CourtListener 10775019•People v. Brown CA2/5
Testo completo
Filed 1/15/26 P. v. Brown CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B338469
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles
County Super. Ct.
v. No. A800733)
PAUL DAVID BROWN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael V. Jesic, Judge. Affirmed.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and David F. Glassman, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Paul David Brown was convicted of two counts of first
degree murder in 1984. Years later, Brown sought vacatur of the
murder convictions and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1
section 1172.6. He appeals the trial court’s order denying his
petition, in which the court found that, in light of the instructions
given, the jury’s verdicts finding true special circumstances as to
both murder counts precluded relief as a matter of law.
We affirm the trial court’s order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Trial, Sentencing, and Appeal
In 1982, Brown and codefendant Scott Pinholster broke
into the home of a friend of Pinholster’s and ransacked it,
searching for money and drugs.2 As Brown and Pinholster were
leaving the house, victims Thomas Johnson and Robert Beckett
arrived. Brown stabbed Johnson to death while Pinholster
stabbed Beckett to death. Afterwards, Brown and Pinholster
shared the $23 and quarter ounce of marijuana they had stolen.
At trial in 1984, Brown was prosecuted for the murders
under multiple theories of liability, including direct liability as a
perpetrator or aider and abettor of murder with or without
premeditation, felony murder, and the natural and probable
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The facts are taken from the prior appellate opinion and
are included for context only. (People v. Brown (Feb. 25, 1986,
B006213) [nonpub. opn.].)
2
consequences doctrine. With respect to the murder counts, the
prosecution alleged multiple murder and felony murder (robbery
and burglary) special circumstances. Brown was also charged
with two counts of robbery and one count of burglary with
associated enhancement allegations.
As pertinent here, the jury was instructed on principals
(CALJIC No. 3.00), aiding and abetting (including aiding and
abetting under the natural and probable consequences doctrine)
(CALJIC No. 3.01), homicide (CALJIC No. 8.00), murder
(CALJIC No. 8.10), malice aforethought (CALJIC No. 8.11),
deliberate and premeditated murder (CALJIC No. 8.20), first
degree felony murder (CALJIC No. 8.21 [robbery and burglary]),
specific intent to commit the underlying crime in felony murder
(CALJIC No. 8.79), aider and abettor of first degree felony
murder (CALJIC No. 8.27), second degree murder (CALJIC
No. 8.30), special circumstances (introductory) (CALJIC
No. 8.80), multiple murder special circumstances (CALJIC
No. 8.81.3), felony murder special circumstances (burglary and
robbery) (CALJIC No. 8.81.17), burglary (CALJIC No. 14.50,
CALJIC No. 14.51), and robbery (CALJIC No. 9.10).
The jury found Brown guilty of two counts of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a), counts 1 & 2), one count of burglary
(§ 459, count 3), and two counts of robbery (§ 211, counts 4 & 5).
With respect to both murders, the jury found true multiple
murder special circumstances (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)), and felony
murder special circumstances for robbery and burglary (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)). The jury found true that during the commission of
the murders, Brown personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b); counts 1 & 2), that during the
commission of the burglary and robbery of victim Thomas
3
Johnson, Brown personally inflicted great bodily injury upon
Johnson (§ 12022.7, counts 3 & 4), and that during the
commission of the burglary and both robberies Brown personally
used a deadly and dangerous weapon, a knife (§ 12022, subd. (b);
counts 3, 4 & 5).
The trial court sentenced Brown to two consecutive terms
of life without the possibility of parole, plus a determinate term of
12 years in prison.
The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to stay the
determinate term imposed until the two consecutive terms of life
without the possibility of parole had been served, but otherwise
affirmed the judgment.
B. Section 1172.6 Petition for Resentencing3
In or around 2023, Brown filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6.4
The People opposed Brown’s petition, arguing that the
instructions the court gave with respect to the special
circumstance allegations required the jury to find that Brown
was either the actual killer or that he was an aider and abettor
who acted with intent to kill before it could find the special
circumstances true. Those findings precluded prima facie
eligibility.
3 We limit our recitation to arguments that are relevant to
the appeal.
4 The petition is not contained in the record on appeal, but
the parties do not dispute that it was filed.
