Diamond PEO v. Accurate Connections CA4/3

CourtListener 10771207Calctapp8 gen 2026

Testo completo

Filed 1/8/26 Diamond PEO v. Accurate Connections CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DIAMOND PEO, LLC, G064290

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-
01082775)
v.
OPINION
ACCURATE CONNECTIONS, LLC,

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Theodore R. Howard, Judge. Affirmed. Motion to dismiss denied. Motion for
sanctions denied.
Roxborough, Pomerance, Nye & Adreani, Michael B. Adreani,
Joseph C. Gjonola and Laura H. Park for Appellant.
Law Office of Drew Petersen and Gordon Andrew Petersen for
Respondent.
Plaintiff Diamond PEO, LLC, appeals from a judgment awarding
attorney fees to defendant Accurate Connections, LLC, pursuant to Code of
1
Civil Procedure section 998. Diamond contends it was entitled to obtain a
more favorable judgment than the section 998 offer because the trial court
should have calculated prejudgment interest at seven percent instead of three
percent. But Diamond submitted two stipulated judgments to the court
calling for three percent interest before suddenly submitting a new judgment
calling for seven percent interest. By awarding interest at three percent, the
court impliedly found signing the seven percent judgment was clerical error.
We see no abuse of discretion in that decision and affirm.
FACTS
Diamond sued Accurate for breaching a promissory note that
required Diamond to repay $20,000 “with interest accruing on the unpaid
balance at a rate of 3 percent (%) per annum . . . .” If Accurate “fail[ed] to pay
the note in-full . . . , [the] unpaid principal [would] accrue interest at the
maximum rate allowed by law, until [Accurate] [wa]s no longer in default.”
Accurate made an offer to compromise the dispute pursuant to
section 998 for $20,665. Diamond did not accept the offer.
The parties ultimately resolved their dispute. Diamond drafted a
proposed judgment, got Accurate to approve it as to form, and submitted it to
the court. In its opening brief, Diamond calls this a “stipulated judgment.” It
called for prejudgment “Interest at 3%”:

1
All undesignated statutory references are to this code.

2
(Above: Initial Proposed Judgment)
The court did not sign Diamond’s initial proposed judgment.
The court later signed an amended judgment proposed by
Diamond, adding two alter-ego defendants after a contested hearing. The
amended judgment contains the exact same table as the initial proposed
judgment providing for “Interest at 3%.”

(Above: Amended Judgment)
While Diamond’s and Accurate’s competing attorney fee motions
were pending, Diamond filed a new proposed judgment still captioned
“Amended Judgment” that changed “Interest at 3%” to “Interest at 7%.”
Diamond submitted this to the court without any accompanying motion, ex

3
parte application, brief, or explanatory declaration. A footnote stated:
“Pursuant to ¶4 of the agreement between the parties (executed Promissory
2
Note) and Cal. Civ. Code §1916-1.”

(Above: Seven-percent Judgment)
The court signed the seven percent judgment; Accurate filed an
objection the next day. Accurate noted “the terms of the submitted Amended
Judgment do not comport with the Stipulated Judgment entered into by and
between the parties in this case, and it unilaterally seeks to include
additional damages, in the form of prejudgment interest, which was not
agreed to, . . . without any motion being made, [and without] giving
Defendants an opportunity to submit opposition and be heard.”
Neither of the parties’ briefs on their competing motions
thereafter mentioned the seven percent judgment. Diamond did assert the

2
At oral argument, Diamond’s counsel represented that the
seven percent judgment was “provided by [his] client to the judge, with an
explanation,” which he “believe[d]” was contained in “a cover page or in the
pleading.” He provided a record citation. We checked and found no cover page
or explanation except this terse footnote.

