In re R.A. CA1/2

CourtListener 10795073Calctapp17 feb 2026

Testo completo

Filed 2/17/26 In re R.A. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re R.A., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171676
v.
R.A., (San Francisco City & County
Super. Ct. No. JW08-6779)
Defendant and Appellant.

R.A. appeals from an order transferring his case from juvenile court to
adult criminal court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1
R.A. argues the transfer order must be reversed because in determining
whether transfer was appropriate, the juvenile court incorrectly applied the
specified criteria in section 707, subdivision (a)(3) (section 707(a)(3)) as it was
recently amended. We disagree and we affirm.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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BACKGROUND
The Facts of the Underlying Offenses
We take the facts for our prior unpublished opinion in R.A.’s direct
appeal. (People v. [R.A.] (Oct. 2, 2015, A140128) [nonpub. opn.].)2
“[R.A.] and [co-defendant M.R.] were members of the MS–13 gang. MS
stands for Mara Salvatrucha, a reference to El Salvador; 13 represents MS–
13’s affiliation with Sureño. On July 30, 2008, the father of MS–13 gang
member ‘Pistolita’ (Pistolita) was shot by a member of the Norteño, a rival
gang, and some MS–13 gang members quickly met to plot revenge. The MS–
13 members who met included [R.A.], [M.R.], Acosta, Cesar Alvarado
(‘Momia’), Walter Chinchilla (‘Demonio’), and Pistolita.
“Some specifics concerning the revenge meeting were confirmed by the
testimony of Jose (‘Chiqui’) Espinal, another MS–13 gang member, who
testified in exchange for a letter of recommendation to the federal judge
before whom Espinal had pleaded guilty to five charges. Espinal testified
that in 2008 Pistolita’s father was shot during a confrontation with rivals
who sold fake green cards in the Mission District. When MS–13 gang
members learned that Pistolita’s father had been shot, they attributed the
shooting to Norteños, and planned to retaliate. Asked how he knew, Espinal
testified he was ‘there when it was planned.’ Sometime after the meeting,
Espinal phoned [M.R.] and told him to get ready, as other gang members
would come by to pick him up. Espinal himself had to go to work.
“Early the next morning, July 31, at approximately 1:15 a.m., 14–year–
old Miranda left his house to meet his 17–year–old friend Linares, telling his
father he was going to return Linares’s iPod. Miranda met Linares and her

2 We previously granted R.A.’s request to take judicial notice of the
record filed in the prior appeal.

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friend, Flores, at the intersection of Persia Avenue and Lisbon Street at
about 1:30 a.m. Miranda had red shoelaces in his sneakers, the color
associated with the Norteño gang.
“The three of them walked toward Linares’s house, when Linares
noticed four men approaching. The men walked past them at first, then
turned back and headed toward them. Flores recognized one of the four men
as [M.R.], who went to the same school as he and his companions. Flores
noticed a fifth man who seemed to be texting or calling someone.
“When the four approached, they produced knives, one of them said,
‘check them,’ and asked whether Miranda and the others had iPods or
phones, which they then took. Two of the men held knives against Flores,
one of whom flashed an MS–13 gang sign. Two others, including [M.R.],
pointed knives at Miranda, who broke free and ran, pursued by two gang
members. Moments later, Linares and Flores saw Miranda on the ground,
stabbed in the chest, neck, arm, and back. Miranda was taken to San
Francisco General Hospital, where he died from his stab wounds. The iPod
he brought to the scene was never recovered.
“A little after 1:30 a.m., Espinal called [M.R.] and asked him ‘what’s
up.’ [M.R.] said ‘a little fish had fallen’—‘that long hair little guy from
school . . . Ivan Dude.’
“On July 31, the day of the murder, [R.A.] contacted Acosta, a fellow
gang member who was also a tattoo artist, told him about the murder, said
that he and [M.R.] had earned gang tattoos for the murder, and asked him to
tattoo them. Acosta did that. And much more. [¶] . . . [¶]
“Acosta was a confidential informant who had for some three years
been working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in a
relationship with Agent John Moore. Using a concealed digital recorder

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provided to him by the DHS, Acosta recorded conversations with MS–13 gang
members [R.A.] and [M.R.] (along with Demonio) regarding the murder of
Miranda . . . .
“Acosta made the recordings while riding in a car with defendants the
day of the murder and at a tattoo session later that same day. Both of the
recordings were in Spanish and were played in segments for the jury, while
Acosta, through an interpreter, testified to their content and identified the
various speakers. For each recording, the jury was provided with two
transcripts introduced in the People’s case, a first draft and a final draft,
which contained the statements in Spanish, each statement’s speaker, and a
side-by-side English translation of each statement. [¶] . . . [¶]
“In the transcript from the recording of the conversation during the car
ride, the following translated statements were attributed to [R.A.], each
statement referring to the events of the previous evening and the murder of
Miranda. [Any changes in statements between the first and final draft are
indicated.]
“• ‘We stabbed that son of a bitch’ [final draft: ‘We took that son of a
bitch down from side to side’]
“• ‘The dude just fell and died right in front of, right in front of the
homeboy dog.’ [final draft: ‘The dude just fell stretched out right in front of,
right in front of the homeboy dog.’]
“• ‘I had like a, a Chinese style sword dog.’
“• ‘And I positioned it crazy, and it just slid in, like this!’
“• ‘. . . I even felt my hand go in dog.”
“• ‘I stuck it all the way in dude, right here, look!’
“• ‘We were following him to stab him even more dude.’
“• ‘I stabbed him, I stabbed him like 3 times in the heart and then I

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stabbed him a bunch of times back here crazy.’ [final draft: ‘I stuck him, I
stuck him like three times in the heart, and then I stuck him a bunch of
times back here crazy.’]
“• ‘Look here, I got 80 bucks for the iPod dog’
“• Fuck that’s what I like doing dude, right? Robbing mother fuckers.’
[final draft: ‘Fuck that’s what I like doing dude, right? Searching mother
fuckers.’]
“According to Acosta, [M.R.] was also in the car during these
discussions and the following statements were attributed to him:
“• ‘We even hide the knife.’
“[R.A.] interjected: ‘We have to go get that shit dog.’]
“• [M.R.]: ‘Yeah dude because all my fingerprints are on it since I didn’t
wear gloves.’
“• ‘Hey, what made me laughs is how he went down; he even closed his
legs, and then dropped dead, like this look! [LAUGHS].’ [final draft: ‘Hey,
what made me laugh is how he went down; he even closed his legs, and then
dropped, balled up, like this look! [LAUGHS].’]
“Later in the car ride recording, Acosta identified [M.R.] as saying that
Linares and Flores, the two people with Miranda the night of his murder,
recognized [M.R.] from school, as Flores apparently asked [M.R.], ‘ “Why are
you checking me if I know you?” ’ In the car, Acosta asked [M.R.], ‘The guy
recognized you?,’ to which [M.R.] responded, ‘Yes, yes, he saw my face . . . we
went to school together and we got into a fight once there too.’ Here, [R.A.]
jumped in to say ‘Yeah, I went to school with them too dog.’
“In the second recording, at the house where Acosta tattooed [R.A.] and
[M.R.], Acosta identified [M.R.] as saying: ‘This dude, these dudes fucked up
because all they did was take [Miranda’s] iPod and slightly stabbed him, and

