CourtListener 10796996•People v. Burns CA2/8
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Filed 2/20/26 P. v. Burns CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B338048
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA269767)
v.
WALTER BURNS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a post-judgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Mark K. Hanasono, Judge. Affirmed.
Unite the People and John Martin Lathrop for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren Sanchez, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
Defendant Walter Burns asserts the 2019 changes to the
law of homicide, which eliminated several imputed-malice
theories of culpability, undermine his 2005 conviction of first-
degree murder and entitle him to resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6 (further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless specified). That provision affords resentencing to those
convicted of certain homicide crimes who could not be convicted
today because of the 2019 changes to the law. The trial court
denied Burns’s resentencing petition at the prima facie stage,
viewing the jury instructions and the jury’s findings as
establishing Burns himself intentionally killed the victim and
precluding Burns’s assertion that his conviction was under a
tainted imputed-malice theory. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Killing
We first offer a brief reprise of facts jurors heard in Burns’s
trial, which our prior opinion affirming Burns’s conviction more
fully sets forth. (People v. Burns (Aug. 1, 2007, B189644)
[nonpub. opn.].) In doing so, we do not take a position on the
veracity of any particular facts. (See People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis) [when evaluating a resentencing
petitioner’s prima facie showing, a “court should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion’ ”].)
Jomo Robbins was shot and killed near Burns’s house.
Three eyewitnesses testified. One neighbor, testifying for the
prosecution, saw Burns shoot Robbins. From his window, this
neighbor saw Burns and Robbins arguing in front of Burns’s
house. Burns began “trying to provoke this guy to — I guess to
fight or something, because the guy, you know, started screaming
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again and saying things, you know, loud, and you could hear
that.” The neighbor could not hear the words Burns said, but he
heard Robbins respond loudly and aggressively, “ ‘You’re
disrespect [sic] my family’ or ‘You disrespect me,’ something like
that.” The neighbor then saw Burns move back several steps,
take a gun from his waist area, point it at Robbins, and fire three
or four times. After Robbins fell, Burns took a step closer and
fired at him four or five more times.
Another neighbor, also testifying for the prosecution,
corroborated the first neighbor’s testimony. This second neighbor
heard four or five gunshots while inside his home. He moved to a
window and saw Burns holding what appeared to be a gun, which
Burns then tucked into his waistband.
Burns’s acquaintance of 26 years, testifying for the defense,
saw Robbins being shot while visiting a relative’s nearby home.
This acquaintance had gone outside to light a cigarette and saw
Burns standing across the street. Nine or 10 gunshots sounded.
“I lit my cigarette. I seen him standing clearly across the street.
When the gunshots rang out, [Burns] was standing here, and he
ran that way.”
2. The 2005 Trial and Appeal
The People charged Burns with Robbins’s murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)), and alleged Burns, in committing that offense, had
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great
bodily injury or death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); had personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)); and
had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)).
The superior court instructed jurors on murder and malice
aforethought pursuant to CALJIC Nos. 8.10 and 8.11. The court
explained, giving CALJIC No. 8.20, that a deliberate and
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premeditated murder was of the first degree. It offered no other
theories of first-degree murder. The court then explained, giving
CALJIC Nos. 8.30 and 8.31, that unpremeditated, undeliberated
murder or a killing resulting from an unlawful act dangerous to
life were murders of the second degree.
The jury convicted Burns of first-degree murder. The jury
also found true all three firearms allegations. The court
sentenced Burns to 50 years to life. This court affirmed the
judgment. (People v. Burns, supra, B189644.)
3. Resentencing Proceedings
On September 19, 2022, Burns filed a petition for
resentencing in the superior court. That court denied Burns’s
petition for failing to make a prima facie case for relief. (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) It concluded the jury “instructions did not
permit the jury to convict [Burns] of murder under theories of
felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or any other theory of imputed malice based on his mere
participation in the crime.”
4. Appeal
Burns timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
“In 2018, after [Burns’s] conviction and sentencing, the
Governor signed Senate Bill No. 1437, making, effective as of
January 1, 2019, ameliorative changes to our state’s homicide
law. (See People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 846.) As part
of these ameliorative changes, malice, a key element the People
must prove in a murder prosecution, may no longer be imputed to
a defendant solely because the defendant participated in another
crime. (Gentile, at p. 846; § 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018,
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ch. 1015, § 2 (Sen. Bill No. 1437).) This means, for instance, that
a defendant is no longer guilty of murder as an aider and abettor
solely because the ‘natural and probable consequences’ of that
other crime included a confederate’s commission of murder.
(Gentile, at p. 842; see id. at pp. 842–843.)” (People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558 (Patton).) These ameliorative changes
apply retroactively through the resentencing process set forth in
section 1172.6. (Ibid.)
“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . may file a petition with the
court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s
murder . . . conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts when” three conditions apply. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a).) As relevant here: First, the charging document “allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory . . . [in] which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Second, petitioner was
convicted of the murder charge or accepted a plea offer in lieu of
trial on such a charge. (Id., subd. (a)(2).) And third, “petitioner
could not presently be convicted of murder because of” the
changes to homicide law effective in 2019. (Id., subd. (a)(3).)
