CourtListener 10796993•People v. Hernandez CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 2/20/26 P. v. Hernandez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B339050
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA348445)
v.
EDWARD GIOVANI
HERNANDEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Larry P. Fidler, Judge. Affirmed.
John Lanahan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
In 2008, Edward Giovani Hernandez, a member of the
Mara Salvatrucha (M.S.) criminal street gang, approached the
owners of a “casita,” an underground bar, and threatened the
owners into agreeing to pay him in exchange for his protection.
Once Hernandez established the arrangement, he sent
codefendant Boris Bonilla—his brother and another member of
M.S.—to the casita to provide security. One night, while Bonilla
was monitoring the casita and Hernandez was absent, a man
arrived, proclaimed membership in a rival gang, and stated the
casita was in his territory. Bonilla communicated with
Hernandez by text and phone and told one of the owners that he
was letting his brother know “to see what was going to happen.”
Bonilla then followed the man outside and shot him to death.
A jury convicted Hernandez in 2012 of first degree murder
and attempted extortion, after the trial court instructed the jury
on, among other things, felony murder and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. Hernandez later petitioned for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 (former section
1170.95) as to his murder conviction. Following briefing and an
evidentiary hearing, at which neither party submitted new
evidence, the superior court denied the petition, finding the
People proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Hernandez was
guilty of either felony murder or implied malice murder under
still-valid theories.
Hernandez argues substantial evidence did not support the
superior court’s determination. We conclude substantial evidence
supported the court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hernandez was a major participant in the underlying felony and
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
acted with reckless disregard for human life, and thus was guilty
of felony murder under a theory that is still valid under section
189, subdivision (e). We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Evidence at Trial
1. The casita and the payment arrangement
Casitas, or “little houses” in Spanish, are (in this context)
illegal after-hours venues operated out of apartments, houses, or
abandoned businesses. They sell alcohol and drugs and often
offer gambling and sex work. Casitas are not safe places, given
these illicit activities. When a casita opens in gang territory, a
gang member will typically approach the casita’s owner,
determine how much money the casita is making, and demand
payment or “taxes.” Casita owners generally comply with the
gang’s demands because they perceive the demands as threats.
The gang that establishes control over a casita may allow
rival gang members to participate in the casita’s activities so long
as those rivals follow the rules and do not attempt to take over
the casita. The controlling gang usually installs its own members
in the casita to protect it from rival gang members and to ensure
the casita’s owners are paying the gang the correct amount of
money. Generally, the controlling gang is only concerned with
protecting its interest in the casita’s revenue, not the safety of the
casita’s patrons. To protect its interest, the controlling gang will
likely use “force and violence,” which may include “shooting and
killing someone.”
3
On September 10, 2008, Evelyn V. and Jimmy P.2 opened a
casita at their apartment in Los Angeles. They advertised their
casita by distributing business cards at bars throughout the
neighborhood, including at a bar where Hernandez worked.
Within days of opening the casita, Evelyn was at home
when she received a phone call from her sister, who said a man
named Cesar had called and was demanding to speak to Evelyn.
(Evelyn’s sister had Evelyn’s cellphone at the time and had
answered a call to that phone.) The man told Evelyn’s sister,
“ ‘I’m outside [the casita] . . . on some motorcycles, and if [Evelyn]
doesn’t come out, I’m going to beat down the doors.’ ”
Evelyn went outside and saw a group of men standing near
three or four motorcycles. Evelyn asked whom to speak to, and
someone pointed to Hernandez. Hernandez confirmed he was the
man who spoke to Evelyn’s sister on the phone. Hernandez then
told Evelyn she had to pay him so that he could protect the casita
from “cholos” in the neighborhood.3 Hernandez said the cholos
“kill[ed] people” and would not mind killing Evelyn, but they
would not harm anyone if they knew he was in charge of the
casita. Hernandez said he would keep gang members from going
to the casita. Evelyn told Hernandez about the problems she was
having at the casita with fights among customers and the police
showing up.
Evelyn told Hernandez she needed to speak to Jimmy
before entering into any potential agreement. Hernandez gave
2 We refer to the witnesses by their first name and last
initial to protect their privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4), (b)(10).)
3 Evelyn understood the term “cholo” to refer to a gang
member.
4
Evelyn his phone number and said to call him once she made up
her mind.
