Wright v. Green CA1/4

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Filed 1/15/26 Wright v. Green CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

MICHAEL C. WRIGHT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173073
v.
COLTON L. GREEN, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. 22CV007971)
Defendant and Appellant.

Colton L. Green appeals from the trial court’s order striking his answer
and an interlocutory judgment ordering the partition by sale of a property he
owns together with plaintiff Michael C. Wright. Green contends the trial
court failed to serve him with one order to show cause that preceded the
striking of his answer and the order striking his answer. He further argues
the trial court failed to comply with certain procedural requirements before
partitioning the property under the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act
(UPHPA; Code Civ. Proc., former § 874.311 et seq.).1 We find no error and
will affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

While this case was pending, the Legislature amended the UPHPA to rename
it the Partition of Real Property Act and broaden its applicability. (Stats.
2022, ch. 82.) The amended statute applies to partition actions filed on or
after January 1, 2023. (§ 874.311.) Because this case arose under the prior

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BACKGROUND
Our understanding of the background of this case is limited. The
record Green has provided, even after the addition of the documents Green
and Wright each submitted in motions to augment the record, contains only a
subset of the documents filed during the three years of litigation of this case,
and does not contain any reporter’s transcripts or other substitute records of
the oral proceedings at any of the hearings.2 As best we can glean, Wright
and Green own a duplex together in Oakland as tenants in common, with
Wright owning 10 percent and Green owning 90 percent. Wright filed a
complaint for partition of the property by sale in March 2022. In November
2023, the trial court granted Wright’s motion for interlocutory judgment and
ordered that the property be partitioned by sale. Green appealed.
This court issued a writ of supersedeas and noted the parties’ apparent
agreement that the UPHPA governed the partition of the property. (Wright
v. Green (March 28, 2024, A169396.) The parties then stipulated and the
trial court ordered that the case would be determined by the statutes
providing for partition as modified by the UPHPA. The parties’ stipulation
further provided that they would file a motion for a judicial determination of
the appraised, fair market value of the property. Green thereafter requested
the dismissal of his appeal, and this court granted his request in April 2024.
(Wright v. Green (April 23, 2024, A169396).)
Wright moved in the trial court to appoint an appraiser. The court held
a status conference in June 2024, but according to the trial court’s minute

law, we refer to the UPHPA in the past tense and, for any statute that has
changed, cite the UPHPA version. We recognize, however, that the
substantive requirements of the UPHPA and the Partition of Real Property
Act are identical.
2 Green’s motion to augment the record, filed July 7, 2025, is granted.

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order, neither Green nor his counsel appeared. The trial court continued the
status conference to July 2024. Wright’s counsel filed a notice of entry of this
order and served it on Green’s counsel.
In early July 2024, Green filed his opposition to Wright’s motion to
appoint an appraiser. Green asked the court to delay appointing an
appraiser, in part because the appointment would create a strict timeframe
under the UPHPA for cotenants who did not request partition to acquire the
interests of cotenants who did request partition.
Later in July 2024, the trial court held the hearing on Wright’s motion
to appoint an appraiser and rescheduled status conference. According to the
trial court’s minute order, neither Green nor his counsel appeared. The trial
court granted Wright’s motion to appoint an appraiser, and Wright’s counsel
filed a notice of entry of this order and served it on Green’s counsel.
Separately, the trial court set an order to show cause hearing regarding
sanctions for Green’s counsel’s failure to appear at the rescheduled status
conference.
In August 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the order to show
cause. According to the trial court’s minute order, neither Green nor his
counsel appeared. The trial court ordered Green to appear at a status
conference in October 2024 to show cause why his answer should not be
stricken for his repeated failures to appear. The trial court also amended its
prior order to appoint a different appraiser, apparently because the first
appraiser was retired. Wright’s counsel filed a notice of entry of both orders
and served it on Green’s counsel.
The second appraiser subsequently withdrew from the case, apparently
in response to Green’s counsel’s accusations that he was biased because he
and Wright’s counsel referred to each other by their first names by email.