4
Brown’s appointed counsel filed a reply arguing that the
jury may have convicted Brown because it imputed codefendant
Pinholster’s actions to him.
The People filed a supplemental opposition arguing that
the prosecution’s natural and probable consequences and felony
murder theories relied on the same crimes, and were therefore
identical. Regardless of the underlying theory of murder, the
jury necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown was
the actual killer, or an accomplice to first degree murder, or that
he was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of
the underlying felonies in which death occurred. In combination,
the jury’s finding that Brown had the intent to kill, and its
finding that Brown was engaged in the commission or attempted
commission of the underlying felonies in which death occurred,
met the current requirements for conviction of felony murder
under section 189, subdivision (e)(2). The People distinguished
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433 (Curiel), which held that, in the context of the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, the jury’s finding of
intent to kill was insufficient to preclude prima facie eligibility
under section 1172.6 if the record did not conclusively establish
knowledge or the relevant actus reus. The record established all
elements of felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(1)
and (e)(2).
Brown filed a supplemental reply. He argued that neither
the verdict forms nor the special circumstance findings reflected
that the jury found Brown (1) acted with intent to kill or (2)
aided, abetted, or assisted the actual killer. Brown asserted that
the jury may have based its murder verdicts solely on the
instructions in CALJIC No. 8.10, which permitted it to find him
5
guilty of murder based on the old felony murder law. Brown
stated that under Curiel, a finding of intent to kill, standing
alone, did not preclude section 1172.6 eligibility.
C. The Hearing
At the hearing to determine whether Brown was prima
facie eligible for resentencing, defense counsel argued that under
the instructions given the jury did not specifically find that
Brown was the actual killer or that he had the intent to kill and
the intent to aid and abet the killing during the commission of
burglary.
The prosecutor stated that the 1984 jury instructions pre-
dated the law that a felony murder special circumstance could be
based on being a major participant in the felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life. At that time, the felony
murder special circumstances could only have been found true if
Brown was the actual killer or acted with intent to kill.5 The jury
was instructed under CALJIC No. 8.81.17, which required it to
find that Brown intended to kill or to aid in the killing to find the
felony murder special circumstance true. In these narrow
circumstances, where the conviction was very old, the
instructions were such that the jury’s findings would support
conviction under the current law, rendering Brown prima facie
ineligible for relief. The instructions connected the actus reas of
5 At that time, intent to kill was an element of the felony
murder special circumstance for both actual killers and persons
who were not the actual killer but acted with intent to kill.
(Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 153.)
6
aiding and abetting the underlying felonies with the intent to
kill.
The trial court agreed with the prosecutor’s argument and
denied the petition because Brown failed to demonstrate prima
facie eligibility.
DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
When Brown was tried under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, a defendant could be convicted of murder
under the theory that the defendant aided and abetted a crime of
which murder was a natural and probable consequence. (See
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 161 [discussing natural and
probable consequences liability generally]; see also § 31.) Under
this doctrine, it was not necessary for the prosecution to prove
that the defendant intended that the murder be committed or
even that the defendant subjectively foresaw that murder could
result from commission of the crime. (See People v. Chiu, at
pp. 161–162.)
When Brown was tried, under the felony murder theory of
liability, “ ‘ “ ‘when the defendant or an accomplice kill[ed]
someone during the commission, or attempted commission, of an
inherently dangerous felony,’ the defendant could be found guilty
of the crime of murder, without any showing of ‘an intent to kill,
or even implied malice, but merely an intent to commit the
underlying felony.’ [Citation.] Murders occurring during certain
violent or serious felonies[, including robbery and burglary,] were
of the first degree . . . . [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ (People v. Wilson
7
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868.)” (People v. Bodely (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1193, 1199.)
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats 2018, ch. 1015) “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine . . . .” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f);
People v. Strong (2022)13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.) The bill
amended section 188, which defines malice, to abrogate the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to
murder. (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842–843.) Now, “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).)
“Senate Bill No. 1437 [also] limited the class of persons
liable for felony murder by adding section 189, subdivision (e).