The next day, Evelyn saw Hernandez at a restaurant.
Afraid that Hernandez had followed her, Evelyn called him and
said she wanted to meet to discuss a payment arrangement.
Later that night, Evelyn and Jimmy met Hernandez at the
casita. Hernandez said he wanted to collect a weekly “rent” of
$350 from the casita in exchange for protection “from danger.”
He said he would send someone to the casita to sell drugs, he
would take all the proceeds from the drug sales, and he would
send another person to the casita to watch the inside. He stated
he hoped they could reach an agreement because “he didn’t want
any trouble.” Jimmy said the fee was too high and Hernandez
lowered it to $250. Hernandez told Jimmy that if Jimmy did not
go along with the plan, he would have to threaten him. Jimmy
and Evelyn then agreed to Hernandez’s arrangement because
they were too afraid to say no.
Hernandez told Evelyn and Jimmy that “he was the one
who gave orders and would take care of that area.” Hernandez
said “he was supervising and taking care of the casita, that he
was going to take care of us and that he would send people to
work outside to supervise whether the police [were] coming and
whether other people, strange people, would get close to the
casita, and that he would send somebody to sell drugs.”
Hernandez said he had “people who worked underneath him” and
“took care of the area for him.”4
4 Jimmy testified that Hernandez told him and Evelyn these
things on the same day that Hernandez first contacted Evelyn by
phone; he believed Hernandez and Bonilla came inside the house
5
The next night, Hernandez returned to the casita with a
man named Willie and said Willie would sell drugs in the casita.
At some point, Hernandez also came to the casita with Bonilla.
Hernandez said Bonilla would be “in charge” and would watch
the inside of the casita to ensure no one else sold drugs.
On September 19, 2008, in the late evening, Hernandez,
Willie, and Bonilla came to the casita. Hernandez and Willie sold
drugs to the casita’s patrons while Bonilla sat by himself near the
kitchen.
2. The shooting
The next night, Bonilla returned to the casita. A new
person also arrived who Bonilla said would sell drugs, per
Hernandez’s instructions. Hernandez was not there. Throughout
most of the night, Bonilla sat by himself and did not speak to
anyone.
At 3:30 a.m., Jose Enriquez Mendez, a young man who
lived above the casita, arrived. He was already drunk, so Evelyn
tried to turn him away. Mendez refused to leave and asked for a
beer.
Another man at the bar approached Evelyn and touched
her shoulder. Mendez told the man not to touch her, and the men
started arguing. Mendez then announced he was a cholo who
“belonged to 18th Street,” a local gang, and “no one could touch
him.” Mendez also approached Jimmy and told him that he could
“take care of” the man who was “bugging [his] wife.” Jimmy told
him that everything was fine. Mendez said “it was his territory”
that first day. According to Jimmy, during that initial meeting
Hernandez introduced himself but did not introduce Bonilla, and
Bonilla did not introduce himself or speak during the
conversation.
6
and “if anything happened, he was there to take care of it.” At
one point, he pulled up his shirt to show a small tattoo of the
number “18” on his chest.
While Mendez was doing these things, Bonilla watched
angrily and picked up his phone. Evelyn approached Bonilla and
asked him to calm down because he looked upset and angry. “He
told [Evelyn] that he was texting his brother which [sic] what
was going to happen.” On cross-examination, Evelyn stated she
“told [Bonilla] to calm down, and he said, no, that he was letting
his brother know to see what was going to happen.” Bonilla also
said (apparently in reference to himself) that “he was a person
who wouldn’t put up with much” and “he didn’t care what could
happen.” On re-cross, Bonilla’s counsel asked Evelyn, “You were
asked yesterday by [Hernandez’s counsel] about the text
messaging, when you walked up to [Bonilla] and he appeared
upset, and he was text messaging, and you asked him—or you
said ‘calm down,’ and he said he was text messaging his brother
and words to the effect of to ask what was next, something like
that. Do you remember that?” Evelyn responded, “Yes.”
Phone records showed that on the night of the murder, a
prepaid phone associated with Bonilla sent text messages to a
phone associated with Hernandez at 3:35 and 3:39 a.m.
Additionally, records showed that at 3:21 and 3:48 a.m., the
phone linked to Hernandez called the prepaid phone, and the
calls lasted for 142 seconds and 43 seconds, respectively. There
were no records of the contents of the texts or phone calls.
