CourtListener 10799886•People v. Martinez CA3
Testo completo
Filed 2/24/26 P. v. Martinez CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
THE PEOPLE, C102792
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 22F00534,
22F2353)
v.
MICHELLE LYNN MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Michelle Lynn Martinez appeals for a second time, following
resentencing. In this appeal, Martinez contends the trial court prejudicially erred in
failing to conduct a full resentencing. She also claims the court erred in its calculation of
custody credits, both as to postsentence conduct credits and credits for days in actual
custody. Finally, she contends that the abstract of judgment should be corrected to reflect
the oral pronouncement of judgment as to the restitution fines and the victim restitution
order. We will affirm the convictions but vacate the sentence and remand for a full
resentencing.
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BACKGROUND
The facts underlying Martinez’s convictions are not necessary for our discussion
of the issues. Suffice it to say that Martinez’s appeal arises from two separate cases:
case No. 22F00534 (case No. 534) and case No. 22F2353 (case No. 353). (People v.
Martinez (July 9, 2024, C098137) [nonpub. opn.] (Martinez).) Case No. 534 alleged 18
counts for various drug-related offenses and jail misconduct. Following a court trial,
Martinez was convicted on counts 1 through 9, and 11 through 18. The trial court
convicted her of the lesser included offense on count 10. (Ibid.)
In case No. 353, Martinez pled no contest to driving or taking a vehicle without
the owner’s consent. (Veh. Code, § 10851.) She stipulated to a consecutive term not to
exceed 16 months in prison.
Original Sentencing
At the original sentencing, based on a negotiated disposition, the trial court
sentenced Martinez to 22 years in case No. 534, with sentences on nine counts stayed
pursuant to Penal Code section 654.1 In case No. 353, the trial court sentenced Martinez
to a consecutive term of one year four months, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 23
years four months. The court imposed the minimum mandatory restitution fine of $300
in case No. 534, and imposed, but stayed a parole revocation fine in the same amount.
The court awarded 189 days of actual credits and 188 conduct credits for a total of 377
custody credits. Both the minute order and the abstract of judgment state that restitution
was ordered to “EAN Holdings, LLC” in the amount of $4,665.16, but this order was not
orally pronounced on the record. Martinez filed a timely notice of appeal.
In her first appeal, Martinez correctly identified several discrepancies between the
trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
judgment, including that the court did not orally pronounce an order for victim restitution
and that the minute order and abstract of judgment did not reflect sentences imposed on
two counts. (Martinez, supra, C098137.) A different panel of this court also found
additional sentencing errors, including that the trial court improperly stayed the Health
and Safety Code section 11370.4 enhancements as to counts 1 and 2, and did not orally
pronounce a sentence on count 18. (Martinez, supra, C098137.) Because these errors
resulted in an unauthorized sentence, we affirmed the convictions, vacated Martinez’s
sentence, and remanded for a full resentencing. (Ibid.)
Resentencing
At resentencing, the trial court prioritized the errors we identified in our first
opinion. It struck the Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 enhancements on counts 1
and 2 instead of staying them. It also pronounced a six-month concurrent sentence on
count 18. Although the clerk’s minute order includes the concurrent sentence for
count 18, the abstract of judgment does not.
Responding to our conclusion that it miscalculated Martinez’s aggregate term at
the original sentencing (Martinez, supra, C098137), the trial court stated, “[T]he District
Court of Appeal did the sentencing math on the case 22F534 and are of the opinion that it
equals 22 years and six months. We’re not sure how they got that number. [¶] [W]e’re
just going to articulate for the record the sentence on those counts, which included time
and consecutive time, I’m going to exclude counts that were declared to be 654 with
concurrent time.” The court excluded nine counts from its oral pronouncement.