5
[Flores] recognized me, he is out with the narcs right now.’ [M.R.], Acosta,
and [R.A.] (along with a few other members of the gang) go on to discuss
having someone vouch for their whereabouts the night of the crimes, in order
to provide alibis for each of them.” (People v. [R.A.], supra, A140128, italics
omitted.)
Proceedings Leading Up to the 2024 Transfer Hearing
In October 2008, the People filed a juvenile warship petition under
section 602, charging then 17-year-old R.A. with the murder of 14-year-old
Ivan Miranda (Pen. Code, § 187); robbery of Miranda (id., § 211); robbery of
Alejandro Flores (ibid.); and attempted robbery of Natalie Linares (id.,
§§ 211, 664). The petition alleged that R.A. committed all counts for the
benefit of criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)), and that he
personally used a deadly weapon in committing both the murder and robbery
of Miranda (id., § 12022.2, subd. (b)(1)).
In March 2010, the juvenile court held a hearing on whether to transfer
R.A. to criminal court under former section 707. The court concluded R.A.
was “not a fit and proper subject” for juvenile court and, accordingly,
remanded him to criminal court for further proceedings and dismissed the
juvenile petition.
In criminal court, the People charged R.A. with: (1) first degree murder
of Miranda (Pen. Code, § 187); (2) robbery of Miranda (id., § 211); (3) robbery
of Flores (ibid.); (4) attempted robbery of Linares (id., §§ 211, 664); (5)
participation in a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22, subd. (a)); (6) conspiracy
to commit assault with a deadly weapon (id., § 182, subd. (a)(1)); and (7)
conspiracy to obstruct justice (id., § 182, subd. (a)(5)). All charges except
count five were alleged to have been committed for the benefit of a criminal
street gang. (Id., § 186.22, subd. (b).) The information further alleged that

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R.A. personally used a deadly weapon in the commission of the murder and
robbery of Miranda. (Id., § 12022, subd. (b)(1).) (People v. [R.A.], supra,
A140128.)
In July 2013, a jury R.A. found guilty on all six charges presented (the
People dismissed count seven). The jury found true the gang enhancements.
It also found true the weapon use enhancements as to counts one and two,
but not true as to counts three and four.
In September 2013, the criminal court sentenced defendant to 25 years
to life in state prison for the murder, plus 10 years for the gang benefit
enhancement, for a total term of 35 years to life.
R.A. appealed. In October 2015, we affirmed the judgment but
modified the sentence to delete the ten-year gang enhancement. (People v.
[R.A.], supra, A140128.)
In 2016, California voters approved Proposition 57, the Public Safety
and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (Proposition 57) (Cal. Const., art. I, § 32), a
measure that amended the law to eliminate the People’s ability to directly file
charges against minors in criminal court and instead require them to file
such charges in juvenile court. (People v. Superior Court (Lara) (2018) 4
Cal.5th 299, 305 (Lara).) Under the proposition, minors may be tried and
sentenced in criminal courts “ ‘only after a juvenile court judge conducts a
transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor’s maturity,
degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the
minor can be rehabilitated.’ ” (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 305, quoting
People v. Vela (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 68, 72 (Vela) and former § 707, subd.
(a)(1).) Proposition 57 also removed the presumption of unfitness to be tried
as a juvenile that previously attached to the alleged commission of certain
offenses. (See Lara, at p. 314.) Our Supreme Court in Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th

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at p. 303 held that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to cases that had
already been filed by November 2016 when the new law took effect. In People
v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 158, 170 (Padilla), the Supreme Court
extended the retroactivity of Proposition 57, holding that it “applies during
resentencing when a criminal court sentence imposed on a juvenile offender
before the initiative’s passage has since been vacated.”
Subsequently, section 707, which sets forth the procedures for
transferring a minor from juvenile court to criminal court, was amended
several times. As relevant here and discussed more fully below, effective
January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly
Bill No. 2361) amended section 707 to provide that in order to transfer a
minor to criminal court, the juvenile court “shall find by clear and convincing
evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 330, § 1; § 707(a)(3).)
In October 2023, the criminal court granted R.A.’s petition for
resentencing under Penal Code former section 1170, subdivision (d) based on
a letter from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(CDCR). The criminal court vacated R.A.’s sentence and ordered the matter
returned to the juvenile court to conduct a retroactive transfer hearing
pursuant to Padilla.
The 2024 Transfer Hearing
The juvenile court held the second transfer hearing over multiple days,
commencing on August 7, 2024, with the court’s ruling issued on October 29,
2024. R.A. was 33 years old at the time of the proceedings.
The People’s Evidence
Prior to the transfer hearing, the deputy probation officer prepared a
report recommending transfer. The court admitted the report into evidence

8
and the supervising probation officer testified to its contents and her
concurrence with the opinions therein. We now summarize the report.
R.A. was born in Honduras. His parents never married, and he lived
with them until he was about six years old. His father abused drugs and
alcohol and physically abused both R.A. and his mother. When R.A. was six
years old, his mother left to the United States and sent him to live with his
grandmother. R.A.’s mother returned to Honduras years later, and when he
was 10 years old, both he and his mother left Honduras and went to live in
San Francisco. R.A.’s mother married his stepfather, and they had two
children together.
R.A. was “initially fine” when he arrived in the United States, but
“problems began” when he was in middle school. He dropped out of school
when he was in the eighth grade. At age 13, R.A. began smoking marijuana
and cigarettes and using cocaine.
R.A. and his family relocated to Texas because of his mother’s concern
that R.A. had become involved with gangs. He was enrolled in high school
but did not complete the ninth grade. R.A. ran away from home and returned
to San Francisco on multiple occasions, and his mother had to pick him up to
take him back to Texas. When R.A. was 16 years old, he experimented with
crystal meth and starting drinking alcohol. He also was involved in a gang-
related assault, which, in prior juvenile court proceedings, he admitted as
true, and for which he was adjudicated a ward, placed on probation, and
released to his mother’s home in Texas.
When R.A. turned 17 years old, his mother could no longer stop him
from leaving their home in Texas. On one occasion when R.A. ran away from
home, he was found in a park in San Francisco along with gang members.
Police picked him up and took him to a shelter, but he absconded the same

