CourtListener 10779544•In re G.L. CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 1/26/26 In re G.L. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re G.L. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
D086390
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES Consolidated with Case No.
AGENCY, D086741
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. Nos. NJ15686B–E)
v.
M.L. et al.
Defendants and Respondents;
G.L. et al.,
Respondents.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alejandro Morales, Judge. Appeal dismissed as moot.
David J. Smith, Acting County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief
Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Lelah S. Forrey-Baker, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Respondent, M.L., Mother.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Respondent, F.D., Father.
Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Respondent Minors, G.L. et al.
At a contested disposition hearing, the juvenile court placed the four
children at issue with F.D. (Father) in Guatemala, authorized their travel to
Guatemala, and terminated jurisdiction with custody orders. (Welf. & Inst.
Code, § 361.2, subd. (b)(1).)1 The court stayed the orders to allow the
San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) time to
arrange international travel for the children. (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7.)
After issuance of the disposition orders, Father informed the Agency he was
not prepared to take custody of the children and would not accept them. The
Agency sought reconsideration of the disposition orders under section 385.
The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to modify the disposition orders,
explaining that the Agency’s remedy was to file new dependency petitions.
The Agency appeals, contending the court erred by denying its
section 385 reconsideration motion.2 It seeks a remand with directions for
the juvenile court to reconsider the motion based on the changed
circumstances. M.L. (Mother) and Father respond that the appeal is moot
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 Mother also appealed from the disposition orders and we
consolidated her appeal with the Agency’s appeal. Mother subsequently
abandoned her appeal and we issued a remittitur as to Mother.
2
because the Agency has already filed new petitions. We agree and dismiss
the Agency’s appeal as moot.3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mother and Father are the parents of now five-year-old G.L., four-year-
old D.L., two-year-old I.L., and one-year-old F.F. Mother also has a 16-year-
old daughter, E.L., with another man.4 The family has an extensive child
welfare history involving referrals for domestic violence and Mother’s
substance abuse. The family resided together until September 2024, when
Father was detained and subsequently deported to Guatemala. In December
2024, the Agency received a referral after Mother was found drinking in her
vehicle with three of the children present. The following month, E.L.
contacted law enforcement after Mother had been drinking and made suicidal
statements.
The children and E.L. were detained at Polinsky Children’s Center. In
January 2025,5 the Agency filed petitions under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1)(D), alleging Mother’s alcohol abuse and Father’s inability to protect and
supervise the children. Father appeared by telephone at the detention
hearing and requested placement of the children. The juvenile court made a
prima facie finding on the petitions, detained the children out of home, and
ordered visitation for the parents. In February, Father informed the social
3 We grant the Agency’s unopposed request filed on October 21,
2025, for this court to take judicial notice of post-appeal orders. (Evid. Code,
§§ 459, subd. (a) & 452, subd. (d)(1).)
4 E.L. is not a party to this appeal and will be discussed as
relevant.
5 Undesignated date references are to 2025.
3
worker that he lived in a spacious home in Guatemala and wanted the
children placed in his care. By March, the children were placed in three
separate resource homes.
The Agency explored placement with Father in Guatemala, initiated a
home evaluation, and received an evaluation in March. Meanwhile, Mother
pled guilty to felony DUI and misdemeanor child endangerment and was
sentenced to two years in prison. In May, the juvenile court sustained the
petitions and bifurcated disposition to allow additional time to determine
whether placement with Father was appropriate. By June, the four younger
children were placed together in the same resource home, while E.L. was
placed separately.
The contested disposition hearing occurred over three days in July.
The juvenile court found that Father consistently participated in the
proceedings, attempted to maintain contact with the children, and testified
that he wanted custody. The juvenile court found Mother was unable to care
for the children and failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
that placement with Father would be detrimental to them. It removed
custody from Mother pursuant to section 361. While acknowledging the
significant bond between E.L. and the children, the court found Father
shared an equally strong bond and that the statutory preference for
placement with a parent controlled. The court placed the children with
Father in Guatemala and terminated jurisdiction. It then stayed the order as
to the children to allow the Agency to arrange international travel.
Following the disposition hearing, the social worker contacted Father to
discuss travel logistics. Father stated he believed the children would be sent
to Guatemala in three to five months, explained he could not financially
provide for them, and indicated he would not retrieve them from the airport
4
the following week. Based on this development, the Agency moved for
reconsideration under section 385. It sought a finding that Father was no
longer seeking custody and requested reunification services for him.