The trial court also adopted “[a]ll other findings and orders that were made at the
original sentencing hearing,” stating, “there’s no point in reiterating those.”2 Instead of
2 The trial court’s findings and orders included an award of 189 actual days in custody,
plus 188 days of custody conduct credit, for a total of 377 days of credit. The findings
and orders also included a single restitution fine of $300, a parole revocation fine of $300
3
including one mandatory minimum restitution fine of $300 in case No. 534, as the
findings and orders from the original sentencing did, the abstract of judgment for the
resentencing included two mandatory minimum restitution fines for $300, one for case
No. 534 and one for case No. 353. Martinez timely appealed.
After Martinez filed her notice of appeal, the trial court scheduled a hearing to
calculate her custody credits. It awarded 799 actual credits and 798 conduct credits for a
total of 1,597 custody credits.
DISCUSSION
I
Failure to Conduct a Full Resentencing
Martinez contends that the trial court failed to conduct a full resentencing when it
only addressed the specific sentencing errors we identified in the opinion on remand. She
further contends that the failure to conduct a full resentencing was not harmless because
in failing to conduct a full resentencing the trial court did not orally pronounce sentences
on nine counts, resulting in an unauthorized sentence. The People disagree that the trial
court failed to conduct a full resentencing and contend that even if the trial court failed to
do so, Martinez forfeited any claim by not objecting at the resentencing hearing.
Martinez has the better argument.
When a defendant is convicted of an offense, a sentencing court has a duty to
render judgment and impose the penalty authorized by law. (§ 12; People v. Martinez
(2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1012.) Judgment is rendered when the trial court orally
pronounces sentence. (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 9.) In
rendering the judgment, the court must pronounce sentence on each count for which the
that was suspended, and victim restitution to EAN Holdings, LLC, in the amount of
$4,665.16. The court stated that Martinez reserved the right to a restitution hearing on
any additional requested amounts. The court also ordered Martinez to provide two blood
specimens, a saliva sample, a right thumb print, and full palm prints.
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defendant sustained a conviction. (People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994.)
The failure to pronounce a sentence for each conviction results in an unauthorized
sentence that can be corrected at any time. (People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405,
1411, fn. 6.)
We remanded for a full resentencing. (Martinez, supra, C098137.) On remand,
the trial court addressed only the errors we identified in our opinion. It (1) struck the
Health and Safety Code section 11370.4 enhancements on counts 1 and 2 instead of
staying them; (2) orally pronounced a sentence on count 18; and (3) addressed our
concern that it miscalculated Martinez’s aggregate sentence. Our remand order was not
so limited. (People v. Smith (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1008, abrogated on another
ground by People v. Bullock (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 985.) It was for a full resentencing.
(Martinez, supra, C098137.)
That the trial court did not conduct a full resentencing of Martinez is most evident
from its failure to pronounce sentence on nine counts. Specifically, the trial court stated:
“[W]e’re just going to articulate for the record the sentence on those counts, which
included time and consecutive time, I’m going to exclude counts that were declared to be
654 with concurrent time.” There are two problems with the trial court’s statement.
First, its statement suggests a fundamental misunderstanding of the effect of our order
vacating Martinez’s sentence and remanding for a full sentencing, which was the
nullification of the previous sentence. (People v. Rouse (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 292,
297.) Because the prior sentence no longer existed, the court had to construct an entirely
new sentence. (Ibid.) By failing to orally pronounce a sentence on the nine counts for
which it stayed the sentences at the original sentencing, the court failed to render
judgment on all of Martinez’s convictions, resulting in an unauthorized sentence.
(People v. Price, supra, 184 Cal.App.3d at p. 1411, fn. 6; People v. Codinha, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 994.)
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Second, when the trial court stated it was excluding counts it had previously
stayed under section 654, the trial court used the term concurrent in connection with
section 654. But where section 654 applies, it precludes any multiple punishment,
consecutive or concurrent. (People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 594.) Thus, the trial
court’s statement leaves unclear whether it intended to stay punishment under section 654
for those nine counts or run punishment for them concurrent to the terms previously
imposed.