Under current law, ‘[a] participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of [certain enumerated felonies, including
robbery] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of
the following is proven: [¶] (1) The person was the actual killer.
[¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent
to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of
murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The person was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of
[s]ection 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)–(3).)” (People v. Garcia
(2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 965.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 added to the Penal Code former
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, which created a procedure
for persons convicted under the prior laws to seek vacatur of the
8
conviction and resentencing. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708;
People v. Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) “ ‘Under section
1172.6, the process begins with the filing of a petition declaring
that “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder
or attempted murder because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189”
made by Senate Bill 1437. [Citation.] The trial court then
reviews the petition to determine whether a prima facie showing
has been made that the petitioner is entitled to relief. [Citation.]
“If the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that
the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may dismiss
the petition. [Citations.]” [Citation.]’ (People v. Wilson, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 869, fn. omitted.)” (People v. Bodely, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at p. 1200.)
“The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial
court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless. . . .” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
971.) “In making its evaluation, the court may review the record
of conviction—including the charging documents, jury
instructions, verdicts, and to a limited extent any prior appellate
opinion—to determine if the petitioner’s allegations are
conclusively rebutted by the record.” People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101
Cal.App.5th 860, 864–865.) “In reviewing any part of the record
of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis, supra, at
p. 972.) If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of
eligibility, the trial court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.)
“If the record demonstrates the jury necessarily found the
9
petitioner guilty of murder under a still-valid theory, the
petitioner does not satisfy the condition that he or she ‘could not
presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to
[s]ection 188 or 189 made’ by Senate Bill 1437 (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3)); under this circumstance, the petition fails at the prima
facie stage, and the petitioner is ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
pp. 464–465 [if the verdicts and jury instructions reflect that the
jury made ‘all of the factual findings necessary to support a
murder conviction under current law,’ ineligibility for relief is
conclusively established]; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
45, 59–60 [where the jury instructions and verdicts demonstrated
the jury necessarily found the petitioner was the actual killer and
therefore was not eligible for relief, the trial court correctly
denied the petition at the prima facie stage].)” (People v. Krueger
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 431, 438)
We independently review a trial court’s determination of
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.) We may affirm a trial
court’s judgment on any correct basis presented by the record,
whether or not relied upon by the trial court. (People v. Orozco
(2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 667, 672–673.)
B. Analysis
Brown contends that the trial court erred because the
record of conviction does not conclusively establish that he is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We disagree. Given the
general introductory instructions on the special circumstances
(CALJIC No. 8.80) and the specific instructions on the felony
10
murder special circumstances (CALJIC No. 8.81.17), the jury’s
true findings on the special circumstance allegations demonstrate
that the jury necessarily found all elements required to prove
Brown guilty of felony murder under section 189, subdivisions
(e)(1) and (e)(2), as amended by Senate Bill No. 1437. Because
the jury made the findings necessary to find Brown guilty under
a still valid theory of murder, he has not met his burden of
demonstrating prima facie eligibility for relief pursuant to section
1172.6.
1. In Light of the Introductory Instructions on
Special Circumstances and the Felony Murder
Special Circumstance Instructions, the Jury
Necessarily Found that Brown was Guilty of
Felony Murder as Defined Under the Current
Laws
a. Jury Instructions and Verdicts
As relevant here, the trial court instructed the jury
generally regarding all special circumstances alleged in counts 1
and 2 that, under CALJIC No. 8.80:
“If you find the defendant in this case guilty of murder of
the first degree, you must then determine if murder was
committed under (one or more of) the following special
circumstance(s): Multiple murder, Robbery, or Burglary.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“If defendant Brown was not the actual killer, it must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally aided,
abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
11
assisted the actual killer in the murder in the first degree before
you are permitted to find the alleged special circumstance of that
first degree murder to be true as to defendant Brown.”
(Parentheses omitted, italics added.)
