Maas v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co. CA4/1

CourtListener 10773864Calctapp13 gen 2026

Testo completo

Filed 1/13/26 Maas v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SANDRA MAAS, D082767

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2019-
00032336-CU-OE-CTL)
MCKINNON BROADCASTING
COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.

SANDRA MAAS, D084334

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MCKINNON BROADCASTING
COMPANY,

Defendant and Appellant.
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from a judgment and orders of the
Superior Court of San Diego County, Ronald F. Frazier, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with instructions.

Fitzgerald Knaier, Kenneth M. Fitzgerald and Kyle W. Hoffman for
Defendant and Appellant.
Gruenberg Law, Joshua D. Gruenberg, Joshua P. Pang, and Pamela
Vallero; William Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff, Appellant and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider several appeals originating in a discrimination suit
brought by Sandra Maas against her former employer, McKinnon
Broadcasting Company (MBC). Maas co-anchored a local news program
from 2010 through 2018, during which time MBC paid her significantly less
than her male co-anchor. Maas sued MBC, claiming MBC violated anti-
discrimination statutes and declined to renew her contract in retaliation for
her complaint about the gendered pay disparity. After a lengthy trial, the
jury found in Maas’s favor. MBC challenges the verdict on various grounds,
none of which we find persuasive. We affirm the judgment.
MBC and Maas have also each appealed the trial court’s award of
attorney fees to Maas. Finding no abuse of discretion, we decline to disturb
the court’s award.
Finally, MBC has appealed a postjudgment order in which the trial
court calculated interest and determined it would retain a portion of MBC’s
postjudgment deposit pending Maas’s appeal of the attorney fee award. We
find the trial court’s calculation of interest was incorrect. On remand, the
trial court shall recalculate the interest owed on the judgment in accordance
with this opinion. Because we have now resolved Maas’s appeal, the basis

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for the trial court’s retention of the deposit no longer exists. The question
whether it was proper for the court to retain the deposit pending appeal is
therefore moot.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Maas’s Employment at KUSI
KUSI-TV is a television station located in San Diego. MBC owned the
station during the events relevant to this matter. MBC hired Maas in 2004
to anchor KUSI’s morning news program. MBC hired Allen Denton in 2009
to anchor the evening news, and in 2010 Maas joined Denton as co-anchor of
that broadcast.
MBC paid Maas less than Denton the entirety of their co-tenure on the
evening news. In 2010, MBC paid Maas an annual salary of $120,000, while
MBC compensated Denton at $200,000 per year. Both generally received
annual raises of $5,000, leaving an apparent $80,000 per-year pay gap
through 2017, when Maas earned $160,000 per year.
In late April 2018, Maas sent the following email to station manager
and owner Michael McKinnon Jr.:
“Hi Mike,

“I am circling back to discuss my contract again. It’s been
a[ ]while.

“I must say that I’m frustrated and a bit embarrassed that
it has been 4 months since my contract expired on
December 31, 2017, and it has not been dealt with. Our last
discussion was in early February.

“I have enjoyed bringing San Diego viewers the news here
at KUSI since I started in 2004. But, as you know, that’s
only part of my job.

“In addition to mentoring young staffers in the newsroom, I
am also out volunteering and working in the community on

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behalf of KUSI. This past month I have emceed San Diego
Women’s Week, The SD District Attorney sponsored
Crime Vigil, and The Gold Digger’s Hat’s Off to SD
fundraiser. My community service is hard to match. I am
highly visible on two boards in San Diego and was awarded
the highest philanthropic honor in our community three
years ago as a Salvation Army “Woman of Dedication.” I
love this city and plan to be here forever.

“My experience is also hard to match. I have worked in this
market on television since 1990. In my 35 years in
broadcasting, I have received more than a dozen Emmy
nominations and have been inducted into the NATAS
Silver Circle for my on-air contributions. My anchoring
skills are second to none at this station. I can confidently
say that no one reads the news in the evening anchor chair
better than I do.

“When I started on the night shift 8 years ago, I was
anchoring 2 hours of news, the 6 & 10 pm. Since then,
KUSI has added 2 more evening newscasts. In addition to
hosting San Diego People and fronting hourly newsbreaks,
I also produce a weekly medical segment called “Healthy
Living.” I get lots of feedback from my medical segments in
the community, and they are available on the KUSI
website. The latest one is on Autism.

“As I’ve told you, I enjoy my job here at KUSI and have a
fantastic relationship with everyone in the newsroom,
Mornings and Nightside. I’m well aware of the recent
lucrative deals you’ve extended to the male on-air talent
and I know how much anchors are compensated here at
KUSI. I am your lead female evening anchor.

“As the lead female anchor at KUSI, with the community
service, experience and skills that I have demonstrated on
a consistent basis, there is no reason my compensation
should be less than multiple male counterparts at KUSI.
Turko would say “It Ain’t Right”. I would like you to
consider increasing my annual salary to be on par with my

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evening co-anchor . . . and, I think that is a very reasonable
request.

“Sandra”

In a subsequent email, Maas asked for an annual salary of $215,000.
In response, MBC offered Maas a three-year contract, with an initial $20,000
raise (a new annual salary of $180,000) and yearly $5,000 raises thereafter.
Maas countered with a demand that the initial $20,000 raise be made
retroactive to January 1, and for salaries of $190,000 and $195,000 in years
two and three. MBC rejected retroactivity and Maas’s proposed raises for
years two and three. Maas said she would accept MBC’s terms, but only for
a one-year deal. In June 2018, the parties agreed to the one-year contract
with an annual salary of $180,000.
In May 2019, Maas met with the human resources director and the
news director Steve Cohen, who informed her MBC would not be renewing
her contract. Cohen said the station was “bringing in a new generation of
journalists.” According to Maas, the human resources director stated, “No,
no, no. That sounds like age discrimination, and that’s not what we’re doing
here.” Maas left the station a few weeks later, at the end of her contractual

term.1

1 MBC seeks to file portions of the record under seal. (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.46(d)(2).) The three exhibits MBC seeks to seal are not relevant
to our disposition of the issues on appeal. This motion is denied.

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B. This Litigation
Maas filed suit against MBC, alleging: (1) MBC failed to provide equal
pay to women (Lab. Code § 1197.5, subd. (a)); (2) gender and/or age
discrimination (Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (a)); (3) failure to prevent
discrimination (Gov. Code § 12940, subd. (k)); (4) retaliation under
Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h); (5) retaliation under Labor
Code section 1102.5; and (6) retaliation under Labor Code section 1197.5,
subdivision (j)(1). Maas voluntarily dismissed several of these causes of
action and proceeded to trial on the equal pay disparity claim, the gender/age
discrimination claim, and one of the retaliation claims.
Trial took place over four weeks. The jury found in favor of Maas on
her equal pay and retaliation claims, and in favor of MBC on the gender/age
discrimination claim. The jury awarded Maas $1,775,000 and declined to
impose punitive damages. After judgment, the trial court granted Maas’s
motion for costs and attorney fees, awarding her an additional $2,376,677.50.
MBC appeals the judgment, the attorney fee award, and another
postjudgment order discussed post. Maas appeals the attorney fee award.

