Duboff v. Schermer CA2/3

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Filed 2/10/26 Duboff v. Schermer CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

BONNIE DUBOFF, B333452

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC617750)
v.

LINDA SCHERMER et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed.
Bohm Wildish & Matsen, James G. Bohm; Greines, Martin,
Stein & Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman and Jeffrey E. Raskin for
Defendants and Appellants.
Levatolaw and Stephen D. Weisskopf for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff and respondent Bonnie Duboff filed this derivative
action on behalf of 245 Spalding Partners L.P. (the Partnership),
against her sister, Linda Schermer, in Schermer’s individual
capacity and in her capacity as trustee of three trusts that are
limited partners in the Partnership.
The Partnership owns an apartment building in Beverly
Hills (the Building). Duboff alleged that Schermer, in her
capacity as trustee of the general partner trust, mismanaged the
Building. Duboff asserted derivative claims for breach of
fiduciary duties to the Partnership and unjust enrichment, in
violation of the Corporations Code. Duboff sought dissociation of
the general and limited partner trusts of which Schermer is
trustee and of Schermer in her individual capacity as a limited
partner. Duboff also sought damages. The trial court found in
Duboff’s favor on all claims, awarding damages and dissociating
Schermer and the three trusts as partners.
On appeal, Schermer argues the judgment must be
reversed because the case fell within the probate court’s exclusive
jurisdiction; there was no substantial evidence that Duboff had
standing to sue as a limited partner; dissociation of the limited
partner trusts and Schermer as a limited partner was an
impermissible remedy; and the award of damages was not
supported by the evidence and was excessive. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Trusts and the Partnership
In 1983, Sam Schermer and his wife, Lucille, created the
Schermer Family Trust.1 When Lucille died, the family trust was

1 We refer to Linda Schermer as “Schermer” and to the other
Schermer family members by their last or full names. Consistent

2
divided into three trusts: the Surviving Trustor’s Trust, the
Deceased Trustor’s Trust, and the Marital Trust (the Trusts).
Sam and Lucille Schermer had three daughters: Duboff,
Schermer, and Deborah Scott.2
Sam Schermer was the sole trustee of the Trusts.
Schermer was designated the successor trustee, and Schermer’s
cousin, Leland Schermer, was named as successor trustee if
Schermer was unable or unwilling to serve. Sam Schermer
resigned as trustee in 2014. In August 2014, Schermer became
the sole trustee of each trust.
245 Spalding Partners L.P. is a limited partnership. There
is no written partnership agreement. The Partnership’s sole
asset is the Building. Before 2014, Schermer served as property
manager of the Building and, in that capacity, she began living
rent-free in the Building in 2006.
The Surviving Trustor’s Trust was the general partner of
the Partnership. All three trusts were limited partners, as were
Duboff, Schermer, and Scott. The Trusts owned over 99 percent
of the Partnership, with the sisters owning the remaining
partnership interests in equal amounts.
The Probate Proceedings
Sam Schermer died in March 2015. That month, Schermer
initiated probate proceedings, In re Estate of Samuel Schermer,
case No. BP161462. Duboff and Scott objected to Schermer’s
request that she be appointed executor of the estate.

with many of the legal documents in the record, we refer to
Samuel Schermer as “Sam Schermer.”
2 Scott is not a party to this action.

3
In June 2015, Duboff and Scott filed a petition in probate
court for suspension of trustee, appointment of temporary
trustee, and removal of trustee. The petition sought the removal
of Schermer as trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s Trust. The
petition asserted, among other things, that Schermer had
egregiously mismanaged the Building, resulting in it being “cash
flow negative,” even though it “should be generating hundreds of
thousands of dollars a year.” The petition also asserted that
Schermer had mismanaged and breached her duties as trustee
regarding other family properties and companies. The petition
alleged that Schermer had disregarded her responsibilities and
obligations as trustee, including by withholding financial records
and by failing to provide information about provisions in the
trusts that benefitted Sam’s heirs. The petition alleged Schermer
had demonstrated hostility to family members, creating an
untenable situation.
The Civil Lawsuit
In April 2016, Duboff filed this lawsuit as a general civil
matter. Duboff asserted derivative claims on behalf of 245
Spalding Partners L.P. for breach of fiduciary duties and unjust
enrichment. The claims were asserted against the general and
limited partners of the Partnership, including Schermer in her
individual capacity and as trustee of the Trusts. The complaint
alleged that Schermer failed to repair and renovate the Building,
failed to lease apartment units and collect rent, failed to provide
tax and other financial information to other partners, and
misappropriated Partnership funds. It sought damages and
dissociation of Schermer in her individual capacity and in her
capacity as trustee of the Trusts.

4
Trial proceeded in two phases. The first phase concerned
Duboff’s standing to bring the claims as a limited partner.3
Duboff claimed she and her sisters became limited partners
through three “gift transfers” of partnership interests that Sam
Schermer made in 2008, 2009, and 2010. In the operative
statement of decision, issued on June 5, 2020, the trial court
credited evidence that Sam Schermer intended to make the three
sisters limited partners and Duboff therefore had standing to
pursue derivative claims on behalf of the Partnership.
In August and September 2022, the trial court conducted a
bench trial on the remaining issues in the case. In October 2023,
the court issued a statement of decision finding in favor of Duboff
on all claims. The court concluded that Schermer, in her capacity
as trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s Trust, breached her
fiduciary duties to the Partnership “by engaging in grossly
negligent and reckless conduct in the management of the 26-unit
apartment building . . . self-dealing, intentional misconduct, and
a knowing violation of [the] law, and has breached her obligation
of good faith and fair dealing in discharging her duties to the
Partnership and Duboff . . . .” The court found Schermer failed
for over four years to address structural damage in the Building
that posed a risk of partial collapse; failed to permanently repair
the roof, leading to “massive water damage” to units on the fifth
floor; failed to renovate the Building, “costing the partnership

3 There were two first-phase trials. At the conclusion of the
first trial, the court ruled that Duboff had standing. However,
the judge retired before a statement of decision could be finalized
and before the second phase of the proceedings was to take place.
Schermer requested and received a mistrial. The parties retried
the standing issue in a second trial. The second judge again
found that Duboff had standing.

