CourtListener 10795821•De Bose v. Public Storage CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 2/18/26 De Bose v. Public Storage CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
DA’QUNISHA DE BOSE, B335002
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 19STCV36682)
v.
PUBLIC STORAGE, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judge. Affirmed.
Valencia & Cywinska, Mark Joseph Valencia and Izabela
Cywinska Valencia for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Seyfarth Shaw, Michele J. Beilke and Julia Y. Trankiem for
Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and appellant Da’Qunisha De Bose appeals from a
judgment confirming an arbitration order. De Bose contends the
trial court erroneously denied her petition to vacate the award on
the ground that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by failing to
make “essential findings and conclusions” as required by the
arbitration agreement and Armendariz v. Foundation Health
Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83 (Armendariz). We
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2019, De Bose filed an action against Public Storage and
district manager Robert Arredondo (collectively, defendants).
The action asserted claims arising from De Bose’s employment
and subsequent termination. In her operative pleading, De Bose
primarily alleged that customers’ hostile conduct—including but
not limited to yelling at her, calling her derogatory names and
racial slurs, threatening violence, and assaulting her—made her
feel unsafe, but defendants took no action when she complained.
De Bose also alleged that Arredondo subjected her to unwelcome
sexual advances. She asserted causes of action for wrongful
termination in violation of public policy; race discrimination, race
harassment, sexual harassment, failure to prevent harassment
and discrimination, and retaliation under the Fair Employment
and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.; FEHA); a violation
of Labor Code section 1102.5; and negligence.
In 2020, the parties jointly stipulated to submit the matter
to arbitration pursuant to an agreement De Bose signed when
she was hired. The agreement required the arbitrator to “render
a written arbitration decision that reveals the essential findings
and conclusions on which the decision is based.” Prior to the
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arbitration, the parties exchanged written discovery and took the
depositions of De Bose, Arredondo, and De Bose’s witnesses.
In December 2022, the parties participated in an eight-day
arbitration. Fifteen fact witnesses, three expert witnesses, and
four healthcare providers testified. According to their closing
briefs, the parties presented significantly conflicting evidence on
each issue.
De Bose’s closing brief asserted that she and four other
former Public Storage employees testified that Arredondo
routinely subjected them to unwanted, sexualized touching and
comments. One of the former employees testified that customers
called her and De Bose derogatory names like “slut” and “bitch,”
and Arredondo did nothing about it when the employee
complained. De Bose and her witnesses further testified that
customers called De Bose and other employees the “N-word” and
Arredondo did nothing about it when De Bose and the other
employees complained; an employee with supervisory authority,
Carmen Hoeman, used the “N-word” in the presence of De Bose
and other employees and Arredondo did nothing; Arredondo
racially harassed De Bose by saying “she could take care ‘of her
own’ as she is Black”; Public Storage did not respond sufficiently
when De Bose was threatened and attacked by customers; and
Arredondo terminated De Bose because she resisted his sexual
advances and complained about racial harassment.
Defendants’ closing brief asserted they presented evidence
that Public Storage took measures to enhance security at the site
where De Bose worked after a 2017 robbery and De Bose declined
time off or medical care after the incident; De Bose reported only
a single incident of a customer threatening her and calling her
the “N-word,” and she told police and Arredondo that the incident
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was “no big deal”; De Bose made complaints to human resources,
including about her pay, but she never complained about
harassment, discrimination, or retaliation by Arredondo,
customers, or anyone else; De Bose complained once about
Hoeman, but did not complain that Hoeman used the “N-word”;
two of De Bose’s four witnesses had testified that Arredondo
never touched them inappropriately; two of the witnesses
described Arredondo engaging in only brief or innocuous physical
contact of them and De Bose; and none of the witnesses ever
complained about Arredondo or heard him say anything
inappropriate to De Bose.
