In re S.A. CA2/7

CourtListener 10799567Calctapp24 feb 2026

Testo completo

Filed 2/23/26 In re S.A. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re S.A. et al., Persons Coming B336413-B, B340419-A, C, B342266-A,
Under the Juvenile Court Law. B345640-D

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. Nos. 20CCJP03089-A-D;
AND FAMILY SERVICES, 24CCJP01536-A)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.B. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Cristina G. Legaspi, Judge, and Lucia J. Murillo,
Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed; remanded with instructions as
to case number B345640.
Maryann M. Goode, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant S.B.
Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant James A.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

In these four appeals, mother S.B. (Mother) appeals the
juvenile court’s orders terminating her parental rights over five
of her children: David B. (also known as King or Rose) (born June
2015), S.A. (born June 2019), O.B. (born May 2021), M.B. (born
September 2022), and R.B. (born May 2024).1 M.B.’s father
James A. also appeals the court’s termination of his parental
rights over M.B., and its denial of his petition for reinstatement
of reunification services and/or placement of M.B. with a paternal
uncle.
Mother contends she established the beneficial parental
relationship exception to the termination of her parental rights

1 Mother’s appeal in case number B336413 is from the
termination of her parental rights for S.A. Appeal case number
B340419 is from the termination of her parental rights for David
and O.B. Appeal case number B342266 is from the termination
of her parental rights for R.B. The children’s respective fathers
are not parties to these appeals. Appeal case number B345640 is
from the termination of parental rights for M.B., from which both
Mother and M.B.’s father, James, appeal.

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with regard to David, S.A., and O.B., and the juvenile court
abused its discretion by failing to apply the exception. (Welf. &
Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)2 With regard to R.B. and
M.B., Mother contends the juvenile court violated her substantive
due process rights by failing to enforce its visitation orders,
precluding her from being able to fully and effectively raise the
beneficial parental relationship exception. James joins Mother’s
arguments with regard to M.B., and contends the juvenile court
violated his substantive due process rights by failing to ensure
regular in-person visitation for him, prejudicially impacting his
ability to bond with his daughter. We conclude that Mother and
James have not demonstrated the juvenile court erred or abused
its discretion as to the beneficial parental relationship exception;
and accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The 2020 Dependency Petition for David and S.A.
In June 2020, David and S.A. were removed from Mother’s
physical custody and placed in foster care. The Los Angeles
Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed
a section 300 petition alleging the two children were at risk of
serious physical harm due to Mother’s substance abuse, their
respective fathers’ substance abuse, and domestic violence
between Mother and S.A.’s father, Brian A.3 The juvenile court

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3 In 2022, the Legislature amended section 300 (Stats. 2022,
ch. 832, § 1), effective January 1, 2023, but the changes do not
affect our analysis.

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detained David and S.A. from parental custody with monitored
visitation for Mother, with discretion to the Department to
liberalize visitation to “unmonitored visits, and up to release” for
Mother upon five clean drug tests.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in February
2021, the juvenile court dismissed the substance abuse counts as
to Mother and David’s father, and sustained the petition for
Mother’s failure to protect and Brian’s substance abuse.4 The
court released David and S.A. to Mother’s custody, ordered family
maintenance services, and ordered Mother to complete a
parenting program, random drug testing, and individual
counseling.

B. The 2021 Dependency Petitions for David, S.A., and O.B.
O.B. was born in May 2021 to Mother and father Carnell F.
In August 2021, six months after David and S.A. were
released to Mother, Mother tested positive for cocaine, Xanax,
and marijuana, and all three children were removed from
Mother’s physical custody. Additional reports regarding Mother’s
substance abuse included giving the children sleeping pills while
she did drugs and passing out while caring for the children. Her
neighbors reported they observed the children roaming the
apartment building hallways late at night and saw six-year-old
David carrying and running with infant O.B.
The Department filed a section 342 subsequent petition on
behalf of the two older children and a section 300 petition on
behalf of infant O.B., each alleging the children were at risk of

4 David’s father, also named David B., passed away from a
drug overdose during the dependency proceedings.

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serious physical harm due to Mother’s substance abuse. (§ 300,
subd. (a)(B)(1).) The juvenile court detained the children from
parental custody with monitored visitation for Mother of up to
three hours per day, three times per week.
In the one month between the children’s detention and the
jurisdiction and disposition hearing, Mother called the children
daily, had one in-person visit, and missed another visit due to
being severely injured with bruises on her face. She claimed she
was hurt in a car crash, and presented the social worker with a
stock photo of a crashed car.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in September
2021, the juvenile court sustained the petitions, removed the
children from Mother with reunification services and monitored
visitation with discretion to the Department to liberalize visits,
and ordered Mother to complete a full substance abuse
rehabilitation program and participate in individual counseling.
Without finding any fault, the court noted at the hearing that
distance was an obstacle to more frequent visits, “impress[ed]
upon the Department the importance of facilitating more
frequent visits,” and ordered the Department to find ways to
increase visits and to provide Mother with transportation
assistance.

C. Mother’s Reunification Services with David, S.A., and O.B.
from August 2021 to September 2022
At the six-month review hearing on March 24, 2022, the
juvenile court found Mother’s progress on her case plan “has not
been substantial.” Mother did maintain routine visits with the
three children during the first six months of reunification
(August 2021 to March 2022). The court found her “partial”

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progress included “regularly visiting.” But she arrived at one
visit “out of it,” did not interact much, and let O.B. cry in her car
seat for about an hour. She missed another visit due to bruises
on her face and other injuries from domestic violence.
After seeing Mother’s injuries on a video call, David stated,
“‘I am scared, I am scared that [mother’s boyfriends] are hurting
my mom . . . . I am scared that when I go home, I am going to
have to protect [S.A.] and [O.B.] from my mom’s boyfriends. She
has too many.” After he was removed, David told his therapist
and a social worker that he had observed Mother’s “boyfriends”
line up outside of her bedroom and take turns going in, and he
would hear moaning noises from inside the bedroom.
S.A. and O.B. were eligible for Regional Center services,
but Mother refused to sign the consent forms, delaying services
during the first reunification period. Mother supported David’s
desire to use the name “Rose” and to wear girl’s clothing at home,
although she was initially resistant and did not support David
wearing girls’ clothes at school. David’s speech services through
an individualized education program were put on hold during the
first reunification period because Mother did not provide consent.
The juvenile court continued Mother’s reunification services and
granted the children’s caregivers shared educational and
developmental rights for the children with Mother.
During the second six-month reunification period (March to
September 2022), Mother continued to visit with the children,
and completed substance abuse, domestic violence, and parenting
programs. Mother was attentive and loving during visits, but
struggled to manage the three children. David enjoyed visits
with Mother and frequently asked about returning to her.
During this period, O.B. was placed with the same caregiver as