Jimmy came out of the kitchen and told Mendez to go to
bed. Mendez shook Jimmy’s hand, gave him a kiss on the cheek,
and told him, “ ‘Anything you need, anything you need, I’m here
7
for you.’ ” While Mendez was saying goodbye to Jimmy, Bonilla
“was just staring at them.”
Mendez then left the casita. While Mendez was standing
outside near the front door, he texted his brother who was in the
upstairs apartment, “ ‘Come pick me up. I don’t feel right over
here. There is a guy tripping on me.’ ” He then called his brother
and repeated his request to be picked up.
After Mendez left, Evelyn tried to lock the front door, but
Bonilla pushed past her and went outside. Bonilla approached
Mendez and punched him, then pulled out a gun and shot
Mendez in the torso. Mendez tried to run away, but Bonilla shot
him three more times, killing him.5 After the fourth gunshot,
Bonilla ran away. Mendez’s brother heard the gunshots a few
seconds after his phone call with Mendez ended.
At 3:59 a.m., officers from the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD) received a 911 call regarding the shooting,
and within minutes, arrived at the casita. Evelyn provided an
officer with the phone number she used to contact Hernandez. At
the officer’s request, Evelyn called Hernandez’s phone.
Hernandez answered, and Evelyn asked if “everything was okay
with that other guy.” Hernandez said, “[E]verything was fine. . . .
‘Don’t worry. We are going to move to another casita.’ ”
3. Prosecution gang expert
LAPD Officer Frank Flores testified as a gang expert for
the prosecution. He opined that both Bonilla and Hernandez
were members of M.S., a very violent gang, at the time of
Mendez’s murder. In part based on their respective tattoos, he
5 According to the medical examiner, Mendez’s cause of
death was multiple gunshot wounds. In total, Mendez had four
gunshot wounds.
8
indicated that both were part of the “Leeward” clique of M.S.
Gang members generally gained admission to the gang by
committing some type of violent act such as a robbery or a
shooting against a rival. They also typically gained status in the
gang through violence, and it was important for gang members to
be feared by their own gang.
Actions by individual M.S. members reflect on the gang.
“They are required, as members of the gang, to uphold the gang’s
reputation, to defend the gang’s territory, to react in a certain
fashion when challenged. . . . If it’s a disrespect, you are required
to act. If you don’t, there could be repercussions . . . even from
your own gang for not doing so.” Sometimes M.S. members
murdered fellow members, including for perceived weakness or
cooperation with law enforcement.
Among M.S.’s primary activities were extortion, robbery,
and drug sales. M.S. typically extorted businesses within its
territory by demanding payment in exchange for protection from
other local gangs.
M.S.’s chief rival was the 18th Street gang. Flores stated
that violence does not necessarily result every time an M.S.
member crossed paths with an 18th Street member—it depended
on different factors, such as “timing and opportunity.” However,
Flores estimated that this rivalry had led to approximately 200
murders committed by the two gangs against each other in Los
Angeles in his 16-year career. Flores opined that if a member of
18th Street went to territory belonging to M.S. and announced
membership in the 18th Street gang, the 18th Street member
likely “would be attacked, assaulted . . . [or] killed. There would
be, without a doubt, some violence.” According to Flores, the
casita was in M.S. territory. He stated it would be highly
9
unusual for an 18th Street gang member to knowingly go into an
M.S.-operated casita. It would be disrespectful for an 18th Street
member to claim his gang in the presence of the M.S. member,
and the M.S. member would be expected to respond, “if not
immediately, then soon after.” But while an M.S. member’s
“normal impulse” would be to assault the 18th Street member, a
casita setting might affect the way the M.S. member responded.
Flores gave an opinion based on hypothetical facts that
tracked the facts of the case. He testified that an M.S. member
who negotiates the payment arrangement with casita owners and
places other gang members inside the casita is likely “in control”
and “call[s] the shots.” An M.S. member who monitors the inside
of the casita is likely in a lower position in the gang hierarchy.
According to Flores, if an individual claimed 18th Street
affiliation in the presence of a lower-ranked M.S. member
monitoring a casita, “the person may seek to get some
concurrence or even permission to [retaliate] there versus outside
or otherwise at another place,” “because it would affect the money
generated by the location.”