9
day.
In the transfer report, the probation department recommended transfer
to criminal court on the basis of four of the five criteria contained in section
707(a)(3): the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor,
whether the minor could be rehabilitated before expiration of the juvenile
court’s jurisdiction, the minor’s previous delinquency history, and the
circumstances and gravity of the offenses. As to the fifth criterion—the
success of previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor—
the probation officer contended that it weighed against transfer because R.A.
was never offered services from which he would have benefited, including
counseling, gang prevention services, and individual and family therapy.
The report continued: “despite this case, [R.A.] continued to have gang
involvement while in custody . . . threatening staff to have someone from the
outside put a bullet in the counsel’s head. . . . [¶] For the majority of the past
16 years [R.A.] has been in custody, [he] remained submerged in his gang’s
activities, doing very little in the way of rehabilitation or even doing anything
productive. [¶] To his credit, he has completed substance abuse counseling, a
non-violence course, anger management and has been baptized. This has all
occurred within the last 1.5 years-2 years, except for the Non-Violence course,
which was completed approximately 5 years ago. [¶] The fact that he has
wasted approximately 13-14 years of his incarceration steeped in gang
activities which placed him behind bars, is an indication that he has done the
bare minimum towards being rehabilitated. [¶] There is much still to be
gained in the way of rehabilitation that is offered by the CDCR. There are
programs within the CDCR that the non-minor can take advantage of. [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . [R.A.], although incarcerated continued his gangster ways for the
majority of the time he has been incarcerated, only showing any evidence at

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significant efforts to rehabilitate in 2022. There is absolutely no significant
evidence that demonstrates that the nonminor is ready to rehabilitate outside
of the CDCR.” The report concluded, “Releasing the non-minor to the
community is a danger to the community due to the lack of rehabilitation
that has been made, it is also a danger to the non-minor himself.”
In addition to the probation report and testimony of the supervising
probation officer, the People called an officer with the San Francisco County
Sheriff’s office, who testified that R.A. had numerous gang tattoos while in
custody in the San Francisco County Jail in September 2023.
The Defense’s Evidence
In his written opposition to transfer filed before the transfer hearing,
R.A. argued that the five statutory criteria “strongly support retention in the
juvenile court.” The defense retained a clinical and forensic psychologist,
Francesca Lehman, Psy.D., to conduct a psychological evaluation of R.A. Dr.
Lehman prepared a report regarding that evaluation and testified on R.A.’s
behalf as an expert in clinical and forensic psychology, as well as childhood
development with a specialization in adverse childhood experiences. Dr.
Lehman’s observations and opinions from her reports and her testimony
included the following.
Concerning R.A.’s developmental and social history, R.A. reported that
he was exposed to pervasive violence and criminality while living in
Honduras, including witnessing his grandfather’s murder and engaging with
gang-involved family members. R.A. was sexually abused by a neighbor
when he lived with his paternal grandmother. And he was physically abused
by his father, who would become violent after drinking and using cocaine.
During one incident, R.A.’s father attempted to drown R.A. R.A. also stated
his mother began physically abusing him when he was 12 years old.

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R.A. began associating with gang members after moving to the United
States. Six months after he arrived, he joined MS-13. R.A. identified
protection, a lack of friends, and little connection to his family as his reasons
for joining the gang.
R.A. struggled with substance abuse. He started drinking alcohol at
age 9 or 10, smoking marijuana at age 14, using heroin at age 18 or 19, and
using amphetamines and methamphetamines shortly before committing the
underlying offenses. R.A. participated in a few substance abuse programs
while incarcerated and reported five years of sobriety as of the time of Dr.
Lehman’s evaluation.
Dr. Lehman then summarized R.A.’s “Reentry Plan,” stating that R.A.
had “put great effort into preparing for release, including identifying and
beginning to enroll in reentry services” such as a housing program,
employment and financial assistance, substance abuse recovery support, and
tattoo removal.
With respect to R.A.’s psychological history, Dr. Lehman reported that
his psychological development was significantly impacted by parental
separation, exposure to domestic violence, drug abuse, traumatic experiences,
and emotional abuse by his father. R.A. also had a history of depression and
suicide attempts.
Dr. Lehman also recounted R.A.’s psychological evaluation conducted
by Dr. Francisco Gomez, Jr., for the first transfer hearing in 2010. Dr.
Gomez opined at the time that R.A. “is an individual who suffers from
cognitive deficits that affect his impulse control, ability to appreciate the
consequences or his behavior, judgment, insight into his behavior, and ability
to focus. Moreover, he has had poor parental supervision and guidance,
experienced psychological trauma and abuse, which has affected his

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emotional maturity and social judgment. He is not an individual that takes
the initiative and does not have the cognitive abilities to properly assess his
options in stressful situations. Thus, he is vulnerable to manipulation and
coercion in situations of duress or following others.” (Italics omitted.)
Between 2016 and 2022, R.A. had completed several programs,
including substance abuse programs, an anti-recidivism class, adult
education, and Criminals and Gang Members Anonymous. In June 2018,
R.A. dropped out of MS-13.
Dr. Lehman also noted that in 2014, when R.A. was 20 years old, he
committed a violent infraction in prison, a gang-related stabbing.
Dr. Lehman evaluated the five criteria in section 707(a)(3) and based
on that evaluation, recommended that R.A.’s case “should be remanded to
juvenile court.”
The defense also retained Roberto Luca, a former gang member who
testified on R.A.’s behalf as an expert on gang recruitment, gang culture in
the prison system, gang abatement, and gang programming specific to
transitioning former gang members into the community. Luca testified as to
the following.
Gangs target individuals who are more susceptible to the influence of a
gang, including those without guidance, and then guide them into criminal
activity. R.A. was a good target because he did not have structure, was not in
school, and was roaming the streets. Gangs indoctrinate the targeted youth
into the culture, values and rituals of the gang. R.A. was such a youth. He
was ushered into the gang, made to feel protected, and was fed and clothed
like family. All the while R.A. witnessed acts of violence and the structure of
the gang. Then, as part of the initiation process, he was asked to participate
in a criminal act to benefit the gang. Advancement in the gang is promoted

13
through intimidation, fear, and violence. Peer pressure exists because
persons like R.A. are trying to find acceptance into a group, and when they do
not commit crimes or follow orders, there will be consequences including
ostracism, physical harm, or death.
In the CDCR, R.A. was placed with active MS-13 gang members where
he was further subject to indoctrination. He was taught the gang rules in
prison and the repercussions that result from failing to follow them.
Dropping out can result in being placed on a “greenlight list,” requiring any
member from any California gang to assault or kill the member dropping out.
Based on his conversations with R.A., Luca believed that R.A. had
absorbed the message of Criminal and Gang Members Anonymous,
understood “how the impact of his crime[s] rippled throughout his
community,” and was on the path to rehabilitation.
In addition to the above, the defense retained Kelly Ryan, who testified
an as expert on cultural conditions and gang abatement in Honduras. Ryan
testified about hardships and traumatic situations for children growing up in
Honduras. Factors that contribute to someone becoming involved in a gang
include experiencing trauma and abuse, living in a gang-controlled
neighborhood, and substance abuse. She also testified that it is common for
Hondurans who have a parent who has left for the United States to wind up
in gangs. After interviewing R.A., Ryan believed that R.A. experienced
factors that made him susceptible to gang involvement. However, during
cross-examination, Ryan acknowledged that not all children who suffer from
trauma in Honduras end up joining a gang.
The People’s Rebuttal
The prosecution called forensic neuropsychologist, Dr. Rachyll
Dempsey, who qualified as an expert in forensic neuropsychology and

