People v. Moreno CA2/1

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Filed 2/23/26 P. v. Moreno CA2/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B333875

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA039438)
v.

EDDIE FERNANDO MORENO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gregory A. Dohi, Judge. Remanded with
directions.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and
Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Susan
Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran, Kristen
J. Inberg, Seth P. MCutcheon and Charles Chung, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________
INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the trial court sentenced defendant Eddie
Fernando Moreno to an aggregate term of 80 years to life
imprisonment. The sentence included indeterminate third strike
terms under the original “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667,
subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d))1 as well as three one-year
prior-prison-term enhancements under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b).
In 2023, the superior court resentenced Moreno pursuant to
section 1172.75 to an aggregate term of 51 years to life. The
court struck the now-invalid prior-prison-term enhancements and
made other changes from the original sentence, including which
terms ran consecutively or concurrently, but left intact Moreno’s
indeterminate third strike sentences.
Moreno appealed from his resentencing and we affirmed.
(People v. Moreno (Sept. 16, 2024, B333875) [nonpub. opn.].)
Moreno petitioned for review; our Supreme Court granted that
request and deferred Moreno’s appeal pending the disposition of
People v. Superior Court (Guevara) 18 Cal.5th 838 (Guevara).
After issuing Guevara, the Supreme Court remanded Moreno’s
appeal to this court with directions to vacate our prior decision
and reconsider the cause in light of Guevara.
Having now done so, we remand for a new resentencing
hearing.

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Offense Conduct, Conviction, and Initial Sentence
In November 2001, while Elena Hiller was packing her
belongings into her truck, Moreno approached her with a knife
and demanded she hand over her wallet. When Hiller told him
she only had one dollar, Moreno demanded the keys to her truck,
made her get into the vehicle with him, and drove away with her
in the truck. After driving a few blocks, Moreno took Hiller’s
wallet, forced her out of the truck, and drove away. About a week
later, officers observed Moreno driving the truck. They tried to
initiate a traffic stop but Moreno sped away and evaded the
pursuing police vehicle for five or six miles before the chase
ended. When Moreno was arrested the police found a knife and
cocaine on his person.
In 2003, a jury convicted Moreno of carjacking (§ 215,
subd. (a); count 1), robbery (§ 211; count 2), unlawful driving or
taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); count 3),
evading an officer (id., § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 4), and
possession of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11350, subd. (a); count 5). As to counts 1 and 2, the jury also
found that Moreno used a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)-(2)).
The trial court found true the allegations that Moreno had
suffered two prior serious or violent felony juvenile adjudications
for robbery with the use of a firearm and robbery with the use of
a deadly weapon, which both qualified as strikes within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law, and that he had served three
prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). The court
sentenced Moreno to an aggregate prison term of 80 years to life,
composed of third-strike terms of 26 years to life on count 1, 26

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years to life on count 2, and 25 years to life on count 4, as well as
three years for the three prior-prison-term enhancements.2
B. The Reform Act and Moreno’s Section 1170.126
Petition
The “voters enacted the [Three Strikes] Reform Act [of 2012
(Reform Act)], which amended state law to authorize
indeterminate third strike life sentences only when the third
felony conviction is ‘serious or violent,’ subject to enumerated
disqualifying factors. (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), (2)(C).) Instead of
receiving an indeterminate term for a subsequent nonserious,
nonviolent felony, the Reform Act provides that, under current
law, defendants will be sentenced to ‘twice the term otherwise
provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.’ ([Id.],
subd. (c)(1).)” (Guevara, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 851.) The Reform
Act also established a retrospective resentencing procedure,
codified at section 1170.126, for defendants presently serving an
indeterminate term of imprisonment whose sentence under
current law would no longer be an indeterminate life sentence.
(Guevara, at pp. 851-852.) Eligible defendants “shall be
resentenced . . . unless the court, in its discretion, determines
that resentencing . . . would pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety.” (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).)
In March 2014, Moreno petitioned for relief under section
1170.126. The court denied the petition. The court construed
language in section 1170.126 which states that “[a]n inmate is
eligible for resentencing if[] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [t]he inmate’s current
sentence was not imposed for any of the offenses” included in the

2 Moreno received a stayed term of 25 years to life on
count 3 and a concurrent term of 25 years to life on count 5.

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list of violent and serious felonies (id., subd. (e)(2), italics added)
to mean that Moreno was eligible for relief only if all his current
commitment offenses were nonserious and nonviolent. Because
Moreno’s current counts of conviction included serious and
violent felonies, namely his carjacking and robbery convictions,
the court found him ineligible for relief.3
C. Section 1172.5 and Resentencing
“Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature eliminated . . .
one-year prior-prison-term enhancements [under section 667.5,
former subdivision (b)] except in cases involving prior terms for
sexually violent offenses. [Citation.] Two years later, the
Legislature made the change retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728,
§§ 1, 3.)” (People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050, 1053-1054.)
Section 1172.75 provides a resentencing process for inmates
serving a term that includes a one-year prior-prison-term
enhancement that is no longer valid.
In 2022, Moreno moved for resentencing under section
1172.75 following a referral by the Department of Corrections