Flores opined that if someone in the casita claimed to be
from the 18th Street gang in the presence of an M.S. member,
and within minutes the M.S. member communicated with
another higher status M.S. member who set up the extortion
operation, Flores would expect the lower-ranking M.S. member to
be seeking permission to take further action. Flores “would
expect permission or concurrence” before taking immediate action
because “[t]he key is generating money and maintaining the
casita.”
10
4. Defense gang expert
Alex Alonso testified as a gang expert for the defense. He
stated that M.S. gang members sometimes commit shootings to
benefit their gang. He testified that many encounters between
M.S. and 18th Street members do not result in violence.
Sometimes rival members are tolerated at a casita operated by
another gang, as the gang’s primary interest is making money.
B. Verdict, Sentence, and Appeal
In 2012, Hernandez had a joint jury trial with Bonilla. The
trial court instructed the jury on three theories of murder:
(1) Mendez’s death was the natural and probable consequences of
Hernandez and Bonilla’s attempted extortion or offer to sell
drugs, (2) Hernandez and Bonilla were guilty of felony murder
because Mendez was killed during the commission of burglary,6
and (3) Mendez was killed with malice aforethought.
The jury convicted Hernandez of first degree murder of
Mendez (§ 187, subd. (a)), and attempted extortion (§§ 524, 664).
The jury found true that a principal personally and intentionally
used and discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b)-(e)), and the crimes were committed for the benefit of,
at the direction of, and in association with a criminal street gang
6 The underlying felony for the burglary was extortion or the
“offer to sell a controlled substance.” The theory was that every
time Hernandez and/or Bonilla entered into the casita, they did
so with the intention to commit extortion and sell drugs.
11
with the specific intent to promote, further, and assist in criminal
conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)).7
The trial court sentenced Hernandez to a prison term of 50
years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for the murder and 25
years to life for the firearm enhancement. As to the attempted
extortion conviction, the court imposed the middle term of two
years and stayed its execution under section 654.
Hernandez appealed, and we affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Hernandez, et al. (Feb. 24, 2015, B240884) [nonpub.
opn.].)
C. Resentencing Proceedings
In 2019, Hernandez filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 as to his murder conviction. The superior
court issued an order to show cause in 2021 and set the case for
an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing in 2024, both parties
relied on the transcripts from Hernandez’s jury trial. No other
evidence was presented.
The People argued that Hernandez was guilty of either
(1) felony murder, in that he was a major participant in the
underlying burglary who acted with reckless indifference to
human life, or (2) implied malice murder. The People contended
that even though Hernandez was not present during the
shooting, “he was actively involved remotely with what was going
on” and “actually ordered the killing.” The defense conceded that
Hernandez was a major participant but argued there was
7 The jury convicted Bonilla of first degree murder and
attempted extortion. The jury found true, as to Bonilla, firearm
enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), & (e)) and gang
allegations (§ 186.22, subd. (b)).
12
insufficient evidence of either reckless indifference or implied
malice.
The court denied the petition, finding beyond a reasonable
doubt Hernandez was guilty of felony murder and implied malice
murder under theories that are still valid. Hernandez timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6 and Standard of Review
Effective 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 1437) substantially modified the law governing accomplice
liability for murder in two ways. (People v. Curiel (2023)
15 Cal.5th 433, 448 (Curiel); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708 (Strong).) First, it narrowed the felony-murder rule
by adding section 189, subdivision (e), to the Penal Code. (Curiel,
at p. 448.) Under that provision, “[a] participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in
which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the
following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
[¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent
to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Second, SB 1437 eliminated liability for murder as an aider
and abettor under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine by amending section 188. (People v. Patton (2025)
17 Cal.5th 549, 558; Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
13
“[U]nder prior law, a defendant who aided and abetted an
intended assault could be liable for murder, if the murder was
the natural and probable consequence of the intended assault.
[Citation.] The defendant need not have intended the murder or
even subjectively appreciated the natural and probable
consequences of the intended crime.” (Curiel, at p. 449.) Now,
section 188 provides that, except in cases of felony murder, “a
principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought” to be
convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) “Malice shall not be
imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (Ibid.)
SB 1437 also created a procedure for those convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if the
person could not now be convicted of murder because of the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The
resentencing procedure begins with the filing of a petition
containing a declaration that all requirements for eligibility are
met. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A); Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708.) The superior court must then determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing that he or she is
entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a)-(c); Strong, at p. 708.)
