CourtListener 10773354•Parker v. Freiberger CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 1/12/26 Parker v. Freiberger CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
SHILOH PARKER,
B342580
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV07715)
v.
HALEY FREIBERGER et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.
Shiloh A. Parker, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Reeder McCreary, Christopher S. Reeder, Duncan
McCreary, and Marcus L. Tippens, for Defendants and
Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiff Shiloh Parker appeals from an order granting
defendants Haley and Kyle Freiberger’s motion to quash service
of summons in Parker’s lawsuit against them.1 The Freibergers,
who are Georgia residents, listed a Georgia property for rent on
Zillow.com (Zillow). Parker applied to rent the property and the
parties negotiated a lease. After a dispute over the deposit and
first month’s rent, Parker sued the Freibergers in California.
The Freibergers specially appeared and moved to quash service of
summons for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court
granted the motion.
We conclude that the Freibergers did not purposefully avail
themselves of the protections of California law, and further
conclude that Parker has not identified any other basis for
reversal. We therefore affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In March 2024, Parker filed a lawsuit against the
Freibergers in Los Angeles County Superior Court.2 Parker
alleged that she was a Los Angeles resident at all times relevant
to the parties’ dispute. Sometime in early 2024, Parker searched
on Zillow for rental properties in Georgia “to eliminate the
monthly travel of her military husband to Georgia for reserve
duty.” She applied to rent a property in Athens, Georgia owned
by the Freibergers. In early February, the parties negotiated a
one-year lease and Parker sent a deposit. Parker alleged that the
1 Because the Freibergers share a last name, we refer to
them by first name herein. No disrespect is intended.
2 The complaint is not included in the record on appeal. We
take this aspect of our statement of facts from the trial court’s
description of the relevant allegations.
2
Freibergers had agreed to mail her the keys as soon as she paid
the deposit, but they did not incorporate that agreement into the
lease, and the Freibergers refused to send the keys until Parker
sent the first month’s rent. Parker sued the Freibergers for
fraud, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
unfair business practices, and disgorgement.
In June 2024, the Freibergers specially appeared in the
action and moved to quash service of summons. The motion
argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the
Freibergers and that Parker failed to properly serve them with
the summons and complaint.
Haley and Kyle provided signed declarations in support of
the motion. They declared that they reside in Georgia and own a
residential rental property in that state. In February 2024,
Parker contacted the Freibergers about leasing the property. The
Freibergers provided Parker with a video tour and exchanged
text messages with her regarding a lease agreement. Parker and
her spouse signed the lease “via Zillow” on February 8, 2024, and
the Freibergers signed it electronically the next day
According to the Freibergers’ declarations, the lease
agreement required Parker to submit a security deposit and the
first month’s rent at the time of signing. Parker’s bank account
prohibited her from sending the full amount in one transaction.
She sent the Freibergers the deposit through Zelle shortly after
signing the lease. On February 11, 2024, Haley asked Parker
about the first month’s rent. Parker “got upset” and asked the
Freibergers to return the security deposit if they were unwilling
to wait until March 1, 2024, to receive the first month’s rent.
On February 11, 2024, Parker e-mailed the Freibergers a
letter demanding that they preserve evidence relating to Parker
3
and nonparty Joseph Parker. The next day, Parker e-mailed the
Freibergers a draft complaint to be filed against them in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.
Haley’s declaration in support of the motion to quash
attached a sworn declaration filed by Parker in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California in which
Parker declared that she was living in Georgia on February 10,
2024.3
Parker opposed the motion to quash in September 2024.
The opposition argued that the court had personal jurisdiction
over the Freibergers because they purposefully availed
themselves of the benefits and protections of California law by
posting their rental property on Zillow. In support of the
opposition, Parker declared that she was a licensed attorney and
the sole proprietor of a law office in the State of California, and
that the Freibergers were aware that she conducted business in
California. She further declared that she was in California when
the Freibergers contacted her to conduct a video tour of the
property.
The opposition also asserted that the motion should be
denied because it was not properly served. In support of this
argument, Parker declared that she did not agree to electronic
service of the motion to quash.
