CourtListener 10778802•Werber v. Armandpour CA2/8
Testo completo
Filed 1/23/26 Werber v. Armandpour CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
FRED A. WERBER, B345274
Petitioner and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23STPB02086)
v.
ROBIN ARMANDPOUR,
Respondent and Appellant,
STEVEN ROSS FREED,
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lynn H. Scaduto, Judge. Affirmed.
Greenberg Traurig, Scott D. Bertzyk and Andrea Carmona
for Appellant Robin Armandpour.
Holland & Knight, Vivian L. Thoreen, Jonathan H. Park
and Lauren N. Mortiz for Respondent Fred A. Werber.
Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Robert C. Eroen for Respondent
Steven Ross Freed.
__________________________
Siblings Fred Werber and Robin Armandpour have been
litigating disputes over their respective gift trusts since their
father’s death in 2021. In December 2024, one facet of that
litigation reached a tipping point: Robin, as a co-trustee of Fred’s
gift trust, refused to distribute annual income to Fred, the trust’s
sole beneficiary. If the distribution did not occur by year’s end,
the trust would face negative tax consequences and the S
Corporation whose shares the trust held would automatically
convert to a C Corporation. The result of that, in turn, would
have been even more negative tax consequences for the
corporation and its shareholders, as well as potential legal
liability for the co-trustees. Fred thus moved ex parte to compel
the annual income distribution. We agree with the trial court
that the ex parte application presented a discrete issue that did
not require an evidentiary hearing and did not implicate the
larger issues underlying the siblings’ litigation. Accordingly, we
find the trial court acted well within its discretion by compelling
the annual income distribution, and we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1999, Ben Werber created irrevocable gift trusts for his
two children: Fred Werber and Robin Armandpour. Fred is the
sole beneficiary of his trust, the “Fred A. Werber Trust”; and
Robin is the sole beneficiary of hers, the “Robin Werber
Armandpour Trust.” Fred, Robin, and Steven R. Freed (the son
of one of Ben’s business partners) are co-trustees of Fred’s trust.
The co-trustees must act unanimously. Robin’s son, Evan
Armandpour, is the contingent remainder beneficiary of Fred’s
trust, meaning that Evan receives the trust principal and
undistributed income after the death of Fred and Fred’s wife.
2
Ben died in 2021, and his wife died in 2022. Since then, the
siblings and Evan have been in near constant litigation involving
their respective trusts.1 This appeal focuses on a single ex parte
application and order, and we limit our factual recitation and
discussion accordingly. We further emphasize that our analysis
is not intended to address any issues outside of the ex parte
application.
Fred’s trust acquired stock of an S corporation, Steward
Realty Management Corporation (Steward). When Ben died in
2021, an estate planning attorney advised that Fred’s trust
needed to make changes to remain eligible as an S corporation
shareholder. One method of doing so is by making a Qualified
Subchapter S Trust (QSST) election on the trust’s behalf.
A QSST election treats the income beneficiary as the owner of the
trust’s S Corporation stock and requires annual distribution of all
income to the income beneficiary.
The three co-trustees agreed to make a QSST election for
Fred’s trust in January 2022. The co-trustees severed Fred’s
trust into both an exempt trust and a non-exempt trust, with the
non-exempt trust receiving the Steward S corporation stock.
A QSST election for Fred’s non-exempt trust was then filed with
the Internal Revenue Service.2
1 We deny as irrelevant Robin’s request for judicial notice of
pleadings filed in connection with the Robin Werber Armandpour
Trust in Los Angeles County Superior Court Case No.
22STPB09575 and pleadings filed in connection with Fred’s trust
after the December 2024 ruling on the ex parte application that is
the subject of this appeal.
2 The co-trustees also agreed to sever Robin’s gift trust into
an exempt trust and a non-exempt trust. Robin’s Steward shares
3
In 2022, Robin told the other co-trustees that she would not
agree to the required annual income distribution from Fred’s non-
exempt trust to Fred, despite the QSST election requirement.
Failure to make the annual income distribution to Fred would
have resulted in negative tax consequences for the trust and
Steward would lose its S corporation status. In December 2022,
Robin relented and authorized the 2022 distribution, thus
preserving the QSST election for the non-exempt trust and
Steward’s S corporation status.
In 2023, Robin again told the co-trustees that she would not
agree to the required annual income distribution. At year’s end,
however, Robin again relented and authorized the distribution to
preserve the non-exempt trust’s QSST election.