If the petitioner has made a prima facie showing he or she
is entitled to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause
and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate
the murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary
hearing the court may consider evidence “previously admitted at
any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,
14
including witness testimony.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
petitioner and the prosecutor may also offer new or additional
evidence. (Ibid.)
On appeal from an order denying a petition under section
1172.6 following an evidentiary hearing, we apply the substantial
evidence standard of review. (People v. Emanuel (2025)
17 Cal.5th 867, 885 (Emanuel).) “Under this standard, ‘we
review the record “ ‘ “in the light most favorable to the judgment
below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact” ’ ” ’ could find [the
necessary fact] beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Ibid.) “ ‘ “While the
trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and
resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility,
all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine
whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder’s findings beyond
a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
400, 414.) “ ‘ “Substantial evidence includes circumstantial
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Superior Court’s
Finding Hernandez Is Guilty of Felony Murder
The Attorney General argues Hernandez is guilty of felony
murder as a major participant in the underlying burglary who
acted with reckless indifference to human life. Hernandez
concedes he was a major participant but argues that the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of reckless indifference.
15
1. Legal principles
A participant in the perpetration of certain enumerated
felonies, including burglary, may be liable for murder if the
People prove he or she “was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life,” within
the meaning of section 190.2, the special circumstances statute.
(§ 189, subds. (a), (e)(3); see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.)
“Section 190.2, subdivision (d), by its text, imposes an actus reus
requirement, i.e., major participation in the enumerated felony,
and a mens rea requirement, i.e., reckless indifference to human
life.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 882.)
“[R]eckless indifference encompasses both subjective and
objective elements. [Citations.] ‘As to the subjective element,
“[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,” and
he or she must consciously disregard “the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.” ’ [Citations.] ‘As to the objective
element, “ ‘[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.’ ” ’ ” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
“ ‘ “Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death
inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish
reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a
‘grave risk of death’ ” satisfies the statutory requirement.’ ”
(Ibid.) “ ‘The degree of risk to human life is crucial to the
analysis.’ ” (Ibid.)
16
Determining a defendant’s culpability for felony murder
requires a “fact-intensive, individualized inquiry” into “the
totality of the circumstances.” (In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th
667, 683 (Scoggins); accord, Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
pp. 883, 885.) To help determine whether a major participant
acted with reckless indifference to human life, our Supreme
Court in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark) “ ‘set out a
nonexhaustive list of considerations relevant to this
determination, including use of or awareness of the presence of a
weapon or weapons, physical presence at the scene and
opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the duration
of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might
represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.’ ” (Emanuel, at
p. 884; see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706, citing Clark, at
pp. 618-623.) “ ‘ “[N]o one of these considerations is necessary,
nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” ’ ” (Emanuel, at
p. 885; accord, Clark, at p. 618.) The “factors identified as
relevant to the reckless indifference inquiry must not supplant
the standard they are meant to elucidate.” (Emanuel, at p. 896.)
“The essential question underpinning our analysis” of the Clark
factors is “what [the defendant’s] actions reveal about his mental
state.” (Emanuel, at p. 891.)
2. Substantial evidence of reckless indifference
Considering the Clark factors and the totality of
circumstances, we conclude substantial evidence supports the
finding Hernandez knowingly created “a grave risk of death.”
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
a. Use or awareness of the presence of weapons
“A defendant’s use of a firearm, even if the defendant does
not kill the victim or the evidence does not establish which armed
17
robber killed the victim, can be significant to the analysis of
reckless indifference to human life.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 618.) In addition to personal use of a weapon, the defendant’s
knowledge that an accomplice will be armed or will use a weapon
during the planned felony is a factor to be considered in
determining a defendant’s mental state, but “the mere fact of a
defendant’s awareness that a gun will be used in the felony is not
sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human life.” (Ibid.;
see People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 809 (Banks)
[defendants “who simply had awareness their confederates were
armed and armed robberies carried a risk of death . . . lack the
requisite reckless indifference to human life”].)
