Cohen v. Snyder CA2/3

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Filed 2/6/26 Cohen v. Snyder CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

LES COHEN, B333194

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV33348)
v.

STEPHEN SNYDER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lia Martin, Judge. Affirmed.
Stephen Snyder, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Krause-Leemon Cohen & Daneshrad and David R. Krause-
Leemon, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant Stephen Snyder appeals from a default
judgment entered in Les Cohen’s lawsuit against him. We affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Cohen sued Snyder in September 2020. Cohen filed a proof
of service of summons stating that on September 26, 2020,
registered process server Marco Toscano personally served
Snyder with the complaint at 21251 E. Terry Way, Covina,
California (the Covina property). At Snyder’s request, the trial
court entered a default against Cohen on October 28, 2020.
In August 2022, Snyder filed a motion to quash service of
summons. He also filed a motion to set aside the default entered
against him under Code of Civil Procedure section 473.5,1 on the
basis that he did not receive the service of summons, and under
section 473, subdivision (b), on the ground that the default was
the result of surprise. Both motions argued that Snyder was in
Florida on September 26, 2020, and that the proof of service was
therefore fraudulent. In support of the motions, Snyder declared
that he had been living at the Covina property in 2020, but he
relocated to Florida on August 20 of that year. He further
declared that he traveled from Florida to Los Angeles on
September 10, 2020, returned to Florida on September 15, and
flew back to Los Angeles on September 30. Snyder submitted an
email itinerary for a plane ticket for passenger Stephen Williams
Snyder from Los Angeles on September 15, 2020, to Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. He submitted another email containing a
ticket for a September 30, 2020, flight from Fort Lauderdale to

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.

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Los Angeles. Snyder also submitted screenshots of cell phone
text messages and photographs, including time, date, and
location metadata, which he claimed established that he was in
Florida on September 25, 27, and 29, 2020.
Cohen opposed both motions. In support of the oppositions,
Cohen submitted the proof of service. He also filed a declaration
signed by Peter Chao, a nonparty who declared that in October
2020, Snyder told Chao that Snyder had been served with
Cohen’s summons and complaint. Cohen’s oppositions objected to
the exhibits attached to Snyder’s declaration as hearsay and
inauthentic.
Snyder filed replies in support of his motions to quash and
to set aside the default. Both replies attached declarations from
five individuals. Four of the declarants asserted that they were
at the Covina property on September 26, 2020, that Snyder was
not there, and that nobody at the residence was served with any
papers on that date. The fifth declarant averred that he saw
Snyder in Florida on September 6 and 29, 2020.
Cohen objected to the replies to the extent that they sought
to introduce new evidence in a reply brief. Cohen also filed a
declaration from Toscano, the process server. According to the
declaration, Cohen’s counsel provided Toscano with “additional
images” of Snyder in December 2022, and Toscano declared that,
to the best of his recollection, he personally served Snyder with
the complaint on September 26, 2020, at the Covina property. 2

2 Snyder objected to the Toscano declaration on the basis
that it was contradicted in part by factual findings in a federal
district court decision. “A court may take judicial notice of a
court’s action, but may not use it to prove the truth of the facts

3
Snyder submitted a declaration explaining that his replies
were filed late because he had difficulty accessing Cohen’s
oppositions and because he received the oppositions shortly
before the Thanksgiving holiday, during which he was traveling.
Snyder did not address Cohen’s argument that the court should
ignore any evidence identified for the first time in the replies.
The trial court issued a tentative ruling denying Snyder’s
motion to quash service of summons. The tentative ruling
concluded that the facially valid service of summons established a
presumption of proper service. The court reasoned that Snyder
failed to rebut that presumption because he “relie[d] solely on”
his own declaration, which the court found to be “self-serving and
unsupported by admissible evidence.” It also found that Snyder
failed to provide “proper evidence of residence in Florida” at the
time of service. At the December 7, 2022 hearing on the motion
to quash, Synder argued that the tentative ruling ignored the
evidence attached to Snyder’s reply brief. Cohen asserted that
this evidence should be ignored because it was filed late. The
trial court did not expressly address the parties’ arguments as to
the reply evidence. It adopted its tentative ruling as final and
denied the motion to quash.
The court denied Snyder’s motion to vacate the default on
December 8, 2022. The court again found that Snyder failed to
rebut the presumption of proper service. It acknowledged that
Snyder had submitted photos and metadata suggesting he was in