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David and S.A., and the social worker reported the children were
bonded with each other. David was doing well in the home, and
called the caregiver “mom” or “foster mom.” David was receiving
therapy and speech services, and making good progress in school.
O.B. was receiving Regional Center services for communication,
sensory, and motor delays. Mother disagreed that O.B. needed
these services.
Based on her “significant progress” in the case plan, in
September 2022 the juvenile court ordered Mother to have
unmonitored and overnight visits with the children.

D. The 2022 Dependency Petition for M.B. and Termination of
Mother’s Reunification Services with David, S.A., and O.B.
Shortly after the September 2022 hearing, Mother gave
birth to M.B. M.B. tested positive for benzodiazepines after
birth, and Mother tested positive for marijuana and
benzodiazepines. David also reported he saw Mother smoking
something during an unmonitored weekend visit and she told
him not to tell, and that James hit Mother in the stomach while
she was pregnant with M.B.
The Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of
M.B., alleging domestic violence between Mother and James,
substance abuse by Mother, and substance abuse by James. The
juvenile court denied the Department’s request to detain M.B.
pending adjudication. The Department also filed a section 388
petition to modify the order for unmonitored visits for the other
children and restrict Mother’s visits to monitored, which the
juvenile court denied.
At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in December
2022, the juvenile court dismissed the substance abuse counts as

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to Mother and sustained the counts regarding James’s domestic
violence against Mother and his substance abuse. Both parents
attended the hearing. The court detained M.B. from James and
released M.B. to Mother. The court ordered both parents to
complete a substance abuse rehabilitation program and
participate in individual counseling.
During the third and final reunification period for the other
three children (September 2022 to April 2023), David continued
to receive wraparound services and individualized education
program services for speech and language impairment and to
assist with behavioral needs and past trauma. David enjoyed
visits with Mother. O.B. continued to receive Regional Center
services due to delays in expressive communication and gross
motor ability, including weekly child development services such
as occupational therapy. O.B. responded well to services and was
walking independently at 18 months.
Seven-year-old David told the caregiver that, during visits
with Mother, he was told to prepare food for himself and his
younger siblings, change the diapers, and give the younger
siblings baths. The Department was concerned David was being
“parentified.” David disclosed to a social worker and his
caregiver that in October 2022, Mother drove the children to a
store, left them unattended while she went inside, and a man
entered the car. David kicked the man, who then exited the car.
David subsequently retracted this account and said it was not
true.
In late January and early February 2023, Mother tested
positive for benzodiazepines, cocaine, methamphetamine, and
fentanyl. In February, the court ordered M.B. removed from
Mother’s custody, and the Department placed her in a foster

8
home. In February, a reporting party also stated David disclosed
that Mother left the children in the care of a 17-year-old uncle
while she went to a party, David saw Mother having sex with a
man in the home, and David was left to care for and feed his
younger siblings. Mother told David that if he told anyone what
happened in the home, she would kill herself. When interviewed,
David denied everything except being left with the uncle, and
stated he felt safe with Mother and wanted to return to her.
In March 2023, the juvenile court modified Mother’s
unmonitored visits to monitored visits. In March, the
Department also filed a section 342 subsequent petition on behalf
of M.B. based on Mother’s substance abuse.
At the status review hearing in April 2023, Mother testified
her positive drug tests could not be accurate because she had
used fake urine for her tests on those dates. She testified she
purchased synthetic urine “off and on” for her tests when she
could afford it. The court stated her argument was “implausible,”
and her testimony that she periodically used synthetic urine
“calls into question everything that Mother said to the worker, to
the court. It is unbelievable to me that Mother would testify
she’s been lying to the Department this whole time with her drug
tests.” The court found Mother’s progress to be “minimal,”
terminated reunification services for David, S.A., and O.B., and
set a permanency planning hearing.
The court also held the jurisdiction and disposition hearing
on the section 342 petition for M.B., sustained the petition, and
removed M.B. from parental custody. Both parents were present
at the hearing. James had not yet been able to visit M.B. The
court ordered reunification services for both parents, including
substance abuse programs, parenting programs, random drug

9
testing, and individual counseling. The parents were permitted a
minimum of three monitored visits per week for three hours per
session, and the court ordered the Department to provide a
visitation schedule and transportation assistance for Mother so
that she could visit.

E. Permanency Planning Proceedings for David, S.A., and
O.B. and Termination of Reunification Services for M.B.
Between April and October 2023, Mother did not have in-
person visits. The Department offered in-person visits to Mother
on April 27 and May 11, but she was unavailable. She had
virtual visits with the children, but her visits were not consistent.
On June 23, 2023, Mother filed a section 388 petition
asking that M.B. be placed with the paternal grandmother or
paternal aunt, which the court summarily denied.
S.A. was placed with his paternal grandparents in June
2023. The Department reported S.A. had a strong, positive bond
with his grandparents and they ensured he received services he
needed for his speech and other issues. S.A. had possible signs of
autism, and received services for speech delay, individual
therapy, and assistance for social and recreational support and
potty training.
David and O.B. were placed together with foster mothers
Olivia M. and Sheena C.
Between early June and late August 2023, Mother was not
in contact with the Department. When she resumed contact, it
was not consistent. At an October 2023 hearing, counsel for
Mother requested in-person visits resume, and the juvenile court
responded the report showed the Department “attempted to
arrange visits for her. She didn’t respond.” As of August 2023,