The trial court issued a tentative ruling on October 21,
2024. The court concluded that the Freibergers were not subject
to personal jurisdiction in California. It found that the
Freibergers reside in Georgia and had no contacts with California
aside from their communications with Parker regarding the
3 The declaration was filed in J.P. v. Eastern Revenue, Inc., et
al., case No. 2:23-cv-10512-HDV-E.
4
lease. The court determined that the Freibergers’ use of Zillow to
offer their rental property for lease did not demonstrate that they
purposefully availed themselves of the benefits of California. The
court therefore tentatively granted the Freibergers’ motion to
quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The court rejected Parker’s argument that she was not
served with the motion to quash. It cited a proof of service
attached to the motion to quash, which reflected that Parker was
served by mail. Although Parker’s declaration asserted that she
did not agree to electronic service, the court determined this was
irrelevant since Parker provided no evidence to contradict the
proof of service.
On October 22, 2024, the court adopted its tentative ruling
as final and entered an order granting the Freibergers’ motion to
quash.
Parker moved for reconsideration of the order quashing
service of summons on October 30, 2024. The trial court denied
her motion on December 3, 2024.
Parker timely appealed from the order granting the motion
to quash and order denying her motion for reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
I. The Freibergers are not subject to personal
jurisdiction in California
Parker argues that the trial court erred in granting the
Freibergers’ motion to quash service of summons because the
5
Freibergers are subject to specific jurisdiction in this state. For
the reasons discussed herein, we disagree.
A. Legal framework and standard of review
California courts “may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the
United States.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 410.10.)4 “A state court’s
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
who has not been served with process within the state comports
with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal
Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with
the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate
‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ”
(Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th
434, 444 (Vons), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington
(1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.)
“Under the minimum contacts test, ‘[p]ersonal jurisdiction
may be either general or specific.’ ” (Snowney v. Harrah’s
Entertainment, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062 (Snowney).)
Parker does not argue that the Freibergers are subject to general
jurisdiction, and therefore “we only consider whether specific
jurisdiction exists here.” (Ibid.)
“A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant only if: (1) ‘the defendant has purposefully
availed himself or herself of forum benefits’ [citation]; (2) ‘the
“controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ [the] defendant’s
contacts with the forum” ’ [citations]; and (3) ‘ “the assertion of
personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and
4 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
6
substantial justice.’ ” ’ ” (Pavlovich v. Superior Court (2002) 29
Cal.4th 262, 269 (Pavlovich), abrogated on another ground as
stated in David L. v. Superior Court (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 359,
369–370, 372.)
“An out-of-state defendant purposefully avails itself of a
forum state’s benefits if the defendant (1) purposefully directs its
activities at the forum state’s residents, (2) purposefully derives a
benefit from its activities in the forum state, or (3) purposefully
invokes the privileges and protections of the forum state’s laws by
(a) purposefully engaging in ‘significant activities’ within the
forum state or (b) purposefully creating ‘continuing [contractual]
obligations’ between itself and the residents of the forum state.”
(Jacqueline B. v. Rawls Law Group, P.C. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
243, 253 (Jacqueline B.).)
“ ‘When a defendant moves to quash service of process’ for
lack of specific jurisdiction, ‘the plaintiff has the initial burden of
demonstrating facts justifying the exercise of jurisdiction.’
[Citation.] ‘If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, then the
defendant has the burden of demonstrating “that the exercise of
jurisdiction would be unreasonable.” ’ [Citation].” (Snowney,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1062.)
“When there is conflicting evidence, the trial court’s factual
determinations are not disturbed on appeal if supported by
substantial evidence. [Citation.] When no conflict in the
evidence exists, however, the question of jurisdiction is purely
one of law and the reviewing court engages in an independent
review of the record.” (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 449.)
Parker’s opening brief purports to challenge several factual
findings as inconsistent with the record, but in truth her
arguments relating to purposeful availment address the legal
7
significance of certain evidence. In short, “there is no material
conflict in the evidence itself, so our review is de novo.” (Anglo
Irish Bank Corp., PLC v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th
969, 980 (Anglo Irish Bank).)
B. The Freibergers did not purposefully avail
themselves of California benefits
The Freibergers are residents of Georgia, and they own a
rental property in that state. They offered the property for rent
on Zillow. Parker, a California resident, contacted the
Freibergers about the rental, and the parties negotiated and
signed a lease.5 There is no evidence that the Freibergers
“ ‘purposefully and voluntarily’ ” directed the Zillow listing
toward California residents.6 (Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p.
