CourtListener 10793812•People v. Davis CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 2/11/26 P. v. Davis CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063338
v. (Super. Ct. No. 19HF1109)
REGINALD JAMAL DAVIS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lance P. Jensen, Judge. Affirmed.
Bases & Bases and Arielle Bases for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal, Andrew Mestman and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Reginald Jamal Davis appeals from the judgment of conviction
entered after a jury found him guilty of several felony counts for, inter alia,
assault with intent to commit a sexual offense during the commission of a
burglary and kidnapping with intent to commit a sex offense. The court found
it to be true Davis suffered prior serious and violent felony convictions. The
court imposed a sentence of 75 years to life plus 32 years.
In his opening brief, Davis argues the trial court abused its
discretion with respect to a pretrial evidentiary ruling and insufficient
evidence supports his convictions with respect to the assault and kidnapping
offenses. He also contends the trial court committed several errors in
imposing sentence and his total prison sentence constitutes cruel and/or
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and the California Constitution.
For the reasons we explain, none of Davis’s contentions of error
has merit. We therefore affirm.
FACTS
I.
DAVIS CHASES AND REPEATEDLY TRIES TO GRAB A FEMALE JOGGER
On August 13, 2019, S.B. was jogging after dark when she sensed
someone was behind her. She slowed down, turned around, and saw a man,
later identified as Davis, about 10 to 15 feet away; she did not know Davis
and had never seen him before.
S.B. heard Davis talking to her but she could not hear what he
was saying. Initially, Davis was walking behind her, but when she started to
run faster, he started to run toward her. She told him to stop following her.
Davis asked her to stop and told her he wanted to talk to her.
2
After Davis came within inches of S.B. and twice tried to grab
her, she ran into traffic in the middle of the street. He followed her and
continued to try and grab her as she tried to run away from him.
S.B. told Davis she was going to call the police. He told her not to
call the police but to instead talk to him. She continued to try to get away
from him by weaving between cars and trying to get a car to stop and help
her; meanwhile, he continued to pursue her and repeatedly told her to stop. A
couple of cars stopped and S.B. got into one of them. The driver of that car
called 911. Davis punched the front of that car. S.B. thought Davis was
drunk.
II.
DAVIS BREAKS INTO M.R.’S NEARBY RESIDENCE
A short distance from where the jogger had escaped Davis,
around 8:30 p.m. later that evening, then 88-year-old M.R. was alone
watching television in her family room when she noticed the outdoor motion
sensor patio lights turn on. M.R. stood up to investigate and looked in the
direction of the glass French doors where she saw a man, later identified as
Davis, standing outside trying to open the doors. M.R. had never seen Davis
before. Davis looked at M.R., “kind of smiled,” and waved.
M.R. walked across the room to her landline telephone and dialed
911 as Davis disappeared into the darkness. While she was on the telephone
with the dispatcher, Davis came up behind M.R. and grabbed her wrist that
was holding the telephone “extremely hard,” causing M.R. pain. Davis moved
M.R.’s wrist to slam the telephone down with such force the cord came loose.
M.R. screamed. Davis told M.R. to “‘shut up.’”
3
Davis pulled M.R.’s hand up to her shoulder and pushed her
toward the front door, then down the hallway, and into the office.1 The lights
in the office were off, and Davis did not turn the lights on. M.R. was very
frightened Davis was going to kill her, rape her, or both.
Inside the office, Davis pushed M.R. over to a small sofa; he
pushed the lower part of her body to the ground and her upper body onto the
seat of the sofa. M.R.’s knees were on the ground, and Davis pushed M.R.’s
face down into the sofa, making it difficult for her to breathe. M.R. then felt
Davis pulling on the back of her jeans under her shirt. She could feel his
finger on her skin; she believed his finger was inside her underpants at her
waistline. M.R. felt Davis pulling her pants downward.
M.R. abruptly pulled her body up and screamed, “‘No’” to Davis
pulling her pants and “[n]o to everything.” Davis took one of the sofa pillows
and smashed it into M.R.’s face “very, very hard.” M.R. felt extreme pain as if
her nose had been broken. M.R. could barely breathe. M.R. wheezed, started
feeling lightheaded, and thought she was going to pass out.
She then heard the landline telephone begin to ring. Davis pulled
M.R. up to her feet and dragged her out of the office, back into the family
room, and toward the telephone. As he dragged her to the telephone, he
instructed her to tell the caller, “‘[I]t was a mistake,” and that M.R.’s
daughter had him deliver a birthday present for M.R. as a surprise.2
1 M.R. estimated the distance from the telephone to the sofa in
the office was about 19 feet.
2 M.R.’s only daughter testified she never asked anyone to go to
M.R.’s home to surprise her with a birthday gift on August 13, 2019. She also
testified she had never heard of Davis before.