MBC also seeks to seal portions of the March 7, 2023, trial transcript, and
submit public sealed and redacted versions thereof. MBC has established an
interest in redacting financial information regarding third parties that
overrides the right of public access and supports sealing; there is a
substantial probability this overriding interest will be prejudiced if the
information is not sealed; and the redactions are the narrowly tailored means
to do so, with no less restrictive means available to protect the information.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.46(d)(6), 2.550(d)–(e).) The parties’ stipulated
motion to augment the record on appeal with public redacted and sealed
versions of the March 7, 2023, transcript is granted. These documents are
hereby deemed a part of the record on appeal.
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Alleged Trial Error
MBC argues various errors throughout the trial prejudiced its defense.
First, MBC objects to several evidentiary rulings, claiming the trial court
improperly (a) admitted expert testimony, (b) limited MBC’s cross-
examination of Maas, (c) limited MBC’s direct examination of Denton, and
(d) permitted Maas’s counsel to misrepresent testimony during closing
argument. We find no abuse of discretion.
Second, MBC argues the trial court erred by refusing to give special
instructions concerning inferences from the evidence. We find the trial court
properly declined MBC’s proposed instructions.
Third, MBC argues Maas and her counsel committed misconduct by
interjecting “social justice appeals” throughout the trial and especially in
closing argument. MBC has not preserved its challenges to most of these
remarks, having failed to object during trial. The trial court sustained the
few objections MBC did make, and we do not find Maas’s or her counsel’s
comments so inflammatory that the jury was incapable of following the
court’s instructions.
Fourth, MBC claims the trial court erred by limiting closing argument
time to 60 minutes and granting Maas an additional 30 minutes for rebuttal
argument. MBC has not shown the trial court abused its broad discretion
when setting argument time.
Finally, Maas argues the cumulative effect of the trial error prejudiced
its case. With one exception, which we find was not prejudicial, we do not
find any errors to cumulate.

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1. Evidentiary Issues
We review a court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
(Hernandez v. Paicius (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 452, 456.) A trial court’s
exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing its
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd and resulted in a
manifest miscarriage of justice. (See, e.g., People v. Chhoun (2021)
11 Cal.5th 1, 26.)
a. Expert Testimony
MBC argues the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of Maas’s
expert, Debra Reilly. “A trial court’s decision to admit expert testimony ‘will
not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown.’ ”
(Kotla v. Regents of University of California (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 283, 291
(Kotla).) The court’s exercise of discretion “ ‘ “is subject to the limitations of
legal principles governing the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal
where no reasonable basis for the action is shown.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 292.)
MBC moved to exclude Reilly’s opinions before trial. After a hearing
under Evidence Code section 402, the trial court held Reilly could testify but
limited her testimony to opinions on “human resources standards” and MBC’s
compliance with its own human resources policies. At trial, Reilly testified
MBC’s human resources director failed to conduct a proper investigation
following Maas’s email reporting a pay disparity and failed to take steps to
prevent retaliation.
MBC first claims Reilly did not offer proper expert opinions because her
testimony “was not sufficiently beyond the jury’s experience, nor did it assist
the jury, for a lawyer to opine that an investigation needs to have
experienced people asking pertinent questions in an unbiased manner, of
necessary witnesses, while obtaining relevant documents and being fair and

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thorough.” Expert opinion testimony must “[r]elate[] to a subject that is
sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would
assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) The trial court acted
within its discretion by concluding human resources policies and
investigations are matters beyond the experience of a typical juror.
Indeed, in Kotla, relied on by MBC, the court observed “expert
testimony on predicate issues within the expertise of a human resources
expert is clearly permissible,” noting expert opinion “that the employer
significantly deviated from its ordinary personnel procedures in the aggrieved
employee’s case, might well be relevant to support (or negate) an inference of
retaliation.” (Kotla, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 294, fn. 6.) While dicta, we
agree with this assessment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by
concluding testimony on human resources investigations “by a qualified
expert on human resources management[, here Reilly,] might well assist the
jury in its factfinding.” (Ibid.)
MBC next argues Reilly’s testimony invaded the province of the jury by
opining on the application of law to the facts. Specifically, “Reilly repeatedly
asserted that [California Department of Fair Employment and Housing
(DFEH)] guidance and [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)] materials imposed certain requirements on MBC. Coming from a
lawyer, referencing legal-sounding materials, a juror would naturally
conclude these were legal requirements. Reilly then repeatedly opined that
MBC failed to meet or ‘deviated’ from those supposed legal requirements.
This told the jury that MBC acted unlawfully in the circumstances, which is
impermissible.”
While Reilly opined on MBC’s compliance with state and federal
guidance on discrimination investigations, none of the claims at trial

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concerned whether MBC “violated” any DFEH or EEOC guidance documents.
MBC suggests these materials do not actually constitute binding legal

guidance2 and has not pointed to any testimony showing the jury was led to
believe these standards governed its liability. Reilly’s testimony thus did not
usurp the role of judge or jury in this respect. (Cf. People v. Jo (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1177 (Jo) [expert testimony on provision of law not
directly at issue in the case was admissible where it “did not encompass any
legal conclusion or opinion on any ultimate issue”].)
MBC also argues Reilly “violated the rule against experts instructing
the jury as to the law” by opining, “per the EEOC, prior [work] experience
[eventually] becomes irrelevant,” and per DFEH, “retaliation can occur
‘much, much later’ after a complaint.”
The first opinion was squarely in the context of discussing whether
MBC’s human resources investigation was appropriate. Reilly noted “an
investigator would be asking all of the witnesses about [specific factors] to try
to determine if” these factors were “legitimate, credible, [and] reliable as the
actual reason” for a pay disparity, “[a]nd then you would . . . match them up
to the person you’re comparing it to and see if that factor really is the actual
reason for the pay discrepancy.” She quoted the EEOC guidance as stating,
“The difference in education, experience, training, or ability must correspond
to the compensation disparity. . . . A very slight difference in experience
would not justify a significant compensation disparity. Moreover, continued
reliance on pre-hire qualifications is less reasonable the longer the lower-paid
employee has performed at a level substantially equal to or greater than his

2 The record does not include these documents.
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or her counterpart.” Reilly further stated she did not think MBC’s human
resources director “analyzed these issues,” noting,
“[T]hings that happened a long, long time ago that—you
know, a decade ago or more than that ago, they’re not—an
investigator is supposed to look and see if they’re even
relevant anymore because so much time has passed where
the two comparators have been doing the same job. [¶]
Something that happened a long, long time ago, that’s what
that last sentence is about. If you’re relying on something
that happened pre-hire, a long time ago, it’s not really—it’s
not really relevant anymore because it plays no role in
what they’re doing day to day, then you, as the
investigator, would give little weight to that prior
education, prior experience, prior training, or prior ability.
Because it’s no longer really a factor in what they’re doing
now.”