In November 2024, Robin told the co-trustees that she
would not agree to the required annual distribution, “which will
result in the termination of the Trust’s status as a QSST.” As a
consequence, Steward’s S corporation status would have
terminated automatically. On December 9, 2024, Fred’s counsel
conveyed the “immediate, adverse and undesired tax
consequences” to Robin’s counsel and warned that refusal would
subject the co-trustees to liability to Steward and its shareholders
for those negative tax consequences.
As of December 16, 2024, Robin had not responded.
Therefore, Fred filed an ex parte application to compel Robin’s
assent to the required annual income distribution to Fred from
were allocated to her exempt trust, and the co-trustees filed an
Electing Small Business Trust election with the IRS for Robin’s
Steward shares. That election does not require annual income
distributions to the trust’s beneficiary. (Int.Rev. Code, § 1361(e).)
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the non-exempt trust. The application relied on the non-exempt
trust’s QSST election the co-trustees previously made.
Robin opposed the application later that day. Robin framed
the issue as involving contested factual questions regarding the
trustor’s intent because the trust’s terms grant the co-trustees
discretion to distribute trust income. Evan joined Robin’s
opposition. A declaration from each party’s counsel supported
their respective pleadings.
On December 20, 2024, the court held a hearing on Fred’s
ex parte application. The court heard argument from all counsel
but did not conduct an evidentiary hearing. The court agreed
that the application presented a “discrete issue” dealing with
preserving the QSST election, which did not implicate the larger
contested issues in the litigation around the trustor’s intent.
The court granted the application and issued a minute order.
On December 31, 2024, the court issued a formal order granting
the application.
Robin timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Robin alleges the probate court erred in four discrete ways
in granting the ex parte order underlying this appeal. Robin
alleges the probate court erred by: (1) failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing on contested factual issues, (2) improperly
substituting its judgment for one of the co-trustees,
(3) misinterpreting the trust instrument, and (4) granting
emergency relief where Fred caused the delay. Robin’s
contentions reflect a fundamental misunderstanding about what
the probate court did and did not decide.
5
“We review a trial court’s ruling on an ex parte application
for abuse of discretion.” (People Ex Rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Suh
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 253, 257.) As discussed in detail below, the
probate court did not need to hold an evidentiary hearing because
the narrow issue presented by Fred’s ex parte application was not
contested. The probate court has authority to decide issues
necessary to supervise the administration of the trust. The court
did not make a finding that all trust distributions are mandatory
and therefore did not misinterpret the trust document. And
Fred’s delay in bringing the application was not unreasonable
based on the parties’ past conduct. Thus, we find no abuse of
discretion in the probate court’s order.
I. The Ex Parte Petition Presented a Limited Issue On
Which There Was No Factual Dispute
In his ex parte application, Fred presented a discrete issue
and requested two limited orders: (1) compelling Robin’s consent
to the distribution of the 2024 net income from the non-exempt
trust to Fred, and (2) compelling the distribution of said income
by December 31, 2024. The emergency basis for this ex parte
relief was also clearly articulated by Fred: “If the 2024 net
income is not distributed to Fred by December 31, 2024 in
compliance with the tax laws,” a cascade of “automatic,
immediate, and irreparable tax consequences” will occur and
“expose the Co-Trustees of the Non-Exempt Trust to liability.”
From the outset, Robin misconstrued the ex parte petition
to be something else entirely. The first section of Robin’s
opposition to the ex parte application states as follows: “First,
Fred is asking the Court to resolve a contested issue ex parte and
without an evidentiary hearing. The Court presently has before
it multiple petitions teeing up the precise issue of whether the
6
relief sought via Fred’s ex parte application is mandated by the
Trust or whether the distribution of all income is discretionary.”
Robin goes on to articulate several of the underlying disputes
among the parties, including whether income distributions are
discretionary or mandatory, which Robin alleges, “will turn on
the Court’s determination of the Trustor’s intent—a
quintessential fact issue.” Notably, Robin did not dispute the
cascade of “automatic, immediate, and irreparable tax
consequences” if the relief Fred requests was not granted.
The ex parte application references the trustor’s intent only
in passing, and none of the relief requested by Fred is premised
on the trustor’s intent. Nor does the requested relief require the
court to determine the trustor’s intent, or to decide whether
income distributions writ large are mandatory or discretionary
under the terms of the trust.
At the hearing on the ex parte petition, Fred’s counsel
confirmed the limited scope of the requests: “There are a number
of undisputed facts at issue in this ex parte application. We are
not here to argue and try to obtain an ex parte order regarding
what the settlor[’]s Ben Werber’s intent was. We’re not
interpreting the language of the trust. We’re not doing any of
that. . . . What we are talking about is based on a number of
undisputed facts applying federal tax law to those undisputed
facts, and what will happen [if] the law is not followed. So, we
agree to disagree on the settlor[’]s intent. That is a primary issue
in the underlying litigation between and among all of these
parties.”