found and recited.” (O’Neill v. Novartis Consumer Health, Inc.
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1405.) Although the record does
not reflect whether or how the trial court resolved Snyder’s
objection, we assume it did not improperly consider the factual
findings recited in the opinion that Snyder identified.

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Florida on certain dates, but it found that none of the evidence
established that Snyder was not present at the Covina property
or served with the service of summons on September 26, 2020.
The court held a hearing on the motion to vacate, but the hearing
was not transcribed by a court reporter.
On December 16 and 19, 2022, Snyder filed motions to
reconsider both orders. He reserved hearings for the motions on
January 8 and 9, 2025.
The trial court entered a default judgment against Snyder
on August 7, 2023. Snyder timely appealed from the default
judgment.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Snyder primarily reiterates the points he raised
in the trial court: that he was not properly served and, relatedly,
that the proof of service was fraudulent. Although the trial court
entered two orders expressly rejecting these arguments, Snyder
does not directly challenge those orders in his opening brief. For
example, rather than arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default under
section 473.5, Snyder asks this court to vacate the default or the
default judgment under that provision. However, an appellate
court reviews the correctness of a trial court ruling. (In re Zeth S.
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 (Zeth S.).) Failure to demonstrate that
the ruling was erroneous may forfeit or abandon any claims on
appeal. (Flores v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation
(2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 205.)
We therefore construe Snyder’s arguments as contending
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions to set
aside the default and to quash service of summons, both of which
argued that Snyder was not served and that the proof of service

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was fraudulent. Finding no error or abuse of discretion, we
affirm.
I. Snyder has not established any basis to reverse the
order denying his motion to set aside the default
A. The trial court did not err or abuse its
discretion in denying Snyder’s request for relief
under section 473.5
If the trial court finds that a defendant did not receive
actual notice of a lawsuit, and that the lack of notice “was not
caused by his or her avoidance of service or inexcusable neglect, it
may set aside [a resulting] default or default judgment on
whatever terms as may be just and allow the party to defend the
action.” (§ 473.5, subd. (c).)
We review an order denying a motion under section 473.5
for abuse of discretion. (Shapell Socal Rental Properties, LLC v.
Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 198, 212.) “The abuse of
discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it
calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling
under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for
substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,
and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if
arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008)
43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712.)3

3 Snyder argues that the standard of review is de novo
because his arguments implicate pure questions of law. While
Snyder raises some legal contentions, he primarily challenges the
court’s section 473.5 order, which we review for abuse of
discretion, and he disputes the trial court’s evidentiary rulings

6
The trial court found that Cohen filed a facially valid proof
of service, which created a rebuttable presumption of proper
service.4 (Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59
Cal.App.4th 789, 795; Evid. Code, § 647.) It further found that
Snyder failed to rebut the presumption and, in turn, that he was
properly served. We find no basis for reversal.
Snyder declared that he was not served with the complaint,
but the court discredited his declaration as self-serving. “It is not
our role as a reviewing court to reweigh the evidence or to assess
witness credibility.” (Ribakoff v. City of Long Beach (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 150, 162.) The court “ ‘was not required to accept
this self-serving evidence . . . .’ ” (Rodriguez v. Cho (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 742, 751 (Rodriguez); Lee v. Yan (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 975, 978–979 [presumption of proper service not
rebutted by “incredible” declaration disputing service].)
Moreover, the Chao declaration averred that Snyder admitted in

and factual findings. We apply the appropriate standard of
review to each aspect of the trial court rulings.