4
court should award prejudgment interest at seven percent as the “‘maximum
rate allowed by law.’” (Boldface omitted.)
When ruling on the attorney fee motions, the trial court
calculated Diamond’s prejudgment interest at three percent. It explained
Diamond’s request for seven percent interest “ignores the express language of
the judgment, which provides for interest at 3% . . . .” It cited “ROA 207”—
the amended judgment. The court concluded Diamond had not obtained a
better result than Accurate’s section 998 offer. Diamond “received a judgment
for $20,609.55, plus costs and fees,” which was “less than Accurate’s section
998 offer of $20,665.00, plus costs and fees.”
The court offset Diamond’s recovery on the note, prejudgment
interest, and preoffer attorney fees and costs against Accurate’s postoffer
attorney fees and costs. (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil
Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 12:648.6, p. 51 [depending
on the 998 offer, a prevailing plaintiff may recover preoffer attorney fees and
costs while the defendant recovers postoffer attorney fees and costs].) The
court entered a “Second Amended Judgment” in April 2024 awarding over
$12,000 to Accurate. (See § 998, subd. (e) [judgment for “net amount . . . shall
be entered”].)
DISCUSSION

We disagree with Diamond’s claim that it (not Accurate) should
have recovered postoffer attorney fees and costs because it was entitled to
$1,430.69 in prejudgment interest at seven percent, which would have
resulted in a $21,430.69 judgment that exceeded Accurate’s $20,665.00
section 998 offer.
The parties were free to settle their dispute on any terms they
wanted—they chose $20,000 plus prejudgment interest at three percent.

5
Diamond drafted and submitted the initial proposed judgment, which it calls
a “stipulated judgment,” providing for three-percent interest. Accurate
approved the initial proposed judgment “as to Form.” The court later signed
the amended judgment, drafted and submitted by Diamond, also providing
for three-percent interest.
That should have been the end of the story. Diamond twice told
the court to award it three-percent prejudgment interest; the court entered
judgment accordingly. (See Aguilar v. Lerner (2004) 32 Cal.4th 974, 986–987
[judicial estoppel elements]; see also Diaz v. Professional Community
Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1204 [invited error doctrine
“‘prevent[s] a party from misleading the trial court and then profiting
therefrom in the appellate court’”; see also Burton v. Cruise (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 939, 945 [party cannot “blow hot and cold” on litigation
maneuvering].)
We see no reason the court was bound to honor the seven-percent
judgment.3 Diamond submitted it to a busy trial court with little fanfare. It
was captioned “AMENDED JUDGMENT” just like the already-signed
judgment—it wasn’t called a “revised amended judgment” or “second
amended judgment.” Diamond did not place the matter on calendar by filing
a motion or ex-parte application asking the court to correct or supersede the
amended judgment. Diamond offered no brief or declaration explaining why
the court should enter a new judgment with an increased interest rate.
Diamond drew as little attention as possible to the unilateral change in

3
We also see no reason to address Diamond’s claim the trial court
should have applied an interest rate of 10 percent.

6
interest rate, which was not highlighted or bolded, with a short and cryptic
footnote.
By calculating interest at three percent and expressly referring to
the amended judgment, the court implicitly treated its signing of the seven-
percent judgment as a correctible clerical error. (See § 473, subd. (d).) “If a
trial judge through inadvertence or mistake signs an order different from
that which he intended because of the error of an attorney draftsman, it may
readily be corrected. [Citation.] ‘In these times busy judges must of necessity
rely heavily upon the attorneys to prepare orders and judgments accurately
. . . .’” (Hennefer v. Butcher (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 492, 507.)4 If the court
inadvertently signed the seven-percent judgment because Diamond drew
little attention to its unilateral change in interest rate, we commend the
court for catching the mistake and correcting it. We regret only that Diamond
chose a path that made the mistake so easy to make.
Finally, we find no timing errors. Accurate timely filed its
attorney fee motion within 60 days after notice of entry of the amended
judgment. (See Cal. Rules of Court (CRC), rule 3.1702; see also Robinson v.
U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 326–327 [court discretion
to extend time for fee motion].) Diamond timely appealed within 60 days after
notice of entry of the second amended judgment memorializing the attorney

4
At oral argument, Accurate noted that Diamond proposed the
seven-percent judgment “out of the blue,” without “instruction, not part of an
order, not part of a motion.” In his attempt to defend the maneuver,
Diamond’s counsel conceded that a court can fix its own clerical error.

7
fee award. (§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1); CRC, rule 8.104(a)(1)(B).) We therefore deny
5
Accurate’s motion to dismiss and motion for sanctions.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Accurate shall recover its costs on
appeal. (CRC, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, ACTING P. J.

BANCROFT, J.*

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

5
Accurate also moves to dismiss the appeal as being from a
stipulated judgment. We see Diamond permissibly appealing from the court’s
refusal to apply the disputed seven-percent judgment, not impermissibly
appealing from the agreed-upon amended judgment.

8

Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude

Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.