269.) The property at issue is in Georgia, and the Freibergers did
not come to California while negotiating the lease, meaning they
5 The complaint alleged that Parker was a California
resident. Parker also declared under oath, in an unrelated
federal case, that she was living in Georgia on February 10, 2024,
the day after the lease was signed. The trial court did not appear
to make any finding as to Parker’s residency. We assume
without deciding that Parker was a California resident for
purposes of our analysis.
6 Parker argues on appeal that the Freibergers “target[ed]
out-of-state students,” citing a declaration filed by nonparty
Matthew Pearson in support of her opposition to the motion to
quash. According to Pearson’s declaration, Kyle told Parker that
Haley owned and rented out homes that “attracted students from
all over the country.” But the fact that the property was
attractive to out-of-state students does not support that the
Freibergers targeted those students.
8
did not benefit from conducting activities in this state.
(Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 253.) Nor does the
Freibergers’ single fixed-term contract with a Californian support
that they invoked the privileges of California law by engaging in
“ ‘significant activities’ ” in this state or forming “ ‘continuing
[contractual] obligations’ ” with Californians. (Ibid.; Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 478 [“an individual’s
contract with an out-of-state party alone” does not “automatically
establish sufficient minimum contacts in the other party’s home
forum”].)
Parker asserts that the Freibergers intended to avail
themselves of the benefits of this state because they posted the
rental property on Zillow, and the parties communicated using
that website. “To determine whether a Web site is sufficient to
establish purposeful availment, we first look to the sliding scale
analysis described in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.
(W.D.Pa. 1997) 952 F.Supp. 1119 (Zippo).” (Snowney, supra, 35
Cal.4th at p. 1063.) “ ‘At one end of the spectrum are situations
where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the
defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission
of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is
proper. [Citation.] At the opposite end are situations where a
defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site
which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive
Web site that does little more than make information available to
those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of]
personal jurisdiction. [Citation.] The middle ground is occupied
by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information
with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction
9
is determined by examining the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on
the Web site.’ ” (Ibid.)
We agree with Parker that Zillow is a middle ground
website, because it allowed the Freibergers to “exchange
information” with Parker and other potential tenants. (Snowney,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1063.) As our Supreme Court recognized,
some courts have concluded that the use of a middle ground
website is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction if it “ ‘ is
capable of accepting and does accept purchase orders from
residents of the forum state.’ ” (Id. at p. 1064, quoting
Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Products (D.Md. 2004) 346
F.Supp.2d 804, 810.) “Other courts have suggested that ‘
“something more” ’ is necessary, such as ‘ “deliberate action”
within the forum state in the form of transactions between the
defendant and residents of the forum or conduct of the defendant
purposefully directed at residents of the forum state.’ ”
(Snowney, at p. 1064, quoting Millennium Enterprises, Inc. v.
Millennium Music, LP (D.Or. 1999) 33 F.Supp.2d 907, 921.)
In Snowney, our high court declined to adopt any particular
test for middle ground websites, because under any standard, the
defendants’ conduct in that case established personal jurisdiction.
(Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1064.) Specifically, the
defendant hotel operators purposefully availed themselves of
California protections by using a website to “tout[] the proximity
of their hotels to California and provid[e] driving directions from
California to their hotels . . . .” (Id. at p. 1064.) But as we have
discussed, there is no evidence that the Freibergers took any
specific steps to target California residents. Snowney is therefore
10
distinguishable, and does not support Parker’s argument that the
Freibergers are subject to personal jurisdiction in this state.
Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 243, another case
addressing a middle ground website, is a closer parallel. There,
the plaintiff, a California resident, found the website of a Virginia
law firm in an online search. (Id., at p. 248.) The plaintiff
contacted the firm by interacting with a “ ‘live chat’ function on
the website.” (Id. at p. 249.) The plaintiff provided further
information to an associate by phone, and then the firm mailed
the plaintiff a proposed retainer agreement at her California
address, which the plaintiff signed. (Ibid.) The plaintiff later
sued the firm and two of its lawyers in California. (Id. at p. 250.)