Regarding the felony murder robbery special
circumstances, the court instructed the jury under CALJIC
No. 8.81.17 as follows:
“As to each Count I and Count II, considered separately: to
find that the special circumstances referred to in these
instructions as murder in the commission of robbery is true, it
must be proved:
“la. That the murder was committed while the defendant
was engaged in the commission of a robbery, or
“lb. That the murder was committed during the immediate
flight after the commission of a robbery by the defendant, and,
“2. That the defendant intended to kill or to aid in the
killing, and
“3. That the murder was committed in order to carry out or
advance the commission of the crime of robbery or to facilitate
the escape therefrom or to avoid detection. In other words, the
special circumstances referred to in these instructions are not
established if robbery was merely incidental to the commission of
the murder.” (Italics added.)
The jury was separately instructed on the felony murder
burglary special circumstances under CALJIC No. 8.81.17.
The jury found true all of the special circumstances alleged
in counts 1 and 2—multiple murder, felony murder in the
commission of a robbery, and felony murder in the commission of
a burglary.
12
b. Legal Principles
Murder liability under current law requires that the
defendant act with a certain intent (mens rea) and commit a
culpable act (actus reus). (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 441.)
As relevant here, to be convicted under a theory of felony murder,
section 189, subdivision (e) provides:
“A participant in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of a [qualifying felony, including robbery and
burglary] in which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one
of the following is proven:
“(1) The person was the actual killer.
“(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree.”6
To determine whether an instruction accurately conveys an
element of a charge, we consider how a reasonable juror would
understand the language of the instruction. (People v. Warren
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 487.) “In addressing this question, we
consider the specific language under challenge and, if necessary,
the charge in its entirety.” (Ibid.)
6 Liability for felony murder pursuant to section 189,
subdivision (e)(3) as a major participant in the underlying felony
who acted with reckless disregard for human life is not
implicated in this appeal. At the time of Brown’s trial, a
defendant could not be convicted of a felony murder special
circumstance on that basis.
13
c. Section 189, subdivision (e)(1), Actual Killer7
If the defendant is an actual killer who kills in the
commission of an enumerated felony, malice is imputed; the only
mens rea required is the specific intent to commit the underlying
felony. (People v. Vang (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 64, 81.) It is
uncontested here that the jury’s verdicts necessarily reflect that
Brown intended to commit both the robbery and the burglary. By
convicting Brown of the murders, the jury necessarily found that
he was either the actual killer or that he aided the actual killer in
some act but was not the actual killer. If the jury found that
Brown was the actual killer, the requirements for liability under
section 189, subdivision (e)(1) were met by the finding that he
committed the underlying felonies and that the murder occurred
in the commission of those felonies.
d. Section 189, subdivision (e)(2), Not the Actual
Killer
Brown contends that the requirements of section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) were not met because the jury did not
specifically find that (1) he acted with intent to kill, (2) the act he
“aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
7 Brown argues that the instructions did not require the
jury to find that he was the actual killer. It does not matter
whether the jury convicted Brown as an actual killer or as a
person who aided the killer with intent to kill. What matters is
that, in light of the verdicts and instructions, the jury must have
convicted Brown of felony murder as it is currently defined under
section 189, subdivision (e)(1) or (e)(2). The precise role the jury
believed Brown played is irrelevant.
14
requested, or assisted”8 was the killing, rather than the
underlying robberies or burglary; or (3) that he acted with
knowledge of Pinholster’s intent. These arguments also lack
merit.
i. Intent to Kill
At trial, the court instructed the jury under CALJIC
No. 8.80 as to all special circumstances that: “If defendant
Brown was not the actual killer, it must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that he intentionally aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the murder in the first degree . . . .” (Italics added.)
Brown contends that the instruction did not expressly inform the
jury that, if he was not the killer, he had to have acted with
intent to kill.
In People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 487, the
Supreme Court addressed whether a special circumstance
instruction (described below) properly conveyed to the jury that
an aider and abettor to felony murder must have the intent to kill
before the jury could find true that special circumstance. The
special circumstance at issue contained the language: “ ‘the
defendant was . . . a person who intentionally aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.’ ”
(Italics added.) The court held that the quoted language did
8 For economy, we will refer to “aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted” as “aided”
in the remainder of this opinion, except when quoting a statute or
instruction.