Reilly did not instruct the jury on the law by explaining what circumstances
investigators are supposed to consider.
Reilly also testified it is important for investigators to admonish both
witnesses and whistleblowers that retaliation is not permitted. She stated
she did not see any evidence MBC’s investigator gave any such admonitions.
Counsel then asked, whether, “[a]ccording to the DFEH
guidelines, . . . retaliation ha[s] to happen right after the incident is
reported,” to which she answered no. She agreed with counsel’s statement it
could “happen much, much later.” Although less clearly limited to her
assessment of the investigation than were other comments, we do not see any
abuse of discretion in admitting this testimony. Again, MBC does not claim
the DFEH guidelines constitute law and does not point to any indicia in the
record the jury would have thought these provisions governed its assessment
of the case. Moreover, Reilly did not apply the guidance to the facts of this
case and thus did not offer any legal conclusions. (See Jo, supra,
15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1177.)
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b. Limitations on Cross-examination of Maas
MBC argues the trial court “erred by curtailing MBC’s cross
examination of Maas about” her “perception of her own value.” But MBC
fails to explain in its opening brief in what way the trial court “curtail[ed]”
the cross examination or to explain how its rulings constituted an abuse of
discretion. “We are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.
[Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority
allows this court to treat the contentions as [forfeited].” (In re Marriage of
Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 (Falcone).) Although MBC
attempts to raise more specific arguments in its reply brief, we decline to
consider these belated contentions. (See, e.g., Neighbours v. Buzz Oates
Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8 (Neighbours) [an “appellant
[must] present all of his points in the opening brief” and “points raised in the
reply brief for the first time will [generally] not be considered”].)
In a related argument, MBC notes the court sustained “vagueness
objections to questions of Maas as to the fact that the market had valued
Denton more highly than her, and sustained its own objection that the
question called for a legal conclusion.” MBC has not explained how the one
vagueness ruling it cites constituted error, forfeiting such argument. (See
Falcone, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.)
MBC also suggests the court abused its discretion by making
inconsistent rulings with respect to “legal conclusion” objections. The court
first sustained the following objection:
“[MAAS:] I think I had more value in the market than
Allen Denton.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay. But the market said
otherwise, didn’t it.

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Argumentative.

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“THE COURT: Calls for a legal conclusion.

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Yes.

“THE COURT: Sustained.”

The court later overruled objections to defense counsel’s questions, “In 2019,
what did you believe your market value as an anchor was?” and, “Did you
have an estimate of what your market value was in terms of a yearly salary?”
Whether or not the first question asking “But the market said
otherwise, didn’t it” called for a legal conclusion, the court properly sustained
an objection to it because the question was argumentative. In effect, counsel
was asking Maas to agree that objective circumstances proved her market
value was less than she believed. This was an argument to the jury rather
than relevant testimony from Maas. (See People v. Chatman (2006) 38
Cal.4th 344, 384 [“An argumentative question that essentially talks past the
witness, and makes an argument to the jury, is improper because it does not
seek to elicit relevant, competent testimony, or often any testimony at all.”)
In contrast, the later questions posed by plaintiff’s counsel concerned Maas’s
subjective estimate of her value. We do not find the court’s differing approach
to these inquiries to be an abuse of discretion..
c. Limitations on Direct Examination of Denton
MBC argues the trial court abused its discretion by sustaining
“relevancy objections to questions to Denton about what facts he knew before
a supportive text to Maas about her lawsuit,” pointing to the following
exchange:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] All right. You expressed some
sympathy to Ms. Maas when you learned KUSI was letting
her go; right?

“[DENTON:] Absolutely.

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“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] At that time, were you aware
that she had been offered a three-year deal and turned it
down for a one-year deal?

“[DENTON:] No, I did not―

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Relevancy.

“THE COURT: Hold on, Mr. Denton. I’m going to sustain
the objection.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] At that time, did you have any
awareness of what her contract negotiations had been?

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Relevancy.

“THE COURT: Sustained.”

According to MBC, “Denton’s ignorance of the[se] facts tended to prove that
his text was uninformed, and therefore meaningless.” (Italics added.) But
defense counsel had not introduced a text message from Denton before asking
this question. And counsel asked specifically whether Denton had “expressed
some sympathy to Ms. Maas when [he] learned KUSI was letting her go,” not
whether he was supportive of her lawsuit. The text message Denton sent
was in response to a news article about Maas’s lawsuit, stating “Looks like
you nailed it. They screwed ya . . . you deserve every single dollar!” It is thus
not clear how the court could have determined counsel’s questions related to

that specific text message.3 MBC has not shown any error in the trial court’s
handling of this issue.

3 Indeed, it appears counsel was not addressing the text message as it
was only later in Denton’s testimony that counsel asked, “Did [Maas] forward
you a news story about her lawsuit at some point in time?”
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d. Misstated Testimony
MBC argues the trial court erred by admitting the following exhibit:

Maas’s counsel displayed this slide during closing argument while stating,
“Mr. Cohen also said Maas actually did more work for KUSI than Denton
considering she did the Healthy Living segment.” MBC argues this was error
because Cohen did not say this exact phrase during his trial testimony.
Cohen testified:
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] And on the issue of
preparedness and hours, you understand that Ms. Maas
had a Healthy Living segment that she prepared every
week; correct?

“[COHEN:] At some point, she began a Healthy Living
segment, which was I think probably two―two minutes and
30 seconds to 3:30 of content that she―that she put
together each week that we ran, yes.

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Okay. And that’s in the 2016,
2017 time frame?

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“[COHEN:] Yes.

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Thank you, sir. And Allen
Denton didn’t have that responsibility; correct?

“[COHEN:] No.”

MBC’s counsel later read aloud from Cohen’s deposition testimony, in which
he testified Denton did not have an “additional duty” like the Healthy Living
segment because Denton anchored the 11:00 news.
It thus appears the slide did not display a direct quote from Cohen’s
testimony, despite putting the language in quotation marks. However, even

assuming the trial court erred,4 MBC has not established prejudice. Cohen
testified Maas did the Healthy Living segments, an “additional duty,” and
Denton did not. While it may have been an exaggeration of his literal
testimony, counsel’s representation was not unsupported.
In addition, both sides questioned Cohen about the Healthy Living
segment, allowing the jury to hear more about his view of the quality and
nature of that work. The jury was instructed demonstrative exhibits had
“not been admitted into evidence” and would not be available to the jurors
during deliberation. The jury was told it could “consider the testimony given
in connection with these materials.” The jury was also instructed lawyers’
arguments are not evidence. In general, courts presume juries dutifully
follow instructions given by the trial court. (Richardson v. Marsh (1987)

4 We note neither the slide nor the closing argument represented that
Cohen had made this statement during his trial testimony. Rather, both
concerned statements made about Maas “before the lawsuit.” What Cohen
said during his trial testimony is potentially beside the point, as other
evidence could also establish what Cohen said before the litigation.
Nonetheless, because the parties focus on Cohen’s trial testimony, we address
this argument on those terms.
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481 U.S. 200, 208, 211.) We do not see any reason to assume the jury ignored
the actual testimony in favor of counsel’s characterization in closing. Thus,
even assuming this was a misstatement of the evidence, we find it was not
prejudicial. (Cf. People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 519 [no prejudice
where “trial court admonished the jury . . . not to mistake counsel’s
statements for evidence” even though there was a “minor variance” between
the argument and “the evidence actually presented”].)
2. Instructional Error
MBC argues the court erred by failing to instruct the jury with three of
its proffered special instructions. With respect to pay discrimination, MBC
asked the court to instruct the jury, “Salary negotiation, where equally
available to both sexes, may be a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation
for a pay differential.” With respect to Maas’s retaliation claim, MBC
requested the following two instructions:
“An employer’s positive employment action following an
employee’s alleged protected activity negates an inference
of retaliation.”

