CourtListener 10789685•People v. Epps CA6
Testo completo
Filed 2/11/26 P. v. Epps CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H053176
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2008065)
v.
MICHAEL RAY EPPS, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
This is defendant Michael Ray Epps, Jr.’s second appeal related to a
January 2020 shooting.
In 2022, a jury convicted Epps of first degree murder based on a willful,
premeditated, and deliberate killing with express malice or a murder
perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to 25 years
to life in prison.
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In 2024, this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Epps (Aug. 16,
2024, H050447) [nonpub. opn.] (Epps).)2
In January 2025, Epps, in propria persona, filed a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6 (petition). The trial court denied the
petition at the prima facie stage. Epps has appealed the order.
Epps’s appointed appellate counsel filed a brief under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo). Epps filed a supplemental
brief on the merits. Epps acknowledges he was tried and convicted after the
changes to murder law made by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) went into effect but contends his trial and conviction
violated what he describes as the legislative intent of Senate Bill 1437.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court’s order
denying Epp’s petition.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. Procedural History
1. 2022 Trial
On January 4, 2022, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed an
amended information charging Epps with the 2020 murder of Arturo C.4
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1).
2 This court previously granted Epps’s request that we take judicial
notice of our prior opinion. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the
record in that matter. (See Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a); 452, subd. (d).)
3 This background information is taken from this court’s opinion in
Epps, the record from that appeal, and other documents in the instant
appellate record.
4 We refer to the victim by his first name and the first letter of his last
name to protect his privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(4), (10).)
2
In January 2022, a jury found Epps guilty of first degree murder based
on a willful, premeditated, and deliberate killing with express malice or a
murder perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle
intentionally at another person outside of the vehicle with the intent to inflict
death.
At a sentencing hearing held on September 30, 2022, the trial court
denied Epps’s motion for a new trial and sentenced him to 25 years to life in
prison.
2. Direct Appeal
In August 2024, a different panel of this court affirmed the judgment.
(Epps, supra, H050447.) As described in this court’s prior opinion,
“A man shot defendant Michael Ray Epps, Jr.’s daughter during a drug
deal. Epps was a marijuana producer/dealer and had supplied the drug to his
daughter for sale. After learning of the shooting from his daughter, Epps set
out to find the assailant with the help of confederates. The manhunt resulted
in the shooting death of a person who had nothing to do with the failed drug
deal.
“At trial, Epps did not contest his involvement in the killing. Rather,
he urged the jury to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter based on heat
of passion. The jury rejected this contention and convicted Epps of first
degree murder for a willful, premeditated, and deliberate killing or a drive-by
killing ([] §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)).
“On appeal, Epps contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury
that passion based on revenge does not reduce a killing to manslaughter.
Epps further maintains that the district attorney violated a written pretrial
agreement (hereafter proffer agreement) by using information derived from
3
Epps’s proffer interview against him at trial.” (Epps, supra, H050447, fn.
omitted.)
This court rejected Epps’s claim of instructional error and agreed with
the trial court that any violation of the proffer agreement by the prosecution
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Epps, supra, H050447.)
In its prior opinion, this court described the “plethora of proof that
Epps, with deliberation and reflection, systematically engaged in a manhunt
that resulted in the killing of an innocent man.” (Epps, supra, H050447.)
3. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
In Senate Bill 1437, the Legislature acknowledged “a need for statutory
changes to more equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their
involvement in homicides.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (b) [eff. Jan. 1,
2019].) To that end, “Senate Bill 1437 significantly changed the scope of
murder liability for defendants who did not actually kill or intend to kill
anyone, including those prosecuted on a felony-murder theory.” (People v.
Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868; see also People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 448–449; § 188, subd. (a)(3).) “The bill also altered murder liability
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (Wilson, at p. 868,
fn. 8; see § 188.) Further, the Legislature added section 1170.95 (later
renumbered as section 1172.6), allowing a person convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to file a
petition with the sentencing court to vacate the conviction and be
resentenced. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4.)
