In re E.G. CA2/2

CourtListener 10795819Calctapp18 feb 2026

Testo completo

Filed 2/18/26 In re E.G. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re E.G., a Person Coming B344099
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP03596B)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Craig S. Barnes, Judge. Affirmed.
Cheryl Spano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Eden Gharapet, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________________________

In this juvenile dependency appeal, A.G. (father) argues
substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s
jurisdictional findings that he failed to protect his 12-year-old
daughter E.G. (daughter) from sexual abuse. After father filed
his appeal, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction and
released daughter to father and his wife C.G., daughter’s mother
(mother). Thus, as an initial matter, we address whether father’s
appeal is justiciable. We conclude, even if his appeal is moot, we
are persuaded to exercise our inherent discretion and consider
the merits of his appeal. We find no error as to the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional findings under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, subdivision (d). Thus, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
1. The Family
Father and mother lived in a one-bedroom apartment with
daughter, two minor sons, and one adult son. By all accounts,
the family members got along with each other, and the children
were well behaved. Daughter slept in the bedroom with her three
brothers. Mother and father slept in the living room. Although
mother had asked daughter to sleep with her in the past,
daughter preferred to sleep in the bedroom. When the
underlying proceedings began, daughter was 13 years old, one of

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the minor sons was 15 years old, and the other was 10 years old.
The adult son had moved in with the family one and a half years
earlier after arriving from Guatamala. Mother and father have
three additional adult children who live in Guatamala.
Daughter spent her time either at home or at school. Most
mornings, mother left for work around 7:00 a.m. and returned
home after 5:00 in the evening. Father took the minor sons to
school in the mornings, leaving home with them around 7:30 a.m.
Adult son took daughter to school, leaving home with her
between 8:00 a.m. and 8:10 a.m. In the afternoons, after school,
father brought the younger minor son home, adult son or father
brought daughter home, and the older minor son arrived home on
his own. Father worked nights and left home in the evenings
after the children had arrived home from school.
2. Events Preceding Petition
In late October 2024, it was discovered that daughter was
approximately 33 weeks pregnant. Until that time, no one in
daughter’s family, including daughter, knew she was pregnant.
Everyone was shocked. A police report was filed and the Los
Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) was notified.
Prior to discovering the pregnancy, rumors were circulating
at daughter’s school that she was pregnant. A physical education
teacher and a campus aid both noticed daughter had gained
weight. Beginning in at least early October 2024, staff and
teachers at the school tried to assess whether daughter was
pregnant, but it was difficult because she generally wore a baggy
sweatshirt at school and, when asked, she denied being pregnant.
Eventually, in late October 2024, the school nurse referred
daughter to a nearby clinic, where she took a pregnancy test.

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When told she was pregnant, daughter had no reaction.
Daughter indicated she did not know how pregnancy occurred.
The school nurse believed daughter genuinely was surprised to
learn she was pregnant.
Daughter denied knowing how she became pregnant or who
got her pregnant. In response to questions about her pregnancy,
daughter generally remained silent or simply stated, “ ‘I don’t
know.’ ” She said the father was neither at school nor at home.
Eventually, daughter replied “no” when asked if father could be
the father of her child. At one point, daughter said she missed
her period, at another time she said she had not missed a period.
According to mother, daughter did not tell mother when she had
her period, but daughter would let mother know when she needed
sanitary pads. In October 2024, mother stated daughter asked
for pads the previous month. Mother also stated she could tell
when daughter had her period because daughter had severe
cramps.
No one in the family household had seen signs of daughter’s
pregnancy. Father had not noticed weight gain and said
daughter had not complained that her clothes no longer fit.
Adult son similarly stated he had not noticed weight gain or
daughter’s body otherwise to have changed. Mother “had no
idea” daughter was pregnant. The older minor son had observed
no signs that daughter was pregnant and could not tell she was
pregnant. The younger minor son said he noticed daughter had
gained weight, but he assumed it was because she was eating a
lot. Earlier, however, he said he had not noticed any changes to
daughter’s body and said she did “not have a normal pregnant
belly.”