The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to quash. In
affirming the order, the appellate court reasoned that the
defendant did not purposefully avail itself of California’s
protections because the website did not target Californians and
the defendants did not seek to “derive any benefit” from
California. (Id. at p. 255.) And although the parties
communicated via an interactive website, the plaintiff initiated
that contact. (Ibid.)
Similarly, here, the parties’ relationship started on an
interactive website. Parker initiated contact. The parties then
communicated by other means and signed a lease. As we have
discussed, there is no evidence that the Freibergers targeted
Californians at any stage, nor that they otherwise sought to
derive any benefit from this state. Under these facts, the
Freibergers did not purposefully avail themselves of California’s
protections. Indeed, to the extent any party used Zillow to avail
him or herself of the benefits of another state, it was Parker, who
11
“first contacted defendants” in search of a Georgia rental.
(Jacqueline B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 254.)
Moreover, even when an out-of-state defendant uses a
website to transact with Californians, purposeful availment is
established only when “the sales [are] substantial; they are not
enough if they are only ‘random, isolated, or fortuitous . . . .’ ”
(Thurston v. Fairfield Collectibles of Georgia, LLC (2020) 53
Cal.App.5th 1231, 1240.) The fact that the Freibergers entered a
single isolated contract with Parker further supports our
conclusion.
Parker argues that we should follow several federal and
out-of-state court opinions in concluding that personal
jurisdiction may be “predicated on sales through eBay or similar
internet platforms.” Of course, these opinions are not binding on
this court. (Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 490
[“out-of-state decisions are not binding on this court”]; Fair v.
BNSF Railway Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 269, 287 [lower
federal court decisions are not binding on California courts].) The
cases could be persuasive, to the extent that they involve similar
facts and substantially similar long-arm statutes, and were
resolved at a comparable procedural stage. But aside from
cursory parenthetical summaries and quotations, Parker fails to
explain why these cases are in any way analogous to this one.
We therefore have no basis to find Parker’s out-of-state and
federal authorities persuasive. (Delta Stewardship Council Cases
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075 (Delta Stewardship)
[appellant’s burden is to support arguments “with reasoned
argument”]; Dills v. Redwoods Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28
Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 (Dills) [appellate court will not
develop appellant’s arguments].)
12
Parker also argues that the Freibergers intended to avail
themselves of California’s benefits because they reached out to
Parker, a California resident, through Zillow and via text
message during their negotiations. And when the Freibergers
gave Parker a video tour of the property, Parker was in
California. However, “our ‘minimum contacts’ analysis looks to
the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the
defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” (Walden v.
Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 285.) Parker fails to identify any
California benefit, privilege, or protection that the Freibergers
sought or obtained through these communications. (Jacqueline
B., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 253.)
Relatedly, Parker asserts that we must consider the
Freibergers’ contacts with California individually. (Anglo Irish
Bank, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 978 [“ ‘Each defendant’s
contacts with the forum State must be assessed individually.’ ”].)
It is unclear precisely what contacts Parker asks us to consider,
however, because she fails to cite to the record in support of this
argument. To the extent Parker means to argue that we should
consider any contacts that we have not already addressed, we
reject her contentions as forfeited. (Hernandez v. First Student,
Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277 (Hernandez) [appellant’s
burden is to “provide adequate record citations” supporting
arguments on appeal].)
Finally, Parker’s reliance on Hall v. LaRonde (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 1342 is misplaced. The plaintiff in Hall, a California
resident, created a software module. The defendant, a New
Yorker, incorporated the module into a software product for sale.
The parties entered a contract under which the defendant was
obligated to make “continuing royalty payments” to the plaintiff.
13
(Id. at p. 1347.) The reviewing court reasoned that the defendant
was subject to personal jurisdiction in this state because he
“created a ‘ “continuing obligation[]” ’ between himself and a
resident of California.” (Ibid.) Parker argues that her
relationship with the Freibergers was similarly ongoing because
the parties signed a twelve-month lease. But the lease was for a
fixed term; unlike in Hall, it did not create an open-ended,
continuing business relationship.7
Parker has not met her burden of establishing that the
Freibergers purposefully availed themselves of California
protections. (Snowney, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1062.) Therefore,
we need not consider the parties’ arguments as to whether the
lawsuit arises from the Freibergers’ contacts with this state or
whether exercising jurisdiction over them would be fair and just.