“The passage of time between an employee’s alleged
protected activity and an employer’s alleged retaliatory
action negates an inference of retaliation.”

The court declined to give these instructions.
“A party is entitled upon request to correct, nonargumentative
instructions on every theory of the case advanced by him which is supported
by substantial evidence. The trial court may not force the litigant to rely on
abstract generalities, but must instruct in specific terms that relate the
party’s theory to the particular case.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994)
8 Cal.4th 548, 572.) However, “[t]he giving of an instruction argumentative
in form is error.” (Slayton v. Wright (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 219, 238.)

17
Moreover, “[a] court may—and, indeed, must—refuse an instruction that is
an incorrect statement of the law.” (People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612,
695.)
MBC does not cite any caselaw supporting its proposed salary
negotiation instruction. The only case cited, Hicks v. KNTV Television, Inc.
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 994, 1004, held there were “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason[s]” for a local news channel’s decision not to renew
a contract with an African American anchor. It does not support the
contention the availability of negotiation itself is such a factor. (See ibid.)
Nor do we agree this instruction is a fair interpretation of California law, as a
salary negotiation is a process that may involve legitimate or discriminatory
considerations. The trial court properly rejected this instruction.
MBC’s proposed retaliation instructions are also incorrect and
argumentative insofar as they claim specific factors “negate[] an inference of
retaliation.” Negate means “[t]o nullify” or “render ineffective.” (See Black’s
Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 1240, col. 1.) As drafted, these instructions
would have put a thumb on the scale in MBC’s favor by overstating the
import of these factors. (See, e.g., Wysinger v. Automobile Club of Southern
California (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 413, 421 [Although “[a] long period
between an employer’s adverse employment action and the employee’s earlier
protected activity may lead to the inference that the two events are not
causally connected,” “if between these events the employer engages in a
pattern of conduct consistent with a retaliatory intent, there may be a causal
connection”]; Robinson v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., Red Arrow Div.
(3d Cir. 1993) 982 F.2d 892, 894 [“The mere passage of time is not legally
conclusive proof against retaliation.”]; Negron-Marty v. Wal-Mart Puerto
Rico, Inc. (D.P.R. 2012) 862 F.Supp.2d 48, 71 [intervening “positive

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employment actions are not an affirmative defense to liability” for
retaliation].)
MBC misunderstands the cases it relies on in support of its “passage of
time” instruction. These essentially hold an employer’s knowledge of
protected activity and the adverse employment action must be quite close in
time for the temporal proximity alone to support an inference of retaliation.
(See Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237,
243; Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden (2001) 532 U.S. 268, 273; Kama v.
Mayorkas (9th Cir. 2024) 107 F.4th 1054, 1061.)
We are not persuaded by the unpublished federal cases MBC relies on
in support of its “positive employment action” instruction to the extent they
suggest intervening positive employment actions are dispositive. (Compare
Ghirmai v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2005) 131 Fed.Appx. 609, 611
[“intervening events, such as [manager’s] positive reviews and assistance,
break the causal connection”] and Miglani v. Edwards Lifesciences, LLC
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018, No. 8:17-cv-00418-JLS-DFM) 2018 U.S.Dist. Lexis
227485 [“Plaintiff was given a positive performance review and a bonus after
any 2015 conversation. This fact negates any suggestion that later discipline
was retaliation” for that conversation] with Dumas v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.
(5th Cir. 2008) 294 Fed.Appx. 822, 827 [“lapse of time and the intervening
positive employment action” weakened inference of causal link between
protected activity and termination but were “not conclusive”]; Jeffries v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (6th Cir. 2001) 15 Fed.Appx. 252, 261 [“While an
intervening promotion may undermine the strength of the inference, Wal–
Mart has cited no authority for the proposition that such a promotion defeats,
as a matter of law, the causal link between a protected activity and a
subsequent adverse employment action.”].)

19
The trial court properly rejected MBC’s instructions as proposed, and
instead instructed the jury it could only find retaliation if it concluded Maas’s
reporting illegal conduct “was a contributing factor in [MBC’s] decision to
subject her to an adverse employment action by not renewing [her] contract.”
(See Lawson v. PPG Architectural Finishes, Inc. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 703, 713–
714 [whistleblower plaintiff “may satisfy [her] burden of proving unlawful
retaliation even when other, legitimate factors also contributed to the
adverse action”].)
3. “Social Justice Appeals”
MBC claims Maas and her counsel made inappropriate references to
issues of societal inequality, “invit[ing] the jury to decide the case on an
improper basis.” As explained post, MBC has not preserved this argument
for appeal.
a. Gender-Related Statements and “Me Too Evidence”
MBC first points to statements in Maas’s opening statement and
closing argument it claims were objectionable. In opening statement, Maas’s
counsel described Maas as someone who “considers herself a . . . champion of
women’s rights.” In closing argument, Maas’s counsel stated: (1) “each of us
sitting and standing in this courtroom has a vested interest in this case”;
(2) gender discrimination, equal pay, and retaliation are “deeply rooted . . . in
the corporations in this country and in [MBC] and . . . remain woven into the
fabric of their culture and . . . these systemic inequalities are silenced”;
(3) “[t]his is just one of many cases, one of many cases that typically go
unheard and unaddressed”; (4) “[t]his is a case that is relevant not just to Ms.
Maas, but to women who suffer pay disparity all over this country”; and
(5) “we need you, members of the jury, to put ‘Yes’ on the punitive damages
box to punish them for what they have done to Sandra Maas and other

