CourtListener 10799788•In re A.L. CA6
Testo completo
Filed 2/24/26 In re A.L. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re A.L., a Person Coming Under the H053519
Juvenile Court Law. (Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 22JU00232)
SANTA CRUZ COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
A.L.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Mother appeals from a juvenile court’s “exit order” terminating dependency
jurisdiction and determining parental custody and visitation as to minor A.L. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 362.4, subd. (a).)1 The pertinent portion of the exit order provides that
“[p]rior to any order for unsupervised visits,” mother “must demonstrate” compliance
with a series of enumerated conditions. Mother’s sole claim of error is that the exit order
improperly limits the family court’s authority to modify her supervised visitation with the
minor. We will strike the portion of the exit order that would impermissibly limit the
family court’s authority to modify mother’s visitation arrangements but will affirm as
modified.
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Section 300 Petition
The Santa Cruz County Human Services Department filed a dependency petition
with respect to then four-year-old A.L., after mother was arrested for driving under the
influence, and officers found A.L. home alone with bottles of medication close by,
minimal food in the refrigerator, and the house in disarray. (§ 300, subd. (b).) The
petition alleged that mother’s substance abuse issue was negatively impacting her ability
to care for A.L. The petition also alleged that father, in custody at the time, had a history
of substance abuse and domestic violence.
B. Family Reunification and Maintenance
The court sustained the petition and removed A.L. from mother’s care. Finding
that placement with father would be detrimental, A.L. was placed in foster care, and the
court ordered reunification services for both parents. Over the next year, mother and
father participated in their case plans and received generally positive reviews. At the
12-month reunification review, the court, following the department’s recommendation,
ordered A.L. returned to the care of mother and father, with shared physical custody and
family maintenance services. A.L. began splitting time between her parents in their
respective homes and appeared to make good adjustment to her new schedule.
While the parents initially worked cooperatively with each other, mother soon
became concerned over the quality of father’s parenting, and those concerns escalated
into seeking a restraining order against father, making unsubstantiated allegations, and
taking A.L. to the emergency room to be examined for alleged sexual abuse. Mother also
suffered relapses with alcohol, struggled with attending substance abuse group meetings,
and failed to prioritize her mental health. A psychological evaluation resulted in mother
being diagnosed with several mental health disorders.
2
C. Section 388 Modification
Shortly after the 12-month family maintenance review, the department moved to
modify the custody order under the authority of section 388, to grant sole physical
custody of A.L. to father. The department reported that mother had engaged in an
“escalating pattern of concerning anxious and paranoid behavior as well as neglect of
[A.L.].” Specifically, mother continued to fabricate allegations against father, had taken
A.L. for additional emergency room visits, and had placed herself and A.L. in proximity
to a person against whom she had a restraining order. Mother had failed to provide A.L.
with appropriate medical treatment for an infection, did not keep father updated on A.L.’s
medical care, and had left A.L. with a third party and did not pick her up. Mother had
also failed to follow through on her own appointments with mental health professionals
and social workers. After a contested section 388 hearing, the court granted the
department’s modification request and awarded sole physical custody of A.L. to father,
with supervised visits to mother.
D. The Exit Order
At the 18-month family maintenance review, the department recommended that
the court terminate dependency jurisdiction and grant sole physical custody of A.L. to
father, with supervised visits to mother.2 After a contested hearing, during which father
testified and mother made a statement asking for full legal and physical custody of A.L.3,
the juvenile court entered a final judgment that (1) terminated dependency jurisdiction,
(2) granted legal and physical custody of A.L. to father, and (3) ordered a minimum of
2
The department initially recommended that mother and father continue to share
joint legal custody but ultimately took no position on this issue, given father’s and A.L.’s
objection at the hearing.
3
The juvenile court had informed mother that she needed to be personally present
if she wished to testify. Mother was not personally present, appearing late by video
instead. The court did not permit mother to testify but allowed her to make a statement
setting forth her position on custody and visitation.