3 In 2015, our Supreme Court rejected the notion that
section 1170.126, subdivision (e)(2) disqualifies an inmate from
resentencing relief under the Reform Act unless all of the
prisoner’s current commitment offenses are nonserious and
nonviolent. (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 688-695.)
After acknowledging the statute’s ambiguity, the court held
“resentencing is allowed with respect to a count that is neither
serious nor violent, despite the presence of another count that is
serious or violent.” (Id. at p. 695.) The record does not indicate
that Moreno sought to challenge the trial court’s prior ruling
regarding his eligibility for resentencing under section 1170.126
either before or after the Supreme Court decided Johnson.

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and Rehabilitation. Moreno requested dismissal of the three one-
year prior-prison-term enhancements imposed as part of his
sentence, reduction of count 5 to a misdemeanor pursuant to
Proposition 47, and dismissal of one or more of his prior strikes
pursuant to section 1385. He also requested “a full resentencing”
where he would receive the benefit of any other ameliorative
sentencing provisions enacted after his prior sentence became
final.
The superior court recalled Moreno’s sentence and, on
August 28, 2023, resentenced him. The court struck the three
one-year prior-prison-term enhancements, reduced count 5 to a
misdemeanor, and stayed the sentence on count 2 pursuant to
section 654. The court denied Moreno’s motion to dismiss his
prior strikes pursuant to section 1385. The court effectively left
the remainder of Moreno’s previous sentence in place, imposing a
new sentence of 51 years to life.
DISCUSSION
Moreno does not contend the trial court erred in
resentencing him on either count 1 or count 2, as carjacking and
robbery are both serious (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9) & (c)(17)) and
violent (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(19) & (c)(27)) felonies and therefore
not subject to the Reform Act provisions regarding nonserious,
nonviolent third strike convictions. Moreno instead argues that
the superior court erred in failing to reduce his sentence for
evading an officer (count 4), which is not a serious or violent
felony, to a second-strike determinate term. Moreno argues that
we should remand the matter to the superior court for
consideration of the Reform Act to the calculation of his sentence.
In light of Guevara, we agree. Following remand, the court
must determine whether resentencing Moreno on count 4 to a

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determinate term would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety as set forth in section 1170.126.
Prior to Guevara, we had held that, by permitting recall
and resentencing of indeterminate third strike sentences, section
1172.75 unconstitutionally amended section 1170.126. Guevera
concluded otherwise, holding that, “as a matter of constitutional
avoidance, section 1172.75 incorporates section 1170.126’s
discretionary public safety override as a condition for nonserious,
nonviolent third strike offenders to obtain resentencing under the
revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.” (Guevara, supra,
18 Cal.5th at p. 850.) The high court remanded for the superior
court to determine whether sentencing the defendant in Guevara
under the revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act would
“ ‘pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.’ ” (Id. at
p. 878.) If it so determined, the superior court was to reimpose
the indeterminate term. (Ibid.) “If the superior court does not
determine that resentencing [the defendant] would ‘pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,’ and [the defendant]
is otherwise eligible under the Reform Act, the court shall
resentence [the defendant] pursuant to the revised penalty
provisions of the Reform Act.” (Ibid.)
The superior court did not have the benefit of Guevara,
meaning that it was not fully aware of the scope of its
discretionary powers when it resentenced Moreno. We remand
for resentencing because “ ‘the record [does not] “clearly
indicate[]” that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 425.)
The superior court made no finding about whether imposing a
determinate term under the Reform Act on count 4 would pose an

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unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as set forth in section
1170.126. We thus cannot tell whether the court would have
resentenced Moreno on count 4 pursuant to the revised penalty
provisions of the Reform Act if it had been aware of its discretion
to do so.
DISPOSITION
Moreno’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded
for the superior court to conduct a resentencing consistent with
Guevara. If the superior court determines when resentencing
Moreno that sentencing him on count 4 under the revised penalty
provisions of the Reform Act would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, the superior court is to reimpose the
indeterminate term. If the superior court does not determine
that Moreno would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety, and Moreno is otherwise eligible under the Reform Act,
the court shall resentence Moreno on count 4 pursuant to the
revised penalty provisions of the Reform Act.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J. M. KIM, J.

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