10
James was consistently participating in virtual visits with one in-
person visit in July that had gone well, and weekend visits
arranged. In October 2023, the Department reported James had
failed to keep consistent contact with the Department, and since
the July visit, he had not been available when the Department
tried to contact him to arrange more in-person visits.
In October 2023, the court identified a prospective plan of
adoption as the most appropriate plan for David, S.A., and O.B.
Mother filed section 388 petitions for David, S.A., and O.B.
in October and November 2023, requesting the court return them
to her custody or in the alternative reinstate reunification
services and order overnight visitation. She attested she
completed a 30-day inpatient substance abuse treatment program
in July 2023 and another parenting program, continued to
participate in 12-step meetings and individual therapy, and that
the children were bonded to her and wanted to return to her. The
court summarily denied Mother’s section 388 petitions. The court
noted Mother had not had consistent visits for several months.
The Department reported in December 2023 that David
and O.B. had a strong, positive bond with their caregivers. David
received speech services, individual therapy, and treatment for
attention deficit hyperactive disorder and posttraumatic stress
disorder. O.B. had age-appropriate social and emotional
adjustment but continued to receive services for developmental
delay.
The Department also provided a report and assessment in
December 2023 that Mother and the children did not have a
beneficial relationship. Mother’s interactions with the children
were largely appropriate, but she focused primarily on the older
children. Mother had difficulty soothing the younger children

11
and difficulty managing and supervising all the children. Mother
was not a source of comfort for the children and at times left
them unattended during her visits, and she did not consistently
bring food or activities to engage all the children at their
appropriate developmental levels. The Department also noted
that during unmonitored visits, David prepared food for himself
and his siblings, as well as changed diapers and bathed the
younger siblings. The Department concluded Mother had a
friendly, familiar relationship with the children, despite
inconsistent visits, but was not a stable, supportive, or consistent
figure in the children’s lives.
In December 2023, the Department held a combined
section 366.26 hearing for David, S.A., and O.B. and review
hearing for M.B. Mother testified she had ongoing visitation
problems with S.A.’s grandparents and had not spoken with S.A.
virtually or in person since August. County counsel confirmed
the grandparents were resisting the visitation schedule and that
the grandparents disagreed with Mother’s entitlement to
visitation with S.A. A Department social worker testified that in-
person visits were not set in September because Mother stated
she could only do virtual visits and that the Department had
spoken with Mother in November and provided a schedule for in-
person visits in early December. Mother was able to have some
virtual visits with M.B., but not in-person visits.
With regard to M.B., the court found Mother’s progress on
her case plan to be substantial and granted another six months of
services. The court ordered the Department to consult with
Mother and the caregiver and to provide Mother with a visitation
schedule. The Court found James’s progress to be nonexistent
but continued his services for another six months.

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In March 2024, the caregiver for David and O.B. reported
Mother’s virtual visitation was inconsistent, and she had not
reached out to schedule in-person visitation. During virtual
visits, she focused only on David, not O.B., and had to be
admonished not to discuss the court case with the children.
Following the second period of reunification services for
M.B., in March 2024, the court found Mother’s progress to be
partial and James’s progress to be minimal, terminated
reunification services for M.B., and set a permanency planning
hearing. The Department reported James’s last contact with the
Department was in October 2023, so no in-person visits had been
arranged, but the caretaker reported he maintained consistent,
engaged virtual visits with M.B. three times a week. James
asserted at the hearing that he completed the majority of his case
plan and that the social worker failed to get back to him about in-
person visits, and the court stated in response that its ruling was
limited to the evidence before it.
Mother overdosed in March 2024 and was revived by first
responders after being found unconscious on the ground near her
car. She was in her third trimester of pregnancy at the time.
Mother refused transportation to a hospital and signed a form
saying she left against medical advice.
The Department reported in April 2024 that Mother had
provided no prospective monitors for visits and struggled with
scheduling in-person visits. At one in-person visit, she engaged
more with the caregiver instead of the children, and she had to be
admonished to engage with the children and to stop whispering
in David’s ear.

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F. The Section 366.26 Hearing Terminating Parental Rights
as to S.A.
The juvenile court held the continued section 366.26
hearing for S.A. on March 29, 2024. S.A.’s counsel asked the
court to terminate Mother’s parental rights, and Mother opposed.
Mother asked the court to apply the beneficial parental
relationship exception and order legal guardianship as the
permanent plan.
Mother testified that when she previously had custody of
S.A., they did everything together and spent no time apart. And
presently, when she would talk to S.A., he would tell Mother he
loved her and missed her, and he would ask when he could go
home with her. Mother testified she was only allowed four in-
person visits with S.A. after her visitation became monitored, and
blamed the social worker and caregiver for the lack of recent
visits. Mother’s counsel argued Mother had a strong bond with
S.A., her visits were consistent for the limited visits that were
provided to her, and it would be detrimental to S.A. to terminate
Mother’s parental rights.
S.A.’s counsel argued Mother had not demonstrated
consistent recent visitation with S.A., who had spent a
substantial amount of his life out of Mother’s care. Counsel also
argued the bond between Mother and S.A. was not beneficial, and
evidence that S.A. enjoyed playing with Mother was insufficient
to find detriment.
The court found Mother did not meet the first prong of the
beneficial parental relationship exception under In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.), because she did not have
consistent, regular visits with S.A. The court determined Mother
“hasn’t been forthcoming with this court[,] she has blamed the

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lack of visits on the caregivers and the Department.” The court
also stated: “I can’t find there is a bond to the extent that [S.A.]
would be detrimentally affected if that bond were severed.” The
court also noted S.A. lived with Mother for 17 months of his life,
and he was approximately five years old at the time of the
hearing. The court concluded the beneficial parental relationship
exception did not apply, and terminated Mother’s parental rights
as to S.A.
Mother timely appealed.