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psychological testing and assessment, including in the prison system. Dr.
Dempsey was asked about the psychological evaluation conducted by Dr.
Gomez for the first transfer hearing in 2010, which evaluation he had to
amend twice. Although Dr. Gomez found R.A. to have a full scale IQ of 71,
Dr. Gomez underestimated R.A.’s executive functioning, meaning his ability
to problem solve, plan, and manage impulses. On these tests, R.A. generally
scored in the average to low-average range. Dr. Dempsey opined that Dr.
Gomez’s evaluation was not valid because of these mischaracterizations and
because he administered some tests to R.A. in English instead of Spanish.
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
On October 29, the juvenile court issued a 24-page written decision
ordering R.A.’s case be transferred to criminal court. At a hearing on October
29, the court stated on the record the findings and orders contained in its
written decision.
In describing the legal standard, the court noted that “under current
law, the prosecution now bears the burden of establishing [‘]by clear and
convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(3).”
The court also stated: “When the juvenile court conducts a retroactive
Proposition 57 hearing in a resentencing case, the juvenile court must
determine whether [it] ‘would have transferred the case to adult criminal
court in accordance with current law.’ People v. Lopez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
835, 850 (emphasis added). Similarly, in a direct filing case where there was
no transfer hearing, ‘When conducting the transfer hearing, the juvenile
court shall, to the extent possible, treat the matter as though the prosecutor
had originally filed a juvenile petition in juvenile court and had then moved
to transfer [the person’s] cause to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’ People v.

15
Vela (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1113.”
Next, under the section entitled, “Findings,” the court addressed each
of the five section 707(a)(3) criteria as follows.
The court found the first criterion—the degree of criminal
sophistication (§ 707(a)(3)(A)(i))—weighed in favor of transfer. As the court
noted, when evaluating this criterion, it “shall give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity, intellectual
capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time of the
alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer
pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and
community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s
involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the
minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the
minor’s criminal sophistication.” (§ 707(a)(3)(A)(ii).)
The court first addressed the facts of the underlying crimes, observing
that R.A. “planned to seek gang-related revenge . . . , acted with experience
. . . and with a degree of viciousness in the robbery and stabbing . . . ,
attempted to cover up his involvement by trying to hide the murder weapon,
and boasted about his crime immediately after.” The court added that his
boasting was indicative of “an immature understanding of the value of life”
and callousness.
The court then considered R.A.’s family and trauma history,
acknowledging that as a child he endured physical and sexual abuse and
witnessed violence firsthand. The court observed that R.A.’s trauma and
childhood experiences made him vulnerable to gang involvement.
Eventually, R.A.’s mother and stepfather could no longer control R.A., who

16
stopped going to school and became affiliated with gang members.
As to peer or adult pressure, the court found no credible evidence
indicating that R.A. was being controlled by the adults in the gang or that he
succumbed to peer pressure when committing the underlying crimes. R.A.
“was an equal, if not dominant, participant” in the crimes, which were
motivated by an intent to seek revenge on a rival gang. And the court found
notable that “two of the overt acts were that [R.A.] stabbed Ivan through the
neck and through the heart with a knife.”
Turning to R.A.’s maturity and development at the time of the offenses,
the court agreed with Dr. Dempsey that the opinions of Dr. Gomez, who had
conducted a psychological evaluation of R.A. back in 2010, were not credible.
Specifically, although Dr. Gomez found R.A. to have a full scale IQ of 71, the
court found that Dr. Gomez underestimated R.A.’s executive functioning,
meaning his ability to problem solve, plan, and manage impulses. The court
found that Dr. Gomez’s evaluation was not valid because of these
mischaracterizations and because he administered some tests to R.A. in
English instead of Spanish. In addition, the court found that while
“[h]allmarks of youthfulness are impetuosity and failure to appreciate
consequences, and [R.A.] is not exempt[,] . . . the evidence shows that he is
capable of appreciating consequences.” Moreover, while substance abuse had
been a part of R.A.’s life, it did not appear to play a role in the murder.
In summarizing its findings on the first criterion, the court stated: “At
age 17, [R.A.] was deeply entrenched in MS-13 gang and criminal gang
activity,” going on to conclude that “the mandatory factors considered under
this criterion, while illuminating how [R.A.] became an MS-13 member, do
not outweigh the degree of criminality and [R.A.’s] commitment to a criminal
lifestyle that he demonstrated in this case.” The court thus found that the

17
first criterion weighed favor of transfer.
The court, however, found the second criterion—whether R.A. can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
707(a)(3)(B)(i))—weighed against transfer. The court stated that in
evaluating this criterion, it was required to “give weight to any relevant
factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to grow and
mature.” (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(ii)).) The court considered this criterion from two
distinct temporal perspectives: (1) the years leading up to and including the
underlying offenses and (2) the present time. With regard to the first, the
court considered R.A.’s “deeply entrenched delinquency” and “that he had
embraced a criminal lifestyle” at the time of the offenses. The court noted
that at the first transfer hearing in 2010, the judge then presiding had found
R.A. “amenable for treatment” under the second criterion. The court found
that it “cannot conclude by clear and convincing evidence that [R.A.], at the
age or 17 or 18, could not be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction.”
The court went on, stating that “[w]hile [it] understands its task to be a
determination of whether [R.A.] would have been transferred to adult court
as a minor under current transfer law, i.e., to address past criminal conduct,
the Court will also consider whether [R.A.] can be rehabilitated under the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction at the present time.” And, it noted, the juvenile
court retains jurisdiction over persons 25 years old or older like R.A. not more
than two years from the date of disposition. (§§ 607, 875.) Accordingly, the
court considered whether R.A. “could be rehabilitated under the two year
‘control period’ if he were retained in juvenile court now.”
In doing so, the court noted the probation report’s statement that
“ ‘Juvenile Probation has little to nothing that could supplant what CDCR