4 Snyder asserts that the proof of service is deficient because
it lacked a description of the person served, a declaration of
diligence, and corroborating evidence such as a photograph.
Snyder appears to reference the requirements for substituted
service, which is only permitted after reasonably diligent
attempts at personal service. (§ 415.20, subd. (b).) But a proof of
personal service need only specify the “time, place, and manner of
service and facts showing that the service was made in
accordance with this chapter,” as well as the name of the person
served. (§ 417.10.) The proof of personal service in this case
satisfied these basic requirements.

7
October 2020 that he had been served with the complaint, which
further supports the trial court ruling.5
Snyder also argues that the evidence filed in support of his
declaration rebutted the presumption of proper service. Cohen
objected to this evidence on the basis that it was hearsay or
inauthentic, and the court sustained that objection, finding that
Snyder’s declaration was “unsupported by admissible evidence.”
We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, and here,
we find no abuse. (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 409.)
Snyder submitted receipts for flights from Los Angeles to Florida
on September 15, 2020, and from Florida to Los Angeles on
September 30, but these establish only that someone purchased
plane tickets in Snyder’s name. They do not support the
proposition for which Snyder cited them—that is, that Snyder
actually used the tickets. (Cf. Gorman v. Tassajara Development
Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 87 [receipts inadmissible as
hearsay to prove that the purchased service occurred].) Snyder
also provided screenshots from a cell phone showing text
messages and photographs, all of which included date, time, and
location metadata. But aside from Snyder’s discredited
declaration, nothing in the record establishes that the
screenshots were taken from Snyder’s cell phone, or that they
otherwise establish where Snyder was at any given time. (Cf.
Evid. Code, § 1401 [writings must be authenticated].)

5 Snyder argues that Chao’s declaration constitutes hearsay.
Although Snyder objected to the declaration below, he did not
assert that it was hearsay, meaning Snyder forfeited this claim.
(In re Marriage of Kerry (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 456, 466.)
Moreover, Snyder’s statements to Chao were offered against
Snyder, and were therefore admissible as admissions of a party
opponent. (Evid. Code, § 1220.)

8
Moreover, even if the court had considered the evidence
supporting Snyder’s declaration, substantial evidence supports
its finding that the presumption of proper service was
unrebutted. As the trial court correctly observed, none of the
flight receipts, photographs, or text messages were dated
September 26, 2020, the date of service. For example, even
assuming that Snyder flew from Los Angeles to Florida on
September 15 and from Florida to Los Angeles on September 30,
this does not foreclose the possibility that Snyder traveled to Los
Angeles another time between those dates. The evidence could
support an inference that Snyder was in Florida on September
26, 2020. But “when two or more inferences can reasonably be
deduced from the facts, a reviewing court lacks power to
substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.” (In re
Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590, 598.)
On appeal, Snyder also discusses five declarations filed
with his reply in support of his motion to set aside the default.
Cohen objected to these declarations below on the basis that new
evidence may not be submitted with reply briefs. Snyder argues
that the trial court did not resolve the objection. However, the
court’s order denying the motion to quash stated that Snyder
“relie[d] solely on” his own declaration. In the order denying
Snyder’s motion to set aside the default, the court referenced its
earlier analysis, and the court never discussed the reply
declarations. Thus, the court at least implicitly sustained
Cohen’s objection to these declarations. We cannot say that the
court abused its discretion in doing so, because “new evidence is
not permitted with reply papers.” (Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537 (Jay).)