Defendants also proffered evidence that De Bose was
terminated based on two incidents. In the first incident, a
coworker reported that De Bose had screamed at her, called her
derogatory names like “bitch” and “ho,” and threatened to beat
her up. In the second incident, an elderly customer reported that
De Bose yelled at her, called her a “bitch,” and threw a rent check
at her. The coworker and customer complained to Public Storage
about De Bose. Defendants further argued that De Bose
“impeached herself more than 50 times” by contradicting her
deposition testimony at trial, and that neither she nor her
witnesses were credible.
Ultimately, the arbitrator issued a seven-page award in
defendants’ favor. In the written award, the arbitrator dismissed
De Bose’s negligence claim as untimely or barred by the workers’
compensation exclusivity rule. The arbitrator further explained
that no credible evidence demonstrated that defendants subjected
De Bose to actionable sexual or racial harassment. The
arbitrator also rejected De Bose’s cause of action for race
discrimination because De Bose had not presented sufficient
4
evidence of Arredondo’s racial animus. The arbitrator found no
evidentiary support for De Bose’s retaliation claim under Labor
Code section 1102.5. Finally, she denied De Bose’s claim for
wrongful termination because De Bose failed to show a
discriminatory motive or that defendants’ legitimate reasons for
terminating her were pretextual. The arbitrator stated the
award fully settled all claims submitted to arbitration, and “[a]ll
claims not expressly granted herein are hereby, denied.”
After receiving the award, De Bose’s counsel requested that
the arbitrator “include essential findings and conclusions”
regarding several of De Bose’s specific factual allegations. De
Bose asked the arbitrator to expressly resolve whether Arredondo
engaged in the specific acts of sexual harassment about which De
Bose and other witnesses had testified; whether Arredondo
terminated De Bose in retaliation for her rejection of his sexual
advances; whether Arredondo denied De Bose’s transfer request
based on her race; and whether Hoeman “used the N-word” in De
Bose’s presence, as well as whether Hoeman was a supervisor.
De Bose also asked the arbitrator to expressly state her
conclusions regarding the timeliness of De Bose’s claims; provide
“a finding assessing the proper burden” on the wrongful
termination claim; expressly rule on the application of an
exception to the workers compensation exclusivity rule to her
negligence claim; address Public Storage’s duty of care; and state
her credibility findings regarding each of the witnesses. The
arbitrator denied De Bose’s request.
In September 2023, defendants filed a petition to confirm
the award in the trial court. De Bose opposed the petition and
filed a competing petition to vacate the award, contending that
the arbitrator exceeded her powers by failing to provide essential
5
findings and conclusions regarding all of De Bose’s claims and
theories of liability.
The trial court granted defendants’ petition to confirm the
award and denied De Bose’s petition to vacate the award. The
trial court concluded the arbitrator’s award made essential
findings and conclusions. The trial court further found that De
Bose had not cited authority requiring the arbitrator “to address
every single alleged incident of misconduct proffered by [the]
plaintiff,” and existing legal authorities gave the arbitrator
discretion to determine the scope of her contractual powers,
including which issues were necessary for her to resolve.
In November 2023, the trial court entered judgment for
defendants. De Bose timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Both the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280
et seq.; CAA) and the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 10 et
seq.; FAA) favor contractual arbitration “as a more expeditious
and less expensive means of resolving disputes than by litigation
in court.” (Hightower v. Superior Court (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th
1415, 1431 (Hightower); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd (1985)
470 U.S. 213, 220 [FAA policy favoring enforcement of arbitration
agreements intended to largely eliminate “ ‘the costliness and
delays of litigation’ ”].) “Thus, it is clearly the expectation of the
parties to an arbitration agreement that the arbitrator’s decision
will be both binding and final.” (Hightower, at p. 1432, citing
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9 (Moncharsh);
see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 344
[“The ‘principal purpose’ of the FAA is to ‘ensur[e] that private
arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms.’ ”].)
