CourtListener 10796480•Wu v. Weng CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 2/19/26 Wu v. Weng CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DAVID WU, B339158
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 22STCV02650
EUGENA WENG,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Rolf M. Treu and Mel Red Recana, Judges.
Reversed and remanded.
Aiman-Smith & Marcy, Reed W.L. Marcy, Brent A.
Robinson; Clarkson Law Firm, Brent A. Robinson; Law Office
of Kelly Y. Chen and Kelly Y. Chen for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Bruce Altschuld and Bruce Altschuld
for Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________
David Wu appeals from a summary judgment entered in
favor of defendant Eugena Weng. Wu sued his former employer
Chef on Fire LLC (COF) and Weng—a member of COF and
the person who hired Wu to work at COF’s restaurant—after
his alleged termination. Wu’s first amended complaint (FAC)
alleged causes of action against COF for violations of the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), wrongful termination,
and retaliation; and against COF and Weng (collectively,
defendants) for Labor Code violations.1
Defendants moved for summary judgment, or,
alternatively, summary adjudication. The trial court granted
their motion in full as to Weng, finding the FAC alleged
no causes of action against her. The court granted summary
adjudication on Wu’s wage and hour claims (failure to pay
wages for all hours worked, to provide meal and rest breaks,
and to provide accurate wage statements)—alleged against “all
Defendants”—on the ground Wu was an exempt employee. The
court denied the motion on Wu’s claims for waiting time penalties
and for failure to permit him to inspect his personnel file—also
alleged against “all Defendants”—and on almost all the other
causes of action alleged against only COF. Wu appealed from
the order to the extent it granted summary judgment in favor
of Weng. By an order from this court, Wu obtained entry
of judgment in favor of Weng on all claims Wu had asserted
against her. We reverse the judgment in favor of Weng.
1 Statutory references are to the Labor Code unless
otherwise noted.
2
BACKGROUND
“On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we
review and recite the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party”: here, Wu. (Clayworth v. Pfizer, Inc.
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 758, 764.)
Weng became a member and five percent owner of COF
around 2018 when COF purchased a restaurant. The other
members of COF were not involved in the restaurant; Weng
ran it. In the summer of 2019, Weng hired Wu—a friend of her
brother Jackson Weng—to work as a manager at the restaurant.
In January 2022, Wu sued COF, Weng, and Doe defendants
after his employment allegedly was terminated in June 2021.
He filed the operative FAC in March 2022. Under “Parties”
the FAC alleged:
“Defendant Eugena Weng . . . and Does 1-10 each
. . . worked as a managing agent and/or owner of
Defendant [COF] and/or Employer Defendants[2] . . . .
In that capacity, Defendant Weng and Does 1-10
(collectively referred to as ‘Individual Defendants’)
each enforced and contributed to defendants’ policies
and practices that resulted in Plaintiff . . . not
being paid wages for all hours worked (including
overtime wages), not being provided with rest-break
compensation for missed or late breaks, and not
being given pay statements reflecting accurate hours
actually worked.”
2 The FAC alleged Does 11-25 each was a business entity and
referred collectively to those Does and COF as the “ ‘Employer
Defendants.’ ”
3
The FAC alleged several causes of action for Labor Code
violations against “all Defendants.” Under those causes of action,
“Defendants” allegedly: (1) failed to pay Wu for all hours
worked in violation of various labor laws (11th cause of action);
(2) “employed Plaintiff for work periods of more than three and
one-half hours,” but “consistently failed to relieve Plaintiff of
his duties when he was lawfully entitled to a rest period” and
failed to pay him for the missed rest periods (12th cause of
action); (3) “failed to provide Plaintiff with accurate wage
statements, in that Defendants never provided Plaintiff . . .
with statements accurately setting forth all hours actually
worked and all wages earned during each pay period” (13th
cause of action); (4) “owed Plaintiff unpaid wages” and “also
have not paid Plaintiff any wages at all for the hours that
he worked between June 8, 2021 through the date of his
termination” [June 20, 2021], and “knew” he “was not fully paid”
(14th cause of action); and (4) “ignored” Wu’s requests through
his attorney to see his personnel file (15th cause of action).
The FAC also alleged FEHA and related causes of action
against the “Employer Defendants.”3
COF and Weng filed a joint answer generally denying the
FAC’s allegations and asserting several affirmative defenses.
Defendants’ twelfth through fourteenth affirmative defenses
alleged Wu “was an exempt employee,” “was a managerial
employee and therefore not entitled to the relief he requests,”
and “was a salaried employee and thus not entitled to the
rights he asserts,” respectively.
3 The matter was assigned to Department 45, the Honorable
Mel Red Recana presiding.
4
On November 7, 2023, Weng and COF filed a notice of
motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for summary
adjudication, along with a memorandum of points and
authorities; declarations of Weng, Jackson Weng (also a former
manager at COF’s restaurant), Leo Sanchez (a former employee
at COF’s restaurant), and defendants’ counsel; and a request
for judicial notice. Defendants filed a separate statement
of undisputed material facts in support of their motion that
same day but then filed a second separate statement on
March 11, 2024.