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one supervised visit per week to mother. The court further stated that “[b]efore the
supervision of the visits can be changed,” mother must show that she has made
substantial progress in her positive communication with father, and “there must be at
least 60 days of positive communication. Mother must also demonstrate engagement
with a psychiatrist and . . . follow[] through with the recommendations of that
psychiatrist,” and she “must demonstrate a minimum of 60 days of sobriety and
engagement with substance use disorder services.”
This portion of the court’s exit order was memorialized into an accompanying
JV 206 form, as follows: “Prior to any order for unsupervised visits, Mother must
demonstrate 60 days of positive communication with the Father on My Family Wizard, or
other application; Mother must demonstrate engagement with a psychiatrist, and that she
is following the recommendations of the psychiatrist; Mother must demonstrate a
minimum of 60 days of sobriety, and engagement with [substance use disorder] services.”
Mother timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A juvenile court’s exit order is “a final judgment and . . . remain[s] in effect after
[dependency] jurisdiction is terminated.” (§ 302, subd. (d).) The order “shall not be
modified” in a subsequent family court proceeding unless the court finds (1) “that there
has been a significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order,”
and (2) “modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.” (Ibid.)
As a part of an exit order, the juvenile court may issue “ ‘collateral orders, such as
counseling orders, that are reasonably related to the custody and visitation orders.’ ” (In
re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204 (Chantal); see also § 362, subd. (d) [“juvenile
court may direct any reasonable orders to the parents or guardians of the child,” including
“a direction to participate in a counseling or education program”].) But the juvenile court
may not condition the family court’s future modification of the exit order upon the
parties’ completion of those programs. (See In re Cole Y. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444,
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1456 (Cole Y.).) Instead, “the decision to modify an exit order . . . is, within the province
of the family court.” (Ibid.)
A. Standard of Review
We normally review a juvenile court’s exit orders for an abuse of discretion. (In
re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 113; In re Marriage of Richardson (2002)
102 Cal.App.4th 941, 949 (Richardson).) But because this appeal requires us to interpret
the exit order to determine its meaning and effect—whether the order improperly limits
the family court’s authority, our review of the order is de novo. (See Bridget A. v.
Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 301 [issue concerning “the scope of the
juvenile court’s discretion,” rather than the “proper exercise of that discretion,” is “a
question of law”].)
We construe the exit order “ ‘ “ ‘as a whole to effectuate [its] obvious
intention.’ ” ’ ” (Richardson, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at pp. 948–949.) When a provision
within the order is susceptible to two interpretations, we must construe the provision to
make it “ ‘lawful, operative, definite, reasonable and capable of being carried into
effect,’ ” and must avoid an interpretation that would make it “ ‘extraordinary, harsh,
unjust, inequitable or which would result in absurdity.’ ” (In re Marriage of Falcone &
Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 989.)
B. Forfeiture and Ripeness
Preliminarily, the department contends that mother forfeited this claim by failing
to raise it in the juvenile court. In Cole Y., the court held that an analogous claim “cannot
be forfeited” because the claim “goes to the allocation of jurisdiction between the
dependency and family courts, a legal issue.” (See Cole Y., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1456, fn. 4.) But there is no question that the juvenile court had both the “ ‘ “power to
hear . . . the case” ’ ” and authority over the subject matter and parties. (See People v.
Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 224 [defining fundamental lack of jurisdiction as “ ‘ “an
entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, [or] an absence of authority over
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the subject matter or the parties” ’ ”].) Rather, the claim here is that the court acted in
excess of its jurisdiction by improperly conditioning the family court’s future exercise of
authority to modify the exit order. (See id. at pp. 224–225 [explaining that a court
exceeds its jurisdiction when it has jurisdiction but acts beyond its prescribed authority,
provides unwarranted relief, or acts “ ‘ “without the occurrence of certain procedural
prerequisites” ’ ”].) A claim that a court has acted in excess of jurisdiction is subject to
forfeiture. (See People v. Gerold (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 781, 787 [distinguishing “ ‘a
lack of fundamental jurisdiction,’ ” which “ ‘may be raised at any time,’ ” from “ ‘a
challenge to a ruling in excess of jurisdiction,’ ” which “ ‘is subject to forfeiture if not
timely asserted’ ”]; see also In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 (S.B.) [“Dependency
matters are not exempt from [the forfeiture] rule”], superseded by statute on other
grounds.)
