People v. Richardson CA2/8

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Filed 1/26/26 P. v. Richardson CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B323293

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA456270)
v.

SAMANTHA RICHARDSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed with
modifications.

Allen G. Weinberg, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and Nicholas J. Webster,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
A jury found defendant Samantha Richardson guilty of second
degree murder and second degree robbery.
Richardson raises two claims of trial error. With respect to
her murder conviction, Richardson contends the trial court erred by
failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter based on heat of passion. We reject that challenge
because no evidence or inferences from the evidence at trial support
such an instruction. Her second claim is that the trial court failed
to calculate her presentence custody credits correctly. We agree
Richardson is entitled to three additional days of presentence
custody credit. We direct the trial court to prepare an amended
abstract of judgment to reflect the correct amount of credit and
transmit it to the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation. We affirm the judgment of conviction as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
1. The charges, convictions, and sentencing
On February 14, 2019, Richardson was charged with one
count of first degree murder in violation of Penal Code 1 section 187,
subdivision (a), and one count of second degree robbery in violation
of section 211. The Information alleged special circumstances in
that the murder occurred in the course of a robbery within the
meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17). The Information
further alleged Richardson personally used a deadly weapon in the
commission of the murder within the meaning of section 12022,
subdivision b)(1).
On June 22, 2022, a jury acquitted Richardson of first degree
murder and convicted her of second degree murder and second
degree robbery. The jury found true the allegation that Richardson

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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used a deadly weapon, a knife, in the commission of the murder.
On August 10, 2022, the trial court sentenced Richardson to 15
years to life on the murder conviction plus one year for use of the
knife plus two years for the robbery conviction. Richardson timely
appealed.
2. Evidence at trial
On April 3, 2017 around 9:00 p.m., Lisa White went to the
Four Corners Market near 5th and San Pedro streets in downtown
Los Angeles to submit paperwork for a job opening. Richardson and
Danile Bookman were in the store. Bookman spoke rudely and
aggressively to White. They exchanged words. White tried to leave
the store, but Bookman tried to block her exit. Bookman stepped
behind White, “snatched” her hair from behind, and took White to
the ground. Bookman pulled at White’s purse, trying to take it.
Bookman said, “[B]itch, you gonna give me this purse.” White got
up and ran out to the street.
White was walking fast, then running when she saw both
women following her. White was headed for her uncle’s truck that
was across the street waiting for her, but both women knocked her
to the ground again in the middle of the street. Richardson
repeatedly kicked her in her head and side telling her to let go of
the purse. Bookman was on top of her. The women struggled for
10 to 20 minutes in the middle of the street, with Bookman still
trying to take White’s purse, which was strapped across her body.
Driving a white truck, Luis Nuno stopped at a red light at the
scene, saw the altercation in the street, rolled down his window,
and told the women to leave White alone. Different witnesses
recounted his statements at trial as “Hey, you got to stop that.
That aint’ right. Get off of her. Leave her alone”; “Please stop.
Don’t do that. You guys stop beating on her. Stop doing that.
Hey”; “[W]hat is going on[?] Like stop. Stop”; “[H]ey, hey, stop.”

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Richardson disengaged from the fight and walked over to Nuno’s
truck and said, “You need to mind your business.” She raised her
arm in a swinging motion as she approached his window, looking
angry or irritated. She put her hand through the open window.
According to the investigating officers’ analysis of his wounds, Nuno
was stabbed multiple times through his open window by someone
outside the truck.
After the stabbing, Nuno quickly tried to roll up his window,
said something White could not recall, and drove away. Another
bystander crossing the street yelled that the police were coming;
Richardson and Bookman ran in different directions, Bookman with
White’s purse.
Nuno drove two blocks before abruptly stopping his truck. He
stumbled out of the truck and fell on the ground between the truck’s
door and the rear tire. Blood was on the car’s exterior and interior
and pooling around his body. He was taken to a hospital where he
later died from a stab wound that punctured his aorta. Richardson
was detained at the scene and identified by White as her assailant.
When interviewed about the events that night, appellant told
Detective Kasie Chavez she was merely present for the robbery and
attack on Nuno. When Chavez falsely told her Nuno had filmed her
on his phone, Richardson said she was angry at Nuno for not
helping her get Bookman off White, whom she was trying to help.
Richardson told Detective Chavez she never touched the truck, but
she had tried to hit Nuno because she was aggravated. Richardson
stated that Bookman and White were “on each other. So he wasn’t
talking about me get[ting] off of her because I wasn’t on her.” When
Detective Chavez asked if Nuno ever got out of the truck,
Richardson said, “No, he would have gotten blood on me.”