Wu filed an opposition to defendants’ motion together with
an opposition and response to defendants’ separate statement;
objections to defendants’ evidence, including an objection to
defendants’ separate statement in its entirety as noncompliant
with rule 3.150 of the California Rules of Court;4 objections
to defendants’ request for judicial notice; a separate statement
of undisputed material facts in support of his opposition; his
counsel’s declaration with a compendium of exhibits—including,
among other exhibits, Wu’s own declaration, COF’s discovery
responses, and excerpts from Weng’s deposition; and a request
for judicial notice, including of California’s minimum wage rates
from 2019 through 2021.
On April 11, 2024, defendants filed a reply brief in
response to Wu’s opposition that also asked the court to strike
Wu’s opposition, asserting it was over the page limit due to
single-spaced footnotes and objecting that Wu had submitted the
declaration of a witness not identified in his discovery responses.
Defendants attached to their reply brief: the first page of a
4 Rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
5
purported motion in limine to exclude witnesses not identified
in discovery; a “ServSafe® Certification” indicating Wu had
passed the “ServSafe® Food Protection Manager Certification
Examination” on March 31, 2021; a page from a document
Wu apparently submitted to the Employment Development
Department; a page from Wu’s deposition transcript; a second
declaration from Weng; and a translated declaration from
Lisa Seo, a former server at COF’s restaurant. The next day,
Wu filed objections to defendants’ reply evidence, arguing
defendants improperly were attempting to introduce new
evidence in support of their motion. Wu asked the court to
strike the reply evidence in its entirety.
On April 18, 2024, defendants filed written objections
to Wu’s evidence a week after they filed their reply brief. They
stated they would have a court reporter at the hearing under
rule 3.1352, and would make the stated objections.
The court heard defendants’ motion on April 25, 2024.5
The court issued a tentative ruling that granted the motion
in part and denied it in part. The court denied defendants’
request for judicial notice of decisions from the California
Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board on Wu’s case, Wu’s
Employment Development Department Appeal Form, and Wu’s
Worker’s Compensation application form—noting the evidence
was inadmissible under Unemployment Insurance Code sections
1094 and 1960. The court granted their request as to Wu’s
complaint to the Department of Fair Employment and Housing,
its right to sue letter, and the FAC, and granted Wu’s request
5 The Honorable Rolf M. Treu heard and decided defendants’
motion.
6
for judicial notice in its entirety. The court also sustained
Wu’s evidentiary objections to defendants’ separate statement
and new reply evidence. The court (1) struck defendants’
separate statement, finding it failed to conform to rule
3.150(d)(1), (d)(2), (d)(3), and (h); and (2) ruled it would
“disregard all new arguments and any evidence COF puts forth
upon reply.” The court also did not consider defendants’ written
objections, as they were filed late under rule 3.1354 without
the court’s permission and any showing of good cause for the
late filing.
After argument, the court took the matter under
submission and, later that same day, adopted the tentative ruling
as its final order. As relevant here, the court granted defendants’
motion “in its entirety” as to Weng after finding the FAC alleged
no causes of action against her; granted the motion as to Wu’s
wage and hour claims—the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth
causes of action—on the ground Wu held a salaried, managerial
position and thus was exempt from overtime and meal break
regulations; and denied the motion as to Wu’s fourteenth
and fifteenth causes of action.
Wu filed a notice of appeal from the court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Weng—a nonappealable order.
This court notified Wu that he must provide the court with an
appealable judgment. Wu obtained a final judgment in favor
of Weng, entered on August 9, 2024, signed by Judge Recana.
Weng moved to dismiss Wu’s appeal, arguing this court
lacked jurisdiction under section 635 of the Code of Civil
Procedure because neither the judge who heard and ruled—
by minute order—on defendants’ summary judgment motion,
nor the presiding judge, had signed the August 9, 2024 judgment.
7
Weng asked us to take judicial notice of the April 25, 2024
minute order “signed” by Judge Treu, the August 9, 2024
judgment signed by Judge Recana, and the fact that Judge
Samantha Jessner was the presiding judge at the time.
We granted Weng’s request.
Wu opposed the motion, noting Code of Civil Procedure
section 635 applies “only to the rendition of judgment after
a bench trial where a question of fact was ‘heard or tried.’ ”
(Quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 635 and citing Armstrong v. Picquelle
(1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 122, 127.) Because summary judgment
is neither a bench trial, nor a proceeding where questions of fact
are heard and tried, section 635 did not apply. Wu also argued
Judge Recana’s entry of the final judgment on Judge Treu’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of Weng was a ministerial
act. We denied Weng’s motion to dismiss the appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of review on summary judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no
triable issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (c).) A defendant moving for summary judgment must
show the plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements
of the cause of action or cannot refute an affirmative defense.
(Id., § 437c, subds. (o), (p)(2).) If the defendant satisfies this
initial burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present
evidence demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact
as to the cause of action or defense. (Id., § 437c, subd. (p)(2);
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850–851
(Aguilar).) “There is a genuine issue of material fact if, and
only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to
8
find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion
in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar,
at p. 845.) “The pleadings determine the issues to be addressed
by a summary judgment motion.” (Arce v. The Ensign Group, Inc.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 622, 628 (Arce).)
“On appeal from a summary judgment, we review the
record de novo and independently determine whether triable
issues of material fact exist. [Citations.] We resolve any
evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in favor of the party opposing
summary judgment”—here, Wu. (Arce, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 628–629; see also Regents of University of California v.
Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 (Regents) [“Evidence
presented in opposition to summary judgment is liberally
construed, with any doubts about the evidence resolved in favor
of the party opposing the motion.”]; Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 327, 342 [moving party’s affidavits are strictly
construed while those of the opposing party are liberally
construed].) We perform the same three-step analysis as the
trial court: we “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings,
(2) determine whether the moving party has established facts
justifying judgment in its favor, and (3) determine whether the
nonmoving party has demonstrated a triable issue of material
fact.” (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1206–1207.)
In conducting this de novo review, we consider “all of the
evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion
(except that which the court properly excluded) and the
uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports.”
(Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) We accept
as undisputed facts only those parts of the moving party’s
evidence that are not contradicted by the evidence of the
9
opposing party. (Arteaga, at p. 342.) “ ‘We need not defer to
the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary
judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not
its rationale.’ ” (Arce, at p. 629.)
2. The FAC alleged causes of action against Weng
individually
Defendants moved for summary judgment specifically
as to Weng on the ground the FAC did not allege a FEHA claim
against her. In their supporting memorandum, defendants
argued Weng must be dismissed because Wu “never filed a FEHA
claim form against . . . Weng” and “did not obtain a right to sue
letter against” her. Defendants argued Wu, as a result, failed
to exhaust his administrative remedies and “no action as to
FEHA’s statutory claims” could “stand against . . . Weng.”
In opposing this contention, Wu argued he “never raised
Weng’s individual liability on any of the FEHA claims . . ., and
[as] this issue was not raised in the answer to the operative
complaint, the Court may not grant summary judgment on this
point.” In other words, because Wu never purported to allege
Weng was individually liable on the FEHA claims alleged against
COF and the entity Does, the court could not grant summary
judgment or adjudication against Wu in favor of Weng on that
point.
Although defendants argued only that the FAC alleged
no FEHA claims against Weng individually, the court found
it alleged no cause of action identifying Weng “as the subject
individual” at all. The court seems to have misapprehended Wu’s
opposition, stating, “Plaintiff opposes arguing that because no
issue was raised on the pleadings regarding Weng, that the Court
may not grant summary judgment. However, Plaintiff provides
10
no authority for this assertion. The standard upon summary
judgment is clear, the defendant must carry their burden to
show no issue of a triable material fact, plaintiff must then show
that a triable issue exists.” The court found “COF has carried
their burden as to Weng, Plaintiff failed to demonstrate theirs.
Therefore, the Motion is granted as to Weng, and this order shall
only address Defendant COF.”
Wu’s opposition did not cite authority for the proposition
that an issue not raised in the pleadings cannot form the basis
for summary judgment. However, it is well established that
“the pleadings determine the scope of relevant issues on a
summary judgment motion.” (Nieto v. Blue Shield of California
Life & Health Ins. Co. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 60, 74.) Indeed,
when considering a motion for summary judgment, the court
first must “identify the issues raised by the pleadings, since
it is these allegations to which the motion must respond.”
(Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp.
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492.) “Summary judgment cannot
be granted on a ground not raised by the pleadings.” (Bostrom
v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1663.)
Here, not only did defendants assert a ground for summary
judgment not raised in the FAC, but the court granted summary
judgment in Weng’s favor on a ground defendants did not assert
in their moving papers—that there was “no single cause of action
alleged at or identifying Eugena Weng as the subject individual.”
The FAC identified Weng as a party and referred to her
and the individual Doe defendants collectively as the “Individual
Defendants.” The FAC defined “Employer Defendants” as COF
and the entity Doe defendants. “All Defendants” thus reasonably
referred to COF and Weng, individually, along with all Doe
11
defendants. The FAC alleged FEHA and related causes of action
—the first through tenth causes of action—against only the
“Employer Defendants.” Weng was not included in the FAC’s
definition of Employer Defendants. Wu, as he stated in his
opposition, did not assert those causes of action against Weng.
Summary judgment or adjudication in favor of Weng on the
ground defendants raised—that Wu could not pursue his FEHA
claims against Weng for failure to exhaust his administrative
remedies as to her—therefore was improper. (California-
American Water Co. v. Marina Coast Water Dist. (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1272, 1293 [summary adjudication in error where
moving party “addressed allegations not pleaded in the complaint
and thus failed to negate the express allegations pleaded in the
complaint”].)
The court also erred in finding the FAC alleged no causes
of action against Weng individually. In contrast to the FEHA
claims, the FAC alleged Labor Code violations—the eleventh
through fifteenth causes of action—against “all Defendants.”
Weng’s name is not listed within each of those causes of action,
but the FAC clearly intended to include her when it referred
to “all Defendants.” Weng is a named defendant in the caption
of the FAC and, as discussed, is described as an individual
defendant under the “Parties” section of the FAC.
Moreover, within each of those causes of action the FAC
alleged the “Individual Defendants”—again, including Weng by
definition—“were the highest-ranking management employees
of Employer Defendants,” were “ ‘other person[s] acting on behalf
of an employer’ and managing agents of Employer Defendants,[6]
6 The thirteenth cause of action alleged the Individual
Defendants were managing agents of COF.
12
who exercised substantial independent authority and judgment,
which ultimately resulted in the enforcement of the wrongful
corporate policies, which caused Plaintiff . . . to be denied wages
for all hours worked, to be denied meal and/or rest period pay
for late or missed breaks, and to receive incomplete or inaccurate
pay statements. Accordingly . . ., pursuant to Labor Code § 558.1,
Individual Defendants are liable to the same degree as Employer
Defendants for the violations alleged in” the eleventh through
fifteenth causes of action.