We recognize, however, that the “application of the forfeiture rule is not
automatic,” even if “the . . . discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and
only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.)
We will decline to apply the general rules of forfeiture here, both because the exit order,
if permitted to stand, will burden mother’s ability to modify her visitation schedule
beyond the limits of section 302, subdivision (d), and because the facts underlying
mother’s claim “are not disputed and the issue raises only a question of law.” (In re
Xavier R. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1412 [“[B]ecause the facts . . . are not disputed
and the issue raises only a question of law, the general rule [of forfeiture] does not
apply”].)
The department next argues that mother’s claim is unripe because she is relying
“on the speculative assumption that a future family court reviewing [the exit order] will
adopt the juvenile court’s orders without consideration of significant change in
circumstances or the child’s best interest.” Until that happens, the department posits,
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mother is not aggrieved. The department’s application of the ripeness doctrine sweeps
too broadly.
Unripe cases are “ ‘[t]hose in which parties seek a judicial declaration on a
question of law, though no actual dispute or controversy ever existed between them
requiring the declaration for its determination.’ ” (Wilson & Wilson v. City Council of
Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1573.) Such is not the case here, where the
juvenile court has already issued a final judgment enforceable in subsequent family court
proceedings. (See Heidi S. v. David H. (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1169 (Heidi S.)
[“[O]nce the juvenile court issued the Exit Order and its jurisdiction ended, the family
court had the responsibility to enforce the Exit Order”].) Of course, the family court may
choose to modify the exit order without regard to the enumerated conditions, upon
finding a significant change of circumstances and that the proposed modification would
be in the best interests of A.L. (§ 302, subd. (d).) But if mother did not challenge the
exit order, the family court might plausibly enforce the juvenile court’s limitation,
reasoning that mother had waived any claims of error by failing to timely appeal. (See
Heidi S., at p. 1166 [suggesting that mother’s request for modification of visitation after
failing to appeal exit order raised concerns that she was “improperly” seeking
reconsideration of exit order].) For the sake of clarity in the superior court, we are not
inclined to dismiss as unripe mother’s contention relating to the exit order on no more
than a bare assumption that a future court would pay it no heed.
C. The Juvenile Court’s Authority
On the merits, mother relies on Cole Y. for the proposition that the exit order
improperly conditions the family court’s future ability to modify the order upon mother’s
compliance with the juvenile court’s collateral orders. We agree. The exit order
challenged in Cole Y. provided that “ ‘to modify the [juvenile] court’s orders, . . . Father
will have to complete . . . a full drug program with weekly testing, a parenting program
and individual counseling.’ ” (Cole Y., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451.) In reversing,
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the court held that while a juvenile court has broad discretion to order a party’s
participation in counseling and other programs, it did not have the authority “to condition
the family court’s modification of an exit order upon the completion of counseling and
other programs in the face of a statute—section 302, subdivision (d)—that requires a
particular finding before the family court may modify such an exit order.” (Id. at
p. 1456.)
The exit order here similarly provides: “Prior to any order for unsupervised visits,
Mother must demonstrate 60 days of positive communication with the Father on My
Family Wizard, or other application; Mother must demonstrate engagement with a
psychiatrist, and that she is following the recommendations of the psychiatrist; Mother
must demonstrate a minimum of 60 days of sobriety, and engagement with [substance use
disorder] services.” As in Cole Y., this order purports to restrict the family court’s ability
to apply section 302, subdivision (d) and modify visitation, here by predicating “any
order for unsupervised visits” upon mother’s compliance with the enumerated conditions.