In addition, counsel for co-trustee Steven also clarified the
distinction between the issues framed by the underlying petitions
and the “discrete” issue presented in the ex parte application.
7
What are the undisputed facts? In August 2022, a QSST
Election was filed with the Internal Revenue Service for Fred’s
non-exempt trust, which references Steward as the S corporation
in question. The QSST Election specifically states: “The Non-
Exempt Trust is required to distribute all of its income currently,
or the trustee will distribute all of its income currently, if not so
required by the terms of the trust, to the current income
beneficiary.” Robin consented to the QSST Election.
Federal tax regulations specify that one of the
requirements for a QSST trust is that all income is distributed to
one individual. (26 C.F.R. § 1.1361-1(j)(1) (2025).) If a QSST
trust fails to meet these requirements, the trust will lose its
QSST status as of the first day of the following year. (26 C.F.R.
§ 1.1361-1(j)(5) (2025).) If a QSST trust loses its QSST status, it
will no longer be a permitted shareholder of the S corporation
whose stock it holds, which in turn will terminate the S
corporation tax status for the corporation. (Int.Rev. Code,
§ 1361(d)(2).)
As noted in the ex parte application, if Steward’s status as
an S corporation is terminated, Steward will be taxed as a C
corporation. “Unlike S corporations, C corporations are subject to
two layers of taxation, with the income being taxed at both the
entity level and the shareholder level. . . . Thus, the C
corporation tax structure would substantially increase the overall
tax burden as income is taxed both at the entity level and then
again at the shareholder level.” Steward’s shareholders include
Fred’s Trust, Robin’s Trust, and members of Steven’s family.
Robin did not contest any of these facts nor argue a
contrary analysis of federal tax law. Thus, the undisputed facts
demonstrate that if the non-exempt trust’s 2024 net income was
8
not distributed to Fred by the end of 2024, Steward would lose its
S corporation tax status, causing a significantly increased tax
burden on all of Steward’s shareholders, including Fred’s Trust,
Robin’s Trust, and members of Steven’s family. Those are the
relevant facts for purposes of the ex parte application.
Further, when announcing her ruling, the probate judge
confirmed her understanding of the “discrete issue” presented by
the application. The court stated: “I’m going to grant the ex
parte application as prayed. . . . The Court compels Robin’s
consent as the co-trustee to the distribution of all the 2024 net
income of the Non-Exempt Trust to Fred who is the sole income
beneficiary. . . . The Court compels the co-trustees of the Non-
Exempt Trust to distribute the 2024 net income to Fred by
December 31st, 2024, to avoid the tax consequences that have
been, I think, described here by two different lawyers in a very
similar fashion.” (Italics added.)
In her reply brief, Robin raises a host of issues, which she
alleges are disputed facts presented by the application. We
address these arguments in turn. First, Robin alleges that Fred’s
application requires the resolution of the following question:
“Does Fred’s Trust mandate that all net income from all assets
must be distributed each year, or does it provide that
distributions of income from non-subchapter S assets are
discretionary?” Whether Fred’s Trust provides that net income
distributions are mandatory or discretionary is irrelevant to the
resolution of this application. What matters is the federal tax
requirement that all net income from the non-exempt trust must
be distributed each year in order to maintain its QSST trust
status.
9
Next Robin alleges, “[d]id Fred’s Trust require that the
subchapter S asset he claims will be imperiled be segregated in
its own subtrust and would Fred’s compliance with that
requirement have mooted the claimed adverse consequences?”
Again, whether Fred’s Trust requires that certain assets be
segregated into their own subtrust is irrelevant to the tax
consequences discussed above. Fred’s compliance with that
requirement is also irrelevant for the purpose of resolving the ex
parte application.
Robin also alleges the following factual issue is relevant to
the ex parte application: “Did Fred breach the Trust to bring
about the ‘emergency’ he invoked below?” However, whether
Fred breached the trust is not an issue for resolution on this
application, although it may be critical to resolution of the
underlying litigation.
Because we find that resolution of the ex parte application
did not turn on contested factual issues, the authority cited by
Robin regarding the need for an evidentiary hearing on contested
fact issues in probate proceedings is misplaced. The narrow issue
presented by the application was uncontested, and therefore,
“[a]n affidavit or verified petition shall be received as evidence
when offered in an uncontested proceeding under this code.”
(Prob. Code, § 1022.) Fred’s application was supported by the
declaration of his counsel. The fact that Robin attempted to
muddy the waters by raising irrelevant facts that are contested
in the underlying litigation is not persuasive, and we find no
abuse of discretion.
