In re I.D. CA2/6

CourtListener 10773296Calctapp12 gen 2026

Testo completo

Filed 1/12/25 In re I.D. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re I.D., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B345590
Under the Juvenile Court (Super. Ct. No. 17JV00056-F)
Law. (Santa Barbara County)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

I.D. was charged with a gang-related murder committed
when he was 17 years old. He appeals from the juvenile court’s
order transferring him to a court of criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707.1 He

All further undesignated statutory references are to the
1

Welfare and Institutions Code.
contends the juvenile court abused its discretion because the
order is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree and
affirm.
Facts of the Alleged Offense2
In December 2018, Santa Maria police responded to a call
after the reporting party advised there had been a gunshot in the
area. Upon arrival, the officer found 18-year-old Adrian Alvarez
lying on the curb, bleeding. He had a gunshot wound to the face.
A spent 12-gauge shotgun shell was located near him. After
medics arrived on scene, Alvarez was pronounced dead.
Police conducted an investigation, interviewed witnesses,
and obtained numerous search warrants to review social media
posts. Over the course of their investigation, police found various
messages and online posts, including a rap song posted to
YouTube, that referenced an ongoing feud between the
Guadalupe and West Park criminal street gangs. Appellant, who
was a known associate of the Guadalupe criminal street gang,
was identified as a possible suspect.
In July 2022, a witness who was present with the victim
the night of the shooting agreed to speak with police. The
witness reported that he was sitting with Alvarez inside a vehicle
when three subjects approached them on foot and called out
“Guad” or “Guadalupe.” Two of the subjects were wearing masks.
The witness identified the third subject, who was not wearing a
mask, as appellant. The witness and Alvarez exited the vehicle
and identified themselves as “West Park.” Appellant approached
Alvarez, discharged a “sawed off shot gun” in the victim’s face,
and fled the scene with his two companions.

2 These facts are summarized from the Fitness Transfer

Report.

2
Section 602 Petition
In 2023, the People filed a petition in juvenile court
charging appellant, who was 21 years old by that time, with
murder. (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a).) The petition alleged that
appellant committed the offense for the benefit of or in
association with a criminal street gang and that he intentionally
and personally discharged a firearm causing death. (Pen. Code,
§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5), 12022.53, subd. (d).) The People also filed
a motion pursuant to section 707, subdivision (a) to transfer
appellant to adult criminal court.
Transfer Hearing
The juvenile court conducted a contested transfer hearing.
The People called four witnesses, including Dr. Amy Watt, a
clinical psychologist who evaluated appellant and prepared a
written report.
Dr. Watt met in person with appellant at the Juvenile
Justice Center (JJC), administered several psychological tests,
and reviewed various reports. Based on her evaluation, Dr. Watt
found no discernable issues regarding appellant’s childhood.
Appellant denied any behavioral issues at school, but Dr. Watt
found this to be inconsistent with the records she reviewed.
Dr. Watt believed appellant minimized the seriousness of
his behavioral issues, which was a “theme” throughout their
interview. This was a “big concern” for her in terms of
appellant’s amenability to rehabilitation because it indicated a
resistance to change. Appellant also minimalized his gang
affiliation, was “cagey” when asked about it, and described it
simply as “friends hanging out.” Dr. Watt opined if appellant
were released, he would likely go back to the gang because he did
not see it as a problem.

3
Dr. Watt also reviewed appellant’s social media profile and
messages, which she believed demonstrated planning and
criminal sophistication. For example, she testified there were
discussions “at length” about how to get a shotgun, how to stash a
gun, and hunting down rival gang members.
When Dr. Watt asked appellant about the present case, he
said he was “in the wrong place at the wrong time.” This was a
concern because Dr. Watt did not sense any remorse or empathy
in appellant. He was quick to change the subject and talked
about being a “changed man” because he was focused on school
and becoming a social worker. He also talked about wanting to
stay in the juvenile system so he could “do less time” and get out
to be with his family.
Dr. Watt did not believe the services appellant had received
while on juvenile probation had been effective in rehabilitating
him because he continued to possess a firearm, post images of
gang signs on social media, and associate with a gang.
Dr. Watt did not find any evidence of neurological issues
based on the various tests she administered to appellant.
She indicated he was “hasty” and “careless” in approaching the
test items, which was likely related to his impulsive behavior.
His responses were also indicative of someone who wants to
“show off” and be “strong,” which reflected his self-esteem and
insecurity.
Dr. Watt concluded that the gravity and circumstances of
the offense were very serious. Based on the five factors set forth
in section 707, subdivision (a), she did not believe 18 months was
a sufficient amount of time to rehabilitate appellant. Dr. Watt
ultimately concluded that appellant was not amenable to
rehabilitation under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