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“Ensuring arbitral finality thus requires that judicial
intervention in the arbitration process be minimized.”
(Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 10; Hall Street Associates,
L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc. (2008) 552 U.S. 576, 588 (Hall) [FAA
provides for “limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway”].) Courts
may vacate an arbitration award “in only limited and exceptional
circumstances.” (City of Richmond v. Service Employees Internat.
Union, Local 1021 (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 663, 666; Hall, at
p. 586 [judicial review categories in FAA are exclusive and cannot
be expanded by contract].)
Under the CAA and FAA, “courts are authorized to vacate
an award if it was (1) procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means; (2) issued by a corrupt arbitrator; (3) affected by
prejudicial misconduct on the part of the arbitrator; or (4) in
excess of the arbitrator’s powers. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2,
subd. (a); 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).)” (Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60
Cal.4th 909, 916 (Richey).) The grounds for vacatur in both
statutes are exclusive. (Hall, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. 583–589;
Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 27–28.) We review de novo
“whether the arbitrator exceeded his [or her] powers and thus
whether we should vacate [the] award on that basis . . . .”
(Richey, at p. 918, fn. 1.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err In Denying De Bose’s
Motion To Vacate
De Bose contends that the arbitrator exceeded her powers
under the CAA and FAA by failing to make “essential findings
and conclusions” as the parties’ agreement required. Specifically,
De Bose contends the arbitrator’s award did not address
“dispositive” issues and allegations regarding De Bose’s claims
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for race discrimination, race harassment, and sexual harassment.
We disagree. The award revealed the arbitrator’s essential
findings and conclusions with respect to these claims.
A. Arbitral awards under federal and state law
The FAA does not require arbitrators to provide a written
explanation of their reasons supporting an award. (Bosack v.
Soward (9th Cir. 2009) 586 F.3d 1096, 1104.) However, some
courts have held that arbitrators who fail to make findings and
conclusions as required by the arbitration agreement “ ‘exceed
their powers’ ” by “fail[ing] to meet their obligations, as specified
in a given contract, to the parties.” (Western Employers Ins. Co.
v. Jefferies & Co., Inc. (9th Cir. 1992) 958 F.2d 258, 262, 259
(Western Employers), italics omitted.) In Western Employers, for
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
arbitrators exceeded their powers by failing to provide findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which were expressly required by the
parties’ agreement. (Id. at pp. 261–262; see also Cat Charter,
LLC v. Schurtenberger (11th Cir. 2011) 646 F.3d 836, 843 &
fn. 14 [arbitrator exceeds authority “by failing to provide an
award in the form required by an arbitration agreement,”
including by “ ‘not doing enough’ ”].)
Federal courts have described “ ‘essential findings and
conclusions’ ” as those necessary and indispensable to the
outcome. (Cox v. Dex Media, Inc. (D.Colo., Mar. 26, 2021, Civ. A.
No. 18-CV-01817-KLM) 2021 WL 1165523, p. *9 (Cox)); see also
Hale v. Morgan Stanley (S.D.Ohio 2021) 571 F.Supp.3d 872, 883–
884 [arbitrator who “sufficiently outlined his reasons for giving
his award” complied with rule that required statement of “ ‘the
essential findings and conclusions on which the [a]ward is
based’ ”].) Where an agreement requires the arbitrator to set
8
forth “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” “the touchstone is
simply whether enough facts are found and enough legal
principles stated so that a reviewing tribunal can ascertain the
reasons for the ultimate determination.” (New Elliott Corp. v.
MAN Gutehoffnungshutte AG (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 969 F.Supp. 13, 15;
see also Cox, at p. *9.)
Under the CAA, an arbitral award “shall be in writing” and
“shall include a determination of all the questions submitted to
the arbitrators the decision of which is necessary in order to
determine the controversy.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1283.4.)