15
convey to the jury that it must find an intent to kill. (Ibid.) The
court recognized that in light of the instructions defining murder
in the first degree as including killings that were intentional,
unintentional, or accidental, a juror could conceivably understand
the “intentionally aided” language to mean that the defendant
intended to commit the robbery in that case, but the court
concluded that “one could understand the charge as requiring
intent to rob and nothing more only if he parsed it in a
hypertechnical manner.” (Id. at p. 488.) A reasonable juror
would “not undertake such tortuous analysis.” (Ibid.)
We conclude that CALJIC No. 8.80, which, as given in
Brown’s case, employs the same language, and therefore
accurately conveyed to the jury that if Brown was not the actual
killer the jury could not find the special circumstances true
unless it found he had acted with the intent to kill. The jury’s
true findings on the special circumstances confirm that it found
Brown acted with intent to kill.
Additionally, the trial court instructed Brown’s jury under
CALJIC No. 8.81.17 that the jury must find “the defendant
intended to kill or to aid in the killing” before it could find true a
felony murder special circumstance as to either of the murder
counts. (Italics added.) Brown asserts that “the use of the
disjunctive ‘or’ suggests that intent to kill was not required if the
defendant intended to ‘aid in the killing.’ ”
We agree that the use of the disjunctive “or” in CALJIC
No. 8.81.17 signaled to the jury that there were two bases on
which it could find the special circumstance true, and that those
bases were not identical. However, absent some logical rationale,
the word “or” did not suggest that the jury could find the felony
murder special circumstances true even if it found Brown did not
16
intend to kill. The difference between the phrase “intended to
kill” and “intended . . . to aid in the killing” in CALJIC
No. 8.81.17 can be explained by our Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the language of section 190.2, the special
circumstance statute. In 1983, in Carlos v. Superior Court,
supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 153–154, the Supreme Court held that
intent to kill was an element of a felony murder special
circumstance under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17), regardless
of whether the defendant was the actual killer or was not the
actual killer but aided the first degree murder. This was the law
at the time of Brown’s trial. The instructions that the trial court
gave the jury at Brown’s trial accurately set forth the law as it
was construed in Carlos: To find the felony murder special
circumstances true, the jury must first find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Brown had the intent to kill, irrespective of whether
the jury found Brown was the actual killer or aided the actual
killer. The difference between the language of the two bases in
CALJIC No. 8.81.17 reflected the fact that liability could attach
to a defendant if he acted in either role, so long as intent to kill
was proven. Because the jury found the felony murder special
circumstances true as to both murder counts, it necessarily found
that Brown intended to kill with respect to both murders,
whether as the perpetrator or as an aider of the perpetrator.
ii. Actus Reas
Brown contends that section 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires
the jury to find that a person who is not the actual killer
undertook some act that aided the actual killer in the killing, and
not just an act that aided in the underlying felony. The actus
17
reas for murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(2) is currently
a matter of vigorous debate among the Courts of Appeal. (See
People v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566 (Lopez I) [defendant
must aid the underlying felony]; People v. Morris (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1016, review granted Jul. 17, 2024, S284751 (Morris)
[underlying felony]; People v. Lopez (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 616,
review granted Nov. 13, 2024, S278162 (Lopez II) [underlying
felony]); People v. Kelly (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 162, review
granted Nov. 26, 2024, S287341 (Kelly) [defendant must aid the
killing]; People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, review
granted June 11, 2025, S290457 (Jackson) [killing]; People v.
Taito (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 694, 704 (Taito) [underlying
felony].) The Supreme Court has granted review and will
ultimately decide the issue.
We need not weigh in on this debate to resolve Brown’s
appeal, however, because we conclude that whatever the meaning
of the current law, the jury made the findings to satisfy the
elements of murder under either interpretation. Brown argues
that the amendments to section 189, subdivision (e)(2) require
the jury to find he aided the actual killer in the killing, and
leaves it at that. But Brown’s interpretation of the statute only
allows him to prevail if the instructions given did not require the
jury to find that he aided the actual killer in the killing.
When interpreting an instruction, we consider what the
language would mean to a reasonable juror. (People v. Warren,
supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 487.) The language of CALJIC No. 8.80
describing the culpable act is identical in substance to the actus
reas language in section 189, subdivision (e)(2). Brown’s jury was
instructed under CALJIC No. 8.80 that to find the special
circumstances true it must find Brown “aided, abetted, counseled,
18
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the murder in the first degree[.]” Section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) provides that liability attaches if the defendant
who is not the actual killer “aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.”