18
has in terms of security and rehabilitation.’ ” The court also noted that R.A.
started substance abuse counseling in 2016 and reports being sober since
2020 after three documented relapses in 2017 and 2020. He had one violent
infraction, a gang-related stabbing, in 2014, when he was 20 years old.
The court then stated it disagreed with gang expert Luca’s opinion that
R.A. “is already rehabilitated because he took the high risk of renouncing the
gang and has sincere awareness of his crime’s effect.” The court observed
that R.A. had “not demonstrated a law-abiding life outside of incarceration.”
Further, the court noted Luca’s opinion “that turning a life around for a gang
member in prison is an ‘ongoing process’ that starts with ‘changing
thoughts.’ ” Indeed, the court noted that “[i]n Mr. Luca’s case, it took 22
years for him to change.”
The court then considered “[t]he array of services proposed in the
defense release plan” including “housing, substance abuse treatment,
employment services, and tattoo removal.” The court “question[ed] the
wisdom and viability of post-release housing and services being located in
San Francisco” in view of the testimony from defense experts that former
gang members who leave MS-13 often face retaliation from the gang for
leaving. The court also found that placement outside of San Francisco
“obviously raises challenges for Juvenile Probation to supervise [R.A.] in the
community.”
The court, however, cited the supervising probation officer’s testimony
that she was “ ‘unsure’ ” that R.A. could be rehabilitated within two years,
but that the services identified in R.A.’s release plan “have helped in similar
cases.” In view of all of the above, the court could not “find by clear and
convincing evidence that [R.A.] cannot be rehabilitated . . . in two years.”
For the third criterion—“the minor’s previous delinquent history”

19
(§ 707(a)(3)(C)(i))—the court found it weighed in favor of transfer. It noted
that one year before the underlying crimes, R.A. was arrested for a gang-
related assault. He was “the main instigator of the fight” that led to R.A.’s
fellow gang members kicking and hitting the victim in the head ten to 15
times. The court noted that although that was R.A.’s “only prior juvenile
petition, the offense is serious and the prior conduct is similar to the
underlying charges, demonstrating [R.A.’s] deepening entrenchment in
criminal gang activity in the year preceding Ivan’s murder.” The court
additionally noted that R.A. had admitted being in 30 to 45 gang-related
fights in 2008. The court then concluded: “[R.A’s] family history, community
environment, and childhood trauma tell a familiar story of a young person’s
pathway to gang involvement. Yet, as Kelly Ryan testified, not everyone
from . . . Honduras who has experienced childhood trauma becomes a gang
member.” Accordingly, the court found the third criterion weighed in favor of
transfer.
With respect to the fourth criterion—the success of previous attempts
by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor (§ 707(a)(3)(D)(i))—the court
concluded that the criterion weighed against transfer. The court reasoned
that there were no prior efforts to rehabilitate when he was under the
jurisdiction of the San Francisco Juvenile Court, as he was “ ‘placed with
relatives in Texas in hopes that he would be removed from negative peers.’ ”
But “[w]hile [R.A.’s] lack of engagement and participation and chronic
runaway behaviors certainly hindered prior attempts to rehabilitation, prior
services were inadequate.”
Finally, as to the fifth criterion—the circumstances and gravity of the
offenses (§ 707(a)(3)(E)(i))—the court found it favored transfer. The court
found that “[a]lthough participating in a group, it was [R.A.] who actually

20
killed 14-year-old Ivan, stabbing him four times, including through the neck,
as well as causing an incised wound on his back. [R.A.] was involved in the
pre-planning to seek revenge, ‘hunting’ for rival gang members with a knife.
[R.A.] was involved in the after-planning to cover up the group’s
involvement.”
The court then applied California Rules of Court, rules 4.421 and 4.423,
which, respectively, list aggravating and mitigating factors to consider under
felony sentencing law. The court found aggravating factors were the great
violence, viciousness, and callousness of the crimes; the sophistication in
bringing a weapon; Ivan’s youth; R.A.’s leadership in the crimes and the
crimes’ involvement of a younger, minor co-participant; the planning and
sophistication in how the crime was committed and covered up; and the
increase in violence from the earlier sustained petition. Mitigating factors
were R.A.’s early childhood trauma and abuse (which were not evidently
factors in the offenses), youth, and immaturity. The court further observed
that R.A.’s trauma and social history had a mitigating effect, but not enough
to reduce the gravity of the offenses. The court found the fifth criterion
weighed in favor of transfer.
After examining the five statutory criteria, the decision ended with the
section entitled, “Conclusion,” under which the court wrote: “[R.A.’s] degree
of criminal sophistication, previous delinquent history, and the circumstances
and gravity of the offenses weigh heavily in favor of transfer to adult court.
Whether he could have been rehabilitated, or can now be rehabilitated, prior
to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction weighs slightly in favor of
his amenability for juvenile court. The lack of adequate previous attempts to
rehabilitate weigh in favor of juvenile court.
“The Court must consider the totality of the circumstances in

21
considering all five criteria listed in Welf. & Inst. Code § 707(a)(3); Cal. Rule
of Court 5.770.[ ] ‘Nothing in section 707 indicates that the juvenile court
was required to give equal weight to each of the five criteria or that it would
necessarily be an abuse of discretion to find that one criterion outweighed the
other criteria.’ [Citation.]
“The Court has considered all the criteria and factors in Welf. & Inst.
Code § 707(a)(3) and applied the current law. The district attorney has met
his burden of proof.” The court then ordered R.A.’s transfer to criminal court
for resentencing.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
R.A. argues the transfer order must be reversed because the juvenile
court failed to apply the proper legal standard in ruling on the transfer
request in two ways: (1) “Failing to Evaluate all of the Five Criteria Through
The Lens Of Amenability” and (2) “Applying the Vela Analytical
Formulation—That it Must Determine Whether [It] ‘Would Have Transferred
the Case to Adult Criminal Court.’ ”3 We disagree with both contentions.

3 R.A. acknowledges that he did not object below to the juvenile court’s
transfer ruling on either ground. Nonetheless, he argues that he did not
forfeit either contention, because each presents a “pure question of law.” (See
People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1061 [reviewing court may consider an
issue not raised in the trial court where the issue “involves ‘a pure question of
law which is presented by undisputed facts.’ ”].) While certain aspects of
R.A.’s arguments do present purely legal issues, such as the interpretation of
a statute, some of his arguments essentially attack the court’s exercise of its
discretion, as explained below. Thus, we are unpersuaded that his claims on
appeal are limited to pure questions of law. Additionally, R.A. appears to
have invited the second claimed error, as he expressly relied on the standard
in Vela, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 82 in his motion for release from custody
pending the transfer hearing. (See People v. Midell (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
1060, 1072 [under the invited error doctrine, “ ‘ “when a party by its own

22
Legal Framework and Standard of Review
“Section 707 sets forth the procedures for transferring a minor from
juvenile court to criminal court. It provides that whenever a minor aged 16
years or older is alleged to have committed a felony, the prosecutor may move
‘to transfer the minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.’
(§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) The prosecution bears the burden of proving that the
minor should be transferred. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.770(a).)” (In re
Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164 (Miguel R.).)
“The Legislature amended section 707 in 2023 and 2024. Effective
January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill [No.] 2361 amended section 707(a)(3) by
adding the following italicized language: ‘Following submission and
consideration of the report, and of any other relevant evidence that the
petitioner or the minor may wish to submit, the juvenile court shall decide
whether the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction.
In order to find that the minor should be transferred to a court of criminal
jurisdiction, the court shall find by clear and convincing evidence that the
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. In making its decision, the court shall consider the criteria
specified in subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive. If the court orders a transfer
of jurisdiction, the court shall recite the basis for its decision in an order
entered upon the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the
court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.’ ” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at

conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the
judgment should be reversed because of that error.” ’ ”].) In any event,
assuming R.A. adequately preserved his claims on appeal, they fail on the
merits for the reasons discussed in the text.