“ ‘[F]ailure to find on all issues submitted is . . . a statutory
ground for vacating an award.’ [Citation.]” (Heimlich v. Shivji
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 350, 364.) Yet, “it is for the arbitrators to
determine what issues are ‘necessary’ to the ultimate
decision. . . . ‘Likewise, any doubts as to the meaning or extent of
an arbitration agreement are for the arbitrators and not the court
to resolve.’ ” (Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 9
Cal.4th 362, 372, quoting Morris v. Zuckerman (1968) 69 Cal.2d
686, 690; see also Hightower, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 1434.)
“[A]n arbitrator’s failure to render express findings on disputed
questions does not invalidate the award where . . . the award
‘ “serves to settle the entire controversy.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”
(Luster v. Collins (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1338, 1345.)
With respect to FEHA claims, the California Supreme
Court has held that an arbitrator must provide “a written
arbitration decision that will reveal, however briefly, the
essential findings and conclusions on which the award is based.”
(Armendariz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 107.)
Defendants contend the FAA applies here. They also assert
that Western Employers has been “supersede[d]” by more recent
9
federal decisions. However, they argue that under either the
FAA or the CAA, the arbitrator did not exceed her powers here.
De Bose has not addressed whether the FAA applies to this
matter and instead contends that under either the CAA or the
FAA, the arbitrator’s award must be vacated. We need not decide
which arbitration statute applies. Under either the CAA or the
FAA, we conclude the arbitrator’s award complied with the
parties’ agreement and the California Supreme Court’s guidance
in Armendariz requiring that the award reveal the essential
findings and conclusions on which the award was based.
B. The arbitrator made essential findings and
conclusions in her award
De Bose contends the arbitrator failed to make essential
findings and conclusions relevant to her race discrimination, race
harassment, and sexual harassment claims, because she did not
expressly address certain specific allegations and evidence. We
address each cause of action below.
1. Race discrimination
De Bose’s race discrimination claim asserted that
defendants unlawfully transferred her and terminated her on the
basis of her race. To prevail on the claim, De Bose was required
to prove that “ ‘(1) [s]he was a member of a protected class,
(2) [s]he was qualified for the position [s]he sought or was
performing competently in the position [s]he held, (3) [s]he
suffered an adverse employment action, . . . and (4) some other
circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.’ ” (Martin v.
Trustees of California State University (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 149,
162, quoting Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317,
355 (Guz).)
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The arbitrator explained her basis for rejecting the claim.
She credited evidence that Arredondo made only a single
comment that De Bose would “ ‘be comfortable with [her] own
kind’ . . . with no other indicia of racism,” and found this was
“insufficient in the total context of her employment to support a
charge of racial discrimination.” The arbitrator also noted the
lack of any evidence that Arredondo expressed discriminatory
animus with respect to other similarly situated employees.
Further, to the extent De Bose relied on “Arredondo’s
claimed racial discrimination” to allege wrongful termination, the
arbitrator stated: “As I have found the evidence insufficient of
[sic] that claim, this one too must fail.” The arbitrator also found
no substantial evidence that defendants’ stated reasons for
terminating De Bose—“a combination of a shouting match with
other employees on two separate occasions and a disrespectful
interaction with a customer about which the customer filed a
complaint”—were pretextual.
In finding that the evidence did not establish that
Arredondo harbored a discriminatory motive, the arbitrator
sufficiently explained the issues necessary to the resolution of the
claim. (See Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203,
225 [“mere discriminatory thoughts or stray remarks are not
sufficient to establish liability under the FEHA”].) Additionally,
the arbitrator concluded that no evidence indicated that
defendants’ nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating De Bose
were a pretext for discrimination. The insufficiency of the
evidence regarding racial animus and pretext is dispositive of
racial discrimination claims under FEHA. (Guz, supra, 24
Cal.4th at pp. 355–356 [plaintiff bears burden to offer evidence of
discriminatory motive for adverse action].)