The FAC also generally alleged Weng worked “as a
managing agent and/or owner” of COF and “enforced and
contributed to” COF’s “policies and practices that resulted in”
Wu “not being paid wages for all hours worked (including
overtime wages), not being provided with rest-break
compensation for missed or late breaks, and not being given
pay statements reflecting accurate hours actually worked.”
Each of the causes of action alleged against “all Defendants”—
including Weng—realleged and incorporated this paragraph
“as if fully set forth” as part of the cause of action.
Section 558.1 provides: “Any employer or other person
acting on behalf of an employer, who violates, or causes to be
violated, any provision regulating minimum wages or hours and
days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission,
or violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7,
1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may be held liable as the employer for
such violation.” (§ 558.1, subd. (a).) The statute defines “ ‘other
person acting on behalf of an employer’ ” as “a natural person
who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the
employer, and the term ‘managing agent’ has the same meaning
as in subdivision (b) of Section 3294 of the Civil Code.” (Id.,
13
subd. (b).) “Courts have defined a ‘managing agent’ pursuant
to [Civil Code section 3294] to be an employee who ‘exercises
substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately
determine corporate policy.’ ” (Espinoza v. Hepta Run, Inc.
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 44, 57, fn. 10 (Espinoza), quoting White v.
Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 573; see Civ. Code, § 3294,
subd. (b) [discussing corporate employer’s liability for punitive
damages for act of employee in certain circumstances based on
“advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization,
ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . on the part
of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation”].)
The FAC alleged Weng was a managing agent or owner
of COF, exercised independent judgment and authority, enforced
or contributed to COF’s policies that resulted in Labor Code
violations against Wu, and was individually liable—as one of
the individual defendants—for those violations to the same
degree as COF—as one of the employer defendants. Accordingly,
the FAC both gave defendants adequate notice that Wu was
asserting his wage and hour claims against Weng individually
and sufficiently alleged her potential individual liability for those
causes of action under section 558.1. (See, e.g., Jones v. Awad,
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 1211 [“courts are encouraged to take
a liberal approach in determining the scope of the pleadings,
so long as those pleadings provide adequate notice to the
opposing party of the theories on which relief is generally
being sought”].)
Defendants’ moving papers, however, did not “respond” to
the above allegations. As we discuss, they presented no evidence
to demonstrate the undisputed facts established Weng could not
be held individually liable under section 558.1.
14
3. Defendants failed to meet their initial burden to show
Wu could not establish section 558.1 applied to Weng
Defendants did not move for summary judgment as to
Weng on the ground she could not be held individually liable
under section 558.1. Their moving papers did not refer to the
statute at all. Defendants only mentioned generally—in their
notice of motion—Wu’s inability to hold Weng individually liable.
The notice asserted summary judgment was proper as to Weng
on the “non[-]FEHA causes of action since Plaintiff has no facts
that Eugena Weng is individually liable for any remaining causes
of action that survive this Motion for Summary Judgment/
Adjudication.” Yet defendants presented no evidence with their
motion to show Wu could not establish section 558.1 applied
to Weng. Weng’s moving declaration attested to Wu’s job duties
and authority, not to her own. Weng’s brother Jackson, and
former employee Sanchez, merely declared Weng was “the
owner’s representative.” Sanchez also mentioned Weng had an
office at the restaurant. None of the exhibits defendants’ counsel
purported to attach to his declaration related to Weng’s position,
authority, or lack thereof, that would be relevant to determining
section 558.1’s application or nonapplication.
Nor did defendants’ moving papers argue the eleventh
through fifteenth causes of action failed against Weng because
she was not an “owner, director, officer, or managing agent of”
COF, was not personally involved in the alleged wage and hour
violations, or did not contribute to the alleged violations through
her participation in, or oversight of, COF’s activities. (See
§ 558.1, subd. (b); Usher v. White (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 883, 896–
897 [“to be held liable under section 558.1, an ‘owner’ . . . must
either have been personally involved in the purported violation
15
of one or more of the enumerated provisions; or, absent such
personal involvement, had sufficient participation in the
activities of the employer, including for example, over those
responsible for the alleged wage and hour violations, such that
the ‘owner’ may be deemed to have contributed to, and thus for
purposes of this statute, ‘cause[d]’ a violation”]; Espinoza, supra,
74 Cal.App.5th at p. 59 [generally agreeing with Usher but
concluding an individual isn’t required to have had “involvement
in the day-to-day operations of the company,” nor must the
individual have “authored the challenged employment policies
or specifically approved their implementation”; “to be held
personally liable he or she must have had some oversight of the
company’s operations or some influence on corporate policy that
resulted in Labor Code violations”].) Not even in their separate
statement of undisputed facts—which the court struck after
sustaining Wu’s objection—did defendants state any facts or
cite any evidence showing Weng was not an individual described
by section 558.1. (See Roger H. Proulx & Co. v. Crest-Liners, Inc.
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 182, 201 [“Without facts set forth in a
separate statement to support a ground for summary judgment,
summary judgment cannot be granted on that ground.”].)