4
The People also presented additional evidence, including
appellant’s cell phone data and location on the night of the
shooting, an image of appellant’s new “Guadalupe” tattoo, which
he said he “earned,” and several images of appellant throwing up
gang signs, including at the memorial site where Alvarez was
killed.
The defense presented several witnesses, including Dr.
Carolyn Murphy, a forensic psychologist who interviewed
appellant, reviewed various reports, and prepared a written
report. Dr. Murphy opined that appellant’s prior delinquent
history was “relatively low-level”; there were no prior attempts to
rehabilitate him because no “comprehensive” psychological
evaluation and treatment plan had been created; appellant was
participating in services, was on the “Trust Unit,” and
demonstrated an “openness to change.” Dr. Murphy believed
appellant was amenable to rehabilitation in the time remaining
with the juvenile system.
The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
In April 2025, the juvenile court granted the motion to
transfer appellant’s case to adult criminal court. In a detailed
oral ruling, the juvenile court acknowledged the People’s burden
to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that appellant was not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. The juvenile court analyzed each of the five
statutory factors set forth in section 707, found each weighed in
favor of transfer, and concluded the People met their burden.
Degree of Criminal Sophistication
The juvenile court found appellant exhibited a “criminal
sophistication” that weighed in favor of transfer. The juvenile
court cited appellant’s age, the degree of “planning,” and the

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“callous” and “indifferent” manner in which appellant carried out
the murder—he walked up to the victim, who he had been
planning to kill, and “point-blank” fired a shotgun. The juvenile
court cited a lack of evidence of mental health or intellectual
issues, trauma, or abuse in appellant’s life. It also observed that
“it took years” for law enforcement to resolve this case “because of
[appellant’s] efforts in avoiding detection,” which “support[ed] the
sophistication criteria.”
Amenability to Rehabilitation Prior to Expiration of Juvenile
Jurisdiction
In considering this factor, the juvenile court found Dr.
Watt’s testimony to be “particularly persuasive” and “afford[ed it]
great weight.” Like Dr. Watt, the juvenile court found appellant
“minimalize[d]” the offense, stated he was “in the wrong place at
the wrong time,” continued with his gang activities even after the
murder, and showed “no insight” into the severity of the offense.
The juvenile court acknowledged that appellant had done well in
JJC but found there was insufficient time to rehabilitate him
before expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction.
Previous Delinquent History3
The juvenile court disagreed with probation and found this
factor weighed in favor of transfer, although it did not attach “as
much weight” to it as the other factors. The juvenile court noted
that appellant “appeared to [have] a reasonably happy
childhood.” Appellant’s delinquent history was not “particularly
long.” However, there was evidence of “serious gang behavior,”

3 The probation officer prepared a report and testified that
three of the five factors supported transfer. Probation did not
believe the third or fourth factors (i.e., previous delinquent
history and previous attempts to rehabilitate) supported transfer.