II. Parker has not established any reversible error
based on any alleged service defect
Parker also argues that there is insubstantial evidence that
she was properly served with the Freibergers’ motion to quash,
and therefore she asserts that the trial court’s ruling is void. We
reject both aspects of this argument.
In support of its finding that Parker was served with the
motion, the trial court relied on the certificate of service filed
with the motion, which averred that Parker was served by mail.
Parker asserts that she “testified that she never received a hard
7 We reject Parker’s assertion that the relationship was
ongoing because the parties contemplated extending the lease
into a second year. The only evidence Parker cites in support of
this claim is a text message exchange that identifies the rent
owed for “this year.” The message does not reference the
possibility of an extension.
14
copy” of the motion by mail. But Parker failed to provide a
reporter’s transcript, and therefore we must presume that the
testimony supports the trial court ruling. (In re Marriage of
Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 (Obrecht) [without a
reporter’s transcript, reviewing court presumes that what
occurred at the hearing supports the trial court order].) Parker’s
declaration in support of her opposition only declared that she
“did not have an electronic service agreement” with the
Freibergers.8 That declaration did not assert that Parker was not
served, and she provided no other evidence to contradict the proof
of service. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that Parker was served by mail. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p.
449 [“factual determinations are not disturbed on appeal if
supported by substantial evidence”].)
On appeal, Parker also points to an October 30, 2024
declaration that she filed in support of her motion to reconsider
the order quashing service, in which she declared that she “never
received a hard copy” of the motion to quash. However, Parker
only challenges the factual findings in the court’s October 22,
2024 order granting the motion to quash. In making those
findings, the trial court necessarily did not consider Parker’s
October 30, 2024 declaration. We may exercise our discretion to
consider evidence that was not before the trial court only when
“the evidence arose after judgment or was unavailable to the
movant before judgment.” (Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244
8 We also reject Parker’s argument that service was
improper because she did not agree to electronic service. As we
have explained, substantial evidence supports a finding that
Parker was served by mail; whether Parker consented to
electronic service is irrelevant.
15
Cal.App.4th 118, 123.) But Parker’s October 30, 2024 declaration
does not present information that was unknown to her at the
time she opposed the motion to quash, and therefore we decline
to consider it.
Moreover, even if Parker was not properly served with the
motion to quash, she has not identified any basis for reversal.
Parker argues that the order is void because the trial court
lacked jurisdiction as a result of the alleged service defect. She
also claims the order is void because the Freibergers’ failure to
serve her amounts to fraud. Parker did not raise these
arguments in her opposition to the motion to quash or in her
motion for reconsideration of the order quashing service.9 Parker
forfeited these contentions by failing to bring them to the
attention of the trial court when it made the rulings challenged
on appeal. (Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 866 (Lopez).)
However, Parker’s first argument appears to challenge the
trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and such challenges may
be raised for the first time on appeal. (Kabran v. Sharp
Memorial Hospital (2017) 2 Cal.5th 330, 339.) Parker asserts
that the alleged service defect means that the trial court lacked
“fundamental jurisdiction” to resolve the motion to quash. She
observes that there are “two different ways in which a court may
lack jurisdiction. [Citation.] A court lacks jurisdiction in a
fundamental sense when it has no authority at all over the
9 Parker raised these arguments in her motion to set aside
the judgment, but she did not appeal from any order denying that
motion. (Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137
[order on motion to set aside judgment separately appealable];
DeZerega v. Meggs (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 28, 43 [when several
orders are appealable, each must be separately identified in
notice of appeal].)
16
subject matter or the parties, or when it lacks any power to hear
or determine the case.” (People v. Ford (2015) 61 Cal.4th 282,
286.) But a motion to quash is the proper vehicle for a defendant
to challenge personal jurisdiction, and the court had power to
resolve such a motion. (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11
Cal.5th 381, 402; § 418.10.) Parker fails to provide any reasoned
argument or legal authority to support her claim that the alleged
service defect meant that the court lacked “authority” over, or
“power” to resolve, the motion. (Ford, at p. 286.; Dills, supra, 28
Cal.App.4th at p. 890, fn. 1 [appellate court will not develop
appellant’s arguments].)
To the extent that Parker means to argue that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over her, Parker forfeited any such
contention by generally appearing in the trial court. (Obrecht,
supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 7.)