9
Even if the court considered the declarations filed with
Snyder’s reply, we would still find no basis to reverse. When a
court considers new evidence identified in a reply, the court will
ordinarily permit the opposing party “the opportunity to
respond.” (Jay, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 1538.) After Snyder
filed his reply, Cohen submitted a declaration from Toscano, the
process server. Toscano averred that he had consulted additional
photographs of Snyder and that, to the best of his recollection, he
personally served Snyder on September 26, 2020. The court may
have also considered the Chao declaration, which asserted that
Snyder admitted in October 2020 that he had received the
complaint. Thus, to the extent that the court considered the
evidence Snyder filed in reply, the court was forced to make
factual findings based on contradictory declarations. It rejected
Snyder’s position and accepted Cohen’s. Where, as here, “ ‘an
issue is tried on affidavits, the rule on appeal is that . . . where
there is a substantial conflict in the facts stated, a determination
of the controverted facts by the trial court will not be disturbed.’ ”
(American Express Centurion Bank v. Zara (2011) 199
Cal.App.4th 383, 387.)
Finally, Snyder asks this court to reverse the judgment
based on additional declarations and evidence that he filed in
support of his motion for reconsideration of the order denying his
motion to set aside the default. We decline this invitation.
For reasons not reflected in the record, Snyder selected a
January 2025 hearing date for his December 2022
reconsideration motion. The court entered a default judgment
against Snyder before the hearing occurred, and thereby
implicitly denied the reconsideration motion. (Ramon v.
Aerospace Corp. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1238.) At that

10
point, Snyder “should have abandoned the now invalid motion for
reconsideration [citation] and attacked the judgment in one of
three ways: by a motion for a new trial; by a motion to vacate; or
by filing a timely notice of appeal.” (Ibid.) For example, Snyder
could have “asked the court to treat the motion for
reconsideration as a motion for a new trial over which the trial
court still had jurisdiction.” (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals
Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 187, 194.) Snyder also could have
filed a postjudgment motion under the same theory as his
reconsideration motion.
Snyder did not pursue any further relief in the trial court.
He instead filed this direct appeal, in which he appears to
challenge the implied denial of his reconsideration motion.
Snyder has not identified any legal authority establishing that
the trial court erred by entering judgment while the
reconsideration motion was pending. But even assuming this
was error, we would reverse only if it prejudiced Snyder, that is,
if “ ‘a different result would have been probable’ ” but for the
error. (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 802,
italics omitted.) Snyder does not argue that the error was
prejudicial. For example, he does not assert that the trial court
would have likely reversed its order declining to set aside the
default, if it had reviewed the three additional declarations.
(Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888,
890, fn. 1 [appellate court will not develop appellant’s
arguments].)6

6 Nor does it appear that reconsideration or reversal was
reasonably probable. When a party seeks reconsideration “based
on new or different facts,” the new evidence “must be such that

11
Snyder also argues that this court should consider the
declarations supporting his reconsideration motion merely
because they were included in the appellate record. But an
appellate court “ ‘reviews the correctness of a judgment as of the
time of its rendition, upon a record of matters which were before
the trial court for its consideration.’ ” (Zeth S., supra, 31 Cal.4th
at p. 405.) As we have discussed, the trial court did not consider
the evidence filed in support of Snyder’s reconsideration motion.
Snyder has not identified any authority supporting his argument
that this court should consider that evidence in the first instance.
B. Snyder has not established that the default or
default judgment resulted from extrinsic fraud
Snyder also asserts that the trial court should have set
aside the default due to extrinsic fraud because the proof of
service was false. A trial court has “inherent power to vacate a
default judgment or order on equitable grounds where a party
establishes that the judgment or order . . . resulted from extrinsic

the moving party could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered or produced it” earlier. (New York Times Co. v.
Superior Court (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 206, 212–213.) The three
declarations are signed by Snyder’s roommate, landlord, and real
estate agent, for an apartment he rented in September 2020.
Snyder declared that he attempted to contact these individuals
when he learned about the lawsuit, but he provided few details
about these efforts. We cannot conclude that it is probable that
the court would have found Snyder’s vague assertions sufficient
to establish reasonable diligence. Nor can we conclude that the
court would have likely credited the new declarations, which
conveniently surfaced just a few days after the court denied
Snyder’s motions, and which describe specific events that
occurred more than two years prior.