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Green’s counsel thereafter did not respond to Wright’s counsel’s repeated
offers to stipulate to any available appraiser.
In October 2024, the trial court held the scheduled status conference
and order to show cause hearing, as well as a hearing on Wright’s motion to
appoint a referee. According to the trial court’s minute order, neither Green
nor his counsel appeared. The trial court appointed a referee to decide offsets
and accounting/contribution issues. It also struck Green’s answer due to his
non-appearance and stated that Wright would move forward with requesting
entry of Green’s default. Wright’s counsel filed a notice of entry of the order
and served it on Green’s counsel. At Wright’s request, the trial court clerk
thereafter entered Green’s default. Wright’s counsel emailed Green’s counsel
a copy of the entry of default.
A few days later, in November 2024 Wright filed an ex parte
application for a determination of value and amended interlocutory judgment
of sale. Wright’s counsel served Green’s counsel with his application. Wright
contended, among other things, that the value of an appraisal was
outweighed by its cost, resulting from Green’s obstruction of the appraisal.
He provided a printout of the Zillow estimate of the property’s value, which
ranged from $682,000 to $970,000. Wright also asserted that Green was
already unable to pay the existing mortgage without Wright’s financial help
and could not take on the additional debt necessary to buy out Wright’s
interest, even based on the lower $682,000 valuation.
Around this same time, Green reserved a hearing date in February
2025 for a motion to set aside his default.
Green’s counsel did not attend a status conference later in November
2024. She told Wright’s counsel in advance that it was because of a family
medical emergency. Wright’s counsel told Green’s counsel that she would tell

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the court of Green’s counsel’s family emergency. At the status conference, the
trial court set the hearing on Wright’s ex parte application for January 2025.
It also advanced to the same date the hearing on Green’s motion to set aside
the default. The trial court served this order on Green and his counsel.
After the hearing, Wright’s counsel emailed Green’s counsel, telling her
that the court had scheduled Wright’s ex parte to be heard in January 2025
“as a regularly-noticed motion” and had advanced the hearing on Green’s
motion to set aside the default to the same date to give the parties “time to
properly brief both.” Wright’s counsel also said she was “very open” to
meeting and conferring regarding Green’s motion to set aside the default.
Wright’s counsel later submitted a declaration stating that at the November
2024 status conference, she had offered to re-file her ex parte papers but the
trial court told her not to.
The court continued the hearing on the motions three times. Green
filed his motion to set aside the default (which he erroneously referred to as a
motion to set aside a default judgment) on March 4, 2025. He did not
mention anything in his motion about not receiving notice of the orders to
show cause. His entire argument section consisted of six lines, without any
citation to legal authority. He asserted that the trial court had struck his
answer after two years of litigation without providing a legal basis. He also
urged the court to set aside the default because the UPHPA creates a clear
statutory scheme that the parties stipulated to follow.
The trial court heard the motions on March 25, 2025. The trial court
denied Green’s motion, in part because he filed his motion one day late. It
granted Wright’s motion as unopposed. The trial court then entered the
interlocutory judgment in April 2025.

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DISCUSSION
I. Striking Answer
Green first challenges the trial court’s order striking his answer as a
sanction. The sole error he identifies concerns notice of two specific orders.
He contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to due process
because it failed to serve him with notice of the August 2024 order to show
cause why the court should not strike his answer and the October 2024 order
striking his answer. He further contends the trial court violated section
1019.5, subdivision (b), which requires a trial court to serve notice of an order
granting or denying a motion on the court’s own motion unless the parties
waive notice.3
“California trial courts possess the inherent power to issue a
terminating sanction for pervasive misconduct . . . .” (Stephen Slesinger, Inc.
v. Walt Disney Co. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 736, 765, disapproved of on other
grounds by City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (2024)
17 Cal.5th 46, 73, fn. 5; accord, Del Junco v. Hufnagel (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th
789, 799.) “Adequate notice prior to imposition of sanctions is mandated
by . . . the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. (Cal.
Const., art. I, § 7; U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) Constitutional due process
principles are offended by summary imposition of sanctions by a superior
court. [Citation.] Adequacy of notice is not dependent upon an arbitrary
number of days notice but should be determined on a case-by-case basis to
satisfy basic due process requirements.” (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated

3 Section 1019.5, subdivision (b) states, “When a motion is granted or

denied on the court’s own motion, notice of the court’s order shall be given by
the court in the manner provided in this chapter, unless notice is waived by
all parties in open court and is entered in the minutes.”