20
women in the community.” MBC did not object to any of these statements
below and has not preserved these issues for appeal. (See People v. Seumanu
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1333 [defendant forfeited challenge to statements
made in prosecutor’s closing argument by failing to make timely and specific
objection].)
To circumvent forfeiture, MBC suggests objections to these statements
would have been futile, arguing “time pressures prevented proper objections,
admonitions, and curative instructions to counter all of counsel’s
misconduct.” MBC specifically claims the court “made it clear that because of
time pressures, [it] did not want interruptions to closing arguments.” The
record belies these contentions.
The court explained the parties were to exchange all demonstrative
visual aids before their closing arguments because “the other side has to have
a right to object.” It is in this context the court added, “I do not want a bunch
of interruptions during closing argument.” Moreover, MBC was aware of its
ability to object since it raised four objections during Maas’s closing
argument—three of which were sustained. The court also agreed to give two
curative instructions after closing arguments, demonstrating the court was
willing to provide such instructions despite “time pressures.” MBC does not
claim the court refused any requested curative instructions.
MBC also complains Maas’s counsel used a picture showing “a crowd of
protesters holding signs demanding ‘Equal Pay’ and ‘When will this
change?’ ” While MBC objected to three exhibits, it did not object to Maas’s
use of the “Equal Pay” graphic. It has thus forfeited its challenge.
MBC next argues Maas’s counsel made “improper appeals” in its
questioning of witnesses, first by asking one witness whether KUSI’s
broadcasts covered “the pay gap [between men and women] in this country”

21
and whether McKinnon thought the issue was important, then by asking
another why “KUSI continually and always” paired “much older men with
younger females.” However, in the first exchange, the court sustained all of
MBC’s objections. In the second exchange, the court only overruled one of
MBC’s objections:
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Did you ever have any
conversations with Steve Cohen or either of the McKinnons
about why KUSI continually and always pairs much older
men with younger females?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Objection; assumes facts not in
evidence.

“THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer, Mr. Rudy.

“[WITNESS:] That would not be a conversation I would
have with Mr. Cohen or the McKinnons.

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] You’ve been in the news
business for how many years now?

“[WITNESS:] This will be 40.

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Do you know why it is that
stations like KUSI pair older anchors, [W]hite anchors,
older [W]hite men, with younger females?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Objection; lacks foundation.

“THE COURT: Sustained.

“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] With regard to your
experience at KUSI, did you ever find out or make an effort
to find out why KUSI―KUSI paired older [W]hite
gentlemen, anchors, with younger females?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Objection; assumes facts not in
evidence and misstates the evidence.

“THE COURT: Sustained.

22
“[PLAINTIFF’S COUNSEL:] Sir, given your experience at
KUSI, did you notice a pattern of older men working with
younger women?

“[WITNESS:] I never really gave it much thought. So no, I
didn’t notice.”

MBC’s counsel did not object during either exchange on the grounds
argued here on appeal. To preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must be
sufficient “to enable the court to make an informed ruling on the motion or
objection.” (People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 854.) None of MBC’s
objections, whether sustained or overruled, alerted the trial court to the
argument it is advancing on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Demetrulias (2006)
39 Cal.4th 1, 20–21 (Demetrulias) [objections regarding relevance, non-
responsiveness, foundation, and speculation did not “alert the trial court to
the claim that the testimony objected to is inadmissible character evidence”].)
That argument is thus forfeited with respect to these questions.
In any event, we see no likelihood counsel’s questions swayed the jury,
especially in light of the court’s instruction: “The attorneys’ questions are not
evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence. You should not think
that something is true just because an attorney’s question suggested that it
was true.”
MBC next claims Maas improperly testified about more general
discrimination by MBC and in the broader community. MBC has not
preserved its arguments with respect to that testimony either.
In cross examination, defense counsel asked Maas, “What you’re
seeking through this lawsuit is money; right?” Maas responded, “What I’m
seeking in this lawsuit, to expose [MBC] for what it is. They are not a friend
of women.” The court overruled MBC’s motion to strike this answer as
nonresponsive. MBC does not argue the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of

23
discretion. Nor did MBC’s objection alert the court to other grounds for
exclusion. (See, e.g., Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 20–21.)
MBC also points to Maas’s statement, “I am seeking justice, [counsel].
My story is not unusual at [MBC]. There are other women in that newsroom
who are afraid to share what happened to them.” The trial court partially
sustained MBC’s objection that the testimony was “not . . . based on personal
knowledge and beyond the call of the question,” instructing the jury to
disregard the last sentence. But again, MBC’s objections did not fairly alert
the trial court to the concern that any part of the testimony included
“improper me too’-type evidence,” as it now argues. (See Demetrulias, supra,
39 Cal.4th at pp. 20–21.) Therefore, it has not preserved this argument for
appeal, either.
In addition, MBC moved to strike Maas’s answer after she stated,
“Female journalists at KUSI when they got wind of my lawsuit, Sasha Foo
told me she hadn’t had a raise in 13 years. . . . Ashlie Rodriguez―” Counsel
did not provide grounds for the motion, stating only “I’m going to move to
strike.” The court then announced the afternoon recess and asked to see
counsel in chambers. Although MBC now argues this should have been
stricken as “me too-type” evidence, the record does not reflect it made this
objection contemporaneously. MBC has thus not preserved the argument for
appeal. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a) [objection must “make clear the
specific ground of the objection”].)
Finally, MBC cites testimony to which no objection was made. Because
MBC did not object to this testimony at all, it has not preserved the question
of its propriety for appeal. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)

24
b. Race-Related Statements
MBC argues it was also prejudiced by several allusions to race during
trial. It first points to Maas’s statement MBC had presented an abridged
version of her social media posts, leaving out pictures with her “ethnically
diverse group of friends.” But by failing to object to this statement MBC has
not preserved its argument on appeal. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).)
MBC next points to questions Maas’s counsel asked about why KUSI
paired older, “[W]hite” male anchors with younger female anchors. The court
sustained all of MBC’s objections to these questions. In any case, we do not
find stray references to “[W]hite” men particularly inflammatory and, as
previously explained, the jury was instructed counsel’s questions are not
evidence.
Finally, MBC points to a statement in Maas’s rebuttal argument to the
jury, urging jurors to reject part of MBC’s theory because “if [it] were the
case, . . . women and people of color” would be “in a very bad position.” The
court sustained MBC’s objection. Again, we do not think this statement was
so inflammatory that the jury was incapable of disregarding it in accordance
with the trial court’s ruling.
4. Closing Argument Time Limits
MBC argues the trial court abused its discretion by limiting closing
argument to 60 minutes per side and granting Maas an extra 30 minutes for
rebuttal. “Trial courts have broad discretion to control the duration and
scope of closing arguments.” (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 147.) A
trial court’s “determination of the proper allotment will seldom be disturbed

25
on appeal.” (People v. Fairchild (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 831, 841.) We find the
trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in the circumstances of this case.
The court advised counsel in advance it would impose time limits on
closing argument. In response to MBC’s request for two and a half hours to
argue, the court stated, “I have never had a closing go that long. And while
this is a complex case, I’ve had plenty of cases in different areas that are just
as complex, if not perhaps a little even more complicated.” MBC told the trial
court its argument could be shorter if the court had given MBC more time “to
dwell on the defense evidence.” The court directly responded to this
assertion, explaining the defense had initially requested three days for its
defense then adjusted its estimate to two days, and ended up using
approximately two and a half days. The court also noted it had allowed MBC
leeway to present some of its defense during Maas’s case in chief, and stated,
“I’m starting to hear some of the same testimony over and over again. So I’m
not certain what more you want to put on that we haven’t already heard.”
Counsel for MBC did not identify any additional evidence it wanted to
present and acknowledged MBC had time to present evidence during Maas’s
case in chief.
On appeal, MBC argues the closing argument time limit prevented it
from addressing specific issues, including: (1) “Maas’s counsel’s efforts to
sway the jury with irrelevant and improper arguments about the pay gap in
society at large, social justice, and the notion of wrongful termination”; (2) a
recruiting email sent to another anchor after Maas’s complaint about unequal
pay; (3) “positive employment actions that followed Maas’s allegedly
whistleblowing email”; and (4) “demonstrative exhibits illustrating [witness]