Not having been present at the scene, Hernandez did not
personally use a weapon on the night of the murder. However,
Bonilla carried and used a gun that night, and Hernandez
concedes he knew Bonilla was armed. Further, the evidence
demonstrates Hernandez purposefully stationed Bonilla in the
casita knowing his brother was armed. This factor thus weighs
in favor of a finding of reckless indifference. (Cf. Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 885 [no evidence in the record that defendant
knew accomplice would bring a gun to the robbery that led to
killing by the accomplice].)
b. Physical presence at the scene and opportunity
to restrain confederates or aid victim
The Supreme Court in Clark noted “the importance of [a
defendant’s] presence to culpability.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 619.) Presence “may be particularly significant where . . . the
murder is a culmination or a foreseeable result of several
intermediate steps, or where the [co-]participant who personally
commits the murder exhibits behavior tending to suggest a
18
willingness to use lethal force. In such cases, ‘the defendant’s
presence allows him to observe his cohorts so that it is fair to
conclude that he shared in their actions and mental state. . . .
[Moreover,] the defendant’s presence gives him an opportunity to
act as a restraining influence on murderous cohorts.” (Ibid.) In
Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th 667, the court found it significant that
the defendant who planned an unarmed robbery was not
physically present at the time of the shooting by his accomplice
during the robbery. (Id. at p. 667.) Rather, the defendant
“remained at a nearby gas station during the course of the crime
and did not arrive at the crime scene until after the shooting
occurred.” (Id. at p. 678.) Evidence supported the defendant’s
claim that he was “unaware in real time that [his cohort] was
deviating from the original plan” for no weapons to be used. (Id.
at pp. 678-679.)
However, “physical presence is not invariably a
prerequisite to demonstrating reckless indifference to human life.
Where, for example, a defendant instructs other members of a
criminal gang carrying out carjackings at his behest to shoot any
resisting victims, he need not be present when his subordinates
carry out the instruction in order to be found to be recklessly
indifferent to the lives of the victims.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 619, citing People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 1281-
1282 [sufficient evidence of reckless indifference where
defendant, although absent from the murder scene, “repeatedly
instructed gang members to shoot a victim who resisted” and
later “awarded them stripes for the murder”]; accord, Scoggins,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679 [“emphasiz[ing]” physical presence at
the scene is not required to demonstrate reckless indifference].)
“Especially in light of emerging technologies, a defendant who
19
plans and directs a murder from afar may be just as culpable as a
defendant who is physically present at the scene of the crime.”
(Scoggins, at p. 679.)
“[W]here a crime unfolds quickly, . . . the failure to restrain
a cohort . . . cannot be said to weigh in favor of a finding of
reckless indifference without some evidence in the record
indicating that the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to do
so.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 892.) “This requires some
awareness of the risk of impending lethal violence and time to
react,” such as when the actual killer makes his or her intentions
clear, thus affording the defendant “ ‘the time to observe and
react before the murder.’ ” (Ibid.) In Scoggins, the Attorney
General argued the defendant could have restrained his
accomplices because he was in constant communication with
them before the shooting and “could have instructed them to
avoid using lethal force.” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679.)
However, the court determined that “although [the defendant]
was in close contact with his accomplices before the shooting, he
lacked control over their actions once they arrived on the crime
scene, especially given how quickly the shooting occurred.”
(Ibid.) There was no evidence that the defendant had instructed
his confederates to kill anyone, or that “he directed his
accomplices to deviate from the plan once they arrived at the
crime scene.” (Ibid.)
Hernandez’s situation was quite different from that of the
defendant in Scoggins. Although Hernandez was not present
inside or outside the casita, Bonilla and Hernandez shared
several text messages and phone calls minutes before the
murder, and both direct and circumstantial evidence support a
reasonable inference that Hernandez was not only aware that
20
Bonilla intended to shoot and kill Mendez, but that he
commanded or authorized Bonilla to do so.
The evidence allows a reasonable inference that Hernandez
was the M.S. shot-caller who set up the extortion plan and
controlled lower-ranking gang members involved in the scheme,
including Bonilla. Jimmy testified Hernandez said he was the
one “supervising” the operation and the one “who gave orders.”
Hernandez stated he had “people who worked underneath him”
and “took care of the area for him.” Hernandez stated he would
send Bonilla to supervise inside the casita and make sure no one
else sold drugs. Moreover, Jimmy observed that all the payment
negotiations were done by Hernandez, and although Bonilla was
present during the negotiations, he did not participate and was
not even introduced.