Indeed, not until their reply did defendants argue Wu
could not establish the requirements of section 558.1. Weng
declared for the first time in her reply declaration that she was
not an investor, managing director, or controlling member of
COF, and that she “oversaw the restaurant at the request of
the members of” COF. The trial court disregarded defendants’
new reply evidence and argument, having sustained Wu’s
16
objection. Weng’s reply declaration thus was not before the
trial court. We do not consider it.7
Defendants thus failed to meet their initial burden of
production to show Weng was not—or Wu lacked evidence
to demonstrate she was—an “other person acting on behalf
of an employer” under section 558.1 and therefore could not be
individually liable for the Labor Code violations alleged in the
eleventh through fifteenth causes of action (to the extent they
survived defendants’ motion, which below we conclude they did).8
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850–851 [“party moving for
summary judgment bears an initial burden of production”—
meaning “the presentation of ‘evidence’ ”—“to make a prima facie
showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact”;
“[a] prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support” the
party’s position].)
Accordingly, Weng is mistaken in arguing it was Wu’s
“burden to provide evidence in opposition to [her] summary
judgment motion” that she was “one ‘who exercises substantial
discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine
corporate policy.’ ” The burden never shifted to Wu on this issue,
as defendants’ motion presented no evidence demonstrating a
7 Weng does not contend the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to consider the new evidence it presented on reply,
or in striking its separate statement.
8 We address below defendants’ separate ground for
summary judgment/adjudication on their affirmative defense
to the wage and hour violations alleged in the eleventh through
thirteenth causes of action—that Wu, as a manger, was an
exempt employee not entitled to compensation for missed
breaks or overtime.
17
triable issue of fact did not exist as to Weng’s individual liability
under section 558.1. (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 832, 840 [“A responding plaintiff has no evidentiary
burden unless the moving defendant has first met its initial
burden.”].)
Wu nevertheless presented evidence as to section 558.1’s
application to Weng. For example, Weng testified she was a
member of COF and held a five percent ownership interest; she
made “all the major decisions”; she did not discuss management
of the restaurant, or restaurant policies, with the other members
of COF at their meetings—it wasn’t “their business. They
[didn’t] get involved.”; she told Wu managers were exempt—
as COF “always t[old] the managers . . . that they’re exempt”;
she researched the exemption issue in 2018 after COF purchased
the restaurant; and she alone determined how much Wu would
be paid.
Weng essentially argues her management of COF’s
restaurant could not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether
she controlled or participated “in managerial or company policy
decisions” of COF. We disagree. Wu presented evidence from
which a trier of fact could infer COF was created to purchase
and own the restaurant, and the restaurant was its sole business
operation. Accordingly, a trier of fact reasonably could find that,
by controlling and managing the restaurant and its policies,
Weng in effect managed COF’s business operations and
participated in the creation and implementation of COF
company policies and decision making. In other words, Weng’s
decisions about running the restaurant were decisions about
COF’s business operations, raising a triable issue as to whether
18
she met the test for individual liability under section 558.1.
(Espinoza, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 59.)
In short, the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of Weng. The FAC alleged the eleventh
through fifteenth causes of action against her individually under
section 558.1. And, based on the evidence properly before the
trial court, defendants failed to meet their initial burden to show
Wu could not establish section 558.1 applied to Weng.
4. Summary adjudication on Wu’s wage and hour
claims against Weng was unsupported
Defendants alternatively moved for summary adjudication:
“[a]s to Plaintiff’s eleventh, twelfth, and fifteenth causes of action
since Plaintiff was a salaried, exempt manager of Defendant,
as a matter of law and is not entitled to the meal and rest period
break claims he makes under the eleventh, twelfth, and fifteenth
causes of action”; and “[a]s to Plaintiff’s eleventh, twelfth and
thirteenth causes of action since Plaintiff was a manager,
Plaintiff’s paycheck was accurate for a salaried, exempt
employee.” The court granted summary adjudication on Wu’s
eleventh through thirteenth causes of action, finding defendants
established Wu—as a salaried employee holding a managerial
position—was exempt from overtime and meal break regulations.
As we have determined the FAC alleged those causes of action
against Weng individually, we must determine whether the
court erred in finding defendants established Wu was an
exempt employee as a matter of law.9
9 Without citing any authority, Weng seems to contend
the court’s granting of summary adjudication on defendants’
exemption defense is not properly before this court. We disagree.
Defendants’ defense relates to causes of action asserted against
19
a. Applicable law
Under California law, employers generally must pay
overtime for work in excess of eight hours in one workday
or 40 hours in one workweek (§ 510) and may not require
an employee to work during a mandatory meal or rest break,
without additional pay and, in some cases, penalties (§§ 226.7,
subds. (b), (c), 512, subd. (a), 558, subd. (a)). The Industrial
Welfare Commission (IWC) has authority to establish exemptions
from these requirements, however. (§§ 226.7, subd. (e) [meal
and rest breaks], 515, subd. (a) [overtime].) IWC Wage Order
No. 5-2001 applies to restaurants as part of the “ ‘Public
Housekeeping Industry.’ ” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050,
subds. 1, 2(R)(1).) It exempts from overtime and meal/rest break
requirements those individuals “employed in administrative,
executive, or professional capacities.” (Id., subds. 1(B), 3(A)(1).)