26
testimony about how little work Maas performed in preparing her Healthy

Living segments.”5
Even if the trial court might have granted MBC more time for
argument, on appeal we are not free to supplant our judgment for that of an
experienced trial judge who is aware of the facts of the case. (See Herring v.
New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 862 [“The presiding judge must be and is
given great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the scope of
closing summations.”]; Hollywood v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 721,
729 [trial courts are better situated than appellate courts to evaluate issues
“in light of the entirety of a case”].) The trial court’s limitation in this case
was not so severe as to constitute an abuse of its broad discretion. Indeed, as
a leading treatise notes, “arguments longer than an hour are often lost on the
jury.” (Fairbank et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials & Evidence (The
Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 13:29, p. 13-7.)
Nor do we agree it was an abuse of discretion to grant Maas an
additional 30 minutes for rebuttal argument. MBC cites two out-of-
jurisdiction cases, neither of which supports the claim parties must have
equal time for closing argument. (See Maloney v. Brassfield (Colo.App. 2010)

5 Under the heading “MBC Was Denied Adequate Time for Closing
Argument,” MBC also argues the court erred by excluding some of the
demonstrative exhibits it sought to use during a witness’s testimony. To the
extent MBC intended to challenge this ruling, it has forfeited its arguments
by failing to present them under an appropriate heading. (Bitner v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1065
[“ ‘Failure to provide proper headings forfeits issues that may be discussed in
the brief but are not clearly identified by a heading.’ ”].) In any event, if we
were to reach the issue, MBC fails to explain how the exclusion of these items
resulted in prejudice, thus forfeiting any such arguments. (See, e.g., Asaro v.
Maniscalco (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 717, 728, fn. 4 [a party forfeits arguments
not briefed on appeal].)
27
251 P.3d 1097, 1103 [finding no abuse of discretion in time limits imposed for
presentation of evidence]; Latino Officers Ass’n v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 8, 2003) 2003 U.S.Dist. Lexis 17778 [imposing time limits for trial as a
whole, and stating, “Fairness dictates that defendants be given equal time”].)
Rather, a trial court is free to balance the requirements of each case to fairly
allocate argument time. Although the trial court did not explain its
reasoning, Maas had the ultimate burden of persuasion on her claims. (See,
e.g., Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 215 [In an
employment discrimination case, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuasion on the
issue of discrimination remains with the plaintiff”]; Joaquin v. City of Los
Angeles (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1207, 1220 [same, retaliation].) In light of
this burden, there was a rational basis for the trial court to grant Maas
additional time for rebuttal.
MBC claims comparative burdens cannot justify the discrepancy in the
time given by the court to each side for closing argument, maintaining MBC
“bore a larger burden of proof than Maas.” According to MBC, it had the
burden of establishing the principal issues in contention, (1) whether “bona
fide factors other than sex justified the pay differential” and (2) whether “its
non-renewal decision would have been made regardless of her age and
gender.” But to establish her equal pay claim, Maas had to prove she “was
performing substantially similar work as [Denton] considering the overall
combination of skill, effort, and responsibility required” and she “was
working under similar working conditions as” Denton. Maas’s skill and effort
were sharply disputed at trial, with MBC arguing Maas did not work as hard
as Denton and lacked his experience and talent. We do not agree that the
elements of Maas’s claim had been conceded.

28
Moreover, to establish her gender and age discrimination claim, she
had to prove her “gender and/or age was a substantial motivating reason for
[MBC’s] decision to not renew [her] contract.” And to establish her
retaliation claim, she had to prove her reporting of illegal conduct “was a
contributing factor in [MBC’s] decision to subject her to an adverse
employment action by not renewing [her] contract.” These issues overlap
significantly with MBC’s affirmative defense as they bear on the reason for
MBC’s decision not to renew her contract. It is thus not accurate to say MBC
had the burden of proof on the principal issues in dispute. MBC has not
shown the trial court’s allocation of argument time was an abuse of
discretion.
5. Cumulative Error
MBC argues but for the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors,
there is a reasonable probability the jury would have found for MBC. As
discussed above, we do not agree there were significant errors or
irregularities, and the one potential error, permitting Maas to present an

interpretation of Cohen’s testimony as a direct quote, was not prejudicial.6
B. Attorney Fees
MBC argues the trial court erred by awarding Maas fees without
adjusting for her unsuccessful claims or cutting fees based on “unsupportable
time entries.” In her cross-appeal, Maas argues the trial court erred by
failing to use a multiplier to increase her fee award. An award of attorney
fees “is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best

6 For the first time in its reply brief, MBC appears to argue the trial
court should have granted its motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict because there was no substantial evidence supporting the jury’s
retaliation verdict. MBC has forfeited this argument by failing to make it in
its opening brief. (See Neighbours, supra, 217 Cal.App.3d at p. 335, fn. 8.)
29
position to evaluate the services rendered, and the court’s decision will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong.” (City of Oakland v. Oakland
Raiders (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 78, 85.) As we shall explain, neither party has
shown the court’s order was clearly wrong.
1. MBC’s Appeal
MBC argues “the trial court deducted only $44,782.50” from Maas’s
requested fee award instead of the $195,085 MBC objected to. In fact,
through a combination of reducing the requested rates and cutting claimed
hours, the court reduced the requested fees by $348,208.50. It is unclear how
MBC can establish error when the trial court apparently reduced the award
by more than MBC requested. In any case, according to the trial court’s
order, it “performed an extremely detailed analysis of the disputed hours and
exercised its best judgment in agreeing with some objections, and disagreeing
with others.” This “detailed analysis” is reflected in specific recalculations as
to each timekeeper. MBC has not provided this court with sufficient grounds

to second-guess the trial court’s best judgment.7
MBC also argues the trial court should have reduced Maas’s fee award
to reflect her limited success. MBC claims the trial court erred as a matter of
law by failing to consider this factor at all. In opposing Maas’s motion, MBC
urged, “[a]ny fee award should reflect [Maas’s] watered-down result” in
comparison to what Maas originally sought. In response, Maas argued “there
was substantial overlap on the activities necessary to prosecute [all] the
employment claims in this matter, as the factual and legal issues were

7 Rather than brief its arguments on appeal, MBC merely lists purported
failings it states are “detailed in MBC’s opposition to Maas’s motion” in the
trial court. “We do not consider such arguments on appeal.” (Garrick
Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320,
334.)