12
fraud or mistake.” (County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228 (Gorham).) “Extrinsic fraud occurs when
a party is deprived of the opportunity to present a claim or
defense to the court as a result of being kept in ignorance or in
some other manner being fraudulently prevented by the opposing
party from fully participating in the proceeding.” (Id. at pp.
1228–1229.) Among other things, “a false return of summons
may constitute both extrinsic fraud and mistake.” (Id. at p.
1229.)
As we have discussed, the trial court found that Snyder
was personally served with the summons. Because Snyder
received notice of the action, he had an opportunity to defend
himself, and we therefore reject his assertion that the proof of
service constitutes extrinsic fraud. (Rodriguez, supra, 236
Cal.App.4th at p. 750.)
Snyder also argues that Cohen’s failure to notify him of the
default constitutes extrinsic fraud and warrants reversal of the
judgment. Because Snyder did not raise this point below, we
reject it as forfeited. (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021)
65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548.) Moreover, Snyder does not assert that
this precluded him from participating in the lawsuit, particularly
since the trial court determined that he was personally served
with the complaint.
Next, Snyder contends the judgment must be set aside due
to extrinsic fraud because Cohen failed to disclose in the
complaint that he had entered a settlement agreement with
Snyder. According to Snyder, the settlement agreement
forecloses all of Cohen’s claims against him. Snyder fails to
explain, however, why this supposed failure “deprived [Snyder] of
the opportunity to present a claim or defense.” (Gorham, supra,

13
186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1228–1229.) Since Snyder was served
with the complaint, if he believed that the settlement agreement
insulated him from liability, he could have filed a demurrer or an
answer raising appropriate defenses. Moreover, Snyder failed to
include the complaint in the record on appeal. We are unable to
assess whether Cohen concealed the settlement agreement or
whether the agreement bars the claims in the complaint. We
therefore reject this argument as forfeited. (Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [“ ‘Failure to provide an adequate
record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the
appellant].’ [Citation.]”].)
C. Snyder was not entitled to relief under
section 473, subdivision (b)
Finally, Snyder argues that the court should have set aside
the default under section 473, subdivision (b). That provision
gives a court discretion to “relieve a party . . . from a judgment,
dismissal, order, or other proceeding taken against him or her
through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” Although Snyder cited this provision in his motion to
set aside the default, the trial court did not directly address it in
its order denying that motion. We nonetheless find no basis for
reversal. A motion to set aside a default under section 473,
subdivision (b) must be filed no later than six months after the
default “ ‘was taken.’ ” This deadline is mandatory and inflexible.
(Arambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333,
344.) The court entered a default as to Snyder in October 2020,
and Snyder moved to set aside the default 22 months later, in
August 2022. “[B]ecause more than six months had elapsed from

14
the entry of default. . . relief under section 473 was unavailable.”7
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980.)
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Snyder’s motion to quash
Snyder also contends that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying his motion to quash service of summons.
He raises the same points that he raised as to the denial of his
motion to set aside the judgment—namely, that he was not
served, and that the proof of service was fraudulent. As we have
discussed, the trial court determined that Snyder was personally
served, and it did not err or abuse its discretion in discounting or
ignoring Snyder’s evidence to the contrary. Snyder has not
identified any other basis to reverse the order denying his motion
to quash. We therefore affirm the order.
III. Snyder has not established any due process violation
Finally, throughout his briefing, Snyder asserts that the
trial court violated his due process rights because he was not
served with the complaint. As we have discussed, we discern no
error or abuse of discretion in the court’s finding that Snyder was
properly served. To the extent that Snyder means to argue that
his due process rights were violated in some other manner, we

7 Snyder notes that he was not served with the default. But
the six-month deadline in section 473, subdivision (b) runs from
the time that the default “was taken,” without reference to
written notice. (Compare § 473.5 [motion to set aside default for
lack of actual notice must be filed within two years of the entry of
a default judgment or “180 days after service on him or her of a
written notice that the default . . . has been entered”].)

15
reject his claims as forfeited because they are unsupported by
reasoned argument. (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs
on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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