The juvenile court held two special hearings on the Agency’s
reconsideration request. The Agency argued that the stay issued under Code
of Civil Procedure section 917.7 stayed the entirety of the disposition order,
including termination of jurisdiction. The juvenile court rejected this
argument, concluding Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 stayed only the
order removing the children from California. Because jurisdiction had been
terminated, section 385 did not apply, and the Agency was required to file
new petitions based on Father’s refusal to accept placement.
In August, the Agency filed new petitions for the children which the
juvenile court sustained. The court entered new disposition orders placing
the children in foster care with reunification services to both parents.
DISCUSSION
The Agency contends the stay issued under Code of Civil Procedure
section 917.7 was not limited to the order authorizing the children’s removal
from California but also encompassed the order terminating juvenile court
jurisdiction. On that basis, the Agency argues the juvenile court erred in
concluding it lacked authority to consider the Agency’s section 385 motion,
thereby preventing the court from acting in the children’s best interests and
from safeguarding statutory timelines designed to promote timely
permanency. It seeks a remand directing the juvenile court to reconsider the
section 385 motion based on subsequent procedural developments, the
children’s best interests, and the reunification framework.
The Agency further asserts the appeal is not moot notwithstanding the
filing and sustaining of new dependency petitions, arguing the children
5
suffered ongoing harm due to an unnecessary delay in the reunification
timeline. Alternatively, should the appeal be deemed moot, it urges us to
decide it anyway, asserting the juvenile court’s ruling prejudiced the children
by extending the reunification period. The Agency also observes that no
published authority addresses the scope of juvenile court authority during
the pendency of a Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7 stay.
Mother disagrees, arguing the appeal is moot because no effective relief
remains available. She contends that retroactively altering reunification
timelines would defy common sense and infringe upon both the parents’ and
the children’s substantive due process rights in maintaining familial
relationships. Even if this court were to exercise its discretion to consider the
merits notwithstanding mootness, Mother argues the juvenile court correctly
concluded it lacked jurisdiction to modify its dispositional orders after
terminating jurisdiction.
An appeal in a dependency matter is moot when, due to subsequent
events, the reviewing court can no longer grant any effective relief, even if
the appellant were to prevail. (In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276.) Relief
is “effective” only if there is both an ongoing harm and a remedy capable of
addressing that harm through the requested outcome. (Ibid.) Although a
technically moot appeal may be reviewed in the court’s discretion, such
review is generally reserved for cases presenting issues of broad public
importance likely to recur, controversies likely to reemerge between the
parties, or unresolved material questions requiring judicial determination.
(Id. at p. 282.)
The threshold inquiry, therefore, is whether any effective relief remains
available to the Agency. The Agency seeks reversal of the July 30 order
denying its section 385 motion for reconsideration of the disposition order
6
placing the children with Father and terminating jurisdiction. In that
motion, the Agency requested a finding that Father was no longer seeking
custody and an order providing reunification services. Subsequent events
have rendered that request academic. The juvenile court has since sustained
new petitions, placed the children in foster care, and ordered reunification
services for both parents. In substance, the Agency has already obtained the
relief it sought.
The Agency nonetheless argues the appeal is not moot due to “the delay
in the reunification timeline,” and asks that the matter be remanded so the
juvenile court may reconsider the section 385 motion and retroactively align
the reunification timeline with E.L.’s case. As Mother notes, accepting this
position could lead to untenable results, including the possibility that Mother
would be deemed to have exhausted a significant portion—or all—of her
reunification period before services were ever ordered.
In any event, we review the correctness of the juvenile court’s ruling,
not the reasoning articulated in support of it. (In re B.L. (2012) 204
Cal.App.4th 1111, 1116.) The Agency’s sole remaining objective on appeal is
to secure a shortened reunification timeline. Yet the July 30 order denying
reconsideration did not address reunification timelines; it simply denied the
section 385 motion. The issue of timelines was neither raised nor litigated at
the hearing. To avoid dismissal on mootness grounds, the Agency effectively
asks this court to decide an issue never presented to the juvenile court and
one that remains fully capable of being addressed prospectively in the
ongoing dependency proceedings. We will not decide a moot appeal based on
unsupported assumptions about what might or might not happen in the
dependency proceedings.
7
Although we retain discretion to review a moot appeal, none of the
recognized grounds for doing so meaningfully applies here. Only the first—
whether the case presents an issue of broad public interest likely to recur—
arguably applies, given the juvenile court’s interpretation of Code of Civil
Procedure section 917.7. Even so, we need not reach that statutory question.
The dispositive issue is the propriety of the order denying the section 385
motion, not the court’s rationale concerning the scope of the stay. Given
subsequent proceedings granting reunification services and reasserting
jurisdiction, the correctness of the denial is no longer justiciable. Addressing
the scope of the stay under these circumstances would amount to an advisory
opinion, which we decline to issue.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
8
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.