G. The 2024 Dependency Petition and Bypass of Services for
R.B.
In May 2024, two months after her March overdose, Mother
gave birth to R.B. Mother did not consent to drug testing at the
hospital, denied any prior dependency history or alcohol and drug
use other than marijuana since becoming a parent, stated her
prior drug tests were “tainted,” and claimed she was not the
person who overdosed in March. R.B. exhibited drug withdrawal
symptoms at the hospital and received treatment to lessen the
withdrawal effects.
R.B. was temporarily detained from Mother’s custody and
the Department filed a section 300 petition stating Mother’s
substance abuse placed R.B. at risk of serious physical harm.
Before the initial hearing, Mother asked to visit R.B. but failed to
show up at the hospital. At the initial hearing, the juvenile court
detained R.B. and ordered monitored visits for Mother. The court
stated: “Mom, visit your baby as much as you can as many hours
allowed.” R.B. was placed in the same foster home as M.B.
At the jurisdiction hearing on July 11, 2024, the court
sustained the petition, taking judicial notice of the case

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proceedings for the siblings and noting prior services had not
successfully rehabilitated Mother’s substance abuse. As of June
2024, Mother had not arranged to visit R.B. Mother had reported
to the Department that she needed a monitor for her visits and
the last time she saw R.B. was at the hospital.
The court continued the disposition hearing to July 24,
2024, at which it removed R.B. from Mother and bypassed
Mother for services due to the termination of her reunification
services and termination of parental rights for her other children.
Mother’s counsel stated that Mother asserted she had been
limited to one phone visit per week, and the Department’s
counsel responded that Mother had longstanding and recurring
issues with visitation, including changing phone numbers and
periods of time during which her whereabouts were unknown.
The court ordered the Department to facilitate Mother’s visits
and to provide a monitor, but advised Mother: “[Y]ou need to call
the social worker or whoever the go-between is for you to make
your scheduled visits 24 hours in advance to confirm your visits.
This child is being made available for you to visit . . . . It’s not fair
to the child to get the child ready for a visit if you’re not going to
make it.”
In early August 2024, R.B. was placed with Olivia and
Sheena, the caregivers of David and O.B. The social worker
observed R.B. and the caregivers had a strong, positive, and
supportive bond, and the caregivers were eager and willing to
adopt R.B., along with her other siblings already in their care.
The placement was in line with a plan for both R.B. and M.B. to
transition to the home with a plan of adoption.
Before R.B.’s placement with her siblings, Mother did not
ask for any visits with R.B. or ask about R.B.’s wellbeing. Mother

16
had initially visited the siblings on a weekly basis and later, on a
monthly basis. After R.B. was placed with the siblings, Mother
called and spoke to David but, as of late August 2024, had only
inquired about R.B.’s wellbeing on one occasion. The Department
reported Mother “has had minimal to no contact with child.
Mother prioritizes her sporadic contact to focus on the older
siblings, and child, [R.B.], seems to be an afterthought.”

H. The Section 366.26 Hearing Terminating Parental Rights
as to David and O.B.
The juvenile court held the continued section 366.26
hearing for David and O.B. on August 29, 2024. Mother was not
present but was represented by counsel.
The Department reported that David and O.B. were bonded
well to Olivia and Sheena, whom the children called “mom” and
“nana.” David stated, “‘I feel good about adoption, where they
take care of you forever,’” but he also wanted “‘to go back to my
mom’s house [because] she bought me lots of stuff.’” Mother had
not visited in person since May 2024, and she only had two
telephone visits with the children between June and August.
During the August phone visit, she only asked to speak to David.
Mother’s counsel argued the beneficial parental
relationship exception applied. Counsel argued Mother
attempted to regularly visit, but was stymied due to distance, her
work schedule, and not having a monitor. Counsel asserted the
children had a positive relationship with Mother and were happy
and comfortable in her care, and David called Mother “mom” and
expressed wanting to return to her. The children’s counsel
argued the exception was inapplicable due to Mother’s
inconsistent visits, lack of engagement during monitored visits,

17
and the reported safety issue that arose during Mother’s
unmonitored visits, and that the stability of adoption outweighed
any detriment to the children from terminating parental rights.
The juvenile court found the children were adoptable and
Mother failed to prove the exception to termination of her
parental rights applied. The court stated at the hearing that
“[w]hile [Mother’s] visitation may arguably be found by the court
as regular, what the court can find is that the children derive
some benefit from it. Some benefit. An incidental familial
benefit. And that doesn’t even go towards proving prong two [of
the Caden C. factors].” “As such, we cannot go to prong three, but
even arguendo, if we do, the court does not find that termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the children.” The
children were “in a home that’s loving, ready and willing to
provide permanence, and stopping that in order to . . . [go] to a
lesser permanent plan, does not serve their best interest. In fact,
that would be detrimental to them versus the permanency in
adoption.” Under the circumstances, the court determined the
beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply and
terminated Mother’s parental rights as to David and O.B.
Mother timely appealed.

I. The Section 366.26 Hearing Terminating Parental Rights
as to R.B.
The juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing for R.B.
on November 20, 2024.
The Department reported five-month-old R.B. was bonded
with her caregivers, who were affectionate with her and
committed to providing R.B. with stability and raising her with
her siblings. Mother’s phone was broken in July, and when the

18
social worker reached her at her new number in late July, she
only asked about having visits with David, not R.B. Mother
requested weekly telephone visits with the children, stating she
had transportation and scheduling issues that made it difficult to
visit during the week. In early August, Mother’s phone was
again broken, and by September 25, she still did not have a
replacement. On September 29, Mother provided a new phone
number and contact information for a potential monitor. The
social worker contacted the potential monitor but heard nothing
from Mother or the potential monitor before the November
report. The caregivers reported Mother had no phone calls with
R.B., and only wanted to speak to David and did not ask about
R.B. when she did call.
Mother testified she tried to schedule visits by calling,
texting, and emailing the social worker, but “[t]he social worker
failed to respond to me about anything that I ask her about[,]”
and “did not make any attempts to reach out [to Mother’s
proposed monitor]” to facilitate an in-person visit. Mother stated
she always provided her new phone numbers, and called the
caregiver every Friday at 6:00 p.m. as scheduled, but her calls
were not answered.
The Department’s counsel argued Mother had not visited,
was unable to be reached for long periods of time and cited her
own scheduling conflicts for not visiting, only asked about David,
and “blames everyone instead of taking responsibility for what
led to the lack of visitation.” Counsel also asked the court to find
Mother’s testimony lacked credibility, arguing the social worker
reached out regarding visitation, but neither Mother nor the
proposed monitor responded.

