CourtListener 10773958•Self & Bhamre v. Moza CA4/3
Testo completo
Filed 1/13/26 Self & Bhamre v. Moza CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
SELF & BHAMRE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063757
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2021-
01179085)
JOSEPH MOZA,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, John C. Gastelum, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Cliff Dean Schneider for Appellant.
Self & Bhamre and Hema C. Bhamre for Respondent.
Joseph Moza appeals from an order denying his motion to vacate
a default judgment. He contends the summons and complaint were not
properly served by publication because they were not mailed to his known
address. Though the issue is raised for the first time on appeal, it is
jurisdictional and we therefore reach it. As we agree with Moza, we reverse.
FACTS
Bhamre is a principal attorney of Self & Bhamre, a firm that
represented Moza in an employment matter. The firm sued Moza in January
2021 for unpaid fees.
Before the firm served the summons and complaint, Bhamre
learned in July 2021 that Moza lived and worked at an address on Ebb Tide
Circle in Newport Beach. The firm attempted to personally serve Moza at the
address more than 10 times—once, the door was answered by an occupant
who said it was “hard to know” when Moza would be home.
Nonetheless, the firm obtained an April 2022 order authorizing
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service by publication. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.50.) In the firm’s application,
Bhamre acknowledged the firm’s knowledge of Moza’s Newport Beach
address and its efforts to personally serve him there. But Bhamre did not
state whether the firm had attempted substitute service or service by mail
with notice and acknowledgement.
The trial court entered default judgment against Moza in
February 2023. The firm mailed a copy of the judgment to Moza at the
Newport Beach address.
The trial court denied Moza’s motion to set aside the default
judgment on September 29, 2023, rejecting his claims of excusable neglect
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All statutory references are to this code.
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and surprise. (§ 473, subd. (b).) Moza had not asserted the default judgment
was void for lack of service. The court noted that Bhamre acknowledged
learning about the Newport Beach address in July 2021.
The firm served Moza with a “notice of ruling on defendant’s
motion to vacate” (capitalization omitted) in October 2023. Moza appealed
four months later.
DISCUSSION
We agree with Moza that the default judgment must be set aside
because the firm did not properly effectuate service by publication. Moza
correctly notes that when a court authorizes service by publication, the
plaintiff must mail the summons and complaint to the defendant if the
plaintiff “ascertain[s]” the defendant’s address “before expiration of the time
prescribed for publication.” (§ 415.50, subd. (b).) As “service by publication is
‘a last resort,’” “section 415.50 is strictly construed.” (Calvert v. Al Binali
(2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 963.) There is no dispute the firm knew Moza’s
Newport Beach address throughout the publication period but never mailed
the summons and complaint to Moza.
We reach this claim even though Moza never gave the trial court
a chance to reach the issue. Without proper service of the summons and
complaint, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.2
“‘[C]ompliance with the statutory procedures for service of process is essential
to establish personal jurisdiction. . . . [U]nder section 473, subdivision (d), the
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We disagree with the firm’s characterization of Moza’s
contention. He does not claim proper service failed to give actual notice. (See
§ 473.5.) Rather, he claims invalid service rendered the judgment void.
(§ 473, subd. (d).)
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court may ‘set aside a default judgment which is valid on its face, but void, as
a matter of law, due to improper service.’” (Kremerman v. White (2021) 71
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Cal.App.5th 358, 371.) Moza’s claim also raises a pure legal question based
on undisputed facts. (Farrar v. Direct Commerce, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th
1257, 1275, fn. 3.) And in the default context, we resolve doubts in favor of a
trial on the merits. (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Bellaire
Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 839.)
Indeed, service by publication was never available to the firm in
the first place, though Moza does not put it in so many words. “If a
defendant’s address is ascertainable, a method of service superior to
publication must be employed.” (Watts v. Crawford (1995) 10 Cal.4th 743,
749, fn. 5.) Bhamre ascertained Moza’s Newport Beach address in July
2021—nine months before the firm obtained the service by publication order
in April 2022—but the firm tried neither substitute service nor service by
mail with notice and acknowledgment. (See Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v.
Hendrix (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 740, 746 [“application . . . for publication of
summons . . . was defective” because plaintiff “fail[ed] to attempt service by
mail”].)
Finally, we reject the firm’s contention that Moza’s appeal was
untimely. The order denying his motion to vacate was issued on September
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“[I]f ‘the judgment is void on its face, then the six month limit
set by section 473 to make other motions to vacate a judgment does not
apply.’” (Kremerman, at pp. 369–370.) “‘“A judgment or order is said to be
void on its face when the invalidity is apparent upon an inspection of the
judgment-roll.”’” (Id. at p. 370.) In case of service by publication, the
judgment roll includes “the affidavit for publication of summons.” (§ 670,
subd. (a).) Here, the application for service by publication acknowledges the
Newport Beach address but discloses no effort at substitute service or service
by mail with notice and acknowledgment.
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29, 2023; he appealed less than 180 days later, on February 7, 2024. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C) [outer 180-day deadline].) The October
2023 notice of ruling did not trigger any earlier deadline. “[S]erving a notice
of ruling is not the same as serving a copy of the order or a notice of entry of
the order, as contemplated by the rules governing the timeliness of appeals.”
(Carmel, Ltd. v. Tavoussi (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 393, 399.)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed. The trial court is directed to enter a new
order vacating the default and default judgment entered against Moza. Moza
shall recover his costs on appeal.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
SANCHEZ, J.
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