The prosecution’s gang expert, when asked a hypothetical
that tracked the facts of the case, testified that someone in
Hernandez’s position (i.e., an M.S. member who negotiated the
arrangement with casita owners and placed other gang members
inside the casita) was likely “in control” and “call[ed] the shots.”
He further opined that someone in Bonilla’s position (i.e., an M.S.
member who monitored the inside of the casita) was likely lower
in the gang hierarchy.
According to Flores, if an individual claimed 18th Street
affiliation in the presence of a lower-ranked M.S. member
monitoring a casita, that M.S. member would be required to
retaliate, but “may seek to get some concurrence or even
permission” regarding how to do so because it would affect the
money generated by the casita. The evidence supported a
reasonable inference that Bonilla sought such guidance or
permission from the shot-caller Hernandez.
21
According to Evelyn’s testimony, Bonilla angrily picked up
his phone during the time that Mendez was making a scene in
the casita, claiming his 18th gang membership, lifting up his
shirt to show his tattoo, telling other customers no one could
touch him because he was from the 18th Street, and telling
Jimmy that “it was his territory” and “if anything happened, he
was there to take care of it.” During these events, Bonilla texted
Hernandez twice and Hernandez called him at least once.
Although the contents of the texts and calls were not available,
there was other evidence of the nature of the communications.
First, Evelyn testified that after she approached Bonilla
and asked him to calm down, he told her he would not calm
down, and that he was texting his brother to let him know “to see
what was going to happen.” In follow-up questioning, Evelyn
confirmed Bonilla in essence said he was texting his brother to
ask “what was next.”
In addition, Flores testified that if someone in the casita
claimed to be from the 18th Street gang in the presence of an
M.S. member, and within minutes the M.S. member
communicated with another higher ranking M.S. member who
set up the extortion operation, Flores would expect that
communication to include the lower-ranking member seeking
permission to take further action. Flores “would expect
permission or concurrence” before taking immediate action
because “[t]he key is generating money and maintaining the
casita.”
Bonilla did not take immediate action in response to
Mendez’s provocative conduct. Rather, after two texts and at
least one phone call with Hernandez, he waited until Mendez left,
followed him outside, and shot him without any further
22
provocation. The evidence allows a reasonable inference that
Bonilla asked his brother for permission or guidance before he
did so. This scenario is thus markedly different from the one in
Scoggins, where the court concluded there was no evidence to
show the defendant directed his cohorts to shoot the victim.
(Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679; cf. Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th
at p. 807 [evidence of call records showing the defendant spoke to
his actual killer accomplice numerous times “either hours before
or shortly after the killing,” without any evidence of the content
of the calls, did nothing to demonstrate defendant was a major
participant in the murder].) The evidence here suggests
Hernandez had an opportunity to restrain Bonilla but did not do
so, and supports a reasonable inference that Hernandez gave the
order to shoot Mendez. This factor strongly weighs in favor of
finding Hernandez acted with reckless indifference.
c. Duration of the crime
“The duration of the interaction between victims and
perpetrators” is another factor to consider. (Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 620.) “A lengthy interaction between
perpetrators and victims of a felony may increase the risk of
resistance, conflict, and violence.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 886.) In Clark, the court observed that “although the planned
robbery was to be of substantial duration, . . . the period of
interaction between perpetrators and victims was designed to be
limited.” (Clark, at p. 620.) Thus, the court concluded “the
evidence was insufficient to show that the duration of the felony
under these circumstances supported the conclusion that
defendant exhibited reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at
pp. 620-621.)
23
Hernandez’s extortion scheme at the casita was an ongoing,
nightly operation with no end date, and the intended victims
were the casita’s owners. Bonilla’s violence was not directed at
them. Except for the few seconds in which Bonilla punched and
then shot Mendez, the two had no direct interactions. Given
Bonilla’s interaction with Mendez was not a planned part of the
extortion activities, the duration of the contact between Bonilla
and Mendez is not particularly probative of Hernandez’s state of
mind. Mendez happened to come into the casita, and in his
drunken state, refused to leave, started arguing with other
customers, and announced his allegiance to a rival gang. There
is no evidence Bonilla, much less Hernandez, knew in advance
that Mendez would be there. To the contrary, Hernandez had
told Evelyn that with the casita under his protection, “cholos”
would leave the casita alone. However, Bonilla’s killing of
Mendez also cannot fairly be described as spontaneous. As
discussed, Bonilla and Hernandez communicated repeatedly
during the time Mendez was present in the casita. (Cf. Banks,
supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 87 [fact that accomplice’s killing of victim
“was apparently a spontaneous response to armed resistance
from the victim” supported conclusion defendant did not know his
own actions would involve a grave risk of death].) The “duration
of the crime” factor is thus neutral in this case.