23
p. 164.)
Accordingly, Assembly Bill No. 2361 amended the procedure for
transferring a case to adult criminal court in three ways: (1) it raised the
prosecution’s burden of proof to clear and convincing evidence, (2) it made
amenability to rehabilitation while under jurisdiction of the juvenile court
“the ultimate question for the court to decide,” and (3) it required the juvenile
court to state the reasons supporting a finding that the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation. (In re E.P. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 409, 416 (E.P.).)
The five statutory criteria listed in subparagraphs (A) through (E) of
section 707(a)(3) were not amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361. (See Stats.
2022, ch. 330, § 1.) Those criteria are: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor”; (2) “[w]hether the minor can be
rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”;4 (3)
“[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history”; (4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts
by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor”; and (5) “[t]he circumstances
and gravity of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by
the minor.” (§ 707(a)(3)(A)–(E).) The statute sets forth a non-exhaustive list
of relevant factors for the court to consider with respect to each of the five

4 “[T]he ultimate determination of whether ‘the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court’ (§ 707(a)(3))
is not the same as the second criterion, which calls for consideration of
‘[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
juvenile court’s jurisdiction (§707(a)(3)(B)(i)).’ ” (Miguel R., supra, 100
Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) “[T]he focus of the second criterion is whether there is
enough time to rehabilitate the minor while the minor is still eligible to
remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) “In contrast, the ultimate
finding that the juvenile court must make under section 707(a)(3) concerns a
global assessment of the minor’s suitability to rehabilitation within the
juvenile court system, and not just a comparison of the time needed with the
time remaining. (§ 707(a)(3).)” (Miguel R., at p. 167.)

24
criteria. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) These
criteria “are based on the premise that the minor did, in fact, commit the
offense.” (People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667, 682; Kevin
P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 189 (Kevin P.).)
Effective January 1, 2024, Senate Bill No. 545 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill No. 545) “amended section 707 to require that with respect to
each of those five criteria the juvenile court ‘shall give weight to any relevant
factor,’ including the specific factors listed as relevant to each criterion.
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).)” (Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) “The previous version of the statute made
consideration of those factors discretionary, not mandatory. (Former § 707,
subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii), (E)(ii).) With respect to the degree of
criminal sophistication, Senate Bill [No.] 545 also added new mandatory
factors for the court to consider: whether the minor has had any involvement
in the child welfare or foster care system and whether the minor has been ‘a
victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery.’ (§ 707, subd.
(a)(3)(A)(ii).)” (Miguel R., at pp. 164–165; Stats. 2023, ch. 716, § 1.)
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion for abuse of
discretion.” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) “ ‘The abuse of
discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies
according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law
are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible
only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ” (Ibid.) To the extent the juvenile court’s
conclusion requires interpretation of a statute, such issue presents a question
of law that we independently review. (People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th
982, 989.)

25
The Juvenile Court Did Not Err In Assessing the Statutory
Criteria
Evaluation of the Criteria “Through the Lens of Amenability”
As noted, R.A.’s first argument is that the juvenile court incorrectly
applied the section 707(a)(3) criteria because it failed to evaluate the criteria
“through the lens of amenability.” Specifically, R.A. attacks the court’s
evaluation of the first, third, and fifth criteria, arguing that it did not explain
how its findings of fact as to each of those criteria “render R.A. not amenable
to rehabilitation.” As he puts in its reply brief, although “the court made
ultimate findings rejecting [his] amenability to rehabilitation,” the court
nonetheless erred because it did not analyze his amenability for
rehabilitation “under” the first, third, and fifth criteria. We are unpersuaded.
Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to give effect to the law’s purpose. (People v.
Reynoza, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 989.) “ ‘ “ ‘We first examine the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. . . . If the language is
clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal
interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not
intend.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Applying these principles, we conclude R.A. misinterprets
section 707(a)(3), as he improperly conflates the individual criteria of section
707(a)(3) with the ultimate determination of amenability.
Section 707(a)(3) as amended by Assembly Bill No. 2361 mandates that
in order to transfer a minor to criminal court, the juvenile court “shall find by
clear and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” Since the
passage of Assembly Bill No. 2361, appellate courts have consistently
referred to a juvenile court’s finding on amenability as the “ultimate”
question for the court to decide at a transfer hearing. (See, e.g., In re J.S.

26
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 212; Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at pp.
164–165; In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288 (S.S.); E.P., supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 416.) Assembly Bill No. 2361’s amendments to section 707
were intended to “refocus” the juvenile court’s assessment and require “[t]he
analysis of the five criteria set forth in the statute [to] be focused through the
lens of amenability to rehabilitation.” (S.S., supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p.
1288.) Indeed, in making the “ultimate finding” regarding amenability, the
statute requires the juvenile court to “consider the criteria specified in
subparagraphs (A) to (E), inclusive.” (§ 707(a)(3).) “Thus, according to the
statute’s plain language, the court is required to consider each of the five
listed criteria in determining whether the prosecution has carried its burden
of proof to transfer a juvenile to criminal court.”.) (Miguel R., at p. 166.)
Further, as courts have explained, “[t]he amended section 707 requires the
juvenile court to consider all five factors together in determining whether the
minor is amenable to rehabilitation.” (E.P., at p. 417, italics added; see
Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 167 [the “ultimate
finding . . . concerns a global assessment of the minor’s suitability to
rehabilitation within the juvenile court system,” italics added].) In short,
section 707(a)(3) provides that the evaluation of the five criteria is the means
by which the juvenile court reaches, and informs, the ultimate determination
of whether the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation. In other words,
amenability is not itself a separate factual finding that supplants the findings
regarding the specified criteria.
Here, R.A. concedes that the juvenile court evaluated each of the five
criteria. He also agrees with the People’s observations that “that the court
articulated the evidence it considered, the evidence it found convincing, the
direction it found that each factor tilted the balance, and the weight it gave