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2. Racial harassment
Similarly, the award provided the arbitrator’s essential
findings and conclusions in rejecting De Bose’s racial harassment
cause of action. To prevail on a racially hostile work environment
claim under FEHA, De Bose had to “show she was subjected to
harassing conduct that was (1) unwelcome; (2) because of race;
and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
her employment and create an abusive work environment.”
(Bailey v. San Francisco Dist. Attorney’s Office (2024) 16 Cal.5th
611, 627.) The arbitrator concluded that any use of the N-word in
De Bose’s workplace was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to
establish the race harassment claim.
De Bose contends the arbitration award was required to
discuss several of her specific allegations, including that an
employee she alleged was a supervisor also used the N-word in
her presence. However, providing essential findings and
conclusions on which the award was based did not require the
arbitrator to discuss every allegation or piece of evidence. The
award indicated that the arbitrator rejected the race harassment
claim based on a finding that the evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate severe and pervasive conduct. The award stated
that the claim was “mostly” based on customer use of racial
epithets. While the award then specifically discussed the
evidence related to customers, it would be broadly understood as
encompassing all of the evidence presented on that claim.
(Grunwald-Marx, Inc. v. L.A. Joint Board (1959) 52 Cal.2d 568,
589 [“[e]very intendment of validity must be given the award”].)
3. Sexual harassment
The arbitrator’s award also made specific findings based on
the evidence to deny De Bose’s hostile environment sexual
12
harassment claim. De Bose alleged Arredondo personally
sexually harassed her and that he did nothing about customers
who subjected her to sexually offensive and derogatory language.
The arbitrator found De Bose’s sworn testimony about
Arredondo’s harassment “at best, inconsistent,” noting that she
had not complained to Public Storage, her family members, or her
coworkers about Arredondo’s alleged unwelcome conduct. The
award then states: “What credible evidence there is in this record
is that Arredondo once gave her a hug after she’d had a
frightening experience and, perhaps, that he sometimes patted a
clothed leg when sitting together or once closely brushed against
her going past her in a doorway. Coworkers who had similar
experiences with Arredondo described them as without sexual
overtones or intent.” The arbitrator further found that even
assuming the alleged incidents of harassment occurred, the
“occasional incidents cannot be found to be either objectively
actionable sexual harassment or to constitute the severe or
pervasive conditions required for a finding of hostile
environment.”
To prove a sexually hostile work environment claim under
FEHA, De Bose had to establish that she “was subjected to
harassing conduct that was (1) unwelcome, (2) because of sex or
gender, and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive work
environment.” (Kruitbosch v. Bakersfield Recovery Services, Inc.
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 200, 213.) By concluding that the only
credible evidence concerned Arredondo’s conduct, and that
evidence did not demonstrate that it was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to constitute actionable sexual harassment, and further
did not demonstrate that De Bose ever made a formal complaint
13
to anyone at the company, the arbitrator resolved all dispositive
issues with respect to this claim. After the arbitrator found the
testimony regarding Arredondo’s other alleged sexual
harassment was not credible, there was no need for the arbitrator
to make any further findings regarding the content of that
testimony. (Rietveld v. Rosebud Storage Partners (2004) 121
Cal.App.4th 250, 257 [arbitration is “a factfinding affair and the
arbitrator need[s] to make credibility determinations”].)
C. There is no basis to conclude the arbitrator
exceeded her powers
In sum, the arbitrator was not required to render
particularized findings and conclusions on every factual
allegation and legal theory to comply with statutory and
contractual obligations. (Cox, supra, 2021 WL 1165523, at p. *9
[arbitrator did not have to state all findings or conclusions or
“ ‘even the most significant evidence’ ” supporting decision to
comply with contractual provision requiring “ ‘essential findings
and conclusions’ ”].) Moreover, the arbitrator’s resolution of the
issues necessary to resolve each cause of action did not require
the arbitrator to weigh whether every allegation made by De
Bose was true or false. The arbitrator’s explanation of why De
Bose failed to present sufficient credible evidence to support the
requisite elements of each FEHA cause of action fully resolved
the claims. (See id. at p. *10 [arbitrator complied with
arbitration provision requiring award to state “essential findings
and conclusions” by addressing burden-shifting framework of
ADEA case].)