5
millions”; and unreasonably failed to obtain a loan to renovate
the Building.
The court found Schermer’s misconduct began in at least
August 2014. The court also concluded that Schermer, “in her
capacity as trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s Trust and general
partner of the Partnership,” had been unjustly enriched and
refused to comply with her obligations under the Corporations
Code.
The trial court dissociated Schermer in her individual
capacity as a limited partner, and in her capacity as trustee of
the Trusts, pursuant to Corporations Code section 15906.01.4
The court further stated that the expulsion and dissociation of
Schermer in her capacity of trustee of each trust would have the
legal effect of expelling and dissociating the relevant trust,
because a trust is not a legal entity and only operates through its
trustee. The court entered judgment in favor of Duboff and
awarded damages.
Schermer timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Matter Did Not Fall Within the Probate Court’s
Exclusive Jurisdiction
Schermer contends the judgment must be reversed because
the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the
complaint. She argues the matter fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court. We disagree.

4 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Corporations Code.

6
A. Procedural background
In August 2017, Schermer filed a notice of related cases
regarding this matter and the two probate cases. The trial court
summarily rejected the notice, finding the cases were not related.
In September 2017, Schermer filed a motion to relate the
three cases pursuant to rule 3.300 of the California Rules of
Court. Duboff opposed the motion, arguing that although there
was “some overlap in parties and in the underlying facts,” the
court in the probate matters would evaluate the legal merits of
claims that pertained to a trust and the appointment of an
executor of an estate under the Probate Code, while the court in
the civil action would evaluate claims under the Corporations
Code related to limited partnership issues. Duboff also asserted
the motion was untimely because she filed her civil complaint in
April 2016, over one year earlier, and the parties had already
engaged in motion practice and discovery.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding the cases
involved different parties and different claims, and they required
resolution of distinct factual and legal issues. The court reasoned
that one probate case required the determination of the proper
executor of Sam Schermer’s estate, and the other probate case
concerned whether Schermer should be removed as trustee of the
Surviving Trustor’s Trust due to mismanagement of that trust’s
properties. In contrast, the civil action was a derivative action on
behalf of a limited partnership that sought expulsion and
dissociation of its general and limited partners under the
Corporations Code, with both Sam Schermer and Schermer
accused of wrongdoing. Although the court acknowledged there
was some factual overlap in the probate and civil matters, it
concluded there would not be a substantial duplication of judicial

7
resources if the cases proceeded before different judicial officers.
The court thus denied the motion to relate the civil and probate
cases.
In June 2018, Schermer filed a motion to transfer this
matter to the probate court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
sections 397 and 398.5 For the first time, she argued that the
probate court had exclusive jurisdiction over Duboff’s civil suit
because it involved the internal affairs of a trust and the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court denied the motion. The court observed that
Schermer had multiple prior opportunities to challenge
jurisdiction, but had not done so until “more than two years after
the complaint was filed” in April 2016. The court thus found the
motion to transfer “expressly untimely” under Code of Civil
Procedure section 396b, subdivision (a),6 and “arguably was
waived” under other provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5 Code of Civil Procedure section 397 provides, in relevant
part, that a “court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the
following cases: [¶] (a) When the court designated in the
complaint is not the proper court. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) When the
convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be
promoted by the change. [¶] (d) When from any cause there is no
judge of the court qualified to act.” Code of Civil Procedure
section 398 concerns transfer procedures “[i]f a court orders the
transfer of an action or proceeding for a cause specified in
subdivisions (b), (c), and (d) of [Code of Civil Procedure]
[s]ection 397. . . .”
6 Code of Civil Procedure section 396b, provides, in relevant
part: “(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 396a, if an
action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction

8
The court also denied the motion on its merits, finding that
Duboff’s complaint was a derivative action under the
Corporations Code seeking dissociation of limited and general
partners based on breaches of duties owed to a corporate entity
and its partners. It thus did not fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court as a matter regarding the
internal affairs of a trust. The court observed that the probate
court would have concurrent, as opposed to exclusive,
jurisdiction, but it declined to transfer the matter because of
“how heavily the civil law case has been litigated and how
minimally the probate law case has been.” Thus, transfer would
“not result in judicial economy.” The court also noted that the
“civil case approaches retrial [on the phase one issue of standing]
while the probate case has been ordered to trail the civil law
case . . . .”
In February 2021, Duboff and Scott filed an ex parte
application in the probate court seeking to stay proceedings on
their probate petition pending resolution of the civil case. They
asserted that Schermer had intentionally delayed the civil matter

of the subject matter thereof, other than the court designated as
the proper court for the trial thereof, under this title, the action
may, notwithstanding, be tried in the court where commenced,
unless the defendant, at the time he or she answers, demurs, or
moves to strike, or, at his or her option, without answering,
demurring, or moving to strike and within the time otherwise
allowed to respond to the complaint, files with the clerk, a notice
of motion for an order transferring the action or proceeding to the
proper court, together with proof of service, upon the adverse
party, of a copy of those papers. Upon the hearing of the motion
the court shall, if it appears that the action or proceeding was not
commenced in the proper court, order the action or proceeding
transferred to the proper court.”

9
and, since their trust proceeding was trailing the civil matter, it
was now approaching the five-year deadline to bring it to trial.
Duboff and Scott also argued that staying the probate matter
would promote judicial efficiency because the civil action “will
greatly impact the issues” in the probate proceeding and “could
be dispositive of at least some issues.” The probate court
overruled Schermer’s objections to the ex parte and granted the
stay request.7
In March 2021, Schermer filed a motion renewing her
original request to relate the cases. Schermer cited Duboff’s
success in staying Duboff’s and Scott’s probate matter, in part
based on overlap between the civil and probate proceedings. The
trial court denied the motion.8
B. Applicable legal principles
Probate Code section 17000, subdivision (a), provides that
“[t]he superior court having jurisdiction over the trust pursuant
to this part has exclusive jurisdiction of proceedings concerning
the internal affairs of trusts.” Probate Code section 17200,
subdivision (b)(1), sets forth a nonexclusive list of proceedings
that concern the internal affairs of a trust. (Babbitt v. Superior
Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1146 (Babbitt).) These
include proceedings concerning: “modification of trust terms;

7 We grant Schermer’s request for judicial notice of the
probate court’s minute order granting the stay request.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c), (d), 459; Doers v. Golden Gate
Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184, fn. 1, disapproved of
on other grounds in Quach v. California Commerce Club,
Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 562, 573, 582, fn. 4.)
8 The record on appeal does not include a minute order or
reporter’s transcript reflecting the trial court’s ruling.