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While Bookman and Richardson were in custody together,
their conversation was recorded. Bookman complained she had
been charged with murder, even though she did not stab anyone.
Richardson replied, “I know.” Bookman recalled that when she
learned the police were coming, she tried to get Richardson to run,
but Richardson refused, replying “[F]uck you. Fuck the police and
fuck this bitch.” Bookman told Richardson the police said Nuno got
out of the car and was stabbed. Richardson replied that the police
were lying because the man who drove up to talk to them never got
out of the car. Richardson said she was arguing with “the dude”
and had lost sight of Bookman. They discussed hitting White and
Richardson said, “You know, I hit her because I did not care.”
3. Lesser Included Offense Instruction
Richardson asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter because “we’re
having a provocation issue, in the heat of the moment a reaction to
something that may or may not have been occurring. [¶] It doesn’t
look—appear that anyone had time to reflect to consider what was
done. It was a knee jerk reaction . . . in the hea[t] of an altercation,
in the heat of a moment. [¶] And there was provocation because
there was a lot of yelling and screaming going back and forth
about—to do one thing or another. And under that excitement, I
think there is some evidence that this may have been a reaction to
that moment in the heat of the passion.” The court responded, “I
don’t see substantial facts that reflect that there could be a heat of
passion with somebody who is in a car, away from the incident,
doesn’t step out of the car at all. It’s just, according to the facts that
we received, something to the effect of, ‘Hey, leave her alone,’ which
other individuals were already saying because we heard that on the
9-1-1 calls. [¶] . . . [¶] But the person drives up and says, ‘Hey, stop’
because they’re still in the car—or they are in the middle of the

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street fighting. I do not see how in the world that can be a heat of
passion.” The trial court consulted CALCRIM 570, the instruction
on voluntary manslaughter, and pointed out that the instruction
required substantial supporting factual evidence to merit
consideration by the jury, citing People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142 (Breverman). The trial court stated that the
evidence of provocation was “nonexistent” because Nuno was
“simply driving by, sees this conduct in the middle of the street,
doesn’t get out of his car, doesn’t know him from Adam, and he
simply says, ‘Stop it.’ He's a concerned citizen, sees someone being
beaten and he says, ‘Stop it.’ [¶] And Miss Richardson allegedly goes
to him and stabs him. He leaves, and 200 yards later, or however
far the distance, he dies because he’s been stabbed in the heart. [¶]
I don’t see it at all. The Court will deny it.”
DISCUSSION
Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude
the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter instruction.
(People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218 [the independent
standard of review applies to the failure of the trial court to instruct
on a lesser included offense].)
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of
murder. The difference is that murder includes, but manslaughter
lacks, the element of malice. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at
p. 154 (Breverman), disapproved on another ground in People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 254–260. “A trial court has an
independent obligation to instruct the jury on all lesser included
offenses the evidence warrants, even against the defense’s wishes.
Such instructions are required when, but only when, a jury could
reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the lesser
offense but not the greater one.” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th
56, 98, italics added.) The Supreme Court explained this sua sponte

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duty “protects both the defendant and the prosecution against a
verdict contrary to the evidence, regardless of the parties’ own
perceptions of their strongest lines of attack or defense. The rule’s
purpose is not simply to guarantee some plausible third choice
between conviction of the charged offense or acquittal, but to
assure, in the interest of justice, the most accurate possible verdict
encompassed by the charge and supported by the evidence.”
(Breverman, at p. 161.) Indeed, in a murder prosecution, a court’s
duty to instruct sua sponte “includes the obligation to instruct on
every supportable theory of the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter, not merely the theory or theories which have the
strongest evidentiary support, or on which the defendant has openly
relied.” (Id. at p. 149.)
In assessing whether substantial evidence exists in this
context, “a court determines only its bare legal sufficiency, not its
weight.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th. at p. 177.) “Speculative,
minimal, or insubstantial evidence is insufficient to require an
instruction on a lesser included offense.” (People v. Simon (2016)
1 Cal.5th 98, 132.) Doubts about whether an instruction is
warranted should be resolved in favor of the accused. (People v.
Tufunga (1999) 21 Cal.4th 935, 944.)
To establish voluntary manslaughter under a heat of passion
theory, it must be shown that the defendant was provoked; as a
result of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the
influence of intense emotion that obscured their reasoning or
judgment; and the provocation would have caused a person of
average disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation, that
is from passion rather than from judgment. (CALCRIM No. 570.)
Heat of passion has both an objective and subjective
component. Subjectively, the accused must be shown to have killed
while under “ ‘the actual influence of a strong passion.’ ” (People v.