d. Efforts taken to minimize the risk of violence
“Efforts at the planning stage to minimize the potential for
violence . . . are viewed as a distinct factor from efforts to restrain
confederates once the felony is underway.” (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pp. 887-888.) Hernandez did not present any
evidence or argue at the section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing that
he engaged in efforts to minimize the risk of violence in the
24
underlying burglary, and the People do not address this factor.
The extortion plan involved placing an armed M.S. member
inside the inherently dangerous setting of a casita, knowing that
rival gang members were in the area. Although Hernandez told
Evelyn and Jimmy he intended for his subordinates’ presence at
the casita to deter members of other gangs or other criminals
from entering the casita, there is no evidence Hernandez
instructed Bonilla not to engage in violence should a rival gang
member enter the casita. This factor thus does not weigh in
Hernandez’s favor.
e. Knowledge of cohort’s likelihood of killing
A defendant’s knowledge of a cohort’s propensity to kill is
another factor to weigh, because “[a] defendant’s willingness to
engage in an armed [felony] with individuals known to him to use
lethal force may give rise to the inference that the defendant
disregarded a ‘grave risk of death.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
p. 621; accord, Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.) In
determining whether there was evidence of a defendant’s
knowledge of an accomplice’s likelihood of using lethal force, the
California Supreme Court in “Banks caution[ed] against relying
too heavily on gang membership where there is no evidence the
defendant or his confederates ‘had ever participated in shootings,
murder, or attempted murder, or even that any member of their
clique had.’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 990;
accord, People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 561, fn. 5; see
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 810-811.)
No evidence was introduced that Bonilla or anyone else in
the Leeward clique of M.S. to which he and Hernandez belonged
had “previously committed murder, attempted murder, or any
other violent crime.” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 805
25
[although defendant and confederates were gang members, there
was no evidence that any of them had previously committed
violent crimes].)8 Given there was no individualized evidence
presented at trial regarding Bonilla’s propensities, we will heed
the Supreme Court’s admonition and not assume based on
Bonilla’s membership in M.S. that he had a propensity for lethal
violence or that Hernandez was aware of such a propensity. This
factor thus does not weigh in favor of finding reckless indifference
by Hernandez.
f. Totality of the circumstances
Ample evidence demonstrated Hernandez was an M.S.
shot-caller who, in his words, “gave orders” to “people who
worked underneath him.” The evidence also demonstrated
Bonilla was a lower-status gang member who was required to
follow Hernandez’s orders with respect to the casita extortion
scheme. Hernandez intentionally placed Bonilla in the casita
knowing his brother was armed. Although Hernandez may not
have anticipated ahead of time that someone like Mendez would
enter the casita and start claiming membership in the rival gang,
Bonilla did not act alone or spontaneously when he shot Mendez.
Rather, Hernandez and Bonilla were in frequent communication
by text and phone after Mendez began engaging in provocative
acts inside the casita. Bonilla said he was advising Hernandez of
the situation and asking him “what was next.” The evidence
permits a reasonable inference that, despite Mendez’s
unanticipated presence and behavior, Hernandez had “some
8 Bonilla was deported to Honduras at some point after a
gang-related arrest at age 16, and it was unclear how long he had
been back in the United States before committing the murder of
Mendez.
26
awareness of the risk of impending lethal violence and time to
react” and “a meaningful opportunity” to restrain Bonilla from
killing Mendez. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 892.) He
failed to do so. Rather, a factfinder reasonably could infer that
Hernandez used his authority and control over Bonilla to direct
Bonilla to shoot Mendez. (Cf. Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 679
[no showing of reckless indifference where defendant “lacked
control” over his cohort’s actions at the crime scene].) Weighing
all the factors and considering the totality of the circumstances,
we conclude substantial evidence supports the superior court’s
determination that Hernandez acted with reckless disregard for
human life and was guilty of felony murder under a still-valid
theory.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
27
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