10
changes in a designated successor trustee; deviations from trust
provisions; authority over the trustee’s actions; and the
administration of the trust’s financial arrangements.” (Estate of
Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, 695.)
The court with jurisdiction over a trust also has concurrent
jurisdiction over “(1) Actions and proceedings to determine the
existence of trusts. [¶] (2) Actions and proceedings by or against
creditors or debtors of trusts. [¶] (3) Other actions and
proceedings involving trustees and third persons.” (Prob. Code,
§ 17000, subd. (b)(1)–(3).)
When “reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de
novo.” (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981
(Thompson).) We also review “questions as to the jurisdiction
and authority of the probate court de novo.” (Estate of Kraus
(2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103, 112.)
C. Discussion
Schermer argues Duboff’s claims fell within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the probate court. She contends the probate
petition is a proceeding concerning the internal affairs of a trust
as described by Probate Code section 17200, subdivision (b)(5):
“Settling the accounts and passing upon the acts of the trustee,
including the exercise of discretionary powers,” and
subdivision (b)(10): “Appointing or removing a trustee.” She
further contends that the civil action “just repackages” the
probate petition and is therefore also a proceeding that concerns
the internal affairs of a trust.
Schermer relies only on the text of these provisions. None
of the cases she cites regarding jurisdiction support her
contention that this civil case falls under the exclusive

11
jurisdiction of the probate court. (See Barefoot v. Jennings (2020)
8 Cal.5th 822 (Barefoot) [concerning amendments to a trust
disinheriting a beneficiary and standing to challenge the validity
of those amendments]; Babbitt, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th 1135
[concerning probate court’s authority to order trustee to provide
accounting]; Conservatorship of Irvine (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th
1334, 1341–1342 [probate court had jurisdiction to consider
petition to invalidate a trust agreement or amendment while
trustor was still alive], disapproved of on other grounds in
Haggerty v. Thornton (2024) 15 Cal.5th 729, 742 (Haggerty).)
We conclude this civil matter does not concern the internal
affairs of a trust. As the trial court acknowledged, there was
factual overlap between the probate and partnership disputes.
However, we disagree that the existence of an overarching
dispute between the parties prevented the trial court from
considering Duboff’s complaint on its own terms. Sam Schermer
chose to create a partnership structure in addition to the Trusts,
and vested ownership of the Building in the Partnership, not the
Trusts directly. Although the same family members are involved,
the partnership structure created relationships and duties of the
players that were similar to those of a trustee and beneficiaries,
but which are not identical. We find no basis to disregard the
import of Sam Schermer’s decision to use a partnership structure
rather than trusts alone.
Schermer thus acted in multiple capacities. She is a
trustee, charged with administering the Trusts. But the
Partnership added another layer of roles as Schermer, as trustee,
facilitated the Trusts’ participation in the Partnership as general
and limited partners. A trustee “has a duty to administer the
trust according to the trust instrument and, except to the extent

12
the trust instrument provides otherwise, according to this
division.” (Prob. Code, § 16000.) There are specific duties of a
trustee set forth in the Probate Code, which include, for example,
that the “trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the
interest of the beneficiaries” (id., § 16002, subd. (a)), and “shall
administer the trust with reasonable care, skill, and caution
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent person
acting in a like capacity would use in the conduct of an enterprise
of like character and with like aims to accomplish the purposes of
the trust as determined from the trust instrument.” (Id.,
§ 16040, subd. (a).) A trustee may also be removed for breaches
of duty to the trust or if the trustee is otherwise unfit to
administer the trust. (Id., § 15642.)
However, the Corporations Code governs limited
partnerships and the relationships among limited partners. (See,
e.g., §§ 15901.06, 15901.10.) Section 15904.08 sets out the
fiduciary duties of a general partner, which the trial found
Schermer breached here. The Corporations Code also establishes
the bases on which a limited partner may be dissociated from a
partnership. (§ 15906.01.) While Schermer’s obligations may
have been similar in her capacities as a partner and as a trustee,
her positions were governed by different statutory schemes.
The instant suit differs from a suit seeking to change a
successor trustee under the Probate Code, which only concerns
the internal functioning of a trust and not a partnership of trusts
and non-trusts. (Cf. Stewart v. Towse (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
425.) The trial court dissociated Schermer as a partner, in all of
her capacities. This changed Schermer’s roles in the Partnership,
but did nothing to change her status with respect to the Trusts.
The trial court did not remove Schermer as a trustee of the

13
Trusts and replace her with someone else, which is what Duboff’s
and Scott’s probate petition seeks to do.
Schermer further contends that reversal is warranted
because the Legislature did not intend to allow beneficiaries of
trusts, such as Duboff, to circumvent probate policies by filing
suits in both civil and probate courts. For this contention, she
relies on the language in Barefoot stating that the Probate Code
“ ‘ “was intended to broaden the jurisdiction of the probate court
so as to give that court jurisdiction over practically all
controversies which might arise between the trustees and those
claiming to be beneficiaries under the trust.” ’ [Citations.]”
(Barefoot, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 827.)
Yet, Barefoot concerned whether a disinherited adult child
had standing in probate court to assert the invalidity of
amendments to her parents’ trust that left her without an
interest in the trust estate. In this context, the court discussed
the prevailing view that “an expansive reading of the standing
afforded to trust challenges under [Probate Code] section 17200
‘not only makes sense as a matter of judicial economy, but it also
recognizes the probate court’s inherent power to decide all
incidental issues necessary to carry out its express powers to
supervise the administration of the trust.’ [Citation.]” (Barefoot,
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 828.)
Here, Duboff’s complaint did not challenge any aspect of
the Trusts or raise challenges that directly concerned the
administration of the Trusts. Instead, her complaint challenged
the Trusts’ conduct of business as the general and limited
partners of the Partnership. Barefoot does not stand for the
proposition that in such a situation, a limited partner’s only
remedy is to challenge the general or limited partner’s conduct in

14
probate court, simply because that partner happens to be a trust
acting through its trustee. Indeed, we observe that it is
commonplace for general civil departments to hear cases
concerning partnerships which have trusts as partners, and,
which involve claims that a partner has breached fiduciary duties
and harmed the partnership. (See, e.g., Stoltenberg v. Newman
(2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 287 (Stoltenberg) [civil action by limited
partner trusts against defendant trust regarding fiduciary and
fraud claims]; Jones v. Wells Fargo Bank (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th
1527 [civil action by limited partner against trustee, trust
beneficiary, and others for breach of fiduciary to partnership and
partners]; Broffman v. Newman (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 252
[limited partner action for breach of fiduciary duties against
general partner where partnership involved trust].) Schermer
provides no legal authority for the proposition that because the
partners here included trusts, this suit falls within the probate
court’s exclusive jurisdiction.
The Legislature has limited the probate court’s exclusive
jurisdiction to the internal affairs of a trust. We find no basis to
conclude that Duboff’s purported forum shopping would allow us
to expand the probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction beyond what
the Legislature has specified. (Haggerty, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 741 [“policy arguments . . . are best directed to the Legislature,
which may amend the trust laws if it chooses”].)
Schermer also asserts that the need for this case to be
heard in the probate court is underscored by the fact that the
probate court is focused on carrying out the trustor’s intent,
which would have resulted in a different remedy here because
Sam Schermer designated her, and then her cousin, as successor
trustees. She asserts that the trial court’s ruling undermined