(Emphasis added.) Only the words of section 189, subdivision
(e)(2) that we have underscored—“commission of”—differ from
the instruction given to Brown’s jury with respect to the actus
reas. Brown argues that the plain meaning of section 189,
subdivision (e)(2) is that a defendant who is not the killer must,
with intent to kill, aid in the killing. He does not suggest that we
should assign the language of the instruction any different
meaning. We see no reason to distinguish between the two
phrases and conclude that a reasonable juror would understand
them to have the same meaning.
The question that remains, however, is whether these
instructions would be understood by a reasonable juror to require
proof that a defendant aiding in the killing itself, or require only
proof that the defendant aided in an underlying felony during
which a killing occurred.
There do not appear to be any published opinions in which
courts have found that the common meaning of “aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree”
is to aid in an underlying felony rather than to aid in the killing
itself. The courts and dissenting justices that have concluded the
phrase refers to aiding the killing are in agreement that this
understanding reflects the plain meaning of the words. (Jackson,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 166–168; Kelly, supra, 105
19
Cal.App.5th at p. 172; Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1031–1032 (dis. opn. of Moore, J.); Lopez I, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 587 (dis opn. of Raphael, J.).)
The cases holding that the relevant actus reus is
commission of the underlying felony do not focus on plain
meaning. They rely instead on legislative intent as influenced by
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “murder in the first
degree” as commission of the underlying felony, which they
characterize as a “term of art.”9 (Taito, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th
at p. 704; Lopez II, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 621–622;
9 Rather than interpreting “aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree,” these
cases focus their analysis on the phrases “murder in the first
degree” or “commission of murder in the first degree” and assign
no meaning to the words “actual killer.” (Taito, supra, 115
Cal.App.5th at pp. 703–704 [interpreting “commission of murder
in the first degree”]; Lopez II, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 621–
622 [words “actual killer” do not impact the analysis; interpreting
“murder in the first degree”]; Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1025–1026 [interpreting “murder in the first degree”]; Lopez
I, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp. 577–578 [ignoring the words
“actual killer”, interpreting “murder in the first degree”].)
Although statutory interpretation may go beyond a
common sense plain language analysis and also include
consideration of the statutory scheme, legislative intent, and
legislative history (see Jackson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 166–181), such considerations would be unknown to the
average juror and would not impact their understanding of the
instruction. As such, we do not discuss them here. (See People v.
Kimbrel (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 869, 872 [jurors are expected to
understand instructions as they are “ ‘commonly understood by
those familiar with the English language’ ”].)
20
Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026; Lopez I, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 578.)
We share the view of the Court of Appeal, Third District, in
Jackson that “[i]f there is a commonsense (as opposed to a
technical legal) meaning of ‘murder in the first degree,’ it
necessarily entails the killing of a human being. It follows that
the commonsense meaning of the phrase ‘aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or
assisted . . . in the commission of murder in the first degree’ is
aiding, abetting, . . . or assisting a killing that legally constitutes
first degree murder. When the words ‘actual killer’ are included
in the phrase, so that it reads, ‘aided, abetted . . . or assisted the
actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree,’ the
ordinary meaning of the statutory language is inescapable:
assisting the killer in killing. The phrase does not plainly
express, at least in commonsense terms, the idea of aiding,
abetting, or assisting someone in commission of a robbery,
burglary or other felony by an act that does not also directly
assist in a killing.” (Jackson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.)
We conclude that the nearly identical words of CALJIC
No. 8.80 carried the same commonsense meaning, and that,
whatever section 189, subdivision (e)(2) is ultimately interpreted
by courts to require in terms of proof, the jurors would have
understood CALJIC No. 8.80 to require that Brown had to aid the
actual killer in the killing. (People v. Mena (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 702, 706 [jurors are presumed to understand the
common meaning of language and to apply it with common
sense].) In finding the special circumstances true here, the jury
necessarily found that, if he was not the killer, Brown aided the
actual killer in the killings, and not merely the underlying
21
burglary and robbery.
iii. Knowledge
Finally, Brown argues that under Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
433, he could not be convicted of murder under section 189,
subdivision (e)(3) because the jury did not find that he had
knowledge of Pinholster’s unlawful intent or that he intended to
assist Pinholster in achieving his unlawful ends. Curiel has no
application here. In Curiel, our Supreme Court held that where a
defendant is convicted of murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the defendant cannot be found prima facie
ineligible for relief solely on the basis that the jury found the
defendant intended to kill. Rather, the record must “conclusively
establishe[] every element of the offense.” (Id. at p. 463.)