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It was difficult to tell daughter was pregnant if she was
wearing a baggy sweatshirt, which she often wore. However,
daughter stated at home she wore shorts and T-shirts that were
form fitting. Mother said daughter wore baggy clothes at home.
Adult son said she wore fitted shirts and loose pants at home,
while father stated she wore pajamas or her school uniform. One
minor son said daughter wore fitted T-shirts and pants at home,
while the other said she wore loose clothes at home. A nurse
practitioner reported that when daughter’s abdomen was
uncovered, it was evident she was pregnant.
Because daughter was rarely if ever unsupervised and
spent her time either at home or at school, it was believed
someone in her household had impregnated her. After learning
of daughter’s pregnancy, mother and father agreed to a seven-day
safety plan. Father and adult son moved out of the house and
minor sons were not allowed to be alone with daughter. After
seven days, father returned home. Mother and father agreed the
children would not be left unsupervised with father until
paternity was determined for daughter’s child. Mother and
father cooperated with the Department and were supportive of
daughter.
Eventually, mother and father confronted adult son, and he
confessed he was the father of daughter’s child. Father said
adult son “kicked himself out of the home due to his own
behavior.” Father no longer wanted to be involved with adult
son. Father said he would protect daughter from adult son and
mother would contact law enforcement if adult son returned to
the home. Mother no longer wanted adult son in her home or
around her children. Prior to learning of daughter’s pregnancy,

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no one in the household had noticed daughter and adult son
acting inappropriately with each other.
3. Petition
After investigating the circumstances surrounding
daughter’s pregnancy, the Department was concerned for
daughter’s safety and questions remained regarding parents’
supervision (or lack thereof) of their minor children. Paternity of
daughter’s unborn child also remained unclear, and the
Department believed the parents reasonably should have known
daughter was pregnant.
Accordingly, in November 2024, the Department filed a
three-count Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition on
behalf of daughter and minor sons.1 The three counts of the
petition were identical and brought under subdivisions (b), (d),
and (j) of section 300. Each count alleged daughter had been
sexually abused by someone in her household, mother and father
knew or reasonably should have known of the sexual abuse, and
mother and father failed to protect daughter, putting daughter
and minor sons at risk.2
At the initial hearing on the petition, the juvenile court
released daughter to her parents under Department supervision.
The court ordered the Department to make unannounced home
visits and ordered adult son to stay away from daughter and the
family home.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Eventually, the juvenile court dismissed minor sons from
the petition. Accordingly, and because they are not subjects of
this appeal, we mention them only to the extent necessary.

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4. Further Investigation
Sometime after the initial hearing, daughter gave birth to a
baby girl.
Prior to adjudication, the Department continued its
investigation. As before, daughter refused to provide any
information regarding her pregnancy, including information
about the father. Regarding the allegations in the petition,
daughter stated, “ ‘I don’t like how it says it’s my parents’ fault.
It doesn’t seem like it’s their fault to me, it’s mine for not
speaking out.’ ” The older minor son similarly stated, “ ‘I don’t
like how it says they “failed to protect the child or reasonably
should have known[”] ’ ” and “ ‘this is not my parents’ fault. It’s
not [daughter’s] fault, she was sexually abused, it’s the person’s
fault who actually did this.’ ”
The members of daughter’s household continued to report
they had not known daughter was pregnant and had not noticed
anything strange about daughter and adult son’s relationship.
They did not know where adult son was and had not spoken with
him. Mother agreed she had “failed to notice things,” stating,
“[W]e failed her [daughter].” Father said, “[I]t hurts my stomach
thinking about what happened,” and “I don’t accept him [adult
son].” Father denied he had sexually abused daughter. He noted
daughter was able to shower and dress herself privately at home.
Mother and father continued to cooperate with the Department
and law enforcement.
Officers investigating the criminal case indicated they had
narrowed down the suspects to father, adult son, and the older
minor son. Father and the older minor son provided DNA
samples. After daughter gave birth, a DNA sample was taken
from her infant child. Given that adult son had disappeared and