15
Sam Schermer’s intent as trustor because Duboff and Scott now
control the Building. However, as noted above, Sam Schermer
decided to vest ownership of the Building in a limited
partnership, not in a trust or trusts alone. As such, we are not
free to ignore the partnership structure or the separate duties
and potential remedies that structure created. Schermer cites no
legal authority for the proposition that when the same parties are
involved in both trust and partnership disputes, only the probate
court may adjudicate the partnership dispute in which the trusts
are merely players. We are bound by the current text of the
statute. (People v. Palacios (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 942, 951
[statute’s text’s “plain meaning governs” in considering
legislative intent].)9
Schermer also argues that even assuming the probate court
had only concurrent jurisdiction over Duboff’s civil complaint,
this case “needed to be decided there.” Without citation to any
legal authorities, Schermer contends that “[n]o reasonable jurist
could fail to see the absolute need to have the intertwined remedy
issues decided together,” and “[n]o reasonable jurist could fail to
see the chaos that results from allowing a civil court to award an
extreme remedy that would never be warranted if the
beneficiary’s twin cases were considered together.” However, the
issue of which court should preside if there was concurrent
jurisdiction was presented to the trial court and decided in the
context of the motion to transfer the instant matter to the
probate court. The trial court provided a reasoned basis for
denying that motion and, as explained above, we disagree that

9 Given our conclusion, we need not address Schermer’s
arguments that she did not waive her jurisdictional objection to
the trial court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

16
the probate and partnership disputes were indistinguishable.
Schermer has not demonstrated the trial court erred in denying
the motion to transfer.
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that
Duboff Had Standing To Assert Derivative Claims as
a Limited Partner
Schermer contends there was no substantial evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that Duboff had standing to sue
as a limited partner. We disagree.
A. Applicable legal principles
Under the Corporations Code, “[a] partner may bring a
derivative action to enforce a right of a limited partnership . . . .”
(§ 15910.02.) The Corporations Code distinguishes between the
rights of a “partner” and the rights of a “transferee.” “The only
interest of a partner which is transferable is the partner’s
transferable interest. A transferable interest is personal
property.” (§ 15907.01.) “A transferee has a right to receive, in
accordance with the transfer, distributions to which the
transferor would otherwise be entitled.” (§ 15907.02, subd. (b).)
But a “transfer” does not “entitle the transferee to participate in
the management or conduct of the limited partnership’s activities
. . . .” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) Rather, “[u]pon transfer, the transferor
retains the rights of a partner other than the interest in
distributions transferred and retains all duties and obligations of
a partner.” (Id., subd. (d).) However, “[a] transferee of a
partnership interest, including a transferee of a general partner,
may become a limited partner if and to the extent that (1) the
partnership agreement provides or (2) all general partners and a
majority in interest of the limited partners consent.” (Id.,
subd. (h).)

17
We review a trial court’s factual findings in its statement of
decision for substantial evidence. (SFPP v. Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Ry. Co. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 452, 462.) “Under
this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally
construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all
reasonable inferences in support of the findings.” (Thompson,
supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.) Substantial evidence constitutes
“evidence of ponderable legal significance, evidence that is
reasonable, credible and of solid value.” (Minnegren v. Nozar
(2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 500, 507.) We do not “reweigh the evidence
and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.”
(Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 76 (Estate of Young).)
The testimony of one witness, even uncorroborated
testimony, may constitute substantial evidence, unless the
testimony is inherently unreliable. (Newman v. Casey (2024) 99
Cal.App.5th 359, 375; Plastic Pipe & Fittings Assn. v. California
Building Standards Com. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1407
(Plastic Pipe & Fittings Assn.).)
B. Discussion
The sole issue decided in the first phase of trial was
whether Sam Schermer consented to making his three daughters
limited partners. The parties agree that his consent was
required under section 15907.02, subdivision (h), because there is
no partnership agreement, and only if Duboff is a partner did she
have standing to bring a derivative action on behalf of the
Partnership. (See § 15910.02.)
Duboff claimed that she and her two sisters became limited
partners when their father made three gift transfers to them on
December 31, 2008, January 1, 2009, and January 1, 2010. These

18
gifts were memorialized in signed “letters” titled “Transfer of
Partnership Interests,” which stated: “I, Sam Schermer, . . .
hereby transfer and assign by way of gift, the following limited
partnership interests in and to the said limited partnership
entitled 245 Spalding Partners” and named each of his three
daughters.
Schermer contends substantial evidence did not support
the trial court’s finding that, with these transfers, Sam Schermer
intended to make Duboff a limited partner. She addresses the
three categories of evidence on which the trial court relied:
(1) Duboff’s trial testimony; (2) Sam Schermer’s gifting history;
and (3) the admissions of Schermer and her attorney. We
consider each category of evidence.
1. Duboff’s testimony
Duboff testified that she had at least four conversations
with her father in which he indicated he had made her a limited
partner. According to Duboff, in the first three conversations,
Sam Schermer told her he had made or was making her and her
sisters limited partners. At no time during any of these
conversations did Sam Schermer use the word “transferee” or
“assignee,” or discuss any limitations on the gifts. Duboff further
testified that around April 2009, when she received her first “K-
1” tax document for the Partnership from her accountant, she
called her father and asked if it had to do with the Partnership,
and he confirmed that it did.
The trial court found that “[b]ased on the court’s
observation of [Duboff’s] testimony and demeanor, and based on
the court’s consideration of the other testimony and exhibits
presented at trial, the court finds that [Duboff’s] testimony
concerning those conversations with Sam was credible.”