4
Davis plugged in the receiver as it had come loose from the
telephone. M.R. heard the voice of the same dispatcher with whom she had
previously spoken when she dialed 911. Davis was behind M.R. but then bent
to face her, inches away from her, and told her several times to tell the caller,
“[I]t was a mistake.” M.R. did not say anything; she was wheezing while on
the telephone trying “to buy more time.” The dispatcher told M.R. the sheriff
deputies were very close by and she was going to be okay.
While still on the telephone with the dispatcher, M.R. saw the
outdoor patio lights turn on. Two sheriff deputies appeared on the patio with
guns drawn. The deputies instructed Davis to open the door. The deputies
entered through the glass French doors, detained Davis, and placed him in
handcuffs.
At no point did Davis try to take anything from M.R.’s house. A
purse was lying on the sofa in the office but at no time did M.R. see Davis
grab that purse; she did not later find anything missing from it or the house.
Davis was upset; he appeared animated, frustrated, and angry,
shouting, “She knows me.” He was talkative and a little erratic. He was also
sweating, but he did not smell of alcohol. After he was placed in the back of a
patrol car, he rambled for a long time, saying things that did not make sense.
III.
DAVIS’S TESTIMONY
Davis testified he was an alcoholic who regularly uses heroin,
speed, and weed. He testified that as of August 13, 2019, he had not slept in a
week. He stated that, pursuant to his usual schedule, he used heroin, speed,
and weed earlier that day. He also drank alcohol throughout the day, up until
his 6:00 p.m. Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, during which he blacked out.
5
He testified he did not remember anything from that moment until later that
night when he woke up handcuffed in the back of a patrol car.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury found Davis guilty as charged in the first amended
information with (1) assault with intent to commit a sexual offense during
the commission of a first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 220, subd. (b); count
1);3 (2) kidnapping with intent to commit a sex offense (§ 209, subd. (b)(1);
count 2); (3) first degree residential burglary (§§ 459 & 460, subd. (a); count
3); (4) dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1);
count 4); and (5) elder abuse (§ 368, subd. (b)(1); count 5).
The jury found true Davis committed counts 2 and 3 against a
vulnerable victim in violation of section 667.9, subdivision (b). The jury also
found true the allegation a non-accomplice was present during the
commission of count 3, in violation of section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21).4
The trial court found the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that, pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1), Davis had previously
been convicted of two serious felonies (§ 1192.5), and pursuant to section 667,
subdivisions (d) and (e)(2)(A) and section 1170.12, subdivisions (b) and
(c)(2)(A), he had previously suffered three serious and violent felony
convictions and adjudications.
The trial court also found true several alleged factors in
aggravation. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1) as to all counts [“crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or
3 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise specified.
4 At the sentencing hearing, the trial court dismissed count 3.
6
other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness”];
rule 4.421(a)(3) as to counts 1, 4, and 5 [“victim was particularly vulnerable”];
rule 4.421(b)(1) as to all counts [“defendant has engaged in violent conduct
that indicates a serious danger to society”]; rule 4.421(b)(2) as to all counts
[“defendant’s prior convictions as an adult . . . are numerous or of increasing
seriousness”]; and rule 4.421(b)(3) as to all counts [“defendant has served a
prior term in prison or county jail under section 1170[, subd. ](h)”].)5 The
court further found true, as to counts 1 and 2, and pursuant to section 1203,
subdivision (e)(5), Davis had suffered a prior felony conviction.
The trial court imposed an indeterminate prison term of 75 years
to life plus a determinate prison term of 32 years.
Davis filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
EXCLUSION OF VIDEO AND AUDIO RECORDING AT TRIAL
Davis argues the trial court erred by denying his motion in limine
seeking the admission of a video and audio recording (the recording)
depicting Davis talking to himself for about 25 minutes while seated in the
back of a patrol car following his arrest. In his opening brief, Davis argues
the recording was relevant to show he was intoxicated at that time, and thus
earlier that evening had been unable to form the specific intent to commit a
sexual offense, a required element for both counts 1 and 2. He also argues the
recording was admissible to show Davis’s “then-existing state of mind,
5 The court found the allegation under California Rule of Court,
rule 4.421(a)(6) not true as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 5.
7
emotion, and physical sensation” within the meaning of Evidence Code
section 1250.
“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence . . . having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) “‘“‘The test of relevance is
whether the evidence tends “‘logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference’
to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive.”’”’” (People v.
Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 913.) “‘Evidence is relevant when no matter
how weak it may be, it tends to prove the issue before the jury.’” (People v.
Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 491.)
We review a trial court’s ruling determining the relevance and
admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion, disturbing it only if we
conclude that the court was arbitrary or capricious in exercising its discretion
which resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Parker (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1, 53.)6 “[W]e review the trial court’s ruling, ‘not the court’s
reasoning and, if the ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.’” (People v.