27
the five factors as part of a totality of the circumstances approach to making
its transfer determination.” And based on that comprehensive analysis, as
R.A. further concedes, the juvenile court “made ultimate findings rejecting
[his] amenability to rehabilitation.” In sum, the court’s ruling complied with
section 707(a)(3), and we thus reject R.A.’s argument that the court erred in
failing to evaluate the first, third, and fifth criteria “through the lens of
amenability.”
Application of the “Vela Analytical Formulation”
R.A.’s second argument is that “The Juvenile Court Legally Erred In
Applying the Vela Analytical Formulation—That it Must Determine Whether
the Juvenile Court ‘Would Have Transferred the Case to Adult Criminal
Court’—Because it Precluded Proper Consideration of All of the Section
707[(a)(3)] Factors As Required By Assembly Bill 2361.” Again, we disagree.
R.A.’s contention is based on Vela where the court held that Proposition
57—which took effect in 2016 and among other things eliminated the People’s
ability to initiate criminal cases against juvenile offenders in criminal court—
applies retroactively to juveniles charged directly in criminal court whose
judgment was not final at the time it was enacted. (Vela, supra, 11
Cal.App.5th at p. 71.) Accordingly, Vela—who had been charged and tried as
an adult for crimes committed when he was 16 years old and whose appeal
was pending when Proposition 57 took effect—was entitled to a transfer
hearing. (Vela, at pp. 71, 82.) Vela conditionally reversed the judgment and
remanded with these instructions: “When conducting the transfer hearing,
the juvenile court shall, to the extent possible, treat the matter as though the
prosecutor had originally filed a juvenile petition in juvenile court and had
then moved to transfer Vela’s cause to a court of criminal jurisdiction. (§ 707,
subd. (a)(1).) If, after conducting the juvenile transfer hearing, the court

28
determines that it would have transferred Vela to a court of criminal
jurisdiction because he is ‘not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under
the juvenile court law,’ then Vela’s convictions and sentence are to be
reinstated. (§ 707.1, subd. (a).) On the other hand, if the juvenile court finds
that it would not have transferred Vela to a court of criminal jurisdiction,
then it shall treat Vela’s convictions as juvenile adjudications and impose an
appropriate ‘disposition’ within its discretion.” (Vela, at p. 1113, italics
omitted.)
In Lara, the Supreme Court approved the remedy set forth in Vela for
juveniles that had cases pending in criminal court prior to the passage of
Proposition 57. (Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 309–313.)5
Here, as mentioned above, in the section summarizing the legal
standard in its written decision, the juvenile court stated that under section
707(a)(3) “the prosecution now bears the burden of establishing [‘]by clear
and convincing evidence that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation
while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.[’]” The court then cited the
Vela standard as set forth above.
R.A. argues that the juvenile court erred in applying “the Vela
analytical formation,” which he describes as “requiring a ‘backward’
hypothetical assessment” that “is incompatible with section 707, as amended
by Assembly Bill 2361 . . . . .” R.A. reasons that whereas Vela “restricts a
court’s consideration of facts to those occurring before and during the
offense,” current section 703(a)(3) requires that “analysis of the [five] criteria

5 Lara cited the original decision issued in Vela, which was pending
review in the Supreme Court at the time. (See Lara, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp.
306, 310.) The Supreme Court subsequently vacated the original opinion
filed in Vela and the Court of Appeal refiled a substantially similar decision
in People v. Vela (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1099.

29
must not be limited to facts before or at the time of the offense, but must also
include consideration of material facts beyond the time of the offense and up
to the present time of the transfer hearing which bear on those criteria.” R.A.
goes on to argue that in this case “[t]he Vela remedy unlawfully tainted” the
juvenile court’s “proper consideration” of the first and third criteria of section
707(a)(3) because it failed to consider “material facts beyond the time of the
offense,” namely that he had dropped out of and repudiated his gang in 2018.
This is so, R.A. contends, even though he acknowledges that the court
considered that very evidence when evaluating the second criterion.
R.A.’s argument is somewhat convoluted, but the gravamen of it
appears to be that the juvenile court should have considered facts that
occurred after R.A.’s underlying offenses in 2008—i.e., that R.A. had
renounced his gang affiliation in 2018—when evaluating the first and third
statutory criteria, not just the second criterion. We find no merit in this
contention.
As an initial matter, we are unpersuaded by a premise of R.A.’s
argument that Vela (and thus Lara) “restricts a court’s consideration of facts
to those occurring before and during the offense.” As quoted above, the Vela
court remanded the matter for the juvenile court to conduct a transfer
hearing with the following instructions: “When conducting the transfer
hearing, the juvenile court shall, to the extent possible, treat the matter as
though the prosecutor had originally filed a juvenile petition in juvenile court
and had then moved to transfer Vela’s cause to a court of criminal
jurisdiction. (§ 707, subd. (a)(1).) If, after conducting the juvenile transfer
hearing, the court determines that it would have transferred Vela to a court
of criminal jurisdiction because he is ‘not a fit and proper subject to be dealt
with under the juvenile court law,’ then Vela’s convictions are to be

30
reinstated. (§ 707.1, subd. (a).)” (Vela, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 1113,
italics added.)
The phrase “would have transferred” (or “would not have transferred”)
in Vela does call for looking “backward” in the sense that it instructs juvenile
courts in certain cases to retroactively apply Proposition 57—i.e., to afford
some defendants a hearing to have their amenability to juvenile adjudication
considered retrospectively under the new standards of Proposition 57. But
this does not mean that Vela was also saying that a juvenile court making
such a determination is “restrict[ed]” to “consideration of facts to those
occurring before and during the offense.” To the contrary.
Vela instructed the juvenile court to decide whether to transfer a case
under the then current legal standards. (See Vela, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at
p. 82 [“If, after conducting the juvenile transfer hearing, the court determines
that it would have transferred Vela to a court of criminal jurisdiction because
he is ‘not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court
law,’ then Vela’s convictions and sentence are to be reinstated,” italics added],
citing former § 707.1, subdivision (a).) And the standards at the time
included former section 707, subdivision (a)(2), which set forth the five
criteria to consider in ruling on a transfer request (criteria that, we note,
remained unchanged after the passage of Assembly Bill. No. 2361, with
several exceptions). (See Vela, at p. 72 [under Proposition 57, certain
categories of minors such as Vela “can still be tried in criminal court, but only
after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to consider various
factors such as the minor’s maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior
delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated,” citing
former § 707, subd. (a)(1)].) As is true under current law, the criteria under
that earlier version of section 707 focused on different areas, with some of