19
Schermer contends Duboff’s testimony is inherently
improbable and, even if it were not, it is insufficient to support
the trial court’s ruling. We disagree. Under the substantial
evidence standard of review, “[t]estimony believed by the trial
court ‘may be rejected only when it is inherently improbable or
incredible, i.e., “ ‘unbelievable per se,’ ” physically impossible or “
‘wholly unacceptable to reasonable minds.’ ” ’ [Citation.]”
(McPherson v. EF Intercultural Foundation, Inc. (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 243, 257; Southern California Edison Co. v. Superior
Court (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 573, 588 [we may not uphold a
finding based on inherently improbable evidence].)
Schermer argues that evidence adduced at trial
contradicted Duboff’s testimony and rendered it incredible or
inherently improbable. This evidence included the lack of
witnesses to any communications in which Sam Schermer
described the intent behind his gifts, evidence Schermer contends
demonstrates that Sam Schermer’s past conduct and knowledge
suggests he would not have made Duboff and Scott limited
partners in the manner Duboff described, and Sam Schermer’s
statements which cast doubt on the intent of the three gifts to his
daughters. We disagree that this evidence demonstrated the
impossibility of Duboff’s testimony or rendered it improbable and
unworthy of credence, such that the trial court erred in crediting
it.
That no one witnessed Duboff’s conversations with her
father, and the lack of evidence that he told anyone else he was
making the sisters partners, does not establish that Duboff’s
testimony was insufficient. (See Plastic Pipe & Fittings Assn.,
supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1407 [single uncorroborated witness
can be sufficient under substantial evidence standard].) There

20
was no evidence, for example, that Sam Schermer never spoke
with Duboff alone, or that the conversations could not have
happened.
Schermer’s testimony that her father did not inform her
that he was making her a limited partner is similarly not
dispositive. (See Plastic Pipe & Fittings Assn., supra, 124
Cal.App.4th at p. 1407.) Instead, it was a piece of evidence the
trial court was required to evaluate for credibility and weigh. We
do not reweigh the evidence on appeal and are bound by the trial
court’s credibility determinations. (Estate of Young, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at p. 76.) Further, even if the court credited this
portion of Schermer’s testimony, it did not directly contradict
Duboff’s testimony about her conversations with their father, or
render those conversations impossible. There was no evidence
that Sam Schermer always gave all of his children the same
information. Moreover, to the extent the testimony conflicted, it
was for the trial court to resolve issues of credibility.
Schermer asserts there was evidence that Sam Schermer
wanted the Surviving Trustor’s Trust to retain the family
investments, and stated its trustee should not be bound by
prudent investor rules. She contends these directives would have
been inconsistent with Sam Schermer making her sisters limited
partners in the Partnership, thereby giving them a say in the
management of the Partnership’s single asset, the Building. To
the extent these decisions were in tension, we disagree that they
are so inherently contradictory that they cannot be reconciled, or
that they leave open only the possibility that Duboff’s testimony
was false. The Surviving Trustor’s Trust and the Partnership
were not the same entity. While the Partnership concerned only

21
the Building, the Surviving Trustor’s Trust corpus was different
and included other assets.
Moreover, making Duboff and Scott limited partners in the
Partnership did not place them on equal footing with Schermer
with respect to the Partnership or the Surviving Trustor’s Trust,
as it offered them no role in the Surviving Trustor’s Trust other
than beneficiary, and did not provide them a role equal to that of
the general partner in the Partnership. (§ 15904.06, subd. (a)
[except as otherwise provided “any matter relating to the
activities of the limited partnership may be exclusively decided
by the general partner”].) We cannot conclude that Sam
Schermer’s decision to relieve the trustee of the Surviving
Trustor’s Trust from complying with prudent investor rules, the
direction that the Surviving Trustor’s Trust should retain the
family investments, or the evidence that Sam Schermer was a
“skilled attorney,” indicates that the only inference the trial court
could permissibly draw from the evidence was that Sam
Schermer would not have made Duboff a limited partner and her
testimony was therefore untrue.
That Sam Schermer was aware of Duboff’s and Schermer’s
animosity is also not inconsistent with his making them both
limited partners. He had previously gifted both sisters voting
shares in one company, Schermer Buena Victory, and 20 percent
interests in another company, Sam Schermer, Inc., despite
knowing of their animosity. And while there was evidence that
Duboff and Schermer did not always get along, both also testified
that they were working together and getting along around the
time of the first two gifts, made one day apart, and their father
was aware of this.

22
Likewise, the trial court could reasonably draw multiple
inferences from other evidence adduced at trial. That the court
drew inferences in favor of Duboff does not render its decision
erroneous. This includes Sam Schermer’s written statement
regarding the 2008 gifts that “[t]his is not a conveyance and
instead is a transfer of interest of $12,000 each via notation
which I am having notarized today,” which the court found was
vague and did not indicate his intent; the evidence that Sam
Schermer had received assistance from his son-in-law in 2003
when he was considering making the sisters partners but did not
consult the son-in-law in 2008, 2009, or 2010; that no writing
documented Sam Schermer’s intent to make the sisters limited
partners except the transfer letters; and the evidence that Sam
Schermer was short of cash at the time he made the gifts.
In sum, we conclude that Duboff’s testimony was not
inherently improbable, physically impossible, or categorically
unbelievable. The uncorroborated testimony of a sole witness
may be substantial evidence sufficient to affirm a trial court’s
findings if that testimony is not inherently unreliable. (Plastic
Pipe & Fittings Assn., supra, 124 Cal.App.4th at p. 1407.)
However, Duboff’s testimony was not the only evidence. The trial
court also considered Sam Schermer’s gifting history and
Schermer’s attorney’s admissions.
2. Sam Schermer’s gifting history
There was evidence at trial that Sam Schermer had
previously gifted both Duboff and Schermer 20 percent interests
in Sam Schermer, Inc., and voting and non-voting shares in
Schermer Buena Victory, two of his other companies. He did not
place any restrictions on those gifted interests and shares. The
Schermer Buena Victory shares were not memorialized in any

23
written document. He also made Schermer and Duboff general
partners in AMS Properties, without any conditions. The trial
court reasoned that Sam Schermer’s practice of giving gifts of
unrestricted interests supported a finding that he did so again in
the 2008, 2009, and 2010 partnership interests to Duboff.
On appeal, Schermer argues no inference can be drawn
from Sam Schermer’s past gifting history because he sometimes
gifted restricted interests, such as non-voting shares; he could not
have imposed restrictions on gifts of stock; and he never gave
voting stock to Scott. We disagree that, even if true, these factors
render the trial court’s factual findings unreasonable. To the
extent Schermer argued the past gifting history conclusively
demonstrated that Sam Schermer would not have, and did not,
gift Duboff limited partnership interests, the evidence that her
father’s gifting history was, at a minimum, variable with respect
to whether the gifted interests were restricted, undermined
Schermer’s argument. The trial court could reasonably consider
this history in weighing the evidence and assessing the
credibility of the witnesses at trial.
Similarly, Schermer contends her father never made their
other sister, Scott, a partner, or gifted her voting stock, thus
making her a limited partner in 2008, 2009, and 2010 was “out of
the blue” and inconsistent with his gifting history. It was for the
factfinder, the trial court, to consider the evidence of Sam
Schermer’s past practices to determine the intent of the 2008,
2009, and 2010 gifts. Even if his gifts in those three years were a
departure from his past conduct related to Scott, that fact did not
conclusively indicate that no inference could be drawn from the
evidence of the gifting history in Duboff’s favor.

