People v. Perez CA2/6

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Filed 1/22/26 P. v. Perez CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B337711
(Super. Ct. No. VA087429)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

ARTHUR PEREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Arthur Perez appeals a post-judgment order
denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition to vacate his 2006
jury conviction of the attempted murder of Yvonne P.1 The
petition was denied at the prima facie stage of the proceedings.
We affirm because, as a matter of law, appellant failed to make a
prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. The jury instructions
conclusively establish that appellant was convicted on the theory
that he was the direct perpetrator of the attempted murder.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Facts
We set forth the relevant facts as summarized by appellant
in his opening brief. Appellant states: “The following statement
of facts has been taken from the factual discussion . . . in this
Court’s decision on direct appeal in [People v. Perez (July 21,
2008)] Case No. B200269 [2008 WL 2791667, at *1-*2].
Appellant does not concede the accuracy of that factual
discussion.”2
“[S]omeone knocked on the door of a house in Whittier.
Brian [H.] answered it. Appellant was standing outside on the
porch with another man . . . . Appellant identified himself as
Snappy from Los Nietos, a rival gang. Appellant and Brian
argued and started to scuffle. Appellant pulled out a gun and
shot Brian in the hip.[3] Brian fell to the ground and shoved the
door closed. Appellant continued to shoot, firing five or six shots
into the house.”
“Yvonne [P.] testified that she heard Brian at the front
door, arguing with someone about selling drugs. She heard
gunshots and saw Brian fall to the ground. She further testified
that she ran to the door and kicked it shut. Appellant stepped off

2 “A number of Courts of Appeal have held . . . that . . . ‘the

Legislature intended to prohibit consideration of “the factual
summar[y]”’ in an appellate opinion. [Citation.] . . . This
constraint applies both at the prima facie determination stage
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), and the evidentiary hearing
stage under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).” (People v.
Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1238.)

3 Appellant was convicted of the willful, deliberate, and

premeditated attempted murder of Brian H. He does not seek to
vacate this conviction under section 1172.6.

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the porch, and Yvonne ran through the middle of the living room.
Appellant fired into the living room as she ran, and one of the
bullets nicked her leg.”
Allegations Found True or Not True by the Jury
As to the attempted murder of Yvonne P., the jury found
true an allegation that appellant had “personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, to wit: a handgun, within the
meaning of Penal Code section 12022.53(c).” It found not true an
“allegation that the attempted murder was committed willfully,
deliberately and with premeditation.”
Section 1172.6
Section 1172.6 provides in relevant part, “A person
convicted of . . . murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime, [or] attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, . . . may file a petition . . . to have the
petitioner’s murder [or] attempted murder . . . conviction vacated
and to be resentenced on any remaining counts” when certain
conditions apply. (Italics added.)
Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine
“[U]nder the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
an accomplice is guilty not only of the offense he or she directly
aided or abetted (i.e., the target offense), but also of any other
offense committed by the direct perpetrator that was the ‘natural
and probable consequence’ of the crime the accomplice aided and
abetted (i.e., the nontarget offense).” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 843, superseded on other grounds as stated in People
v. Hola (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 362, 369-370.)

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Prima Facie Showing Requirement and Standard of Review
“Petitioners seeking relief under section 1172.6 must, first,
file a facially valid petition that states the statutory
requirements for relief [citation], and second, make a ‘prima facie
showing’ [of eligibility for relief] [citation], before a court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on
the ultimate question of resentencing . . . .” (People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 556.) “The trial court's denial of a
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage ‘“is a purely legal
conclusion,”’ which appellate courts review de novo.” (People v.
Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 276 (Muhammad).)
Appellant Failed to Make the
Required Prima Facie Showing
Section 1172.6 permits a person convicted of attempted
murder to petition for relief only if the person was convicted of
“attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (Id., subd. (a); see People v. Coley (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 539, 548 [Section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to
attempted murders based on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine”].) Appellant concedes that at his trial
“[t]here was no natural and probable consequences jury
instruction.”
“[T]he jury instructions . . . demonstrate, on their face and
as a matter of law, that [appellant] was not and could not have
been convicted of [attempted] murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. This is so because the jurors
were not provided any instruction on which they could have
found [appellant] guilty of [attempted] murder under that
doctrine.” (People v. Soto (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1055.)

4
Appellant argues, “The jury could have convicted him based
on a flawed kill zone theory that permitted the imputation of
malice . . . , which was the functional equivalent of the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.” Based on the firing of
multiple shots into the house, the trial court gave CALJIC No.
8.66.1 expounding a “kill zone” theory of attempted murder. The
instruction provided: “A person who primarily intends to kill one
person [here, Brian H.], may also concurrently intend to kill other
persons [here, Yvonne P.,] within a particular zone of risk. [This
zone of risk is termed the ‘kill zone.’] The intent is concurrent
when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a
primary victim, are such that it is reasonable to infer the
perpetrator intended to kill the primary victim by killing
everyone in that victim's vicinity. [¶] Whether a perpetrator
actually intended to kill the victim, either as a primary target or
as someone within a [‘kill zone’] or [zone of risk] is an issue to be
decided by you.” (Italics added.)
The “kill zone” instruction does not support appellant’s
claim that he could have been convicted of attempted murder
based on “the functional equivalent of the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” The instruction refers only to the
“perpetrator” of the attack. Moreover, “[j]ury instructions must
be considered in their entirety, and not in isolation.” (People v.
Snyder (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1228.) In their entirety, the
jury instructions establish that appellant was convicted based on
the theory that he was the direct perpetrator of the attempted
murder of Yvonne P., not merely an aider and abettor.
The trial court did not instruct the jury on aiding and
abetting. In his reply brief appellant concedes, “[I]t is clear that
he was not convicted as an aider and abettor.” But “the natural

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and probable consequences doctrine applie[s] only to impose
liability on an accomplice, on an aiding and abetting theory.”
(Muhammad, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 277.) That appellant
was the direct perpetrator is supported by the true finding on the
allegation that he had “personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm . . . within the meaning of Penal Code section
12022.53(c).”
Disposition
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

6
Laronda McCoy, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

______________________________

Teresa Biagini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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