31
them focusing on the time of the offense. For example, the first criterion
regarding criminal sophistication included consideration of “the minor’s age,
maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at
the time of the alleged offense” (former § 707, subd. (c)(3)(A)(ii), italics added),
and the fifth criterion was the “circumstances and gravity of the offense
alleged” (id., subd. (a)(2)(E)(i), italics added). But other criteria focused on
different areas, not just the time of the offense. For example, the second
criterion was “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (id., subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)), which
includes consideration of “the minor’s potential to grow and mature” (id.,
subd. (a)(2)(B)(ii)). And the third criterion—previous delinquent history
(former § 707, subd. (a)(2)(C)(i))—has been interpreted to refer to delinquent
conduct previous to the transfer hearing, and not just previous to the
underlying offenses. (See D.C. v. Superior Court (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 441,
451–456.) Accordingly, R.A. fails to establish that Vela “restrict[ed] a court’s
consideration of facts to those occurring before and during the offense.”
But even assuming for argument’s sake that R.A.’s interpretation of
Vela were correct, we would reject his contention that the court improperly
assessed the statutory criteria by purportedly ignoring the evidence about his
gang affiliation renouncement.
It is true that the court’s discussion of the legal standard in its written
decision mentioned the standard in Vela with which R.A. takes issue.
However, within its discussion of the second criterion (rehabilitation prior to
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction), the court explained: “While
the court understands its task to be a determination of whether [R.A.] would
have been transferred to adult court as a minor under current transfer law,
i.e., to address past criminal conduct, the Court will also consider whether

32
[R.A.] can be rehabilitated under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction at the
present time.” And the court did so, assessing whether R.A. could have been
rehabilitated, as of both the time of the offenses and the transfer hearing. As
to the latter inquiry, the court expressly considered evidence that R.A. had
renounced his gang affiliation and the defense experts’ opinions regarding
R.A.’s rehabilitation. Indeed, the court considered this and other evidence
before finding that the second criterion weighed against transfer.
This leads us to R.A.’s contention that although the court considered
evidence of his gang renouncement under the second criterion, it nonetheless
erred because it did not also consider that evidence under either the first
criterion or third criterion. R.A. complains that the court “did not consider
[that evidence] when it may have mattered most: evaluating criminal
sophistication through the lens of amenability . . . .” Similarly, R.A. argues
that consideration of those “significant material facts showing amenability to
rehabilitation” is the analysis “through which [the third criterion] must be
evaluated.” This argument is unavailing.
To the extent this is a rehash of R.A.’s first claim of error that the
juvenile court erred in failing to assess certain of the individual criteria
“through the lens of amenability,” we reject it for the reasons discussed
above. R.A.’s contention is also untenable because it effectively confuses the
second criterion with the first and third criteria.
The first criterion is “the degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by
the minor.” (§ 707(a)(3)(A)(i).) And section 707(a)(3)(A)(ii) provides that
when evaluating this criterion, “the juvenile court shall give weight to any
relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s age, maturity,
intellectual capacity, and physical, mental, and emotional health at the time
of the alleged offense; the minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks

33
and consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or peer
pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s family and
community environment; the existence of childhood trauma; the minor’s
involvement in the child welfare or foster care system; and the status of the
minor as a victim of human trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the
minor’s criminal sophistication.” (Italics added.) “The criminal-
sophistication criterion ‘requires a juvenile court . . . to consider the whole
picture, that is, all the evidence that might bear on the minor’s criminal
sophistication, including any criminal sophistication manifested in the
present crime.’ ” (Kevin P., supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 192.) Thus, as noted
above, a reasonable construction of the first criterion is that it focuses on
facts and circumstances existing at the time of the alleged offense(s) (see D.C.
v. Superior Court, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 452) bearing on the minor’s
criminal sophistication.
The third statutory criteria is “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent
history.” (§ 707(a)(3)(C)(i).) When evaluating this criterion, “the juvenile
court shall give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to,
the seriousness of the minor’s previous delinquent history and the effect of
the minor’s family and community environment and childhood trauma on the
minor’s previous delinquent behavior.” (§ 707(a)(3)(C)(ii).) As noted above,
“previous” has been interpreted to mean previous to the transfer hearing, so
the juvenile court may properly consider conduct the minor engaged in after
the offense, but before the transfer hearing. (D.C. v. Superior Court, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 451.) And “delinquent history” does not refer only to
conduct resulting in a delinquency petition but also to any previous
delinquent conduct. (See id. at p. 453.)
In contrast to the first and third criteria, which focus, respectively, on

34
the minor’s criminality and previous delinquency, the second criterion
patently focuses on the minor’s amenability to rehabilitation. (See
§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i) [“[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction”]; § 707(a)(3)(B)(ii) [“When
evaluating the [second] criterion . . . , the juvenile court shall give weight to
any relevant factor, including, but not limited to, the minor’s potential to
grow and mature.”].)
Out of the three criteria discussed above, evidence regarding R.A.’s
repudiation of his gang affiliation is most relevant to the second criterion,
since, as R.A. claims, it goes to whether he is amenable to rehabilitation.
Therefore, it was appropriate for the court to consider such evidence in
evaluating the second criterion, rather than the first or third.
In short, R.A. has failed to show the court improperly evaluated the
statutory criteria.
Finally, we turn to the People’s assertion with which they close their
respondent’s brief: “As it has been shown that the court did not commit the
analytical errors [R.A.] ascribes, it is clear that [R.A.’s] concern is only with
the court’s exercise of discretion.” We agree. The People’s observation is
made evident by R.A.’s contentions such as the following, which challenges
the court’s weighing of the first criterion: “If R.A. was deeply entrenched in
criminal gang activity at age 17, how is it he was not amenable to
rehabilitation then or now, many years later having debriefed and exited the
gang? If R.A. acted in a criminally sophisticated manner then, how did that
make him not amenable to rehabilitation then and now at age 33?” To the
extent R.A. requests that we independently review the record, reweigh the
evidence, and reweigh some or all of the five criteria in a manner contrary to
that done by the juvenile court, we decline the invitation. “The existence of

35
evidence supporting [R.A.’s] position does not demonstrate that the juvenile
court abused its discretion. Our role is not to substitute our judgment for
that of the juvenile court or reweigh the evidence. ‘ “ ‘ “The appropriate test
for abuse of discretion is whether the [juvenile] court exceeded the bounds of
reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that
of the trial court.” ’ ” ’ ” (In re J.P. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1123.) Here,
R.A. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile
court’s findings and conclusions. Indeed, with respect to the court’s findings
on the first criterion, R.A. appears to concede that the court’s “findings of fact
are supported by the record.” R.A. also fails to show, and we do not find, that
the court’s weighing of the statutory criteria and “ultimate findings rejecting
[his] amenability to rehabilitation” were arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd.
In sum, R.A. has failed to demonstrate the juvenile court abused its
discretion in transferring his case to criminal court.
DISPOSITION
The order transferring R.A. to adult criminal court is affirmed.

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RICHMAN, J.

We concur.

STEWART, P. J.

MILLER, J.

(A171676N)

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