Only the executive exemption is at issue here.10
“A person employed in an executive capacity means any
employee: [¶] (a) Whose duties and responsibilities involve the
management of the enterprise in which they are employed or of
a customarily recognized department or subdivision thereof; and
[¶] (b) Who customarily and regularly directs the work of two or
both COF and Weng. The court entered judgment in favor of
Weng “on all claims . . . Wu asserted against” her. Accordingly,
whether the court’s summary adjudication of defendants’
exemption defense was proper is directly relevant to our review
of the judgment entered in Weng’s favor.
10 The administrative and professional exemptions do not
involve management activities—what defendants argued Wu’s
position entailed. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11050, subds.
1(B)(2)(a), (1)(B)(3)(a).)
20
more other employees therein; and [¶] (c) Who has the authority
to hire or fire other employees or whose suggestions and
recommendations as to the hiring or firing and as to the
advancement and promotion or any other change of status
of other employees will be given particular weight; and [¶]
(d) Who customarily and regularly exercises discretion and
independent judgment; and [¶] (e) Who is primarily engaged in
duties which meet the test of the exemption.” (Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 8, § 11050, subd. 1(B)(1)(a)–(e).) To qualify for the executive
exemption, the employee “must also earn a monthly salary
equivalent to no less than two (2) times the state minimum wage
for full-time employment,” which is 40 hours per week. (Id.,
subd. 1(B)(1)(f); see also § 515, subd. (a) [IWC may establish
exemption from overtime pay for executive employee who
“is primarily engaged in the duties that meet the test of the
exemption, customarily and regularly exercises discretion and
independent judgment in performing those duties, and earns
a monthly salary equivalent to no less than two times the state
minimum wage for full-time employment” (italics added)].)
“ ‘[S]tatutes governing conditions of employment are to be
construed broadly in favor of protecting employees.’ [Citations.]
To that end, we narrowly construe exemptions against the
employer, ‘and their application is limited to those employees
plainly and unmistakably within their terms.’ [Citations.] We
employ these same principles to wage orders promulgated by the”
IWC. (Peabody v. Time Warner Cable, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 662,
667.) The employer “ ‘bears the burden of proving the employee’s
exemption as an affirmative defense.’ ” (Kizer v. Tristar Risk
Management (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 830, 839.)
21
When moving for summary judgment (or adjudication)
based on “the assertion of an affirmative defense, . . . ‘the
defendant has the initial burden to show that undisputed facts
support each element of the affirmative defense.’ ” (Anderson
v. Metalclad Insulation Corp. (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 284, 289.)
“The defendant must demonstrate that under no hypothesis
is there a material factual issue requiring trial. [Citation.] If the
defendant does not meet this burden, the motion must be denied.”
(Id. at pp. 289–290; Consumer Cause, Inc. v. SmileCare (2001)
91 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [summary judgment is improper
if defendant fails to address—or fails to produce evidence
supporting—an element of its affirmative defense].) “Only if the
defendant meets this burden does ‘the burden shift[ ] to plaintiff
to show an issue of fact concerning at least one element of the
defense.’ ” (Anderson, at p. 290.) Thus, on summary judgment,
a defendant cannot base its showing of a complete defense
on the plaintiff’s “lack of evidence to disprove the applicability”
of the claimed defense. (Consumer Cause, at p. 473; see also
Huynh v. Ingersoll-Rand (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 825, 831 (Huynh)
[where defendant failed to establish an element of its defense,
summary judgment must be reversed “even if the plaintiff failed
to introduce a scintilla of evidence challenging that element”].)
We apply the same standards in reviewing the summary
adjudication of a cause of action, or an affirmative defense to
a cause of action, as we do in reviewing a summary judgment.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (c), (f); Smith v. Wells Fargo
Bank, N.A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1471.)
22
b. Defendants failed to meet their burden to establish
a complete defense to Wu’s wage and hour claims
Citing primarily to Weng’s declaration,11 defendants argued
the following facts demonstrated Wu was an exempt employee,
precluding his eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth causes of action:
Wu “was required to and did complete a course identifying him
as a manager with the requirement that he obtain a Manager’s
certificate”;12 received a salary; set COF employees’ work
schedules; “was required to interact with the Orange County
Department of Health when there [were] health-related issues
at the restaurant”; “was required to order food supplies for
the restaurant for each and every shift that worked at the . . .
restaurant”; “was authorized to hire and fire employees at
the restaurant”; and had keys to the restaurant “while other
employees did not.”
11 The exhibits defendants cited in their moving papers
correspond to their “Table of Exhibits” that, while part of
appellant’s appendix, apparently were not filed—but may
have been considered—in the trial court. Moreover, the court
struck defendants’ separate statement, which cites to Weng’s
declaration and various exhibits. We do not consider defendants’
separate statement.
12 The referenced certificate—an exhibit to defendants’
unfiled Table of Exhibits and their reply—was a “ServSafe®
Certification,” not a general management certification. It
certified Wu, on March 31, 2021, “successfully complet[ed] the
standards set forth for the ServSafe® Food Protection Manager
Certification Examination, which is accredited by the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) – Conference for Food
Protection (CFP).”
23
That evidence related only to whether Wu was engaged
primarily in the duties required to meet the executive exemption
test. Defendants’ moving papers did not present any evidence,
however, demonstrating Wu’s salary was the equivalent of twice
the minimum wage—a necessary element to establish their
executive exemption affirmative defense. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
§ 11050, subd. 1(B)(1)(f); § 515, subd. (a).) As Wu notes, the only
evidence defendants presented of his salary—again, in their
unfiled “table”—was a June 25, 2021 paystub, showing gross pay
of $1,076.92 for the pay period of June 7 through June 20, 2021.