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(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 982, 995.) We review a trial court’s issuance of such
sanctions for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 996.)
Preliminarily, Green has not shown that section 1019.5, subdivision (b)
applies here, since it is not clear from the record that the trial court issued its
orders to show cause on its own motion. Green asserts the trial court issued
its orders sua sponte, while Wright asserts that the orders were at his
request. Neither party cites anything in the record to support his position, in
part because there is no reporter’s transcript or acceptable substitute
documenting what took place at any hearing in the case. In this posture, the
tie goes to Wright, since Green as the appellant has the burden of presenting
an adequate record. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [because
judgment is presumed correct and an appellant has the burden of showing
error, an appellant’s “ ‘[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant]’ ”].)4 We therefore
conclude that section 1019.5, subdivision (b) did not obligate the trial court
itself to serve copies of its orders on Green.
This point is fairly inconsequential, however, because even if section
1019.5, subdivision (b) did not obligate the trial court to serve notice of its
orders, Wright was required to do so under section 1019.5, subdivision (a).5

4 In response to Wright’s citation to Jameson v. Desta, Green

inexplicably asserts that the case cannot be cited because it is unpublished
and rule 8.1115(a)–(b) of the California Rules of Court prohibits citation of
unpublished opinions in such circumstances. The decision is published, as
are all decisions by the California Supreme Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.1105(a) [“All opinions of the Supreme Court are published in the Official
Reports”].)
5 Section 1019.5, subdivision (a) states, “When a motion is granted or

denied, unless the court otherwise orders, notice of the court’s decision or
order shall be given by the prevailing party to all other parties or their

7
Likewise, Green’s due process rights entitled him to adequate notice prior to
the imposition of sanctions. (Childs v. PaineWebber Incorporated, supra,
29 Cal.App.4th at p. 995.)
The record does not support Green’s argument that he did not receive
sufficient notice because it shows that Wright served copies of the two orders
that Green complains of.6 First, on September 6, 2024, Wright’s counsel filed
and served a notice of entry of the trial court’s August 2024 order to show
cause. The order attached to this notice of entry of order states, “Defendant
is Ordered to appear at the scheduled Status Conference and show as [sic] to
why the answer shall not be stricken.” It then states that the status
conference was scheduled for October 24, 2024, almost seven weeks after
Wright’s counsel filed and served the notice of entry of order.
Second, Wright’s counsel served notice of the October 2024 order
striking Green’s answer. On October 29, 2024, Wright’s counsel filed and
served a document titled, “Notice Of Ruling Of [sic] Plaintiff’s Motion For An
Accounting And Contribution Or, In The Alternative, For The Appointment
Of A Referee To Determine Same.” The minute order attached to this notice
states, “Due to Counsel of Defendants non appearance the Court strikes

attorneys, in the manner provided in this chapter, unless notice is waived by
all parties in open court and is entered in the minutes.”
6 We note that the record does not appear to show that the trial court or

Wright served Green with notice of entry of the order at the July 2024 status
conference setting the order to show cause hearing for August 2024.
However, Green does not complain of lack of notice of this hearing, so we do
not consider that issue. (Dilbert v. Newsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317, 323
[“ ‘it is not the appellate court’s role to construct theories or arguments that
would undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness’ ”
of the trial court judgment].)

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defendant Colton Green’s Answer and Plaintiff will move [sic] with filing a
Default package.”
Green has not disputed that his counsel received these notices. Nor
does Green offer any reason to think that the notices Wright filed and served
were insufficient in any way. This silence is significant, especially given that
Green failed to designate these documents for inclusion in the clerk’s
transcript when he designated his record for this appeal or when he moved to
augment the record, forcing Wright to move to augment the record to include
them. (See Steven M. Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian (2007)
150 Cal.App.4th 813, 822 [“It is noteworthy that the only argument that
appellants advance in support of the proposition that the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding terminating sanctions is evasive and does not
address the actual basis for the court’s order assessing terminating
sanctions”]; LA Investments, LLC v. Spix (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1044, 1061–
1062 [treating argument as waived where appellants omitted key documents
from record, forcing the opposing party to supply them, and failed to cite to
the record].) The obvious inference is that Green’s counsel was attempting to
make it look as though she had received no notice at all, which was not the
case.7
Because Green received actual notice to his counsel of the August and
October 2024 orders he complains of, we reject Green’s argument that his due
process rights were violated by not receiving notice specifically from the court

7 At oral argument, after we issued a tentative opinion, Green’s counsel

asserted for the first time that the notices were deficient because the titles of
the notices did not inform her that multiple orders were attached and she
therefore gave the notices only a cursory glance. This argument is
unpersuasive. Green’s counsel cannot complain that she lacked notice simply
because she did not read the documents she received.

