excluding evidence of an accused’s
defense theoretically could rise to this level, excluding defense
evidence on a minor or subsidiary point does not impair an
accused’s due process right to present a defense. [Citation.] If
the trial court misstepped, ‘[t]he trial court’s ruling was an error
of law merely, there was no refusal to allow [defendant] to
present a defense but only a rejection of some evidence
concerning the defense.’ [Citation.].” (People v. Fudge (1994) 7
Cal.4th 1075, 1103.)
30
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
KELLEY, J.*
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
31
John F. McGregor, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Machleit.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm and David A.
Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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