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Mother’s counsel argued Mother had “a substantive due
process interest in visitation with her children,” it was “unfair to
try to assess or to terminate parental rights based on lack of
relationship when she was never even given that opportunity to
do so,” and “the court was obligated to permit her to visit the
children pending the [section 366.26] hearing, unless it found
that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” Counsel
argued the Department failed to facilitate Mother’s visits, and
the proposed monitor’s lack of response “doesn’t alleviate the
Department from their responsibilities to at least offer a
monitor.”
The court observed R.B. was Mother’s fifth child to be
removed from her care, and Mother overdosed while pregnant but
did not acknowledge the severity of what happened. The social
worker had no contact with Mother for extended periods due to
her telephone issues, and Mother’s testimony that she was able to
call weekly “flies in the face of information that [M]other
provided that she had no working phone.” The court noted
Mother “testified to refute” evidence that she previously claimed
scheduling issues prevented her from visiting, “and now it goes to
weight. Who do I believe more?” The court also addressed
“Mother’s contention that no one assisted her with getting a
replacement phone, getting help with even a landline visit,
getting transportation help,” explaining: “This is not a
reasonable services [case]. . . . If Mother really had legitimate
proof of misdoing, wrongdoing, or malfeasance by [the
Department], there was no walk-on. There was no [section 388
petition] filed to let the court know that her visitations were
being withheld, that the visitation orders were being violated by
the agency.”

20
The juvenile court further noted: “Even if I were to find
that Mother had regular visitation and contact up until her
phone stopped working, Mother would have had to show that . . .
the child, not the Mother, the child derived a benefit from this
contact, and that benefit equates to a positive and emotional
attachment. This child was a newborn when the child was
removed, and . . . there was no such bond.” Considering the
detriment to R.B. from the termination of parental rights versus
the benefit of adoption, the court found there would be no
detriment. The court concluded no exception applied and
terminated Mother’s parental rights as to R.B.
Mother timely appealed.

J. The Section 366.26 Hearing Terminating Parental Rights
as to M.B.
The permanency planning hearing for M.B. was continued
for several months to transition her into the same home as her
siblings (which occurred in October 2024), and because James
was incarcerated for violating a domestic violence restraining
order to stay away from Mother.
On January 22, 2025, Mother told the court she last had an
in-person visit with M.B. in May 2024, and the court issued an
order for the Department to show cause regarding Mother’s
contention that she was being denied visits and calls with M.B.
In February 2025, James filed a section 388 petition
alleging he was sober and had completed various services, and
requesting the court reinstate reunification services and consider
a relative placement with his brother. James did not allege that
the Department had failed to comply with visitation orders or
that his visitation with M.B. was withheld.

21
The court held the order to show cause hearing on Mother’s
visitation on March 3, 2025, and discharged the order against the
Department. The court found the Department’s reports and
records “very thorough” and “in direct contrast” to Mother’s
allegation of no visits since May 2024. The court found “it
appears that Mother has been having visits with [M.B.],”
including “some in-person visits” as well as virtual. The court
ordered the Department to facilitate Mother’s in-person visits at
a location halfway between Mother and the children, and it urged
Mother to get “as much contact as you can” under her “three by
three” visitation schedule, including virtual and in-person visits.
On March 26, 2025, the juvenile court found reasonable
services had been provided.
The court held the final section 366.26 hearing and
section 388 hearing for M.B. on April 14, 2025.
James testified he had completed domestic violence and
parenting programs and drug treatment; and starting in 2025, he
began visiting M.B. once a week for about two hours. He was
establishing a bond with her, and wanted to reunify or have his
brother adopt her. James did not argue he had been denied
visitation. The Department reported James did his best to
engage with M.B. during several in person visits, and M.B. was
gradually readjusting to being with him and exhibited no
negative behaviors after visits. The court concluded James had
established “changing, not changed” circumstances and denied
his section 388 petition, stating it could not find it was in M.B.’s
best interests to reinstitute reunification so late in the
proceedings, when permanency had been pending for a long time.
Neither parent testified further. Mother’s counsel conceded
that Mother could not establish the Caden C. factors but

22
reiterated that Mother believed the Department and caregivers
were blocking her attempts to visit and call. James’s counsel
argued the beneficial parental relationship exception should
apply because he had been having recent consistent visits with
M.B.
The juvenile court found M.B. was adoptable and neither
parent had established the beneficial parental relationship
exception should apply, and it terminated parental rights as to
M.B. The court stated, “I understand the history of the case, and
Mother’s contention that the Department and the caregiver has
precluded Mother’s visitation. And the court dealt with the
Department and ordered [child and family team meetings] and
funds and facilitations and halfway marks. ¶ But today, the
court cannot find that regular visitation and contact. During the
three years that this case has been pending before the court,
Mother’s visitation has been less than regular and more recently
than not, they have been more irregular.”
Mother and James each timely appealed.5

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
The purpose of a section 366.26 selection and
implementation hearing is “‘to provide stable, permanent homes’
for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) If the court has

5 Specifically, Mother only appealed from the April 14, 2025
section 366.26 hearing. James appealed from the section 366.26
hearing; the January 22, 2025 and March 3, 2025 hearings
relating to the OSC; and the October 21 and July 18, 2024 orders
continuing the section 366.26 hearings.