Camacho (2022) 14 Cal.5th 77, 123.)
6 In the opening brief, citing People v. Albarran (2007)
149 Cal.App.4th 214, 224, footnote 7, Davis suggests we should review the
trial court’s evidentiary ruling de novo because his “constitutional rights are
affected by the error.” But the appellate court in Albarran expressly stated,
“[T]he decision on whether evidence . . . is relevant, not unduly prejudicial
and thus admissible, rests within the discretion of the trial court” and
“‘[w]here, as here, a discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial
court, its exercise of that discretion “must not be disturbed on appeal except
on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.”’” (Albarran, at pp. 224–225.) It was an order denying a motion for
new trial that the Albarran court reviewed de novo. (Id. at p. 224.)
8
We have reviewed the recording and cannot conclude the trial
court abused its discretion in finding it irrelevant to prove whether Davis was
intoxicated and had otherwise been able to form the requisite specific intent
for counts 1 and 2. While the recording includes Davis’s statements that he
“drink[s] and do[es] drugs,” Davis does not say anything about whether he
was then under the influence. Instead, the recording largely shows, as
observed by the trial court: “Davis on a rambling monologue that has a
consistent, predominate theme of having access to ACLU phone numbers and
internal affair[s] phone numbers and how he intends to, more or less, tune up
the officers and make them a lot of money and that his mom has some type of
information . . . that will be unleashed on social media . . . and it will be the
end of the world, more or less, for these officers once she releases that” with
“little tangents such as officers’ treatment of him in the past, things of that
nature.” The recording does not show Davis was intoxicated and does not
otherwise provide enough information as to his state of mind such that it
would be probative of his intent.
Even if the trial court abused its discretion by deeming the
recording irrelevant, the trial court ruled Davis’s statements made therein to
constitute inadmissible hearsay, rejecting Davis’s contention they fit within
the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule. Although Davis
acknowledges this ruling in his opening brief, he has forfeited any challenge
to it because he has not provided any analysis explaining how the trial court’s
determination the recording was inadmissible hearsay was wrong. (People v.
Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 150 [court declined to address issue which
defendant only mentions and fails to expand on “with either argument or
citation to relevant authority”]; People v. Galambos (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th
9
1147, 1159 [“defendant does not develop this argument with citations and
analysis and thus has waived it”].)
In any event, any error in excluding the recording at trial was
harmless. We review allegations of evidentiary error using the harmless error
standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v. Marks
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 226–227.) The Watson standard requires reversal only
if “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra,
46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) “‘[P]robability’ in this context does not mean more likely
than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.”
(Richardson v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1040, 1050.) The appellant
bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. (People v. Gonzalez (2018)
5 Cal.5th 186, 195.)
Davis acknowledges in the opening brief that “extensive
evidence” of his purported intoxicated state at the time the charged offenses
occurred was before the jury at trial. S.B. testified she thought Davis was
drunk as he chased after her. Evidence was presented that before, during,
and after the commission of the charged offenses, Davis’s appearance and
conduct suggested he might have been intoxicated. For example, Orange
County Sheriff’s Deputy Adrian Cortes described Davis’s demeanor after he
handcuffed him and took him out of M.R.’s house as talkative, even
“rambling” about unusual things and “a little erratic.” He noted Davis was
sweating and appeared upset, animated, frustrated, and angry. Cortes,
however, added that in his experience as a patrol deputy, detained suspects
commonly exhibit such characteristics and thus they do not necessarily
reflect a state of intoxication. In hindsight, however, Cortes testified he
10
thought Davis was possibly under the influence at the time of the charged
offenses, but the thought had not crossed his mind at the time.
Davis does not explain in his appellate briefs what the recording
would have added to the admitted trial evidence on the issue of intoxication.
Any error in the exclusion of the recording was harmless as a matter of law.
II.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Davis contends insufficient evidence shows he had the requisite
specific intent to commit a sexual assault in the commission of counts 1 and
2. He also argues insufficient evidence supports the asportation element of
count 2 (kidnapping with the intent to commit a sexual assault). For the
reasons we explain, substantial evidence supports the jury’s findings as to
counts 1 and 2.
A. Standard of Review
“When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction is
challenged on appeal, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value from which a trier of fact could find the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Our review must presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence.” (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21,
44.)
“‘[A] reasonable inference . . . “may not be based on suspicion
alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or
guess work. [¶] . . . A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from
evidence rather than . . . a mere speculation as to probabilities without
evidence.”’” (People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360.) “‘“‘If the
11
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the
reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled
with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’”’”
(People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104.) We do not reweigh evidence,
reevaluate the credibility of a witness, or settle factual conflicts, because
“these are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” (People v. Xiong (2013)
215 Cal.App.4th 1259, 1268.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Findings Davis Specifically Intended
To Commit a Sexual Offense in the Commission of Counts 1 and 2
Both counts 1 (section 220, subd. (b)) and 2 (section 209,
subd. (b)(1)) require the intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or
other specified sexual offenses. “The question whether the intent existed is
one for the jury to determine from the conduct of the defendant and the
surrounding circumstances.” (People v. Meichtry (1951) 37 Cal.2d 385, 389.)
Intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
crime. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1130, overruled in part on
other grounds in People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.)
Here, the trial evidence of Davis’s conduct and the surrounding
circumstances constitutes more than substantial evidence supporting the
finding Davis kidnapped and assaulted M.R. with the intent to commit a
sexual offense against her. The trial evidence shows Davis, shortly after
chasing and attempting to grab S.B. as she jogged down a nearby street,
broke into M.R.’s house, grabbed M.R.’s arm, forcibly caused her to hang up
the telephone with the dispatcher, and pushed her into the dark office of her
home. Inside the office, Davis pushed M.R.’s face down into the cushions of a
sofa and placed his finger inside the waistband of the back of her pants.
Davis started to pull down her pants before M.R. interrupted his efforts by
12
jumping up and shouting, “[N]o”! Davis responded to M.R.’s resistance by
taking a sofa pillow and smashing it into M.R.’s face with great force. M.R.
testified she was afraid Davis was going to rape her. Additional evidence
shows Davis did not appear interested in M.R.’s purse or any property in her
residence. Substantial evidence supports the inference Davis intended to
commit a sexual offense against M.R.
In his opening brief, Davis challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence of his specific intent, arguing because “extensive evidence”
presented at trial showed he was intoxicated the evening of August 13, 2019,
he was incapable of forming the specific intent to commit a sexual offense.
But the evidence of possible intoxication was not conclusive on the issue;
Davis does not explain otherwise.
It was the province of the jury to consider such evidence of
intoxication, along with all of the other evidence presented at trial of Davis’s
conduct and surrounding circumstances, to determine whether Davis had
actually formed the requisite specific intent. Because substantial evidence
supports the jury’s finding Davis formed the requisite specific intent for the
commission of counts 1 and 2, we find no error.
C. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Asportation Element of the
Kidnapping Offense
Pursuant to section 207, subdivision (a), “simple kidnapping”
requires proof of the following “‘three elements: (1) a person was unlawfully
moved by the use of physical force or fear; (2) the movement was without the
person’s consent; and (3) the movement of the person was for a substantial
distance.’” (People v. Bell (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 428, 435.) “This last
element, i.e., that the victim be moved a substantial distance, is called the
‘asportation’ element.” (Ibid.)
13
“Aggravated kidnapping,” pursuant to section 209,
subdivision (b)(1), involves a kidnapping “for the purpose of robbery or
certain sex offenses.” (People v. Martinez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 225, 232,
overruled on a different ground in People v. Fontenot (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 70.)
The asportation element of aggravated kidnapping has two prongs:
“[A]ggravated kidnapping requires movement of the victim that is not merely
incidental to the commission of the underlying crime and that increases the
risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the
underlying crime itself.” (People v. Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 232.)
“The two prongs of aggravated kidnapping are not distinct, but interrelated,
because a trier of fact cannot consider the significance of the victim’s changed
environment without also considering whether that change resulted in an
increase in the risk of harm to the victim.” (Id. at p. 236.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the findings Davis pushed
M.R. to the office and that such movement of M.R. (1) was not merely
incidental to his commission of a sexual offense against her and also
(2) increased the risk of harm to M.R. above that inherent to the sexual
offense itself. As to the first prong, M.R. testified she was sitting on a sofa in
her family room watching television when she noticed the sensor lights on the
patio turn on. After she saw Davis standing on the patio just outside the
family room’s set of French doors, she walked across the room to the
telephone and dialed 911. While M.R. was on the telephone with the
dispatcher, Davis suddenly appeared behind her, forced her to slam down the
telephone receiver, and grabbed her wrist.
Although he had already overpowered her, he did not attempt to
commit a sexual offense against her in the family room. Instead, he pulled
M.R.’s hand up to her shoulder and pushed her from the family room toward
14
the front door of her home, then down the hallway, and into the office where
he then attempted to pull down her pants. Substantial evidence shows
Davis’s movement of M.R., which she estimated to be a total of 19 feet, was
not merely incidental to committing a sexual offense against her. (See People
v. Robertson (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 984 [“‘Where a defendant drags a
victim to another place, and then attempts a rape, the jury may reasonably
infer that the movement was neither part of nor necessary to the rape’”].)
Substantial evidence also shows Davis’s movement of M.R.
increased the risk of harm to her. By moving her out of view through the
windows of the French doors, away from the front door, down the hallway
and into the darkness of the office, Davis not only reduced the possibility of
her escaping, he decreased the likelihood of detection should law enforcement
arrive in response to M.R.’s call to 911.