In January 2025, Epps filed a petition for resentencing under section
1172.6. The trial court denied the petition on February 5, 2025, without
appointing counsel for Epps and without issuing an order to show cause. (See
§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
4
The trial court’s written order states “Petitioner was tried and
convicted of murder well after January 1, 2019, the effective date of Senate
Bill 1437, which amended sections 188 and 189 and added section 1170.95,
the predecessor to section 1172.6, to the Penal Code. Section 1172.6 ‘does not
apply to defendants who—like [Petitioner] in this case—were convicted under
the current law.’ (People v. Reyes (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 292, 296.)
Petitioner’s arguments regarding false and misleading evidence are outside
the purview of a section 1172.6 petition and should be raised on habeas
corpus.”
B. Appellate Events
In November 2025, Epps’s appointed appellate counsel filed a
Delgadillo brief. This court informed Epps of his right to submit a
supplemental brief.
In December 2025, Epps filed a supplemental brief on the merits of his
appeal. Epps contends that the jury’s finding of his guilt was based on false
evidence. Epps asserts that the prosecutor unlawfully argued that the jury
could convict him as the shooter or as an aider and abettor when the
prosecutor knew that Epps was not the shooter. Epps further contends that
the prosecution did not present substantial evidence that Epps intended to
participate in a killing and (impermissibly, in Epps’s view) relied on Epps’s
conduct after the shooting as evidence of his guilt. Epps asserts that his
conviction “in no way complied with the [l]egislative [i]ntent of [] Senate Bill
1437.”
II. DISCUSSION
Where, as here, appellate counsel finds no arguable issues in an appeal
from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition, we are not required to conduct an
independent review of the record. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
5
pp. 224–231.) We give the defendant the opportunity to file his or her own
supplemental brief, and we then evaluate any specific arguments raised. (Id.
at pp. 231–232.) Accordingly, we address the issues Epps has asserted in his
supplemental briefing.
“We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition at
the prima facie stage.” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
Epps argues that the prosecutor improperly argued his guilt to the jury and
presented insufficient evidence of his intent to kill. Epps acknowledges that
his trial occurred after Senate Bill 1473 went into effect but contends that his
trial violated the “[l]egislative [i]ntent” of Senate Bill 1473.
The instant record of conviction conclusively shows that Epps is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. Senate Bill 1437
went into effect on January 1, 2019. The killing for which Epps was
convicted of murder did not occur until 2020. Under section 1172.6
subdivision (a)(3), “in order to be resentenced, a petitioner must allege that
he could not presently be convicted of murder (or its attempt) ‘because of
changes’ brought by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Reyes, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th 292, 298 (Reyes).) By its timing, no aspect of Epps’s prosecution
occurred under those aspects of murder law that were eliminated by Senate
Bill 1437.
We agree with the Reyes court that a defendant like Epps, who was
convicted after Senate Bill 1437 changed our state’s murder law, “is not the
type of defendant [section 1172.6’s] retroactive procedure was intended to
benefit, and any contrary interpretation of this statute would lead to absurd
results.” (Reyes, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 299.) Epps “was not convicted
under the prior law, which permitted a theory of murder based on imputed
malice.” (Id. at p. 298.) Moreover, Epps’s jury instructions make clear that
6
the jury was instructed that, in order to convict him of first degree murder,
they were required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Epps acted with
intent to kill.5
Epps’s arguments regarding defects in the prosecutor’s arguments or
the proof against him are not relevant to a petition under section 1172.6,
which applies only to those “convicted under the former law to seek
retroactive relief under the law as amended.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708.) Epps’s arguments do not undermine our conclusion that
he was convicted of murder solely on a theory that is still valid under Senate
Bill 1437. Furthermore, to the extent that these arguments allege trial or
sentencing error, they are not cognizable on a section 1172.6 resentencing
petition or in this appeal. (See People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
947; People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.)
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s February 5, 2025 order denying Epps’s Penal Code
section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.
5 Epps was prosecuted for first degree murder under two alternate
theories: (1) willful, deliberate and premeditated murder and (2) shooting
from a motor vehicle. The trial court’s instructions informed the jurors that
they could not convict unless all of them agreed Epps was guilty of first
degree murder, but they did not all need to agree on the same theory. Both
theories of first degree murder required the jury to find that Epps acted with
the intent to kill in order to find him guilty. The jurors were also given an
aiding and abetting instruction, which required them, in order to convict, to
find that Epps intended to aid the perpetrator in accomplishing the unlawful
act. The jury found Epps guilty of first degree murder.
7
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H053176
People v. Epps
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