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father and mother had reported he confessed to them, it appeared
likely adult son was the perpetrator. Nonetheless, law
enforcement could not simply take parents’ word and could not
rule out either father or older minor son until DNA results were
received, which could take up to six months.
Although the Department “considered a voluntary case for
the family,” it determined continued court supervision was
“warranted” because law enforcement had not yet ruled out
father or older minor son as perpetrators. The Department also
believed court supervision was necessary to ensure the family
continued to have no contact with adult son so as to protect
daughter from further abuse.
The day before the adjudication, the Department submitted
a last minute report for the court. The Department reported,
among other things, that the family had been responsive to
assistance for daughter and her infant child, mother had stopped
working, and mother was “hands on and cares for” the infant.
The Department also noted mother and father were “responding
appropriately to the sexual abuse to [daughter]. They believed
her, are protecting her from further contact with the abuser/adult
sibling and supporting her as much as they are able to.” The
Department also reported “there have been no reported safety
concerns.” Considering the family’s progress, the Department
changed its earlier recommendation that mother and father
attend sexual abuse awareness classes to a recommendation that
they address those issues and others in individual counseling.
5. Adjudication and Disposition
A combined adjudication and disposition hearing was held
on January 29, 2025. At that time, the DNA test results
remained pending.

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Counsel for daughter asked the court to sustain the
petition. Counsel noted, while parents had supported and
protected daughter since discovering her pregnancy, it was still
unknown who the father of her child was and it was still too early
to know if parents could “remain sufficiently protective if [adult
son] attempts to reconnect with the family.” Counsel also
believed “parents should have reasonably known of what was
going on.” Counsel for the Department similarly noted, although
parents did not seem to know of daughter’s pregnancy, they
reasonably should have known. Counsel argued the subdivision
(d) count was met because “it’s 100 percent certain that
[daughter] was sexually abused by a member of this household.”
On the other hand, counsel for father asked the court to
dismiss the petition in its entirety. Counsel stated there had
been “no indication that the minor was pregnant,” the parents
were unaware of the pregnancy, and “parents have shown their
protective capacity since day one of this case.” Counsel also
argued the subdivision (b) count could not be sustained because
there was no current risk to daughter. Counsel believed the only
reason the petition was filed was because the father of daughter’s
child was still unknown, which counsel argued was the
Department’s burden to show. Counsel for mother similarly
argued there was no current risk and, therefore, the court could
not sustain the subdivision (b) count. Counsel stated there were
no signs of daughter’s pregnancy and since discovering the
pregnancy, parents had been protective. Counsel asked the court
to amend the subdivision (d) count so that parents were
nonoffending, stating “it’s clear that it was not due to parental
fault.”

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After hearing argument, the juvenile court amended the
petition by striking reference to the two minor sons, sustained
the subdivision (b) and (d) counts as amended, and dismissed the
subdivision (j) count. The court believed the parents “made a lot
of assumptions” regarding adult son, some of which were
“unwarranted,” and made no “inquiry to see if he posed any risk
to [daughter].” The court acknowledged the parents were
cooperating with the Department “to address these issues,” but
noted “some of these are jarring to the point where I think they’re
still trying to get their bearings here and will need to have the
services to ensure that there’s no further risk to [daughter].”
Although the court noted parents did not need to test regularly to
see if daughter was pregnant, the court was concerned that
parents might abdicate responsibility by relying heavily on
daughter’s privacy to the exclusion of inquiring as to her
menstrual cycle. The court stated, “[T]here’s a reference to
menstruating, and there’s an extended period of time where
there’s no inquiry there.” The court also noted daughter was the
only female in close setting with her male siblings. The court
found parents “should have known.”
The court declared daughter a dependent of the court and
released her to her parents under Department supervision. The
court ordered family preservation services and reiterated its
order that adult son have no contact with daughter or the family
home.
6. Appeal and Post-appeal Orders
Father appealed the juvenile court’s January 29, 2025
jurisdictional findings.
Six months later, on July 30, 2025, the juvenile court
terminated jurisdiction and released daughter to her parents.