As a reasonable trier of fact could conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt the movement that occurred here was more than merely incidental and
increased the risk of harm beyond that inherent in the commission of a
sexual offense, we find no error.
III.
SENTENCING ISSUES
In his opening brief, Davis raises several challenges to his prison
sentence. The trial court sentenced Davis to an indeterminate term of
75 years to life by imposing three consecutive terms of 25 years to life on
counts 1, 2, and 4. The court also imposed a determine term of 32 years by
imposing six 5-year terms (nickel priors) under section 667, subdivision (a)(1)
15
plus 2 years for the enhancement under section 667.9, subdivision (b). For the
reasons we explain, none of Davis’s challenges has merit.
A. The Court Did Not Err by Finding Section 654 Inapplicable to Count 2
Davis argues the offense of assault with intent to commit a
sexual offense charged as count 1 was part of the same course of conduct as
the kidnapping with the intent to commit a sexual offense count charged as
count 2. Therefore, he argues, the trial court erred by failing to stay count 2
pursuant to section 654.
Under section 654, “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in
different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under
more than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) “[T]he purpose of section 654 is to
ensure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with his
culpability.” (People v. Correa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 331, 341.) Section 654
precludes multiple punishments not only for a single act, but also for an
indivisible course of conduct. (Ibid.) If two or more offenses “were merely
incidental to, or were the means of accomplishing or facilitating one objective,
[a] defendant may be found to have harbored a single intent and therefore
may be punished only once.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 335.)
A defendant’s intent and objective are factual questions for the
trial court and as such, must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162.) Here, neither the
parties nor the trial court addressed the applicability of section 654 on count
2. We therefore consider whether substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s implicit finding Davis’s intent and objective in assaulting M.R. were
separate from, rather than incidental to, his intent and objective in
16
kidnapping her, rendering the imposition of multiple punishments
permissible. (People v. Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 162.)
We conclude sufficient evidence supports the court’s implicit
finding section 654 did not apply to count 2. Had Davis’s assault of M.R. been
limited to grabbing her wrist and pushing her from the family room to the
office, the imposition of separate punishment for the offense of kidnapping
with the intent to commit a sexual assault would have been impermissible
under section 654. But here, M.R. testified after Davis pushed her into the
office and onto the sofa and reached his finger into the waistband of her
pants to begin pulling her pants down, M.R. interrupted Davis’s assault by
jumping up and shouting, “[N]o” at him. Davis responded by assaulting Davis
anew—this time by smashing a sofa pillow into M.R.’s face with great force.
Substantial evidence thus shows M.R.’s interruption of Davis’s
assault, albeit brief, provided an opportunity for Davis to reflect upon and
abandon his assaultive behavior that accompanied the asportation of M.R. to
the office. Davis elected to resume his assault of Davis by striking her in the
face with the sofa pillow. The trial court therefore did not err by implicitly
finding section 654 inapplicable and punishing Davis for both assault with
the intent to commit a sexual offense and kidnapping with the intent to
commit a sexual offense.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Refusing To Strike Any of
the Nickel Priors
Davis argues the trial court erred by denying his request to strike
any of Davis’s six nickel priors pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a)(1),
found true by the trial court. Consequently, the trial court imposed two 5-
year prison terms on each of counts 1, 2, and 4. The nickel prior
17
enhancements thus comprised 30 years of the total 32-year determinate
prison term imposed by the trial court.
“[A] court’s decision to strike a qualifying prior conviction is
discretionary. [Citation.] As such, a court’s decision not to strike a prior
necessarily requires some exercise of discretion.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 375, italics omitted.) When a defendant challenges the court’s
refusal to strike an enhancement, “[t]he burden is on the [defendant] to
clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
[Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to
have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on
review.’” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977–978.)
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated that, in declining
to strike any of the nickel priors, the court considered “all the discretionary
power and authority that [had] been vested” in the court and further stated it
had specifically evaluated the nature of the offenses, Davis’s background, the
circumstances surrounding Davis’s present and prior offenses, the mitigating
circumstances, rule 4.410 of the California Rules of Court, Davis’s
constitutional rights, and “the interests of society to ensure that [Davis’s]
punishment fits the crime . . . as well as the perpetrator, . . . Section 1385,
and any other required or discretionary criteria required by the court to
consider.” The court stated that after weighing and considering “any and all
required and discretionary criteria,” it found the “dismissal of an
enhancement would endanger public safety,” as “there is a likelihood that the
dismissal of the enhancement and/or strike would result in physical injury or
other serious danger to others.”