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of those orders. The fact that Green received actual notice of the August and
October 2024 orders also means that, even if section 1019.5, subdivision (b)
applied here and the trial court was itself obligated to serve its orders on
Green, the trial court’s failure to do so was harmless.
II. Interlocutory Judgment
Separate from his challenge to the trial court’s order striking his
answer, Green attacks the amended interlocutory judgment of partition by
sale that the trial court entered in response to Wright’s motion.
Actions to partition a property by sale generally proceed in two steps.
The trial court first determines the interests of the parties in the property
and the right to partition, issues an interlocutory judgment, and orders the
partition of the property. (§ 872.720, subd. (a); Summers v. Superior Court
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 138, 142–143; see 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate
(4th ed. 2024) § 11:15.) Such an interlocutory judgment is expressly
appealable. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(9).) The court then appoints a referee to sell
the property and distributes the proceeds, subject to offsets or credits due
between the cotenants. (§§ 873.010, 873.510, 873.820; Wallace v. Daley (1990)
220 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1035 [“Every partition action includes a final
accounting according to the principles of equity for both charges and credits
upon each co-tenant’s interest”].)
The UPHPA added several steps to this process. (Former § 874.313,
subd. (c) [UPHPA “supplement[ed]” other statutes governing partition and
controlled over any inconsistent provisions].) When the UPHPA applied, the
trial court had to determine the fair market value of the property by
appraisal or, if it “determine[d] that the evidentiary value of an appraisal
[was] outweighed by the cost of the appraisal,” then after an evidentiary
hearing. (Former § 874.316, subds. (a), (c).) If a party requested partition by

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sale, the trial court then had to “send notice to the parties that any cotenant
except a cotenant that requested partition by sale [could] buy all the interests
of the cotenants that requested partition by sale.” (§ 874.317, subd. (a).)
Cotenants had 45 days to elect to buy the interest of the cotenants that
requested partition. (Id., subd. (b).) The trial court would reconcile any
competing buyout demands and facilitate the buyout. (Id., subds. (e)–(f).) If
necessary, the court would then order the partition of the property by sale or
in kind. (§ 874.318.)
The UPHPA presumed that the property would be partitioned in kind
but allowed for partition by sale if the court found that partition in kind
would “result in great prejudice to the cotenants as a group.” (§ 874.318,
subd. (a).) Among the factors to consider when deciding whether to order
partition by sale were “[w]hether the heirs property practicably [could] be
divided among the cotenants,” “[e]vidence of the collective duration of
ownership or possession of the property by a cotenant and one or more
predecessors in title or predecessors in possession to the cotenant who are or
were relatives of the cotenant or each other,” and “[a] cotenant’s sentimental
attachment to the property, including any attachment arising because the
property has ancestral or other unique or special value to the cotenant.”
(Former § 874.319, subd. (a)(1), (3)–(4).)
“The standard of review for an interlocutory judgment of partition is
abuse of discretion. [Citations.] Under that standard, ‘[t]he trial court’s
“application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and
capricious.” ’ ” (Cummings v. Dessel (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 589, 597.)
Green argues the trial court failed to comply with several of the
UPHPA procedures. First, he contends the trial court did not determine the
fair market value of the property either by appraisal or by evidentiary

11
hearing. Second, he argues the trial court did not send him notice under
section 874.317, subdivision (a) of his right to buy out Wright’s interest.
Third, he claims he was entitled to the opportunity to buy out Wright’s
interest notwithstanding his default. Finally, he faults the trial court for
ordering partition by sale rather than partition in kind.
Green’s arguments have no merit, largely because he fails to reckon
with the significance of the fact that he was in default when the trial court
entered the amended interlocutory judgment. Entry of a defendant’s default
has several effects, but the one most relevant here is that “[t]he entry of a
default terminates a defendant’s rights to take any further affirmative steps
in the litigation until either its default is set aside or a default judgment is
entered. [Citations.] ‘A defendant against whom a default has been entered
is out of court and is not entitled to take any further steps in the cause
affecting plaintiff’s right of action; he cannot thereafter, until such default is
set aside in a proper proceeding, file pleadings . . . or demand notice of
subsequent proceedings.’ ” (Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc.
(1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 381, 385–386, italics added.) A defendant in default
“ ‘ “is not entitled to notices or service of pleadings or papers.” ’ ” (Steven M.
Garber & Associates v. Eskandarian, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 823, fn. 11,
italics added; see § 1010 [“No bill of exceptions, notice of appeal, or other
notice or paper, other than amendments to the pleadings, or an amended
pleading, need be served upon any party whose default has been duly entered
or who has not appeared in the action or proceeding”].)
With these principles in mind, we consider each of Green’s arguments
in turn. First, the trial court did not err in determining the value of the
property. Wright’s motion to amend the interlocutory judgment (which
Green did not include in the record) argued that the value of an appraisal