24
3. Schermer and her attorney’s admissions
The trial court also found that “before and during this
litigation, [Schermer] and her attorney made statements
admitting that she and [Duboff] are limited partners in the
Partnership.”
According to the trial court’s ruling, evidence was adduced
at trial that Schermer signed two declarations stating under oath
that she was a limited partner in the Partnership. However, the
trial court’s ruling acknowledged Schermer’s testimony that the
declarations were based on her mistaken belief that the
Partnership’s K-1 tax forms indicated she was a limited partner.
The trial court did not appear to rely on these declarations for its
ruling.
Instead, the court relied on two letters authored by
Schermer’s attorney, which were admitted at trial.10 The
attorney’s letters were sent to Duboff’s counsel, in July 2015 and
November 2015, before Duboff filed this lawsuit.
The first letter responded to Duboff’s request as a limited
partner to inspect and copy records of the Partnership.
Schermer’s attorney wrote, “ ‘We have been able to undertake a
cursory review of your client’s assertions and her standing to
make the inspection demand . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Pursuant to
Corporation[s] Code 15903.04, as a limited partner, Ms. Duboff
will be permitted to inspect and copy the information . . . to the
extent that such information exists and is maintained by 245
Spalding Partners.’ ” (Italics added.)
In the second letter, also in response to Duboff’s inspection
demand, Schermer’s attorney wrote: “ ‘Your client knows who the

10 Neither Schermer’s declarations nor the attorney’s letters
are in the record on appeal.

25
partners are as well as [Schermer] does. This is yet another
attempt to harass, vex, and annoy [Schermer]. The information
is readily available from the tax returns . . . . But to avoid
another request, here is the information in alphabetical order as
requested.’ ” The letter listed Duboff and her sisters as limited
partners of the Partnership.
Schermer argues this letter’s reference to tax returns
establishes her attorney was also mistakenly relying on the K-1
tax forms to determine who was a partner. She contends there
was no evidence that her attorney had personal knowledge of who
the partners were, or that he obtained his information from
another source, thus the only “reasonable inference” is that the
attorney made the same mistake as his client.
The trial court reasoned: “Although [Schermer] explained
that she made the statement that she is a limited partner in her
declarations by mistake based on the statements in the K-1’s,
[Schermer] did not offer any competent evidence establishing
that her attorney’s statements in his two letters that Bonnie is a
limited partner were also based on the statements in the K-1’s.
Thus, as discussed above, the statements made by [Schermer’s]
attorney on her behalf are deemed to be admissions of
[Schermer], and there is no evidence that her attorney made
them by mistake or based on mistaken assumptions obtained
from statements in the K-1’s.”
Schermer contends the trial court should not have
considered the attorney’s statements because there was no
evidence they were based on anything other than Schermer’s own
mistake. We find no error in the trial court’s reliance on the
attorney’s admissions. We draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the judgment. (Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at

26
p. 981.) The trial court could reasonably infer that Schermer’s
attorney would exercise care in using the term “limited partner,”
and in interpreting the legal documents in Schermer’s possession.
The trial court could also reasonably consider the lack of evidence
that Schermer’s attorney was equally mistaken about whether
Duboff was a limited partner. (See Bell v. Staacke (1911) 159
Cal. 193, 196–197 [counsel’s statements in letter admissible as
admission]; Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union
of Machinists (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 675, 707 [statements of
counsel made prior to trial may constitute admissions].) That the
attorney said the information was “ ‘readily available from the
tax returns’ ” does not necessarily indicate that the K-1 tax forms
were the primary or sole source of the attorney’s information, or
that the attorney had misinterpreted any relevant tax
documents.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Duboff was a limited partner who had standing to file derivative
claims.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Dissociating the
Limited Partners
The trial court found Schermer should be dissociated as a
limited partner in her individual capacity, and in her capacity as
trustee of the Trusts, under section 15906.01,
subdivision (b)(5)(C). Specifically, the trial court found
Schermer’s conduct made it not “reasonably practicable” for the
activities of the Partnership to carry on with her or the entities
she controls as limited partners. The court’s ruling was based on
Schermer’s “grossly negligent and reckless conduct in managing
the Spalding building . . . .” The court observed that “as a limited
partner, Defendant Linda Schermer agreed with all the actions

27
she took in her capacity as trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s
Trust as general partner of the Partnership . . . .” The court cited
Schermer’s testimony that she believed she had complied with
her fiduciary duties as to repairs and took no responsibility for
her failure to timely obtain a loan to renovate the Building.
The court further reasoned: “As Duboff states, ‘[i]f all the
trusts are not dissociated, Schermer can simply revote herself as
the general partner and the partnership will be back to where it
is now.’ ” The court additionally explained that due to Schermer’s
breaches of fiduciary duties, her dissociation as an individual,
and as the trustee of the limited partner trusts, was warranted
under section 15906.01, subdivision (b)(5)(C).
Schermer contends the trial court abused its discretion by
dissociating her and the limited partner trusts from the
Partnership. She does not contest the court’s dissociation of her
as trustee of the general partner Surviving Trustor’s Trust or
that trust as general partner.
A. Applicable legal principles
California has adopted the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act, including provisions regarding dissociation. (Evans v.
Galardi (1976) 16 Cal.3d 300, 306; see §§ 15900, 15906.01 et seq.)
A person may be dissociated as a limited partner by judicial order
“upon the occurrence” of certain enumerated events, including
“on application by the limited partnership . . . because . . .
[¶] . . . [¶] the person engaged in conduct relating to the limited
partnership’s activities which makes it not reasonably practicable

28
to carry on the activities with the person as limited partner.”
(§ 15906.01, subd. (b)(5)(C); see also § 15908.02, subd. (a).)11
“[A] trust is a ‘person’ that may associate in a partnership
. . . .” (Han v. Hallberg (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 621, 624–625; but
see Presta v. Tepper (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 909, 913–914 [trust
itself is not a partner].) However, a “trust cannot act in its own
name and must always act through its trustee . . . .” (Han, at
p. 624.) This is because “ ‘[u]nlike a corporation, a trust is not a
legal entity. Legal title to property owned by a trust is held by
the trustee . . . .’ ‘ “A . . . trust . . . is simply a collection of assets
and liabilities. As such, it has no capacity to sue or be sued, or to
defend an action.” ’ [Citation.]” (Stoltenberg, supra, 179
Cal.App.4th at p. 293.) “A trust is an arrangement where
‘ “property is transferred with an intention that it be held and
administered by the transferee (trustee) for the benefit of another
. . . .” ’ [Citation.]” (Godoy v. Linzner (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 765,
780.)
B. Discussion
The trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion. The
court found that Schermer violated the Corporations Code and
caused the Surviving Trustor’s Trust to breach its fiduciary
duties as the general partner. In over 14 pages, the statement of
decision recited evidence that Schermer, in her capacity as

11 As another state court applying the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act has explained, a “main purpose” of the Act “is ‘to
prevent mandatory dissolution’ of a partnership.” (Robertson v.
Jacobs Cattle Co. (Neb. 2013) 830 N.W.2d 191, 203.) Thus, where
a partner’s conduct would constitute grounds for dissolution of
the partnership or dissociation by judicial expulsion, “the court
may in its discretion order either dissociation by expulsion of one
or more partners or dissolution of the partnership.” (Ibid.)