Generally, when an unauthorized sentence is discovered on appeal, a reviewing
court affirms the defendant’s conviction and remands the case for the trial court to
pronounce a sentence consistent with the verdict. (People v. Taylor (1971)
15 Cal.App.3d 349, 353.) We see no reason not to adopt that approach here. Because the
trial court’s failure to resentence Martinez on all counts resulted in an unauthorized
sentence, we remand again for a full resentencing. (People v. Smith, supra,
166 Cal.App.3d at p. 1008.)
II
Our order for a full resentencing necessarily encompasses calculating Martinez’s
custody credits and the appropriate assessments, fines, and restitution awards. (People v.
Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425.) We briefly address Martinez’s claims to
provide some additional guidance on remand.
Custody Credits
The parties agree that the trial court erred when it failed to award Martinez credit
for all actual days in custody up to the date of her resentencing and when it calculated
Martinez’s conduct credits for the period after her original sentencing. We agree with the
parties.
When it resentenced Martinez, the trial court was required to “credit [her] with all
actual days [she] had spent in custody . . . up to that time,” including time in custody
after the original sentencing. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37, italics
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omitted; § 2900.1.) The record shows the trial court did not do so. The trial court also
erred when it calculated Martinez’s postsentence conduct credits. (Buckhalter, at p. 31.)
After a defendant is sentenced, any conduct credits must be calculated by the agency with
custody of the defendant, not the trial court. (Ibid.)
On remand, the trial court is directed to calculate Martinez’s credits for her actual
days in custody from the day after her original sentencing to the date of resentencing, and
to calculate Martinez’s presentence conduct credits up to the date of her original
sentencing. (People v. Buckhalter, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 31, 37.)
Mandatory Restitution Fine and Victim Restitution Order
The parties agree that the abstract of judgment conflicts with the trial court’s oral
pronouncement of judgment as to the $300 mandatory minimum restitution fine and the
victim restitution order for $4,665.16 to EAN holdings, LLC, imposed in case No. 353.
They also agree that the second mandatory restitution fine should be stricken. As to the
victim restitution order, however, the People urge us to order a limited remand to allow
the court to clarify the order.
A trial court is required to include all aspects of a judgment in its oral
pronouncement. (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 855.) That includes fines and
direct victim restitution. (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 387; People v.
Rowland (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1745, 1751.) “The clerk cannot supplement the
judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the
abstract of judgment.” (Zackery, at pp. 387-388.)
On remand, the trial court is directed to include in its oral pronouncement of
judgment the mandatory restitution fine imposed in each case or state its reasons for not
imposing a fine on the record. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b); People v. Zackery, supra, 147
Cal.App.4th at p. 389.) It must also include in its oral pronouncement the amount of the
victim restitution award to EAN Holdings, LLC. (People v. Rowland, supra, 51
Cal.App.4th at p. 1751; § 1202.4, subd. (a); Cal. Const. art. I, § 28, subd. (b).)
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Court Operations and Facilities Assessments
The California Supreme Court recently issued its decision in People v. Kopp
(2025) 19 Cal.5th 1. In Kopp, the court held that upon a defendant’s request, the trial
court must hold a hearing on the defendant’s ability to pay before imposing ancillary
costs, like the court operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and the court facilities
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). (Kopp, at pp. 30-31.)
The court’s decision applies to pending appeals. (See People v. Guerra (1984)
37 Cal.3d 385, 399.) At resentencing, if requested by Martinez, the trial court must
assess her ability to pay before imposing the court operations assessment and the court
facilities assessment. (People v. Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 30-31.) As to the
restitution fine, the trial court is required to assess Martinez’s ability to pay only if, upon
resentencing, it imposes a restitution fine in excess of the statutory minimum. (Id. at
p. 30.)
DISPOSITION
The convictions are affirmed. The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded
for a full resentencing consistent with this opinion.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, Acting P. J.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
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