30
inextricably intertwined.” The trial court stated it had “fully considered the
arguments of all parties, both written and oral.” We therefore must assume
the court fully considered the arguments concerning Maas’s degree of success.
(See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140 (Ketchum) [“ ‘ “All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support [the ruling] on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively

shown.” ’ ”].)8
MBC next claims the court was required to “articulate a clear
explanation of its reasoning,” relying on a quote from Harman v. City &
County of San Francisco (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1279, 1317. In California,
“ ‘there is no general rule requiring trial courts to explain their decisions on
motions seeking attorney fees.’ ” (Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2021) 72
Cal.App.5th 334, 361.) Harman concerned fees arising under 42 United
States Code section 1988 and made a noted departure from California’s
default rule, stating, “in reviewing a federal remedy, it is reasonable to insist
on a record adequate to allow a meaningful review of federal standards
governing the remedy.” (Harman, at p. 1308.) Because the fees at issue were
awarded under Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1197.5, subdivision (h), there
is no cause to depart from standard state practice.
MBC also cites Espejo v. The Copley Press, Inc. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th
329, 382 (Espejo), for the proposition “a fee award must be reversed and
remanded where a trial court fails to follow the Supreme Court’s Hensley v.
Eckerhart (1983) 461 U.S. 424, 437 two-step inquiry, and fails to explain why
a fee reduction is unwarranted in light of a plaintiff’s limited success.” In

8 We note MBC has not provided a record of what was discussed at the
motion hearing, and “ ‘[i]t is the burden of the party challenging the fee
award on appeal to provide an adequate record to assess error.” (Ketchum,
supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1140–1141.)
31
Espejo, the trial court awarded damages to a class of plaintiffs for
unreimbursed business expenses. (Espejo, at p. 341.) On appeal, the court
found the damages award “fail[ed] to take into account clearly specified
credits, reversals, and payments to [the plaintiffs] in the business expense
categories at issue in determining the amount of restitution to award,”
reversing and remanding for the court to recalculate the appropriate
damages. (Id. at pp. 368, 370, 386.)
The court also “conclude[d] the trial court should reconsider the
amount of the [attorney fee] award in light of the possible reduction of
plaintiffs’ monetary award on remand,” noting, “[b]ecause the degree of
success plaintiffs will achieve after redetermination of their monetary award
on remand may change, the court’s assessment of the degree of success
achieved by plaintiffs’ counsel could also change.” (Espejo, supra,
13 Cal.App.5th at p. 381.) The court observed the order did “not reflect that
the [trial] court applied the Hensley two-step inquiry or otherwise considered
plaintiffs’ limited success in determining the amount of their fee award.” (Id.
at p. 382.) However, the remand on attorney fees was not because of a lack of
reasons in the order, but because the potential damages adjustment would
potentially affect the fee analysis. (See ibid.) Because we do not disturb the
underlying judgment, we have no reason to ask the court to reassess its fee
award.
With respect to the substance of the court’s award, MBC argues a
reduction was required because “Maas sued on seven causes of action” and
only prevailed on two. But fees should not be “reduced when a plaintiff
prevails on only one of several factually related and closely intertwined

32
claims.” (Chavez v. City of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th 970, 989.) Maas’s
unsuccessful claims were closely intertwined with her prevailing claims.
Before trial, Maas voluntarily dismissed two of her retaliation claims
and her claim that MBC failed to prevent discrimination. The retaliation
causes of action were largely duplicative, alleging under different legal
theories that MBC retaliated against Maas for advocating against gender
discrimination and unequal pay. Maas’s failure to prevent discrimination
claim was also closely related to her other claims, as indicated by the trial
court’s ruling that Reilly could testify on MBC’s failure to investigate pay
inequity even after Maas dropped her failure to prevent discrimination claim.
Maas lost her age and gender discrimination claim at trial, but the
court could have reasonably concluded the theories were also factually
related to and closely intertwined with her prevailing claims. The basis for
Maas’s gender discrimination claim was MBC’s refusal to renew her contract.
This arises from the same factual nexus as the equal pay and retaliation
claims. Maas’s age discrimination claim arose largely from statements made
by Cohen after she was informed her contract would not be renewed. The
circumstances under which Maas left KUSI also closely connect with Maas’s

retaliation and gender discrimination claims.9 For example, Maas alleged in
her complaint, “KUSI treated [Maas] differently than her male peers. At
KUSI, male anchors were given the opportunity to determine when to leave
the job. At KUSI, the standard was different for women over forty compared

9 Although MBC argues in its reply brief the age discrimination claim
“was entirely separable, as age discrimination is a distinct wrong, and
requires proving a distinct set of facts” it fails to provide any record citations
or authority for these assertions.
33
to men over forty. According to KUSI, women over forty had a ‘cycle’ and had
to make room for a ‘new generation,’ while men over forty did not.”
In sum, MBC has not provided any basis to believe the trial court failed
to consider Maas’s limited success. Nor has MBC shown the award of
attorney fees, compared to the overall relief obtained by Maas, was so
disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
2. Maas’s Cross-Appeal
Maas argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enhance
the fee award in light of contingency fee risk. A court may apply a
“multiplier” to the lodestar amount to account for contingency risk. (See
Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48.) The purpose of such a multiplier is
to account for the risk of loss and delay in payment in contingency fee cases
and thus persuade attorneys to take on cases of significant public interest.
(See Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132
Cal.App.4th 359, 395.) However, a court may also decide instead to include
the contingency risk value in setting the lodestar itself, in which case it
would deny a multiplier. (Ibid. [“The contingency adjustment may be made
at the lodestar phase of the court’s calculation or by applying a multiplier to
the noncontingency lodestar calculation (but not both)”] italics added.) That
is apparently what the court did here, stating:
“After reviewing the moving, opposing, and reply points and
authorities and all declarations submitted, the Court finds the
rates charged by other counsel in employment actions are
commensurate with those awarded to plaintiff’s counsel in this
matter. The Court finds the rates listed take into account the
risk and delay in payment.”

Maas nonetheless claims the trial court’s explanation of its decision is
deficient, citing Ramos v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2000) 82
Cal.App.4th 615, 626. In Ramos, this court found the trial court’s application

34
of a large multiplier (2.5) was an apparent abuse of discretion because the
record reflected the trial court counted “the same factors” when setting the
lodestar and when applying a multiplier, thus “creat[ing] a windfall.” (Ibid.)
The court also found “[a] reasonable exercise of discretion [would] not allow”
the very high hourly rate after the multiplier “except in truly pioneering and
high risk cases.” (Ibid.) Because this court did “not understand the trial
court’s apparent conclusion that this is such a case,” it said it “require[d]
more explanation before we may uphold it . . . as a valid exercise of
discretion.” (Ibid.) Thus, in Ramos, the trial court’s exercise of discretion
was not supported by the record and the order contained an apparent legal
error.
Here, the court expressly stated it considered “the risk and delay in
payment” when considering appropriate hourly rates for Maas’s counsel.
Maas’s arguments to the contrary lack foundation. Although Maas also
complains it is unclear how the court assessed appropriate rates, “ ‘[t]he
value of legal services performed in a case is a matter in which the trial court
has its own expertise. [Citation.] The trial court may make its own
determination of the value of the services contrary to, or without the
necessity for, expert testimony.’ ” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th
1084, 1096.) Maas fails to point to anything in the order or the record that
would suggest an abuse of discretion.
C. MBC’s Second Appeal
Shortly after trial, Maas filed an ex parte application claiming MBC
was selling KUSI’s assets to another corporation. By stipulated order, MBC
agreed to deposit $6,331,910.15 with the court, and Maas agreed to delay
enforcement of the judgment until after the sale of KUSI.