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We granted the Department’s motion for judicial notice of the
juvenile court’s July 30, 2025 order.
DISCUSSION
1. Mootness
As an initial matter, we address whether father’s appeal is
moot. As noted above, after father filed the instant appeal, the
juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and released daughter
to her parents. We asked the parties to brief whether these
postappeal orders rendered father’s appeal moot.
The Department claims the juvenile court’s order
terminating jurisdiction arguably rendered father’s appeal moot.
Father, on the other hand, argues his appeal is not moot. Relying
on our Supreme Court’s recent opinion in In re S.R. (2025) 18
Cal.5th 1042, father claims his appeal is not moot because the
allegations underlying dependency jurisdiction here must be
reported for inclusion in California’s Child Abuse Central Index
(CACI). Father explains how inclusion in the CACI would
directly affect his legal rights. Both parties also recognize that,
even if postappeal events rendered father’s appeal moot, we
nonetheless have inherent discretion to consider father’s appeal.
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 285.)
We agree with father’s position—which follows that of our
Supreme Court in In re S.R., supra, 18 Cal.5th at page 1048—
that were the findings in this case to result in his inclusion in the
CACI, his legal rights would be affected and his appeal would not
be moot. It is not clear, however, that the sustained allegations
here mandate a report to the CACI. “The CACI lists persons who
have substantiated reports of child abuse or severe neglect
against them.” (Id. at p. 1052; Pen. Code, § 11169, subd. (a).
Here, there is no sustained allegation that father physically or

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sexually abused daughter. As to the sustained failure to protect
allegations, it is not clear these would fall within the definition of
“severe neglect” required for reporting to the CACI. (See Pen.
Code, §§ 11165.2, subd. (a) and 11169, subd. (a).)
In any event, it is not necessary for us to determine
whether the sustained allegations here mandate a report to the
CACI. We are persuaded that, even if father’s appeal is moot, we
nonetheless should exercise our discretion to consider the merits
of his appeal, a result the Department does not oppose. (In re
D.P., supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 285.) Thus, we turn to the merits of
father’s appeal.
2. Jurisdiction
The juvenile court exercised its jurisdiction under
subdivisions (b)(1) and (d) of section 300. We consider
subdivision (d) first.
a. Section 300, subdivision (d)
Under subdivision (d) of section 300, a juvenile court may
assert dependency jurisdiction over a child when either “[t]he
child has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that
the child will be sexually abused” “by the child’s parent or
guardian or a member of the child’s household.” (§ 300, subd. (d)
(subdivision (d).) The court may also exercise jurisdiction under
subdivision (d) if “the parent or guardian has failed to adequately
protect the child from sexual abuse when the parent or guardian
knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in
danger of sexual abuse.” (Ibid.) For purposes of this subdivision,
“sexual abuse” is defined by section 11165.1 of the Penal Code,
which includes rape, statutory rape, and lewd and lascivious acts
upon a child. Unlike subdivision (b) of section 300, jurisdiction
under subdivision (d) does not require a finding of current risk at

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the time of adjudication. (In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
795, 803.)
b. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for
substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) “ ‘In
reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we
determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted,
supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all
reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings
and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the
light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note
that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial
court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise
independent judgment, but merely determine if there are
sufficient facts to support the findings [and disposition order] of
the trial court.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In determining whether substantial
evidence exists such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
order challenged on appeal is appropriate, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the challenged order. (Ibid.)
“Substantial evidence is evidence that is ‘reasonable,
credible, and of solid value’; such that a reasonable trier of fact
could make such findings.” (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th
187, 199.) Substantial evidence “ ‘is not synonymous with any
evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of
evidence need not be affirmed on appeal.’ ” (In re Yolanda L.
(2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992.)