23
decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative
preference is for adoption.” (In re Elizabeth M. (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 768, 780; accord, In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th
45, 53 [“if the child is adoptable[,] . . . adoption is the norm”]; see
In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 (Marilyn H.) [state has
a “compelling” interest in “providing stable, permanent homes for
children who have been removed from parental custody” and
reunification efforts have been unsuccessful].)
“When the court finds . . . the child is likely to be adopted,
the statute mandates judicial termination of parental rights
unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate one of
six enumerated exceptions applies.” (In re Elizabeth M., supra,
19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 780-781; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B); see
also In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
The beneficial parental relationship exception allows the
court to order a permanent plan other than adoption if a parent
demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, “(1) regular
visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of
parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631; see § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) It
applies only in “‘exceptional circumstances.’” (Caden C., at
p. 631; accord, In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
A parent has regular visitation and contact when the
parent “‘visit[s] consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent
permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632; accord, In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 691.)
Whether “‘the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship’” with his or her parent is shaped by factors “such as
‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the

24
parent's custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’”
(Caden C., at p. 632; accord, In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316-317 (Katherine J.).) When determining
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child, courts need to consider “how the child would be affected
by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be
like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the
child’s life.” (Caden C., at p. 633; accord, In re D.P. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 153, 164.)
We apply a “hybrid standard of review” to the beneficial
parental relationship exception. (In re Katherine J., supra,
75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317; see In re I.E., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at
p. 691.) The first two elements are reviewed for substantial
evidence. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.) “[W]e
presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing
party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all
conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) As a reviewing court, we do “‘not
reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or
resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ [Citation.] The determinations
should ‘be upheld if . . . supported by substantial evidence, even
though substantial evidence to the contrary also exists and the
trial court might have reached a different result had it believed
other evidence.’” (Caden C., at p. 640.)
As for the third element, we review factual determinations
for substantial evidence and review the “the ultimate decision—
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent . . . for

25
abuse of discretion.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640; see
In re I.E., supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.) “A court abuses its
discretion when it ‘“‘has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by
making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination’”’” or when it “rest[s] a disposition on an error of
law.” (In re M.G. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 836, 848-849; see
Caden C., at p. 641; In re Charlisse C. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 145,
159.)
If there are no disputed facts, whether the juvenile court’s
application of sections 366.26 or 388 violated a parent’s
substantive due process rights “is a purely legal
question, . . . which we review de novo.” (In re S.G. (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 1298, 1310.) However, on appeal we do not
reweigh the evidence, credibility of witnesses or the juvenile
court’s credibility determinations. (See In re I.B. (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 133, 158.)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Concluding Mother Failed To Establish the Beneficial
Parental Relationship Exception
Mother argues the trial court erred by not applying the
beneficial parental relationship exception to the termination of
her parental rights for David, S.A., and O.B.6 As noted, it was
Mother’s burden to establish all three elements required for the

6 Mother does not argue on appeal that the beneficial
parental relationship exception should apply to the termination
of her parental rights for M.B. and R.B. And James does not
argue on appeal that the beneficial parental relationship
exception should apply to the termination of his parental rights
for M.B.

26
beneficial parental relationship exception to apply. (See § 366.26,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); see also Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
Mother’s arguments essentially invite us to reweigh the evidence
before the juvenile court, which we are unable to do on appeal.

1. Regular Visitation and Contact
“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is
straightforward. The question is just whether ‘parents visit
consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The juvenile
court found at the section 366.26 hearings for David, O.B., and
S.A. that Mother failed to maintain regular visitation and contact
with the three children during the dependency proceedings,
despite being permitted three visits per week.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding the first
Caden C. factor was not satisfied. That evidence includes:
Although Mother initially maintained regular monitored visits
with David, O.B., and S.A., and was granted unmonitored and
overnight visits in September 2022, the consistency of her visits
was reduced significantly after the court modified her visits to
monitored visitation in March 2023. Between April and October
2023, Mother did not have in-person visits, fell out of contact with
the Department for long periods of time, and did not respond or
stated she was unavailable for in-person visits. She had virtual
visits with the children, but they were not consistent. Her virtual
and in-person visits remained inconsistent from October 2023
through termination of parental rights for S.A. in March 2024
and termination of parental rights for David and O.B. in August
2024. The court also determined Mother “hasn’t been
forthcoming with this court[,] she has blamed the lack of visits on

27
the caregivers and the Department.”

2. Beneficial Relationship
The second prong of the beneficial parental relationship
exception has two components: the child has a positive emotional
attachment to the parent, and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) Factors the court may consider include “‘[t]he age of the
child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody,
the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent
and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632; see
In re Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.)
The court stated with regard to David and O.B. that,
“[w]hile [Mother’s] visitation may arguably be found by the court
as regular, what the court can find is that the children derive
some benefit from it. Some benefit. An incidental familial
benefit. And that doesn’t even go towards proving prong two.”
“As such, we cannot go to prong three.” As to [S.A.], the court
stated: “I can’t find there is a bond to the extent that S.A. would
be detrimentally affected if that bond were severed.” The court
noted S.A. lived with Mother for 17 months of his life, and he was
approximately five years old at the time of the hearing.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court findings
that Mother’s visits provided at most only an “incidental benefit”
to David and O.B, and that there was not a bond that would be
detrimentally affected as to S.A. Mother’s monitored virtual and
in-person visits, as noted, were inconsistent. And even assuming
a positive emotional attachment, the record contains substantial
evidence that the benefits to the children of continuing a parental
relationship with Mother did not extend beyond a friendly bond.

28
As the juvenile court noted, the children spent much of their lives
out of Mother’s custody. David and S.A. were removed from
Mother’s custody between June 2020 and February 2021, and
again from August 2021 on; and O.B. was removed at three
months old in August 2021. Mother primarily focused on David
or the older children generally (i.e., David and S.A.), rather than
O.B.
After being ordered to have monitored visits in March 2023,
Mother did not progress again to unmonitored visits to deepen
her bond with any of the children. The juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion by finding that, however pleasant their
intermittent visits may have been, the record also reflected
negative effects stemming from their visits with Mother. Mother
was sometimes “out of it,” struggled with managing and soothing
the children, and inappropriately spoke about the court case
during visits. Sometimes she failed to show up for planned visits.
During Mother’s unmonitored visits prior to March 2023, the
children were insufficiently supervised, and David took on
parentified caretaking responsibilities for his younger siblings,
including preparing meals and changing diapers. David also
witnessed or heard sexual activity and domestic violence between
Mother and men in the home.
David, S.A., and O.B. also had special behavioral and
developmental needs, including speech and language challenges,
developmental delays, and O.B. had drug exposure and
withdrawal symptoms. David, who had previously witnessed
domestic violence toward Mother and sexual activity between
Mother and multiple men in the home, also continued to worry
about Mother’s safety. Mother was not engaged with the
children’s developmental and behavioral health services or

29
David’s individualized education program and remained in a
relationship with James where he inflicted domestic violence
upon her. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding
Mother did not satisfy the second Caden C. factor.