Defendants presented no evidence establishing that amount
was at least twice the minimum wage, however. It undisputedly
was not. The trial court—at Wu’s request—took judicial notice
of the minimum wage rates from 2019 to 2021: $11 (2019),
$12 (2020), and $13 (2021) per hour for employers with 25 or
fewer employees; and $12 (2019), $13 (2020), and $14 (2021)
per hour for employers with 26 or more employees. Wu’s
June 7 to June 20, 2021 pay—assuming 80 hours of work
for the two-week period—works out to $13.46 per hour.
Moreover, based on our independent review of the record,
in his opposition to defendants’ motion—although unnecessary—
Wu presented evidence (his and his counsel’s declarations,
payroll records, and Weng’s deposition testimony) demonstrating
he was not paid twice the minimum wage in 2019, 2020, and
2021. Nor has Weng responded to Wu’s argument on appeal
that the undisputed evidence before the trial court established
he was not paid twice the minimum wage and thus did not fall
under any exemption from overtime and meal/rest breaks.
Weng’s sole response to Wu’s contention that defendants failed
to establish their exemption defense as a matter of law is:
24
“Respondents submitted conclusive evidence that Appellant
was a manager of the restaurant and thus an exempt employee
not entitled to the benefits he alleges. The trial court agreed.
As a managing agent, he’s statutorily exempt salaried employee
[sic] under Labor Code § 515.”
Accordingly, defendants failed to meet their burden on
summary judgment/adjudication to show no issue of fact existed
as to every element of their exemption defense. We thus need not
determine whether Wu presented sufficient evidence to raise a
triable issue as to whether he primarily engaged in the duties
required to meet the executive exemption. (Huynh, supra,
16 Cal.App.4th at p. 830 [opposing plaintiff is not required to
present evidence to establish anything unless and until the
moving defendant has presented evidence establishing every
element of the affirmative defense necessary to sustain a
judgment in its favor].)
Defendants’ motion apparently also attempted to challenge
Wu’s ability to establish he in fact had not been paid for all
the hours he worked. In their moving papers, after presenting
evidence of Wu’s duties, defendants argued that, “when Plaintiff
was asked to provide sworn testimony on the days he claims
he was entitled to extra compensation – he provided no facts.
Defendant propounded a fact specific interrogatory to identify
the amount of overtime hours Plaintiff claims he worked. The
response was ‘. . . he was not paid for work performed in excess
of 8 hours of 40 hours in a week pursuant to the requirement/
formula set forth by the California Labor Code . . .’.”13
13 Defendants also moved for summary adjudication generally
as to all causes of action “based on Plaintiff’s factually deficient
responses to 35 special interrogatories . . . .” Weng opaquely
25
Defendants further argued that this response “did not provide
Defendant with sufficient [or any] information to determine if
Plaintiff actually worked any overtime and how much he claimed
he worked. Plaintiff was a salaried manager and never requested
or produced documentation of an entitlement to overtime pay.”
Defendants’ moving papers did not indicate which
interrogatory number they were referring to. Rather, defendants
merely cited generally to “Exhibit I”—Wu’s responses to special
interrogatories—part of the unfiled “table.” Exhibit I consists
of Wu’s answers only, not the interrogatories posed. (Exhibit H
in defendants’ unfiled “table” is a copy of their special
interrogatories through number 18 only.) Moreover, the
response defendants cited was incomplete.14
refers to this argument in her respondent’s brief, asserting: “Also
to be noted Respondents’ papers asserted that Appellant failed
to respond to discovery requests yet was submitting evidence that
he objected to producing during the discovery phase. Yet even
with this ‘hardball’ litigation tactic he still could not prevail
at the summary judgment hearing on many issues.”
14 Wu’s answer to special interrogatory 33 included the
portion defendants cited. Wu objected that the interrogatory
was “overbroad and burdensome” and sought “information
more readily [sic] to the employer.” Wu nevertheless responded,
“Almost every day that Plaintiff worked he either is owned [sic]
unpaid break premium pay for late and/or missed breaks, or he
was not paid for work performed in excess of 8 hours or 40 hours
in a week pursuant to the requirement/formula set forth by
California Labor Code and applicable wage order. Plaintiff
was misclassified as an exempt employee when in fact he was
just a kitchen worker performing kitchen and other restaurant
duties. The fact that he was paid ‘salaried’ does not relieve the
26
In any event, in response to other interrogatories—as
reflected in Exhibit I—Wu stated he “worked long hours and
often 7 days a week without any rest day, from 3 pm to 11 pm
or midnight”; and “[t]here was no time records that Defendant
maintained for Plaintiff,” and no time records had been produced
despite “multiple” requests. Further, Wu’s counsel declared
defendants’ counsel did not ask Wu at his deposition about his
overtime hours or how many hours he claimed he had worked.
She also declared defendants never made Wu aware that
it considered any of his discovery responses deficient.
Even if we were to consider defendants’ Exhibit I—despite
the trial court having stricken their separate statement—Wu’s
discovery responses were nothing like the response at issue in
Field v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 703—
the case defendants relied on in their moving papers. There, the
plaintiff in a wrongful foreclosure action contradicted her earlier
discovery response in a declaration submitted in opposition to the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Id. at pp. 705–708.)