18
In his opening brief, Davis does not argue the trial court
considered any inappropriate factor or otherwise demonstrated a
misapprehension of the law applicable to the determination of whether to
strike any nickel prior. Instead, he argues the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to strike the nickel priors because “[a]bsent from the court’s
analysis is any mention of [Davis]’s substance abuse issues, childhood
trauma, mental health issues, the fact that the prior offenses were well over
five years old, or any of the other issues trial counsel discussed in the defense
sentencing brief.” Davis, however, did not raise this challenge to the trial
court’s explanation of its sentencing decision when the court announced it at
the sentencing hearing.
In People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353, the Supreme Court
held: “[T]he waiver doctrine should apply to claims involving the trial court’s
failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices.
Included in this category are cases in which . . . the court purportedly erred
because it . . . misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons
or give a sufficient number of valid reasons.”7 The California Supreme Court
explained: “Our reasoning is practical and straightforward. Although the
court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner, counsel is charged
with understanding, advocating, and clarifying permissible sentencing
choices at the hearing. Routine defects in the court’s statement of reasons are
7 The Supreme Court in People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at page
354, made clear that an unauthorized sentence, defined as one which could
not be lawfully imposed under any circumstance in the particular case, may
be corrected by an appellate court at any time. The Supreme Court explained:
“Appellate courts are willing to intervene in the first instance because such
error is ‘clear and correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by
the record at sentencing.” (Ibid.) Davis does not contend the trial court
imposed such an unauthorized sentence here.
19
easily prevented and corrected if called to the court’s attention. As in other
waiver cases, we hope to reduce the number of errors committed in the first
instance and preserve the judicial resources otherwise used to correct them.”
(Id. at p. 353.) Because he failed to challenge the court’s statement of reasons
in the trial court, Davis has forfeited bringing any such challenge on appeal.
In any event, the record reflects the trial court articulated
rational reasons for its decision to deny Davis’s request to strike the nickel
priors. Although the court did not specifically mention factors cited in Davis’s
sentencing brief, Davis does not cite any legal authority, and we have found
none, showing the court was required to specifically address all relevant
factors in stating the reasons for its sentencing decision. Furthermore, as
quoted ante, the trial court stated it considered all relevant factors in
rendering its decision; nothing in the record suggests otherwise. We find no
abuse of discretion.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Davis’s Motion To
Dismiss His Prior Strikes
“When a defendant is convicted of a felony, and it is pleaded and
proved he had committed prior ‘violent’ or ‘serious’ felonies, the Three Strikes
law provides for the imposition of increased sentences. [Citations.] A trial
court is presumed to have acted properly whenever it sentences a defendant
in accordance with the Three Strikes law. [Citation.] A sentencing court
nonetheless has the power to dismiss one or more prior strike convictions in
the interests of justice.” (People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 370.) “In
deciding whether to exercise its discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction
in the interests of justice, a trial court ‘must consider whether, in light of the
nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character,
20
and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [sentencing]
scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he
had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.’” (Id. at pp. 370–371; see also People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 161.)
A trial court’s decision not to strike a prior felony conviction is
reviewed for abuse of discretion, and “‘“[t]he burden is on the party attacking
the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary.”’” (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 376.) “[A] trial court
does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) In light of the
“presumption that any sentence conforming to the Three Strikes law’s
sentencing norm is both rational and proper[,]” “‘a trial court will only abuse
its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances,’ such as ‘where the trial court was not “aware of its discretion”
to dismiss [a prior strike] (citation), or where the court considered
impermissible factors in declining to dismiss [a prior strike],’ or ‘where no
reasonable [person] could disagree [the defendant] falls outside the spirit of
the three strikes [law] scheme.’” (People v. Nunez, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 371.)
Here, Davis argues the trial court abused its discretion by
denying his Romero motion8 and declining to dismiss any of his three prior
strikes which consisted of a 1988 robbery conviction and convictions for
attempted robbery and assault with a deadly weapon in 1996. In refusing to
strike any of Davis’s prior strikes on the ground doing so would endanger
8 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero).
21
public safety, Davis argues the trial court “failed to properly consider the
length of [Davis]’s sentence, his substance abuse issues, the staleness of the
prior strikes, and his youth at the time of the first strike.”
Applying the governing deferential standard of review, however,
we conclude the record reflects the trial court properly exercised its
discretion. With respect to its denial of the Romero motion, at the sentencing
hearing, the court reiterated that the court read and considered Davis’s
aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in the probation and
sentencing report and by counsel in sentencing briefing. The court reiterated
that the court read and considered rule 4.425 of the California Rules of Court.