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Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 550 (Moye).) “Heat of passion arises
when ‘ at the time of the killing, the reason of the accused was
obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause
the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly
and without deliberation and reflection, and from such passion
rather than from judgment.’ ” (People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th
186, 201.)
The objective component requires, among other things, that
the provocation be such as to cause an ordinary person of average
disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection.
(Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 549–550.) The provocation must be
caused by the victim or reasonably believed by the accused to have
been engaged in by the victim. (Ibid.)
Richardson argues that she stabbed Nuno in a heat of passion
after he provoked her. The evidence here, considered in its totality,
could not support a reasonable juror’s conclusion that Nuno
provoked Richardson or that she acted reasonably in stabbing him
if she was provoked.
As to the objective element of reasonable provocation,
Richardson contends that Nuno must have said or done something
to provoke her to act so violently during their brief interaction with
each other at the truck cab’s window. However, “must have”
without supporting factual evidence is not a ground upon which a
lesser included instruction may be given. The instruction requires
substantial evidence, not speculation. Richardson points to nothing
but speculation in support of her argument that the instruction
should have been given. There is no evidence whatsoever that
Nuno acted provocatively. As the trial court pointed out, Nuno,
from the cab of his truck, simply admonished the women to stop the
assault. He did not get out of the truck, approach or touch the
assailants, verbally insult or taunt them, display a weapon, call the

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police, move his truck in a threatening manner, or attempt to
physically intervene in any way.
Richardson contends she was aggravated at Nuno for not
stopping the fight because she, too, wanted to help the victim Lisa
White. She appears to contend she was “irritated” that Nuno did
not stop the assault. Richardson’s statement that “I hit [White]
because I did not care” belies this contention. Nevertheless, even if
it were true that Richardson was irritated, Nuno’s failure to
physically intervene, coupled with his mere verbal admonitions,
does not amount to reasonable provocation under any turn of
events.
Because there is no evidence of provocation in the record, it is
difficult to subjectively parse Richardson’s response to whatever
Nuno did or said. However, the infliction of multiple stab wounds
on a person who observes a fight and tells the assailants to stop
their assault is not a reasonable response by any stretch of the
imagination, even if, as Richardson told Bookman, she was arguing
with “the dude.” If their argument were heated, a completely
speculative contention, verbal taunts and insults are not sufficient
to excuse an otherwise murderous killing. (See People v. Manriquez
(2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 586 [taunts and insults insufficient to
warrant instruction]; People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212,
226 & fn. 2 [physical pushing and use of the term “faggot”
insufficient to warrant instruction].) Because we don’t know what,
if anything, Richardson and Nuno said to each other at the cab of
the truck, we cannot infer from the evidence that Richardson’s
violent stabbing response was the product of an ordinary person’s
inability to reflect on their actions. (See Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at
p. 550.) If Richardson was provoked or acting in the heat of passion
because of White’s staunch resistance to the robbery, that heat of
passion could not then be directed at Nuno to warrant a voluntary

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manslaughter instruction because the victim must be the
provocateur or reasonably believed to have engaged in provocation.
(Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 549–550.)
If Richardson became enraged and unable to reflect on her
actions because Nuno took the side of the victim during their
“argument,” “[n]o case has ever suggested . . . that such predictable
conduct by a resisting victim would constitute the kind of
provocation sufficient to reduce a murder charge to voluntary
manslaughter.” (People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 306,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Cromer (2001)
24 Cal.4th 889, 901.) We agree with the People that no one can
beat and rob a person in the middle of the street and when an
onlooker predictably tells them to stop, be absolved of the murder of
the onlooker.
Because both the subjective and objective elements of the
manslaughter instruction were not supported by any evidence
whatsoever, the trial court was correct in rejecting Richardson’s
request for a lesser included offense instruction.
Richardson also contends the judgment must be modified to
accurately reflect her presentence custody credit. The People agree,
as do we. At sentencing, the trial court awarded Richardson 1,952
days of actual custody credit. However, Richardson spent 1,955
days in custody before she was sentenced. She is therefore entitled
to three additional days of credit. The abstract of judgment must be
modified to reflect the correct amount of presentence custody credit.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed as modified. The trial
court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment to
reflect the correct calculation of 1,955 days of presentence custody
credit and forward a certified copy to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the judgment
is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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