29
trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s Trust as general partner of the
Partnership, engaged in “grossly negligent and reckless conduct
in the management” of the Building, self-dealing, intentional
misconduct, and a knowing violation of law. Schermer does not
contest those factual findings on appeal. Further, the trial court
found that Schermer believed her unlawful conduct was proper.
Schermer contends that since the court’s findings
concerned her conduct as trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s
Trust, there was no basis to dissociate her as an individual
limited partner or the other limited partner trusts. Yet, in
considering the feasibility of continuing the Partnership, the trial
court was not required to ignore that even without the Surviving
Trustor’s Trust as the general partner, Schermer controlled four
of the six limited partners. Schermer would continue acting as
trustee on behalf of the limited partner trusts, and the acrimony
between the parties was undisputed. (See Owen v. Cohen (1941)
19 Cal.2d 147, 152 [“courts of equity may order the dissolution of
a partnership where there are quarrels and disagreements of
such a nature and to such extent that all confidence and
cooperation between the parties has been destroyed or where one
of the parties by his misbehavior materially hinders a proper
conduct of the partnership business”]; Brennan v. Brennan
Associates (Conn. 2009) 977 A.2d 107, 120 [under the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, “an irreparable deterioration of a
relationship between partners is a valid basis to order
dissolution, and, therefore, is a valid basis for the alternative
remedy of dissociation”].)
Likewise, the court was permitted to consider its findings
that Schermer’s improper conduct on behalf of the Surviving
Trustor’s Trust lasted for years, was deliberate, and was in bad

30
faith. It was not arbitrary or outside the bounds of reason for the
trial court to conclude that Schermer’s continued active
participation in the Partnership as an individual limited partner
or on behalf of the limited partner trusts she controlled as trustee
would make it not reasonably practicable for the Partnership
activities to carry on. Irrespective of Schermer’s potential
testimony about whether she would attempt to reinstate herself
as the general partner in some capacity, the trial court had a
record of nearly a decade of her conduct that it could reasonably
weigh and consider in deciding on an appropriate remedy.
As we understand her arguments, Schermer asserts the
trial court abused its discretion by failing to employ a more
limited remedy. She contends the trial court should not have
dissociated her individual interest, because if the limited partner
trusts were dissociated, she would no longer control a majority of
the interests that were permitted to select a new general partner.
She also contends that if the court in the probate proceeding
removed her as trustee of the Trusts, then dissociating them
would become unnecessary. She likewise argues that despite the
fact that the Trusts could only act through the trustee—
Schermer—the court should not have dissociated the Marital and
Deceased Trustor’s Trusts because Schermer’s objectionable
conduct was taken only in her capacity as the trustee of the
Surviving Trustor’s Trust.
That the trial court could have reasonably chosen a
different remedy does not render the one it selected an abuse of
discretion. (See e.g., Sunset Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1935)
9 Cal.App.2d 389, 405 [rejecting argument that appointment of
receiver was erroneous because other remedies were available].)
As explained above, the trial court’s decision to dissociate the
limited partner trusts and Schermer as an individual limited

31
partner was based on its detailed findings that Schermer had
engaged in deliberate unlawful conduct, in bad faith, that caused
the Partnership significant damage. The court thus reasoned
that Schermer’s continued involvement in the Partnership in any
capacity other than a holder of economic interests would render it
not reasonably practicable for the Partnership’s activities to carry
on. Further, the trial court could reasonably fashion a remedy
based on the status of the parties as they stood at the time, not
based on an anticipated change of trustee that would take place
in the probate proceedings. Schermer fails to establish that the
dissociation of her and the trusts as limited partners was an
abuse of discretion. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 270, 277 [“ ‘ “the party asserting trial court error
may not . . . rest on the bare assertion of error but must present
argument and legal authority on each point raised” ’ ”].)
IV. Damages Award
Duboff sought, and the court awarded, monetary damages
on the first cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. The court
awarded: (1) $77,000 that the Partnership paid Schermer in
management fees; (2) the value of Schermer’s rent-free
apartment in the Building after she became successor trustee to
the Surviving Trustor’s Trust; and (3) the Partnership’s lost
rental revenues. Schermer asserts trial court error as to each
category of damages. We find no basis for reversal.
We review the factual findings underlying the trial court’s
award of damages for substantial evidence. (Coziahr v. Otay
Water Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 785, 820; see also Atkins v.
City of Los Angeles (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 696, 738 (Atkins)
[amount of damages is a fact question and will not be disturbed if
supported by substantial evidence].)

32
“ ‘The law requires only that some reasonable basis of
computation of damages be used, and the damages may be
computed even if the result reached is an approximation.’ ”
(Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 774.) An approximation especially may be
permissible where the defendant’s wrongful acts have created the
difficulty in proving the amount of damages or have caused the
other party not to receive profits or other sums to which the party
would have been entitled. (Id. at p. 775.) However, “[a] damage
award must not be ‘ “ ‘speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent,
or merely possible.’ ” ’ [Citations.]” (Atkins, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th
at p. 738.)
A. $77,000 in management fees
Schermer contends substantial evidence did not support
the trial court’s $77,000 restitution award. The trial court found
Schermer violated section 15904.06, subdivision (f), which
provides that “[a] general partner is not entitled to remuneration
for services performed for the partnership.” The court found that
Schermer improperly received the $77,000 when she was the
trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s Trust and was therefore acting
as the Partnership’s general partner.
Schermer contends there is no evidence of how much, if
any, of the $77,000 was paid to her during the relevant period.
She became the successor trustee of the general partner trust,
the Surviving Trustor’s Trust, in August 2014. Before that, she
served as property manager and was thus entitled to
compensation in that capacity. She asserts there is no evidence
she received $77,000 during the period she was a trustee, such
that section 15904.06, subdivision (f) applied. She also maintains