35
After MBC filed its first appeal, the parties engaged in settlement
discussions. Eventually, these negotiations reached an impasse.
On February 14, 2024, MBC filed a notice and “Amended Notice of
Availability of Funds on Deposit to Satisfy Judgment,” stating MBC “hereby
makes the $6,331,910.15 on deposit with the Court available to [Maas] to the
extent needed to satisfy the Judgment.” MBC calculated the amount owed as
$4,496,253.02. MBC claimed this notice stopped the accrual of interest under

Code of Civil Procedure10 section 685.030. MBC also “reserve[d] its right to
obtain disbursement of all funds on deposit with the court in excess all of the
amount needed to satisfy the judgment.” Maas would not accept payment
from MBC because, among other things, she sought fees and costs she had
incurred in connection with enforcing the judgment, and motion for such
costs must “be made before the judgment is satisfied in full.” (§ 685.080,
subd. (a).) On March 20, 2024, Maas filed a motion seeking $105,845.00 in
postjudgment attorney fees. That same day, MBC filed a motion for
determination of judgment satisfaction. The trial court held a hearing on
both motions on April 12 and issued its order on April 18.
The court disagreed with MBC’s argument that its notice and
“Amended Notice of Availability of Funds on Deposit to Satisfy Judgment”
stopped the accrual of interest, finding the notice sought to condition the
release of the funds on the return of the balance of the deposit and its refusal
to pay postjudgment attorney fees. The court found “interest on the
judgment [would] cease on April 19, 2024,” mistakenly stating this was “the
date of the . . . order setting forth the amount of deposited funds to disburse
to [Maas].” The court calculated the amount owed on the judgment, including

10 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise specified.
36
attorney fees and interest, as $4,570,453.79, and awarded an additional
$51,172.50 in postjudgment fees to Maas.
The court also held it would retain the balance of MBC’s deposit
pending Maas’s appeal, stating:
“The Court disagrees with [MBC] that a potential award of
a lodestar multiplier for [Maas’s] previous motion for
attorneys’ fees and costs (if [Maas] prevails on appeal) is a
separate judgment. Although an award of [Maas’s]
attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in bringing her appeal
would constitute a separate judgment (Lucky United
Properties Inv., Inc. v. Lee (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 125, 138),
the relief afforded to [Maas] in awarding a lodestar
multiplier on the original fees motion would constitute part
of the original judgment.”

1. Interest
Section 685.030, subdivision (b), provides, “If a money judgment is
satisfied in full . . . interest ceases to accrue on the date the judgment is
satisfied in full.” A judgment is satisfied in full on the earliest of several
enumerated dates, including “[t]he date satisfaction is tendered to the
judgment creditor or deposited in court for the judgment creditor.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(2).)
The trial court erred in determining the date of interest cessation.
MBC’s February 14, 2024, notice made “the $6,331,910.15 on deposit with the
Court available to [Maas] to the extent needed to satisfy the Judgment.”
MBC had already “deposited” the funds with the court. It thus satisfied the
plain language of the statute, and the funds were “deposited in court for the
judgment creditor” as of February 14, 2024.
The trial court found this notice was not sufficient to satisfy
section 685.030 because MBC disclaimed Maas’s postjudgment fees and
sought the return of the rest of its deposit. The notice purports to “reserve[]

37
[MBC’s] right to obtain disbursement of all funds on deposit with the Court in
excess all of the amount needed to satisfy the Judgment,” but this is a
reservation of rights with respect to funds not needed to satisfy the judgment,
not a condition on the release of funds.
We also fail to see how MBC’s refusal to pay additional postjudgment
fees constituted a condition on the release of funds to satisfy the judgment.
MBC (incorrectly) took the position its notice also cut off Maas’s right to seek
additional attorney fees under section 685.080, subdivision (a). But whether
Maas could withdraw the funds and still seek postjudgment fees under
section 685.080 is separate from whether MBC had satisfied the judgment for
purposes of section 685.030. (See Wertheim LLC v. Currency Corp. (2019)
35 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1134 [“[S]atisfaction of a judgment for purposes of
interest cessation does not satisfy the judgment for all purposes. In the
context of a postjudgment motion for costs, the judgment is not satisfied until
the judgment creditor has been paid.”].) Moreover, section 685.080 is not a
“condition” imposed by MBC, but the normal operation of interrelated
statutes. Indeed, it is an intended consequence of these statutes that MBC
was able to protect itself from the further accrual of interest by depositing the
funds in accordance with section 685.030, while Maas was able to protect her
ability to seek additional fees under section 685.080 by refusing to accept the
funds. (See Wertheim, at p. 1134.)
In short, the notice was sufficient to stop interest accrual under
section 685.030. On remand, the court shall recalculate interest owed on the
judgment with a cessation date of February 14, 2024.
2. Retention of the Deposit
MBC argues the trial court should not have retained the balance of the
deposit and asks us to order the trial court to “release all MBC funds on

38
deposit with the Superior Court, including all accrued interest.” We have
some concerns regarding the trial court’s retention of MBC’s deposit. MBC
tendered a deposit to the court to stay enforcement of the judgment. That
was no longer a live concern once the full amount of the judgment was
released to Maas. And neither the trial court nor Maas has identified any
authority for the court’s retention of the deposit to secure funds in the event
of Maas’s victory on her appeal.
Nonetheless, this issue is mooted by our resolution of the consolidated
appeals. Whether or not the trial court should have retained MBC’s deposit
is now legally irrelevant. The trial court retained the deposit because it
reasoned “the relief afforded to [Maas] in awarding a lodestar multiplier on
the original fees motion would constitute part of the original judgment.” We
have determined Maas is not entitled to a multiplier on her attorney fee
award. Therefore, the trial court will release the balance of MBC’s deposit on
remand. Because our opinion cannot provide any effective relief, the issue is
moot, and we will not decide it. (See, e.g., Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar
Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178.)
IV. DISPOSITION
With respect to appeal No. D082767, the judgment is affirmed. Maas is
entitled to recover costs incurred in connection with MBC’s appeal, and MBC
is entitled to its costs in connection with Maas’s cross-appeal.

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With respect to appeal No. D084334, on remand, the trial court is
directed to recalculate interest on the judgment with a cessation date of
February 14, 2024. The parties are to bear their own costs in connection with
this appeal.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

KELETY, J.

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