Brown’s argument presumes that felony murder under
section 189, subdivision (e)(2) requires knowledge of the
perpetrator’s mental state and a desire to achieve the
perpetrator’s unlawful ends as direct aiding and abetting does. It
does not. (Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 176; Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 464.) The Curiel court itself stated this plainly:
“[If] the jury . . . made findings on all of the other elements
supporting felony murder under section 189 as amended,
including (1) the commission or attempted commission of a felony
enumerated in that statute and (2) the death of a person during
the commission or attempted commission of the enumerated
felony[,] . . . [and] additionally found intent to kill, . . .
[c]onsidered together, the jury’s findings would completely refute
a petitioner’s allegation that he or she could not currently be
convicted of murder because of changes to sections 188 and 189.”
22
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 464.)
As we have discussed, by finding the special circumstances
true, the jury necessarily found all of the elements of felony
murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(1) and (e)(2). This is
true whether “aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree” requires the defendant
to have assisted in the killing or the underlying felony. Because
the record “conclusively establishes every element of the offense,”
Brown is ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 463.)
2. A Defendant is Ineligible for Section 1172.6
Relief Where the Record Shows that the Jury
Necessarily Found the Defendant Guilty Under
a Currently Valid Theory of Murder, Regardless
of Whether the Jury Was Also Instructed Under
Theories of Murder that are no Longer Valid
We also reject Brown’s contention that, because he was
tried with a codefendant and the trial court instructed the jury on
theories of liability that are no longer valid (felony murder under
the prior law and murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine), he made a prima facie case for relief
under section 1172.6. Although in many instances the giving of
instructions on theories of murder that are no longer valid would
be sufficient to establish prima facie eligibility for section 1172.6
relief, that is not the case where the overall record demonstrates
that the jury made findings that necessarily render the defendant
ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (People v. Mares
23
(2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1173.)
Brown insists that, even if the special circumstance
instructions and the verdicts otherwise foreclose eligibility, the
jury could have convicted him under an invalid theory of murder
simply because the jury was also given instructions that allowed
malice to be imputed to him. Brown points to no authority to
support the proposition that where the court’s instructions could
have permitted conviction under a now-invalid theory of murder
those instructions defeat evidence in the record that conclusively
demonstrates the jury actually convicted the defendant under a
theory of murder that currently remains valid. In the cases
Brown cites, the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal found
that the defendant could have been convicted on an invalid
theory because the jury was instructed on theories of murder that
are no longer valid and there was nothing in the record that
foreclosed eligibility as a matter of law. (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at pp. 441, 446–447 [jury’s finding of intent to kill did not
conclusively establish ineligibility where jury did not also find
defendant had knowledge of perpetrator’s intent or find
defendant committed an act that assisted the crime]; People v.
Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1188 [prosecutor’s closing
argument at trial did not establish as a matter of law that
defendant was convicted of provocative act murder under a valid
theory]; People v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1269
[in light of ambiguous jury instructions and prosecutor’s closing
argument, record did not conclusively establish ineligibility].)
Here, as we have already discussed, the jury could not have
found the special circumstances true unless it also found all of
the elements of murder that are required to support a still valid
theory of liability. Specifically, in light of the instructions given,
24
the jury necessarily found that Brown was guilty of felony
murder, either as an actual killer or because, with the intent to
kill, he “intentionally aided, abetted, counseled, commanded,
induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual killer in the
murder in the first degree.” Brown is prima facie ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. The existence of instructions on invalid
theories of liability does not undermine that conclusion.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order denying Brown’s petition
for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
KIM, (D.), J.
KUMAR, J.
Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
25
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.