3. Detriment from Termination
The third and final prong of the beneficial parental
relationship exception is whether the stability and permanence of
the children’s adoptions were outweighed by the harm caused to
them by terminating their parental relationship with Mother.
(See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634.) As stated, the
statutory preference in a permanency hearing for a dependent
child is adoption. (See id. at p. 631 [“‘the norm . . . remains
adoption’”]; accord, In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
When the benefits of a stable, adoptive, permanent home
outweigh the harm the child would experience from the loss of a
continued parent-child relationship, the juvenile court orders
adoption. (See Caden C., at p. 634.)
The juvenile court concluded that the benefits of
consistency and stability in the adoptive homes of the children’s
foster caregivers outweighed any harm caused by the termination
of Mother’s parental relationship. The court stated with regard
to David and O.B. that, “arguendo, if we do [go to prong three],
the court does not find that termination of parental rights would
be detrimental to the children,” and as to S.A., it found there was
no bond “to the extent that [S.A.] would be detrimentally affected
if that bond were severed.” Substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s conclusion that each child’s needs were well met
in his or her adoptive placement. This evidence included: the
children were strongly bonded with their caretakers; David and

30
O.B were in a stable placement with most of their siblings; and
the children’s special needs were being met by their caretakers
through individualized education, speech services, Regional
Center services, occupational therapy, and individual therapy.
Caden C. instructs juvenile courts to determine “how the
child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in
effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home
without the parent in the child’s life. . . . [T]he effects might
include emotional instability and preoccupation leading to acting
out, difficulties in school, insomnia, anxiety, or depression.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) On the other hand, “a
new, stable home may alleviate the emotional instability and
preoccupation leading to such problems, providing a new source
of stability that could make the loss of a parent not, at least on
balance, detrimental.” (Ibid.) Here, the record supports the
juvenile court’s determination that the benefit and security
provided by the children’s placement with their adoptive parents
outweighed any harm that would be caused by the loss of their
relationships with Mother.
This is true even with regard to David, the oldest child who
had the longest custodial relationship with Mother. David
enjoyed visits with her, stated he felt safe with her and wanted to
return to her, and called her “mom,” but also was bonded with his
caregivers and stated: “‘I feel good about adoption, where they
take care of you forever.’” In many cases, “a relationship involves
tangled benefits and burdens. In those cases, the court faces the
complex task of disentangling the consequences of removing
those burdens along with the benefits of the relationship.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634; see In re A.L. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1158-1159 [affirming finding beneficial

31
parental relationship exception did not apply where father
regularly visited daughter and developed beneficial bond with
her, but she viewed father as “‘a fun, friendly person’ to have
visits with,” not a parental figure].) Under the abuse of
discretion standard of review, we determine whether the juvenile
court’s decision exceeded the bounds of reason; in so doing, we
cannot substitute our view for that of the juvenile court. (See
Caden C., at p. 641; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-
319.)
In light of the evidence before the juvenile court, its
determination that Mother did not satisfy the three Caden C.
factors—because her visits were not consistent, her bond with
David, S.A., and O.B provided only an incidental benefit to them,
and the benefits to the children of adoption outweighed the harm
to them of terminating their parental relationship with Mother—
was not arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise an abuse of discretion.

C. The Juvenile Court did not Violate Mother’s or James’s
Substantive Due Process Rights
Mother contends the juvenile court violated her substantive
due process rights by purportedly failing to enforce its visitation
orders, precluding her from being able to raise the beneficial
parental relationship exception to the termination of her parental
rights as to M.B. and R.B.7 James joins Mother’s arguments as to

7 On appeal, Mother does not raise substantive due process
arguments relating to her visitation with David, S.A., or O.B.
Separately, Mother observes, and the Department does not
dispute, that the minute order from the section 366.26 hearing
mistakenly states the juvenile court found the parents
maintained regular and consistent visitation, and the JV-320

32
M.B., contending the juvenile court also violated his substantive
due process rights by failing to ensure regular in-person
visitation for him. We conclude James forfeited his due process
arguments as to M.B. by failing to raise them in the juvenile
court, and that Mother’s argument lacks merit. As to R.B., we
conclude the record does not support Mother’s contention the
court failed to enforce its visitation orders and also conclude
Mother has not demonstrated a substantive due process
violation.
“Parents whose children are subjects of a dependency
proceeding have constitutionally protected interests in a
continued relationship with their children.” (In re Alexandria P.
(2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1341 [“Children also have a
fundamental interest in stability and permanency deserving of
constitutional protection.”]; see Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at
p. 306 [“A parent’s interest in the companionship, care, custody
and management of his children is a compelling one, ranked
among the most basic of civil rights.”]; In re Jasmon O. (1994)
8 Cal.4th 398, 419.) “[C]hildren have a fundamental independent
interest in belonging to a family unit [citation], and they have
compelling rights to be protected from abuse and neglect and to
have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the
caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the child.
[Citation.] The interests of the parent and the child, therefore,

form contains an incorrect date for the termination of parental
rights. These errors do not affect our analysis; however,
pursuant to our inherent authority to correct clerical errors in the
record, we remand with directions for the juvenile court to correct
the identified errors. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th
181, 185.)

33
must be balanced.” (Marilyn H., at p. 306; In re S.G., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1313.)
“Although a parent’s interest in the care, custody and
companionship of a child is a liberty interest that may not be
interfered with in the absence of a compelling state interest, the
welfare of a child is a compelling state interest that a state has
not only a right, but a duty, to protect. [Citations.] The
Legislature has declared that California has an interest in
providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been
removed from parental custody and for whom reunification
efforts with their parents have been unsuccessful. [Citations.]
This interest is a compelling one.” (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th
at p. 307; accord, In re S.G., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1313-
1314.)
“The state’s interest requires the [juvenile] court to
concentrate its efforts, once reunification services have been
terminated, on the child’s placement and well-being, rather than
on a parent’s challenge to a custody order.” (Marilyn H., supra,
5 Cal.4th at p. 307, accord, In re S.G., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1313-1314.) Thus, “the sole purpose of the section 366.26
hearing is to select and implement one of the listed permanent
plans” in the statute, with “the focus of the case shifted away
from reunification to providing a permanent, stable placement for
the children.” (Marilyn H., at p. 304.)