33
that the tax returns show this amount was paid to “officers” in
the plural, so to both her and her father.
In 2014, the Partnership paid Sam Schermer, Inc.
$105,000, and Schermer testified that a “portion” of this was to
compensate her for management services regarding the Building.
However, she did not know how much she was owed and had not
maintained any paperwork, as this was “up to the [Partnership’s]
accountant.”
A 2014 tax return for Sam Schermer, Inc., on a line reading
“Compensation of Officers,” states: $77,000. At trial, opposing
counsel asked Schermer about this amount: “So that was a
payment made to either you or your father or the two of you
combined; correct?” Schermer replied, “I would assume so.”
Schermer further testified that this was a payment for
management services that she and her father provided the
Partnership.
Schermer has not established trial court error. She
testified that part of the $105,000 was to pay her for
management services. The trial court awarded $77,000 based on
the tax return and her testimony that she received some
compensation for providing management services in 2014. Her
testimony allowed for the possibility that the $77,000 was a
payment made to her alone, or her father, or to both of them. She
further testified that she believed she was entitled to a
management fee not only for 2014, but for 2015 and subsequent
years. She did not argue below, as she does on appeal, that some
portion of the $77,000 was warranted because it was for services
she provided before becoming trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s
Trust. Indeed, Schermer testified that she did not maintain
paperwork to reflect the amounts to which she was entitled for

34
management fees. She has not established that $77,000 was not
a “ ‘reasonable approximation’ ” of the damages. (JMR
Construction Corp. v. Environmental Assessment & Remediation
Management, Inc. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 571, 585.)
B. Rent-free apartment
Schermer further contends the trial court improperly
awarded damages for her use of an apartment in the Building
after she became successor trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s
Trust. She does not contest the amount, but rather the fact of a
damages award at all.
The trial court awarded the Partnership damages for the
fair rental value of Schermer’s apartment for the period between
August 2014 and July 2022. Like the management fee, the trial
court determined that under section 15904.06, subdivision (f),
Schermer was not entitled to a rent-free apartment as
compensation for her services after she became trustee of the
general partner trust.
Schermer argues the Surviving Trustor’s Trust was the
“general partner . . . not entitled to remuneration” under
section 15904.06, subdivision (f), not her. She asserts that she
“received the apartment in her capacity as resident manager, a
division of roles and compensation expressly authorized in the
original partnership agreement, the trust documents, and when
[her father] hired [her] for that role.”12

12 There is no written partnership agreement. To the extent
she refers to a 1992 partnership agreement for AMS Properties,
as she did in the trial court, we also find no reason it would
apply, particularly in the absence of any such argument on
appeal. AMS Properties was the previous owner of the Building.

35
That Schermer was authorized to receive a rent-free
apartment in the trust documents or the superseded partnership
agreement does not establish that section 15904.06,
subdivision (f)’s prohibition applicable to general partners did not
apply. The trial court could reasonably determine that once
Schermer became the trustee of the Surviving Trustor’s Trust,
serving as the general partner of the Partnership, there was no
evidence that she ever provided any services to the Partnership,
or received any benefits, in any other capacity except as on behalf
of the general partner trust. Further, there was no partnership
agreement that would allow her to individually receive
remuneration. Schermer has provided no argument or authority
to support the conclusion that the trial court erred in considering
the evidence and determining that the receipt of the rent-free

We assume Schermer is referring to language in the
Surviving Trustor’s Trust under “Successor Trustees” and “Dual
Capacity of Trustee,” as follows: “While she is serving as Trustee,
LINDA J. SCHERMER may continue to serve as rental agent
and property manager for any real property which is an asset of
this Trust and may continue to be paid for her services as
property manager . . . I specifically authorize LINDA J.
SCHERMER to serve as Trustee notwithstanding her potential
dual compensation as Trustee and as rental agent and property
manager and notwithstanding the potential for conflicts of
interest that may arise . . . .” However, we find no reason this
stated trustor intent applies here to contravene section 15904.06,
subdivision (f), and Schermer points to no relevant authority.
Schermer also cites evidence that she was the property
manager and thus allowed to live in the Building rent-free since
2006. However, this evidence does not establish that her right to
live rent-free was not terminated when she became successor
trustee.

36
apartment inured to Schermer in her role as trustee of the
Surviving Trustor’s Trust, serving as the general partner of the
Partnership, thereby violating section 15904.06, subdivision (f).
C. Damages based on gross lost rental revenues
The trial court awarded damages for lost rental revenues,
plus prejudgment interest, based on Schermer’s failure to make
apartment units habitable and rentable through renovation.
Schermer disputes the trial court’s method of calculating these
damages, arguing that the court “impermissibly awarded gross
‘lost rental revenues’ rather than estimated lost profits (i.e.,
estimated revenues minus expenses).” Because the
uncontroverted evidence is that both methods would have
reached the same result, and an approximation was permissible,
we find no basis to reverse.
The trial court relied on the testimony and calculations of
Duboff’s damages expert, Wesley Nutten. Schermer argues
Nutten impermissibly failed to consider expenses the Partnership
would have incurred if it had rented the vacant units, such as
utilities, turnover costs, and costs of maintenance. Schermer
further contends the proper measure of damages in a case
involving a business is net profits, not gross revenues.13
However, Schermer fails to establish that had lost profits
been the measure of damages rather than lost rental revenue, the
result would have been different. The trial court admitted into

13 We disagree with Duboff’s argument that Schermer waived
these arguments by failing to challenge the expert’s opinions in
her closing brief. Schermer preserved the argument for appellate
review by raising it in her motion for new trial. (Navigators
Specialty Ins. Co. v. Moorefield Construction, Inc. (2016) 6
Cal.App.5th 1258, 1279, fn. 2.)

37
evidence Nutten’s testimony comparing his “lost rents” analysis
with a “lost profits-type calculation.” The testimony explained
that “the lost rent calculation, ignoring the expense side of the
equation, results in the same exact answer as the lost profits
calculation.” (Italics added.) Schermer did not present any
evidence to the contrary. It is undisputed that Schermer did not
provide any expert opinion or other evidence that the amount
Nutten calculated was not a reasonable approximation of the
damages. On appeal, Schermer essentially contends Nutten’s
testimony was not credible to the extent he explained that the
lost profits and lost rental revenue calculations would yield the
same results. However, it was for the trial court as the factfinder
to determine the credibility of witness testimony, including
expert testimony. (People v. Poulsom (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 501,
518.) Schermer has not established that Nutten’s conclusions
were invalid as a matter of law or unsupported by substantial
evidence.
In sum, we find no reversible error.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff Bonnie Duboff is
awarded her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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