The court stated it agreed with the statement in the probation
and sentencing report that Davis’s “‘actions in this case are deplorable as
they appear to have been committed for no other reason than power and self-
gratification. The victim was elderly, lived alone, and was unable to defend
herself. It is difficult to imagine how frightened she likely felt as she was
assaulted by a stranger in the sanctity of her home where . . . she should have
felt safe and protected from harm.’” The court further stated: “‘It is difficult to
see [Davis] as anything other than a violent opportunist—opportunistic
predator who selfishly pursued his own desires. It seems clear [Davis]
presents a threat to the safety of others.” The court also cited M.R.’s
statement: “‘I would hate to think of another woman going through the
terrifying experience that I did.’”
The trial court further observed: “[A]t the time of the offense the
victim was an 88-year-old woman who had lived on her own in the safety of
her home for 23 years after her husband’s passing. When the victim testified,
she was bright, sharp, and healthy. Since the offense, it appears she has
transformed from an outgoing person who had a rich and active life to
22
someone who was afraid to—of coming home at night and therefore had to
stop attending evening events to deal with her sense of uneasiness. She
subsequently felt the need to give up her independence and move into an
assisted-living facility.”
In his opening brief, and similar to his challenge to the court’s
refusal to dismiss the nickel priors, Davis argues that in denying the Romero
motion, the trial court failed to address (1) Davis’s substance abuse issues;
(2) the “staleness of [his] prior strikes”; and (3) Davis’s youth at the time he
was convicted of his first strike. He further argues that given his
circumstances, including his drug addiction, mental health issues, and
childhood trauma, “the equivalent of a life sentence. . . is unfair and unjust”
and “contradicts the purpose of sentencing reform—to decrease the severity
and length of sentences.”
But “‘[t]he trial court is not required to state reasons for declining
to exercise its discretion under section 1385’ [citation], and ‘is presumed to
have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative
record to the contrary.’” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.)
There is no indication in our record the trial court believed it could not
consider relevant factors, considered improper factors, or failed to give proper
consideration to all relevant factors. Indeed, the court stated on the record it
considered all relevant factors before denying the Romero motion. That the
trial court commented on the seriousness of Davis’s offenses, the
consequences M.R. had suffered, and the danger Davis poses to society does
not mean those are the only factors the court considered. (See People v. Myers
(1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310 [“that the court focused its explanatory
comments on the violence and potential violence of appellant’s crimes do[es]
not mean that it considered only that factor”].)
23
People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, which Davis cites in
his opening brief, does not compel a different result. There, the defendant
demanded money from two different individuals selling oranges and in one
instance squashed two bags of oranges and in another instance threw a bag of
oranges to the ground and stomped on them. (Id. at p. 1139.) The defendant
was convicted of attempted second degree robbery and attempted extortion,
and he was sentenced to 25 years to life plus 14 years after the trial court
denied his Romero motion, which sought to strike his three prior strikes. (Id.
at pp. 1139–1140.) The appellate court concluded the trial court had abused
its discretion in denying the Romero motion. (Id. at pp. 1140–1145.) While
Avila recognized the defendant’s age and the length of time since the prior
offenses could be factors in mitigation, Avila did not hold that those
circumstances always require finding an abuse of discretion. (See id. at
pp. 1141–1142 [noting “remoteness remains a factor in mitigation” and it was
“significant that [defendant] committed his prior strikes when he was under
the age of 21”].) Notably, Avila recognized the defendant’s present offense in
that case “was not violent or brutal by any stretch” and he “did not use a
weapon or otherwise use physical violence against the victims, nor did he
make any specific threats.” (Id. at p. 1142.)
The circumstances here are plainly different, where Davis’s
offenses of assault with the intent to commit a sexual offense and kidnapping
with the intent to commit a sexual assault involved, inter alia, physical
violence against M.R.
We find no error in the court’s denial of the Romero motion and
refusal to strike Davis’s prior strikes.
24
D. Cruel and/or Unusual Punishment
Davis contends his indeterminate prison sentence of 75 years to
life plus a determinate term of 32 years constitutes cruel and/or unusual
punishment under article I, section 17 of the California Constitution and the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The California
Constitution prohibits “cruel or unusual” punishment, and the United States
Constitution prohibits “cruel and unusual” punishment. “‘The distinction in
wording is “purposeful and substantive rather than merely semantic.”’”
(People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 723 (Baker).) Therefore, “‘we
construe the state constitutional provision “separately from its counterpart in
the federal Constitution.”’” (Ibid.) “‘Whether a punishment is cruel or unusual
is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment.’” (People v.
Gomez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 493, 499.)
1. California Constitution
The California Constitution prohibits “[c]ruel or unusual
punishment.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) “[A] sentence will not be found
unconstitutional under the California Constitution unless it is so
disproportionate to the defendant’s crime and circumstances that it shocks
the conscience or offends traditional notions of human dignity.” (People v.
Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 616.) The California Supreme Court has
described three “techniques” to aid in determining whether a sentence is so
disproportionate that it is unconstitutional: (1) “examin[ing] the nature of the
offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger
both present to society”; (2) “compar[ing] the challenged penalty with the
punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for different offenses which,
by the same test, must be deemed more serious”; and (3) “compar[ing] . . . the
25
challenged penalty with the punishments prescribed for the same offense in
other jurisdictions having an identical or similar constitutional provision.” (In
re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 425–427, italics omitted.)
“‘The weight afforded to each prong may vary by case. [Citation.]
“Disproportionality need not be established in all three areas.”’” (People v.
Wilson (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 128, 167–168.) “‘A defendant has a considerable
burden to overcome when he challenges a penalty as cruel or unusual. The
doctrine of separation of powers is firmly entrenched in the law of California
and the court should not lightly encroach on matters which are uniquely in
the domain of the Legislature.’” (People v. Johnson (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
253, 296.)
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated it “applied a
three-prong test to determine whether [the sentence it imposed] is
unconstitutionally disproportionate to the offenses for which it is imposed
and assigned importance of each of the prongs depending upon the facts of
this specific case.” After doing so, the court stated it found Davis’s sentence
was not “‘so disproportionate to the crimes committed that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity’” to violate the
prohibition against cruel and/or unusual punishment under the state and
federal constitutions.
Davis fails to overcome the considerable burden of establishing
his sentence was cruel or unusual. The jury found him guilty of, inter alia,
assault with intent to commit a sexual offense and kidnapping with intent to
commit a sexual offense. We cannot “conclude this case is among the rarest of
the rare in which the punishment imposed violates article I, section 17 of the
California Constitution.” (In re Nuñez (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 709, 725.)
26
On appeal, Davis argues the degree to which he poses a “danger
to society cannot be analyzed without considering [how his] mental health
and substance abuse issues were a major factor in his commission of the
offenses.” He argues “[i]n that light, mental health treatment and drug and
alcohol rehabilitation would go a long way in reducing his danger to society.”
Davis also argues “the large bulk of [his] sentence (his third
strike status and section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements) is for conduct
that occurred over a quarter of a century ago.” Such factors, however, are
insufficient to outweigh the seriousness of the assault and kidnapping with
the intent to commit a sexual offense at issue here. (See, e.g., Baker, supra,
20 Cal.App.5th at pp. 724–725 [weighing factors].)
Davis also contends the sentence was disproportionate to his
offenses, citing the United States Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics stating the median time served in
state prison for murder is 17 and one-half years. Davis does not provide
further analysis and does not compare his sentence with the sentences
prescribed in California for more serious offenses. Nor does he provide a
comparative analysis of the sentence he received with the sentences
prescribed for the same offenses in other jurisdictions which have an
identical or similar cruel or unusual constitutional provision.
Davis also argues the trial court here imposed “the functional
equivalent” of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. But “it is
immaterial that [a] defendant cannot serve his sentence during his lifetime.
In practical effect, he is in no different position than a defendant who has
received a sentence of life without possibility of parole: he will be in prison all
his life. However, imposition of a sentence of life without possibility of parole
in an appropriate case does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment
27
under either our state Constitution [citation] or the federal Constitution.”
(People v. Byrd (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1383.)
In support of his arguments, Davis relies on a concurring opinion
of Justice Mosk in People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 600–602. But
concurring opinions are not binding authority. (Byrd, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1383.) Davis does not cite any binding authority concluding a sentence
surpassing an adult defendant’s possible lifespan constitutes cruel or unusual
punishment.
Davis has failed to show his sentence is so disproportionate to his
crimes and circumstances that “it shocks the conscience or offends traditional
notions of human dignity” to violate the cruel or unusual provision of the
California Constitution. (People v. Perez, supra, 3 Cal.App.5th at p. 616.)
2. United States Constitution
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” It “contains a ‘narrow
proportionality principle,’ that ‘does not require strict proportionality
between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that
are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’” (Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48, 59–60.) “This proportionality principle is narrow when applied in
noncapital cases.” (People v. Wilson, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.) Indeed,
successful challenges are “‘exceedingly rare’” in noncapital cases. (Ewing v.
California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 21.)
Considerable overlap exists in the state and federal approaches to
cruel and/or unusual punishment. Although slightly different in text, “‘both
standards prohibit punishment that is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime
or the individual culpability of the defendant.’ [Citation.] ‘The touchstone in
each is gross disproportionality.’” (Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 733.)
28
An Eighth Amendment analysis begins with a comparison of “‘the
gravity of the offense and the severity of the sentence.’ [Citation.] ‘This
analysis can consider a particular offender’s mental state and motive in
committing the crime, the actual harm caused to his victim or to society by
his conduct, and any prior criminal history.’” (Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at
p. 733.)
For the same reasons stated in our state constitutional analysis,
we conclude Davis cannot show the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment
to the federal Constitution either.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, J.
DELANEY, J.
29
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.