In arguing that the arbitrator’s award was inadequate, De
Bose urges us to define “essential findings and conclusions”
according to Code of Civil Procedure former section 632,
14
governing trial court statements of decision.1 De Bose provides
no support for adopting this standard in the context of arbitration
awards. Moreover, even if we accepted De Bose’s unsupported
contention that the definition applies here, it would not alter the
outcome. Like arbitration awards, statements of decision also
“need not respond to ‘every point raised by a party or make an
express finding of fact on each contested factual matter; it need
only dispose of all basic issues and fairly disclose the court’s
determination as to ultimate facts and material issues in the
case.’ [Citation.]” (Alafi v. Cohen (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 46, 60.)
Nor do De Bose’s citations to Western Employers, supra,
958 F.2d 258, or Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 665, support her argument that the written
award in this case fell short of providing essential findings and
conclusions. Western Employers and Pearson Dental vacated
arbitral awards on the basis that they failed to state any findings
and conclusions. (Western Employers, at p. 260 [panel included
no findings of fact or conclusions of law in award]; Pearson
Dental, at pp. 671–672, 679 [arbitrator issued “brief letter”
stating plaintiff’s FEHA claims were untimely without explaining
reasoning].) The Ninth Circuit and the California Supreme Court
1 Code of Civil Procedure section 632 was amended in 1981.
The current version of the statute requires trial courts to “issue a
statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its
decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial
upon the request of any party appearing at the trial.” (Id.,
subd. (a).) The prior version on which De Bose relies required
trial courts to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. E.
Folcka Construction, Inc. v. Medallion Home Loan Co. (1987) 191
Cal.App.3d 50, 52–54 [1981 amendment eliminated requirement
for findings of fact and conclusions of law].)
15
concluded, respectively, that failing to provide any explanation of
the award deprived the plaintiff of the benefit of his contractual
bargain (Western Employers, at pp. 261–262) and violated the
plaintiff’s unwaivable statutory right to judicial review under
Armendariz (Pearson Dental, at pp. 676–679). Additionally,
Pearson Dental held that the arbitrator made a legal error
regarding tolling that deprived the plaintiff of his unwaivable
statutory right to a hearing on the merits of his FEHA claim.
(Pearson Dental, at pp. 670, 678–679, citing Armendariz, supra,
24 Cal.4th at pp. 106–107; Richey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 918
[Pearson Dental limited to vacatur where arbitrator’s
misunderstanding of agreement’s “ ‘procedural framework’ ”
deprived parties of hearing on merits of FEHA claims].)
In this case, De Bose has not identified any comparable
omissions or procedural errors that deprived her of the benefit of
her bargain or of her unwaivable statutory rights. Unlike the
arbitrators in Western Employers and Pearson Dental, the
arbitrator here issued an award explaining her reasoning for
denying each cause of action after hearing testimony from
numerous witnesses over the course of several days. The
arbitrator did not abdicate her obligation to explain her decision,
such that she did not provide any findings or conclusions that the
parties bargained for and foreclosed the possibility of judicial
review, nor did her conduct deprive De Bose of a hearing on the
merits of her claims.
Western Employers and Pearson Dental did not confront
whether and under what circumstances an arbitrator’s
explanation of its award falls short of the “essential findings and
conclusions” required by contract or law. Thus, neither Western
Employers nor Pearson Dental supports a conclusion that the
16
award here is subject to vacatur. (Santisas v. Goodin (1998) 17
Cal.4th 599, 620 [“An appellate decision is not authority for
everything said in the court’s opinion but only ‘for the points
actually involved and actually decided.’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
ADAMS, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
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