She answered “ ‘[u]nsure’ ” in response to an interrogatory asking
if she contended that the notice of trustee sale was not mailed
to her in compliance with the relevant statute, and if so, to state
“ ‘all facts related to this contention.’ ” (Id. at p. 706.) In her
declaration opposing summary judgment, in contrast, the
plaintiff attested she never received the notice of trustee sale.
(Ibid.) The reviewing court affirmed the summary judgment,
concluding that, because the plaintiff’s new position—that she
never received the notice—contradicted her discovery response
that she was “ ‘[u]nsure’ ” if the bank’s notice was proper, the
employer’s obligation to pay him pursuant to the requirement
of California law.”
27
court was “free to disregard” the declaration. (Id. at pp. 708–
709.)
Wu, in contrast, did not take a new position in his
opposition declaration. He also had asserted objections to
defendants’ interrogatories that defendants apparently did not
challenge. In any event, we liberally construe Wu’s evidence.
(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 618; see also, e.g., Browne v.
Turner Construction Co. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1349
[“without a demonstration of ‘discovery abuse,’ there is no general
prohibition against ‘introducing previously undisclosed evidence
in opposition to a summary judgment motion’ ”].) Accordingly,
to the extent Weng is arguing Wu’s general interrogatory
response about the extra hours he worked prevented him
from demonstrating his wage and hour claims—or somehow
established Weng’s defense to them—we reject that contention.
Moreover, Wu presented evidence that he worked overtime and
during breaks, demonstrating a triable issue of fact existed on
that issue. For example, Wu declared that, before March 2020,
he “regularly worked from about 9 am or so to 7 or 8 pm, six days
a week, more than 40 hours a week”; he had a meal break during
that time period but rarely a rest break; and when dine-in service
resumed in mid-April 2021, he worked “7 days a week, more than
40 hours a week (often 3-11 pm).”
Defendants generally objected to Wu’s declaration on
the ground his interpreter’s declaration was vague and did not
state where the declaration was executed. They also objected
to exhibits Wu submitted consisting of text messages between
himself and Weng and/or Jackson that he sent and/or received
while he was at work before or after his scheduled shift, arguing
Wu’s discovery responses did not “refer[ ] to any text messages.”
28
Weng notes the trial court overruled defendants’ objections
as untimely even though defendants had arranged for a court
reporter at the hearing under rule 3.1352. Rule 3.1352 states
a “party desiring to make objections to evidence in the papers
on a motion for summary judgment must either: [¶] (1) Submit
objections in writing under rule 3.1354; or [¶] (2) Make
arrangements for a court reporter to be present at the hearing.”
Defendants conceded they filed their written objections
late. (See rule 3.1354(a) [objections must be filed at the same
time as the reply papers].) At the hearing, defendants’ counsel
asked the court to “entertain[ ]” their objections to the evidence
because a court reporter was present. Counsel asked that his
objections, which he was “happy to read to the court, be heard
at this hearing.” Instead of orally asserting those objections,
however, counsel moved on to address the court’s tentative ruling
on the merits. Weng’s respondent’s brief makes no argument
that the court abused its discretion in refusing to consider
defendants’ late-filed objections—or, apparently, in failing
to treat their written objections as having been made orally at
the hearing—much less that the court would have sustained
the objections. (See Butte Fire Cases (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
1150, 1169 [party challenging trial court’s evidentiary ruling
has the burden to establish the court abused its discretion];
Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. Superior Court (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 946, 960 [erroneous evidentiary ruling reversible
only if it is reasonably probable that result would have been
more favorable].) We therefore do not revisit the court’s effective
overruling of defendants’ objections.
We thus conclude summary adjudication in favor of Weng
on Wu’s eleventh through thirteenth causes of action based on
29
defendants’ exemption defense was in error, and defendants
did not meet their burden to support summary adjudication
on those causes of action against Weng on any other ground.
5. The court’s denial of defendants’ motion as to Wu’s
fourteenth and fifteenth causes of action applies
to Weng
The court denied defendants’ motion as to COF on the
FAC’s fourteenth cause of action for waiting time penalties,
finding Weng’s declaration that she mailed Wu his final paycheck
—without proof of mailing—was insufficient to demonstrate no
triable issue of fact as to whether Wu received his final paycheck
when he had declared he did not. The court also denied
defendants’ motion as to COF on the FAC’s fifteenth cause of
action that alleged defendants violated section 226 by ignoring
Wu’s request to see his personnel file—served on COF’s
agent for service of process—and Wu’s counsel’s “subsequent
communications.” The court noted the parties agreed Wu had
asked for his personnel file. The court found COF provided no
authority showing its agent for service of process could not have
given “the file request to COF to be processed,” and COF thus
had failed to demonstrate the absence of a triable issue of fact.
Defendants’ failure to demonstrate an absence of a triable
issue of fact on these causes of action as to COF also is true
as to Weng. Wu alleged these causes of action against Weng
individually, and defendants failed to show Wu couldn’t establish
Weng met the test for individual liability under section 558.1.
Weng allegedly acted on behalf of COF. The court’s denial of
defendants’ motion as to COF on the fourteenth and fifteenth
causes of action therefore applies to Weng for the same reasons.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in favor of Weng.
30
DISPOSITION
The judgment in favor of Eugena Weng is reversed. The
matter is remanded for further proceedings. David Wu is entitled
to his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
HANASONO, J.
31
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