10
II. The Court Has Authority to Decide Issues Necessary
to Supervise the Administration of the Trust
Next, Robin argues the probate court erred in substituting
its judgment for Robin’s exercise of her discretion as trustee.
We do not dispute that the trust instrument grants the trustee
“total, complete and absolute discretion” to make distributions of
trust income. Nor do we dispute that the trust also has specific
mandatory income distribution provisions concerning S
corporations, which provide that “[i]ncome of an S Trust shall be
distributed to, and only to, the S Trust’s beneficiary[.]”
The parties do not dispute that the non-exempt trust held
shares of Steward, an S corporation. Thus, as to the income
generated by Steward, the co-trustees do not have discretion.
Rather, the trust instrument mandates that “income of an S
Trust shall be distributed to . . . the S Trust’s beneficiary.”
(Italics added.) Put differently, there was no interference with
Robin’s discretion when she lacked discretion in the first place.
Although not emphasized by either party on appeal, the
non-exempt trust appears to have held assets other than Steward
based on the allocation of assets between the exempt and non-
exempt trusts at the time the co-trustees severed Fred’s trust in
2022. Thus, to the extent the non-exempt trust held assets other
than shares of Steward in 2024, distribution of income from those
assets rests in the co-trustees’ discretion per the terms of the
trust.
Probate Code section 17206 grants the probate court broad
discretion to supervise the administration of trusts. “The court in
its discretion may make any orders and take any other action
necessary or proper to dispose of matters presented by the
petition[.]” (§ 17206.) Fred’s ex parte application was brought
11
under this specific Probate Code section. Thus, the probate court
has “inherent power to decide all incidental issues necessary to
carry out its express powers to supervise the administration of
the trust.” (Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 951.)
“This inherent equitable power of the probate court has long been
recognized to encompass the authority to take remedial action.”
(Schwartz v. Labow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427.)
Here, where the failure to act would have dire tax
consequences not only for the parties to this action but also to
third-party shareholders of Steward, the probate court acted well
within its “inherent power” to grant the ex parte application, and
we find no abuse of discretion.
III. The Probate Court Did Not Interpret the Terms of
the Trust
Next, Robin argues that the probate court misinterpreted
the trust instrument. We find this argument perplexing, as the
probate court made no findings regarding the terms of the trust
or the trustor’s intent. The minute order entered by the court
reflects that “[t]he Court finds that sufficient evidence has been
provided to grant the matter on calendar this date based upon
the reading of the moving papers and consideration of all
presented evidence.” The probate court then granted the
requests presented in the application, namely, compelling Robin’s
consent to the distribution of all 2024 net income of the non-
exempt trust to Fred by December 31, 2024. The formal order
entered by the probate court was similarly limited.
At the ex parte hearing, the probate court made no mention
of the trustor’s intent nor the terms of the trust. Rather, the
court granted the ex parte application “as prayed” and ordered
precisely the relief requested in the application – to compel
12
Robine’s consent to the distribution and to order the distribution
to take place by December 31, 2024.
Because the probate court did not interpret the terms of the
trust or make any findings regarding the trustor’s intent, there
was no abuse of discretion and no error compelling reversal.
IV. Any Delay in Presenting the Ex Parte Application
Was Not Unreasonable
Finally, Robin argues that Fred was responsible for the
delay in seeking an emergency order until the “eleventh hour,”
and therefore there were no grounds for equitable relief.
As noted above, Fred and Robin went through this song and
dance in 2022 and 2023, and both times Robin ultimately agreed
to make the distributions at the end of the year. While it is true
Fred could have sought this relief earlier in the year, we find that
Fred’s decision to wait until December was not unreasonable in
light of Robin’s capitulation at the end of the year in 2022 and
2023. Fred could reasonably believe that Robin would again
agree to make the distributions at the end of 2024, as she had
agreed the prior two years. When Robin had not responded by
December 16, 2024, Fred reasonably concluded he could wait no
longer and filed the ex parte application.
The application was supported by the declaration of Fred’s
counsel, which provided “competent testimony based on personal
knowledge of irreparable harm,” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1202(c)), namely the cascade of “irreparable and substantial
negative tax consequences for Steward and its
shareholders . . . exposing the Co-Trustees of the Non-Exempt
Trust to liability.” Thus, Fred presented the necessary basis for
equitable relief.
13
We find no abuse of discretion in the probate court’s order
granting relief under these circumstances.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Fred shall recover his costs on
appeal.
UZCATEGUI, J.*
We Concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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