While the extent of mother’s compliance with the conditions imposed may well inform
the family court’s evaluation of a future request for unsupervised visitation, such a
decision is “within the province of the family court,” subject only to the limitations of
section 302, subdivision (d). (Cole Y., supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1456.)
In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 613 (D.B.), cited by the department, is
distinguishable. In D.B., the juvenile court in its exit order granted the mother legal and
physical custody of the minor and ordered that the noncustodial “[f]ather ‘may have
monitored visitation upon completion of or a showing of substantial compliance in
individual counseling and five conjoint counseling sessions with the child.’ ” (D.B., at
p. 626.) In rejecting father’s argument that these terms impermissibly restricted the
family court’s power to modify custody or visitation, the court explained: “[T]he
juvenile court did not restrict the family court’s power. . . . What the juvenile court said
about counseling does not limit the family court’s power at all. The juvenile court order
8
does not tell the family court what to do. It tells Father and Mother what to do.” (Id. at
p. 627.)
We understand the reviewing court in D.B. to have construed the disputed
condition in the light most favorable to the judgment, as self-executing regulations of the
parents’ relationship, not limitations on the family court. (See In re Marriage of Falcone
& Fyke, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 989 [explaining that an ambiguous order should be
given “ ‘the construction that [would] make the [order] lawful, operative, definite,
reasonable and capable of being carried into effect’ ”].) In this light, the condition
requires mother to cooperate with, and facilitate, father’s supervised visits with the minor
upon father’s substantial compliance with the counseling requirements, without
additional intervention from the family court. (See D.B., supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
p. 626.) By contrast, the express limitation here, by its plain terms, would restrict when a
family court may order unsupervised visitation. The “[p]rior to any order” restriction
here extends beyond merely “tell[ing] . . . mother what to do,” impermissibly purports to
limit the authority and discretion of the family court to evaluate whether changed
circumstances are “significant” and whether supervised visitation has ceased to be in the
minor’s best interest.4 (§ 302, subd. (d); cf. D.B., at p. 627.) The juvenile court here
4
In the family law context, “[t]he changed circumstance rule applies to a
modification request seeking a change in a final determination of custody” but “does not
apply to a modification request seeking a change in the parenting or visitation schedule.”
(In re Marriage of Lucio (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1077.) Courts have interpreted
the twofold burden of section 302, subdivision (d), however, to apply to visitation and
custody orders alike. (See Heidi S., supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at p. 1164 [“before modifying
the visitation schedule set forth in the exit order, the family court must find a significant
change of circumstances that warrants that modification” (italics added)]; In re Marriage
of David & Martha M. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 96, 103 [“section 302, subdivision (d)
compelled the family court to find a significant change of circumstances and that the
modification was in the best interests of the child before the family court modified the
juvenile court visitation order”].)
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acted in excess of its jurisdiction by conditioning the family court’s authority to modify
its exit order upon mother’s compliance with the enumerated conditions.
Like mother, however, we do not question the juvenile court’s apparent
determination that regulating mother’s communications with father and requiring her to
participate in mental health treatment are in the minor’s best interest. And in terminating
dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court retains authority to impose conditions on the
parents for the minor’s benefit. (See, e.g., Chantal, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206 [holding
that juvenile court in terminating jurisdiction and ordering parental counseling was not
bound by requirements of Fam. Code, § 3190].) We understand the challenged provision
of the exit order to represent the juvenile court’s intention to do so, even though the scope
of its order impermissibly limited the family court. For this reason, we decline mother’s
request to simply strike the substantive conditions in their entirety; we will instead strike
only the clause, “[p]rior to any order for unsupervised visits . . . .”
III. DISPOSITION
We modify the July 30, 2025 exit order to delete the following language: “Prior to
any order for unsupervised visits” from item 2.a. As modified, the order is affirmed.
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_____________________________________
LIE, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________________
GROVER, Acting P. J.
_____________________________________
WILSON, J.
In re A.L.; Santa Cruz County Human Services Department v. A.L.
H053519
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