1. As to M.B., James forfeited his due process argument
by raising it for the first time on appeal, and Mother’s
due process argument lacks merit
Here, James did not raise any substantive due process
challenge in the juvenile court. Although James filed a

34
section 388 petition that was heard at the section 366.26 hearing
terminating parental rights, the petition did not argue the
Department failed to comply with visitation orders or that
James’s visitation with M.B. was withheld. Nor did he argue at
the section 366.26 hearing that visitation issues precluded him
from satisfying the beneficial parental relationship exception.
We therefore conclude James forfeited this argument. (In re
Malick T. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1127 [“[F]orfeiture
generally applies when a party did not alert the juvenile court
that he or she objected to an order being made or when a party
failed to ask in the juvenile court for relief being sought on
appeal.”].)
Based on the record before us, we conclude Mother’s
substantive due process argument as to M.B. lacks merit. At the
section 366.26 hearing, Mother’s counsel argued that “the
Department and/or the caretaker had essentially blocked all
contact with the child for over a year” and that it was only after
the court had set the order to show cause that the Department
made M.B. available for calls and visits. But Mother never filed a
section 388 petition challenging the Department’s compliance
with the visitation schedule, or alleging visitation with M.B. had
been withheld in violation of due process.
The juvenile court did hold an order to show cause hearing
on Mother’s allegations that she was being denied visitation with
M.B., so her visitation arguments arguably are not forfeited on
appeal. But even considering the merits of Mother’s arguments,
we conclude there was no due process violation. Although
Mother urges us to accept her version of the facts, we defer to the
juvenile court’s factual findings and “[w]e do not second-guess the
court’s credibility calls,” as the trier of fact. (In re Merrick V.

35
(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 254.) Here, the juvenile court made
credibility determinations throughout M.B.’s case, to Mother’s
detriment. It found she had “credibility issues,” “very low”
credibility, and that “the information Mother provides [] doesn’t
appear to shake out.” The court also held an order to show cause
hearing on Mother’s allegations that she was being denied
visitation with M.B., and found the Department’s “very thorough”
records directly refuted Mother’s claim that she had not visited
with M.B. from May 2024 to January 2025. The court discharged
the order to show cause because it concluded the Department had
fulfilled its duty of ensuring Mother had visitation with M.B.
Under the circumstances, Mother cannot establish a substantive
due process violation.

2. As to R.B., Mother’s due process argument lacks
merit
Mother did raise a substantive due process argument at
R.B.’s section 366.26 hearing (for the first time and in her closing
argument), which the juvenile court appeared to believe was a
“reasonable services argument.” Mother argues the court erred
and that its error was not harmless. Based on the record before
us, we conclude there was no due process violation.
Although Mother argues the court did not enforce its
visitation orders, she identifies no specific instances where the
court failed to do so. Instead, she focuses on the Department,
which in her view “failed to facilitate contact and visitation
between [M]other and [R.B.]” by not procuring a monitor for in-
person visits. Mother relies extensively on her own testimony
that “the social workers failed to sufficiently ensure telephone
contact” and “never even tried to set up any video conference

36
calls” with R.B. Mother further contends: she consistently called
the foster parent “every Friday”; texted and emailed the
Department social worker and foster parent for R.B., but received
“absolutely nothing” in response; “th[e] social worker did not
make any attempts to reach out” to a potential monitor Mother
identified; and, Mother kept the social worker and foster parent
informed regarding how to reach her and “were the first to be
told” when her phone numbers changed.
But the juvenile court found Mother’s testimony was not
credible given the other evidence before it. The Department’s
report indicated there were long periods of time when the
Department had no way to communicate with Mother because
she did not have a functioning cell phone number. The report
also reflected that when Mother did communicate with the
Department, Mother stated she was unable to visit R.B. in person
because of her work schedule and transportation issues, and
Mother instead requested phone visitation. Additionally, the
Department’s report indicated the Department was in contact
with Mother in July, August, and September 2024, and the
Department reached out to Mother’s proposed monitor but never
received a response from the monitor. The Department’s report
stated that when Mother called, the foster parent reported
Mother did not ask about or ask to speak with R.B.
At the section 366.26 hearing, the Department’s counsel
asked the juvenile court to make a credibility determination and
not to believe Mother’s version of events. In finding that Mother
had not maintained regular visitation and contact with R.B., the
court explained to Mother that it was deciding “who I believed
more,” as between Mother’s testimony and the Department’s
reports in evidence. The court found Mother’s testimony that she

37
was consistently in contact with the Department seeking to
schedule visits “flies in the face” of her own statements to the
Department in the reports. Based on these facts, we cannot
conclude Mother demonstrated the Department, or court,
deprived Mother of her due process right to visitation with R.B.
Mother relies on In re David D. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 941,
954-956 and In re Brittany S. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1399, 1407-
1408. In both cases, the court of appeal reversed orders
terminating parental rights because the juvenile court failed to
ensure sufficient visitation pending the 366.26 hearing and
remanded with instructions to provide the mother six additional
months of services and visitation. But neither was a due process
case, and both are distinguishable. David D. was “an
extraordinary and troubling case” where “[d]ue to the court’s
order prohibiting visitation between this mother and her
children, adequate reunification services were not provided.”
(David D., at pp. 951, 953.) And Brittany S. involved an
incarcerated mother where the reunification plan “fail[ed] to
provide for visitation” and “limited contact to telephone calls and
letters.” (Brittany S., at p. 1407.) This case does not involve
similar orders prohibiting or limiting Mother’s visitation with
R.B.

38
DISPOSITION

Appeal case number B345640 is remanded for the limited
purpose of directing the juvenile court to correct the clerical
errors identified by the parties. The juvenile court’s orders
terminating Mother’s and James’s parental rights are otherwise
affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.

39

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