In re J.A. CA1/2

CourtListener 10796997Calctapp20 feb 2026

Testo completo

Filed 2/20/26 In re J.A. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re J.A., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172292
v.
J.A., (City & County of San Francisco
Super. Ct. No. JW23-6036)
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1
On July 10, 2023, J.A. admitted allegations in two juvenile wardship
petitions (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602),2 based on two separate incidents
involving a co-offender, that she committed assault by force likely to produce
great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)), assault by force likely to
produce great bodily injury on a public transit passenger (id., § 245.2), and
organized retail theft with the intent to sell (id., § 490.4, subd. (a)(1)).

1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion, reciting only those facts
necessary to resolve the issues raised. (See Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1;
People v. Garcia (2022) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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At the disposition hearing on January 31, 2024, the juvenile court
declared J.A. a ward and placed her on probation. As conditions of probation,
the court ordered J.A. to pay a $300 restitution fine, which it suspended due
to J.A.’s inability to pay, and direct victim restitution in an amount to be
determined at a hearing. Following such a hearing, in an order filed on July
8, the court directed J.A. and her co-participant to pay, jointly and severally,
direct victim restitution in the amount of $39,451.18. On December 27, the
court formally entered the victim restitution order. This appeal followed.
In her opening brief, J.A. first challenged the victim restitution order
based on a legislative amendment that took effect while this appeal was
pending. When the court entered its victim restitution order, it was
permitted to order joint and several liability for victim restitution among co-
offenders. (See former § 730.6, subd. (h)(2), as amended by Stats. 2015, ch.
131, § 1; In re S.S. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 543, 550–551.) Effective January 1,
2025, however, minors may not be held jointly and severally liable for victim
restitution. Assembly Bill No. 1186 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill
1186) added paragraph (3) to section 730.6, subdivision (b) (section
730.6(b)(3)), which now provides: “For the purposes of victim restitution,
each minor shall be held severally liable, and shall not be held jointly and
severally liable as co-offenders. The court shall apportion liability based on
each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses
included in the order of restitution. The aggregate amount of apportioned
liability for all minors involved shall not exceed 100 percent in total.” (Stats.
2024, ch. 805, § 6.)
In her opening brief, J.A. argued that section 730.6(b)(3) applies
retroactively and requires a remand for a new restitution hearing to allow the
court to apportion restitution liability among her and her co-offender based

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on each offender’s percentage of responsibility.
In response, the Attorney General points out that after J.A. filed her
opening brief, this court issued its decision in In re J.L. (Dec. 23, 2025,
A171588) 117 Cal.App.5th 388 (J.L.), where we held that section 730.6(b)(3)
operates prospectively and thus rejected an argument similar to J.A.’s.
In setting forth the legal principles regarding retroactivity, we noted
that “ ‘[o]rdinarily, statutes are presumed the apply only prospectively,
unless the Legislature expressly declares otherwise.’ ” (J.L., supra, 117
Cal.App.5th at p. 398.) A contextually specific qualification to that
presumption was established in In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada).
(J.L., at p. 398, citing People v. Burgos (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1, 8, 14 (Burgos).)
That qualification is that when the Legislature has amended a statute to
reduce the punishment for a particular criminal offense, we will assume,
absent evidence to the contrary, that the Legislature intended the amended
statute to apply to all nonfinal judgments. (Burgos, at pp. 12–14, citing
People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 323 [in turn citing Estrada, at pp.
742–748]; see J.L. at p. 398.)
Turning to whether the Legislature intended section 730.6(b)(3) to
operate retroactively, we were guided by an additional presumption, that the
Legislature is aware of the existing law and to have enacted or amended a
statute in light thereof. (J.L., supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at p. 401.) Direct
restitution to a victim is generally recognized to be a civil remedy, not
punishment (in contrast to a restitution fine, which is intended as
punishment). (See id. at pp. 399, 401.) Thus, we presumed that when the
Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1186, it knew that victim restitution is not
punishment. (Id. at p. 401.) This was confirmed, we found, by the legislative
history of the bill. (Id. at pp. 401–402.) From this, we inferred that “when

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Assembly Bill 1186 was enacted, the Legislature . . . did not intend Assembly
Bill 1186’s change in how victim restitution is awarded to implicate Estrada.
Rather, the Legislature expected that such a change would operate
prospectively under the default rule . . . , unless it expressly specified
otherwise,” which it did not. (J.L., at p. 402.) We thus held that “section
730.6(b)(3) operates prospectively.” (J.L., at p. 402.)
The Attorney General contends that under J.L., J.A. is not entitled to
retroactive application of section 730.6(b)(3). In her reply brief, J.A.
effectively concedes the point by “acknowledg[ing] J.L. rejects her argument
and that she had not found a published decision that disagrees with J.L. and
supports her argument.” We accept this concession, and thus find no error in
the victim restitution order.
J.A.’s second argument is that the $300 restitution fine should be
stricken pursuant to another recent amendment to section 730.6. The
Attorney General agrees. As do we.
At the time of the disposition hearing, the restitution fine was required
by the statute. (See former § 730.6, subd. (a)(2)(A), (b)(1).) Effective January
1, 2025, Assembly Bill 1186 amended section 730.6 to remove the
requirement that a minor pay a restitution fine. The relevant portion of the
statute now provides, “The court shall not impose a separate and additional
restitution fine against a minor found to be a person described in Section
602.” (§ 730.6, subd. (a)(2), as amended by Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 6.) As
explained above, unlike direct victim restitution, the purpose of a restitution
fine is punishment. (J.L., supra, 117 Cal.App.5th at pp. 399, 401.) Thus, we
agree with the parties that amended section 730.6, subdivision (a)(2) applies
retroactively under Estrada, and that the restitution fine imposed in this
case should be stricken as a result.

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DISPOSITION
The $300 restitution fine is ordered stricken. The juvenile court is
directed to amend the disposition order to reflect this fact. In all other
respects, the disposition and restitution orders are affirmed.

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RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P. J.

DESAUTELS, J.

(A172292N)

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