6
including the present offense and an adult conviction for felony
firearm possession.
Success of Previous Attempts to Rehabilitate Minor
In finding this factor weighed in favor of transfer, the
juvenile court noted that appellant committed the instant offense
while he was on “wardship probation.” Although appellant
successfully completed juvenile probation, he continued his gang
activities into adulthood and failed to rehabilitate within the
juvenile court system. Appellant’s lack of insight and failure to
acknowledge his gang involvement were “significant” to the
juvenile court in finding appellant was not amenable to
rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.
Circumstances and Gravity of the Offense Alleged in the Petition
The juvenile court observed that the evidence was
“overwhelming” that this was a very serious offense. The
circumstances involved “premeditation, callousness, and
indifference to the victim.” After surveilling the area and
engaging with his gang members to locate the victim, appellant
“simply walked up to the victim” and “callously sho[t]” him in the
face with a shotgun.
Discussion
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in finding that
clear and convincing evidence supports the transfer to criminal
court. We review the juvenile court’s determination to transfer a
minor to criminal court for abuse of discretion. (In re J.S. (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211 (J.S).) “The court’s factual findings are
reviewed for substantial evidence, and its legal conclusions are
reviewed de novo. [Citation.] A decision based on insufficient
evidence or the court’s ‘“erroneous understanding of applicable

7
law’” is subject to reversal. [Citation.]” (Kevin P. v. Superior
Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 187.)
Section 707 provides that the People may move to transfer
to adult court any minor 16 years of age or older alleged to have
committed one of several enumerated offenses, including murder.
(§ 707, subds. (a)(1), (b)(1); D.W. v. Superior Court (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 109, 116.) To prevail on this motion, the People
must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the minor
is “not amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3); In re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.
App.5th 1277, 1288 [“‘amenab[ility] to rehabilitation’” is the
“ultimate determination”]; J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 212
[same].)
In making this determination, the juvenile court must
consider five specific factors: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal
sophistication exhibited by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i));
(2) “[w]hether the minor can be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction” (id., subd.
(a)(3)(B)(i)); (3) “[t]he minor’s previous delinquent history” (id.,
subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); (4) “[s]uccess of previous attempts by the
juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor” (id., subd. (a)(3)(D)(i));
and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged in
the petition to have been committed by the minor” (id., subd.
(a)(3)(E)(i)).
The statute also sets forth a nonexhaustive list of relevant
factors for the juvenile court to consider with respect to each of
the five criteria. (§ 707, subds. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii),
(E)(ii).) If the juvenile court orders a transfer to criminal court, it
must “recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon
the minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the

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court’s finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation
while under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Id., subd.
(a)(3).)
Substantial Evidence/Abuse of Discretion
Appellant contends the decision to transfer him to criminal
court is not supported by substantial evidence and therefore the
juvenile court abused its discretion in granting the transfer
motion. Appellant raises a number of contentions, including: (1)
Dr. Watt unreasonably concluded that appellant “minimalized”
his past delinquent and criminal conduct because any
“downplaying of the circumstances” or reluctance to speak with
“full candor” was reasonable given that appellant was concerned
about self-incrimination; (2) the prior true findings/criminal
convictions for possession of firearm should not be held against
him in evaluating his ability to rehabilitate because there is a
“vast chasm-like” distinction between an arrest and true finding
or conviction for firearm possession and murder; (3) the absence
of a history of trauma or abuse does not mean appellant is not
amenable to rehabilitation as a youth, especially given that he
has a wife and young daughter, has been accepted to and is
attending university, and seeks a career as a social worker; and
(4) appellant’s desire for adjudication in the juvenile court so that
he can be released sooner does not lead to an absence of
amenability.
But appellant’s contentions boil down to a request for this
court to reweigh the evidence and come to a different conclusion
than the juvenile court. We are not at liberty to do so. As we
have previously explained, “we do not reweigh the evidence and
we do not substitute our discretion for the discretion exercised by
the trial court.” (J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.)

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Here, the juvenile court considered all the evidence
presented and found Dr. Watt’s testimony to be particularly
persuasive and afforded it great weight. Moreover, the juvenile
court properly focused on the key question of whether appellant
was amenable to rehabilitation while under the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction. It examined each of the five statutory criteria,
discussed the relevant factors thereto, and ultimately found, by
clear and convincing evidence, that appellant was not amenable
to rehabilitation before expiration of juvenile court jurisdiction.
We conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile
court’s findings for the reasons articulated in its oral ruling.
The juvenile court therefore reasonably exercised its discretion to
transfer appellant to adult criminal court. As such, there was no
error.
Disposition
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

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Gustavo Lavayen, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________

Courtney M. Selan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Deepti Vaadyala, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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