12
was outweighed by its cost resulting from Green’s obstruction. Wright
included an exhibit with a Zillow estimate of the property’s value. Green did
not oppose the motion, nor could he given his default. The trial court could
therefore credit Wright’s argument and value the property according to his
documentary evidence.
Second, the trial court did not err in failing to send Green notice of his
right to buy out Wright’s interest. Section 874.317, subdivision (a) required
the court to “send notice to the parties that any cotenant except a cotenant
that requested partition by sale may buy all the interests of the cotenants
that requested partition by sale.” By its plain terms, the statute required
notice to “parties.” After his default, Green was effectively no longer a party
and was no longer entitled to notice, including under section 874.317.
(§ 1010.) Moreover, even if Green were somehow entitled to notice under
section 874.317, subdivision (a) of his right to buy out Wright’s interest, any
error in failing to send him notice was harmless. Green was well aware of his
right to buy out Wright, since he discussed the buyout procedure in an
opposition he had filed in July 2024 in response to Wright’s motion to appoint
an appraiser.
Third, Green’s default also precluded him from participating in the
statutory buyout of Wright’s interest. A defendant in default “ ‘is not entitled
to take any further steps in the cause affecting plaintiff’s right of
action . . . .’ ” (Devlin v. Kearny Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, Inc., supra,
155 Cal.App.3d at pp. 385–386.) Green emphasizes that section 874.317,
subdivision (b) stated that “any cotenant” that did not request partition by
sale could give notice to the court that it elected to exercise its buy out right.
But nothing in the UPHPA stated that this provision would relieve a
cotenant in default from the general rule that a defaulting party is no longer

13
entitled to participate in the litigation. When the Legislature intends to
except a proceeding from the rules applicable to defaults, it does so explicitly,
as it has for quiet title actions. (§ 764.010 [in quiet title actions, the “court
shall not enter judgment by default but shall in all cases require evidence of
plaintiff’s title and hear such evidence as may be offered respecting the
claims of any of the defendants”].) By contrast, the UPHPA expressly
envisioned that cotenants could be subject to default judgments, since it
required a court conducting a partition in kind to allocate part of the property
to cotenants “that are unknown, unlocatable, or the subject of a default
judgment.” (§ 874.318, subd. (d).)
Even if Green were entitled to the statutory opportunity to try to buy
out Wright’s interest despite being in default, any error in depriving him of
that opportunity was harmless on this record. Green has the burden of
establishing prejudice to obtain a reversal of the judgment. (Century Surety
Co. v. Polisso (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 922, 963 [“we cannot presume prejudice
and will not reverse the judgment in the absence of an affirmative showing
there was a miscarriage of justice. [Citations.] Nor will this court act as
counsel for appellant by furnishing a legal argument as to how the trial
court’s ruling was prejudicial”].) “To establish prejudice, a party must show
‘a reasonable probability that in the absence of the error, a result more
favorable to [it] would have been reached.’ ” (Diaz v. Carcamo (2011)
51 Cal.4th 1148, 1161.) Wright documented in the trial court that Green was
already unable to pay the existing mortgage without Wright’s financial help
and could not take on the additional debt necessary to buy out Wright’s
interest. Wright highlighted this evidence in his respondent’s brief and
argued any error was harmless, but Green still has not shown Wright was

14
incorrect or otherwise addressed whether there is a reasonable probability
that he could take advantage of the buyout opportunity if given a chance.
Finally, the trial court did not err by ordering partition by sale. The
judgment reflects the trial court’s conclusion that partition in kind was not
equitable because the property is a duplex and it is physically impossible to
divide a duplex into 90 percent and 10 percent portions. Green points out
that the UPHPA favored partition in kind and required the trial courts to
consider evidence of the collective duration of ownership of a property by a
cotenant and a cotenant’s sentimental or ancestral attachment to a property.
(Former § 874.319, subd. (a)(4)–(5).) This is true, but the UPHPA also
required the court to consider whether “the property practicably c[ould] be
divided among the cotenants.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Green fails to explain how
a duplex can feasibly be divided into 90 percent and 10 percent portions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.

Wright v. Green (A173073)

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