Next, Parker asserts that the order is void because the
Freibergers’ failure to serve her constitutes “extrinsic and
intrinsic fraud.” As we have discussed, Parker failed to raise this
argument below. Even if the argument were not forfeited on that
basis (Lopez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 866), Parker also fails to
support it with legal authority, reasoned argument, and citations
to the record. Specifically, Parker has not identified any legal
authority defining the term “intrinsic fraud” or applying it to the
facts of this case. (Delta Stewardship, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p.
1075 [appellant’s burden is to support arguments “with reasoned
argument and citations to authority”].) As for Parker’s extrinsic
fraud theory, Parker avers that she was “prevented from fully
participating in the proceeding . . . .” (Hudson v. Foster (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 640, 664.) Parker argues that she was not served
with the “correct” version of the motion to quash, and therefore
17
she did not realize that she might need to conduct jurisdictional
discovery until she read the trial court’s tentative ruling. But
Parker provides no citations to the record to support her
argument that she was served with the wrong version of the
motion, nor any explanation as to what aspect of the incorrect
version misled her. (Hernandez, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 277
[appellant’s burden is to support arguments with reasoned
argument and citations to the appellate record].)
III. Parker’s remaining contentions fail
Parker raises several other arguments, none of which
warrant reversal.
Parker asserts that the trial court’s finding that the
Freibergers “ ‘do not even operate their own business’ ” is
unsupported by substantial evidence. She also contends the trial
court erred by finding that the only evidence of any connection to
California is that Parker “ ‘was in California while attempting to
negotiate with the [Freibergers], who were in Georgia, regarding
the Property, again, located in Georgia.’ ” Both aspects of the
challenged order merely quoted the Freibergers’ motion to quash.
The court did not adopt the quotations as findings or rely on
them in support of its ruling.
Parker also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by denying her request for jurisdictional discovery.
(HealthMarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th
1160, 1173 [trial court has discretion to allow plaintiff opposing
motion to quash to conduct jurisdictional discovery].) According
to Parker’s appellate briefing, she requested jurisdictional
discovery during the hearing on the Freibergers’ motion to quash,
and the trial court denied the request. However, Parker failed to
procure a reporter’s transcript of the hearing. We therefore
18
presume that the trial court resolved Parker’s request without
abusing its discretion. (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery
(2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 [appellant’s burden to provide
adequate record; reporter’s transcript indispensable in many
cases involving abuse of discretion standard of review]; Obrecht,
supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 9 [without a reporter’s transcript,
reviewing court presumes that what occurred at the hearing
supports the trial court order].)
Next, Parker contends that the trial court erred by
“vacating” her motion to reconsider the order quashing service of
summons as “moot.”10 Parker appears to conflate the trial court’s
ruling on the merits with its decision to take the matter off
calendar. On December 3, 2024, the trial court denied Parker’s
October 31, 2024 motion for reconsideration of the order granting
the Freibergers’ motion to quash. The court’s order considered
and rejected Parker’s arguments on their merits. The court did
not vacate the motion as moot. Rather, having denied the motion
on the papers, the court ordered that the scheduled hearing on
the motion “is now off calendar as moot.” Parker’s appeal does
not otherwise challenge the order denying her motion to
reconsider the order quashing service. We therefore affirm that
order.
10 Parker’s notice of appeal does not separately list the order
denying her motion for reconsideration. “However, if the order
that was the subject of a motion for reconsideration is appealable,
the denial of the motion for reconsideration is reviewable as part
of an appeal from that order.” (§ 1008, subd. (g).) Because the
order granting the motion to quash is appealable, the order
denying Parker’s motion for reconsideration thereof is reviewable
in this appeal. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(3).)
19
In her prayer, Parker asks this court to assign a new judge
to the case and award her unspecified appellate fees. We reject
these requests, as they are unsupported by any argument,
citations to the record, or legal authority. (Delta Stewardship,
supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075; Hernandez, supra, 37
Cal.App.5th at p. 277.)
Finally, having found no error or abuse of discretion, we
reject Parker’s request for reversal based on cumulative error.
20
DISPOSITION
The orders granting the Freibergers’ motion to quash and
denying Parker’s motion for reconsideration are affirmed. The
Freibergers are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
21
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