Upon receipt of a facially sufficient petition — along with
briefing in opposition or support — the superior court holds a
hearing to determine whether a petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) If so, the court issues
an order to show cause and then holds an evidentiary hearing.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) If not, the petition may be denied
so long as the superior court provides a written statement of
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reasons. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see generally Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pp. 559, 562.)
The record of conviction informs the prima facie
determination. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The record
may include “the trial evidence, the jury instructions, and closing
arguments of counsel” (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1,
13 (Lopez)), as well as “ ‘the jury’s verdicts, and the factual
findings they necessarily reflect’ ” (People v. Morales (2024)
102 Cal.App.5th 1120, 1131, italics omitted, quoting People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 465 (Curiel)). The superior court
may not engage in factfinding, weigh the evidence, or make
credibility determinations at the prima facie stage. (Lewis, at
p. 972.)
We independently review a trial court’s conclusion that a
petitioner failed to make a prima facie case for relief. (Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14.)
II. The Superior Court Properly Denied Burns’s
Petition at the Prima Facie Stage.
Burns has not made a prima facie showing, and dismissal
of his petition was proper, because the record of conviction
conclusively demonstrates that he was not convicted under an
imputed malice theory (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)) and that his
conviction survives the 2019 homicide law changes (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3)).
“A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
law if the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of the evidence, or credibility
determinations, that . . . the petitioner was the actual killer,
or . . . the petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was not
imputed based solely on participation in a crime.” (Lopez, supra,
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78 Cal.App.5th at p. 14; see Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563
[citing People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233, in which a
petitioner could not make a prima facie showing when “petitioner
was the ‘only participant in the killing,’ [and so] he was not
convicted under an invalid theory”].)
Jurors convicted Burns of first-degree murder, and the only
way for jurors to do so, given the jury instruction, was to find a
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing. The jury rejected
murder in the second degree, and, furthermore, the jury
expressly found Burns personally and intentionally shot Robbins
in committing the murder given its findings on the gun
enhancements. (See, e.g., § 12022.53, subd. (d) [requiring a
finding that the defendant “personally and intentionally
discharge[d] a firearm and proximately cause[d] great bodily
injury . . . or death”].)
Further, the jury was not instructed on any theory of
murder culpability that involved imputed malice or that Senate
Bill No. 1437 abrogated. (People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 52 [“[I]f the record shows that the jury was not instructed on
either the natural and probable consequences or felony-murder
doctrines, then the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law.”].) The court’s jury instructions did not permit a conviction
based on the felony-murder rule, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine related to aiders and abettors, or any other
imputations of malice. Nor was Burns charged with any target
crimes that might have undergirded such theories. Burns’s
conviction thus has no defect that Senate Bill No. 1437 sought to
rectify.
Burns contends otherwise, directing us to the inclusion of
the phrase “natural consequences of the act” within the jury
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instructions addressing implied malice and second-degree
murder. But “ ‘[t]he use of the term “natural consequences” in
the . . . definition of implied malice does not import into the crime
of murder . . . the distinct “natural and probable consequences”
doctrine developed in the context of aiding and abetting
liability.’ ” (People v. Carr (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 (Carr),
quoting People v. Martinez (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 314, 334.)
“ ‘[I]mplied malice is not imputed malice.’ ” (People v. Love (2025)
107 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1289, quoting Carr, at p. 139.) And Senate
Bill No. 1437’s ameliorative changes did not affect the quoted
language in these instructions. (See People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 288–299; Carr, at pp. 141–145 [explaining
the difference between the now-abrogated doctrine and the
“natural consequences” language used elsewhere in homicide
law].) Moreover, by finding first-degree murder and rejecting
second-degree murder, the jury rejected implied malice in favor of
premeditation and deliberation, thus the definition of implied
malice seems to be of no bearing here. (Cf. People v. Rivera
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 231 [tying implied malice to second-
degree murder, not to first-degree premeditated murder].)
Finally, we decline Burns’s invitation to revisit, at the
prima facie stage of this resentencing matter, the jury’s weighing
of the trial evidence implicating him as the shooter, which it
plainly credited. The jury’s findings are conclusive on us in this
matter. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 460, 471 [issue
preclusion applies in section 1172.6 resentencing proceedings].)
III. No Relief Under Section 1172.1 is Available.
Burns contends that even if section 1172.6 resentencing is
unavailable, he should have been given the opportunity to pursue
resentencing under section 1172.1 because he has shown
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reformed conduct while serving his sentence. Section 1172.1 now
allows a court to resentence a defendant on its own motion “at
any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original
sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority
or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1); Assem. Bill No. 600 (2023-
2024 Reg. Sess.).) But section 1172.1 expressly denies defendants
the right to make such requests, and trial courts have no
obligation to respond to them. (§ 1172.1, subd. (c) [“A defendant
is not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under
this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief
under this section, the court is not required to respond.”].) Even
if we were to construe Burns’s mention of section 1172.1 below as
a request for relief under that statute, and even if we were to
construe the superior court’s silence as an order summarily
declining to consider that request, we would find that order is not
appealable. (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 996;
People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 696–697.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying resentencing.
SCHERB, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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