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c. Substantial evidence supports dependency
jurisdiction under subdivision (d).
The sustained subdivision (d) count includes two parts.
First, the juvenile court found, “The child [daughter] was
sexually abused by a member of the child’s household, resulting
in the pregnancy of the child.” Second, the court found father and
mother “failed to take action to protect the child when they knew,
or reasonably should have known, of the sexual abuse of the
child.” Father argues substantial evidence does not support
jurisdiction under subdivision (d). We are not persuaded.
As to the first part of the subdivision (d) count, it cannot
reasonably be disputed that when daughter was 12 years old, she
was raped and impregnated by someone in her household. This
alone gives rise to dependency jurisdiction under subdivision (d)
and is sufficient for us to affirm the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction. (In re Carlos T., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at pp. 803–
804.)
As to the second part of the subdivision (d) count—that
father reasonably should have known of the sexual abuse and
failed to protect daughter—it is undisputed that, until daughter’s
pregnancy was discovered, father had failed to protect her from
sexual abuse. This is not surprising because, until alerted to the
pregnancy, father was unaware of both the abuse and its telltale
sign, daughter’s pregnancy. Thus, we must consider whether
substantial evidence supports the finding that father reasonably
should have known of the sexual abuse.
Father argues there was no reason for him to have been
aware of daughter’s pregnancy (and, therefore, the sexual abuse)
because daughter showed no physical or behavioral signs of
pregnancy and she repeatedly denied being pregnant. The record

14
does not reveal daughter exhibited behavioral changes related to
her pregnancy. However, there is evidence that, at least a few
weeks before her positive pregnancy test, daughter was showing
physical signs of being pregnant. At school, people noticed
physical changes. Not only were teachers and staff trying to
assess whether daughter was pregnant, but rumors were
circulating that she was pregnant. Although father notes it was
difficult to see the size of daughter’s abdomen when she wore
baggy sweatshirts, which she often wore, there is evidence that at
least sometimes she wore fitted shirts at home. Indeed, her 10-
year-old brother noticed she had gained weight, although he did
not know why and believed it was due to eating a lot. Moreover,
mother agreed she had “failed to notice things,” stating she and
father had “failed” their daughter. Thus, by the time daughter’s
pregnancy began “showing” father reasonably should have
noticed and, at the least, asked questions (as was being done at
school) so that he could have taken steps to protect daughter from
further abuse or harm.
Because we conclude the record supports a finding that
father reasonably should have known of daughter’s pregnancy
(and, therefore, the sexual abuse) due to physical signs that
daughter was pregnant, we need not and do not address father’s
additional argument that the juvenile court incorrectly faulted
him for not perceiving improper conduct between adult son and
daughter. We do note, however, the record holds less support for
this proposition. Similarly, although the juvenile court discussed
the parents’ apparent lack of awareness of daughter’s menstrual
cycle, we do not find that pertinent to father’s appeal. The record
reveals daughter communicated about her menstrual cycle with

15
mother and not father, which is reasonable in a mother-daughter
relationship.
Finally, father also argues substantial evidence did not
support a finding of current risk of harm at the time of the
adjudication hearing. As noted above, however, findings under
subdivision (d) do not require a current risk of harm. (In re
Carlos T., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.) Thus, we do not
address that here. Similarly, in considering subdivision (d), we
are not persuaded by the cases on which father relies that
address current risk of harm under subdivision (b) of section 300.
(See In re F.V. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 219; In re R.M. (2009) 175
Cal.App.4th 986; In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
1387.)
Because we find jurisdiction was proper under subdivision
(d), we need not and do not address the remaining jurisdictional
findings under subdivision (b) of section 300. (In re I.J., supra, 56
Cal.4th at p. 773.)

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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s January 29, 2025 order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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