In re A.M. CA2/2

CourtListener 10771205Calctapp8 gen 2026

Testo completo

Filed 1/8/26 In re A.M. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re A.M., a Person Coming B342064
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP02376A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

S.M.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Thomas Stephens, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________________________

S.M. (mother) argues that insufficient evidence supports
the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. We
agree. Accordingly, we reverse those orders and remand the
matter to the family court for a hearing on any outstanding
custody and visitation issues.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Family
Mother and A.M. senior (father) had their son A.M. in July
2014. They separated in November 2022, and mother got a
restraining order against father that required him to move out of
the family home. The home was placed on the market, and
mother planned to (and did) move to Florida once it sold.
Father filed a petition in the family court to prevent mother
from moving A.M. to Florida. That court issued an order in April
2023, giving parents joint legal and physical custody, preventing
mother from moving A.M. to Florida, and prohibiting corporal
punishment.
In January 2024, mother filed a request to move to Florida
with A.M., which the family court denied on June 4, 2024. The
court kept in place the joint legal and physical custody order but
awarded sole physical custody to father upon mother’s move to
Florida.
On June 19, 2024, mother picked up then nine-year-old
A.M., took him home and then out to lunch. At the restaurant,
mother placed her hands on his shoulders, and he told her not to
touch him. This upset mother. A.M. then played with his iPad

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and refused to order food. Mother told him they were going
home, and A.M. talked back to her, causing her to raise her voice.
On the car ride home, mother told A.M. that he was banned from
watching shows on his iPad, and she tried to take the device from
his hands. A.M., resting his legs on the center console, called
mother a “crazy bitch.” Mother slapped him on the outer shin
three times, causing visible “petechiae (broken blood vessels).”
A.M. demanded mother take him to the police because she hit
him, and mother declined. Once they arrived home, A.M. ran to a
neighbor’s home and reported that mother had hit him.
On some prior occasion, mother had grabbed A.M.’s wrist
and dragged him to the ground.
By August 2024, mother had moved to Florida to live near
her family.
2. Procedural Background
On July 31, 2024, the Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) filed a petition asking the court to exert
jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300,
subdivisions (a) and (b)(1) on the ground that mother “physically
abused [A.M.] by repeatedly striking [his] leg,” which was
“excessive and caused [him] unreasonable pain and suffering,”
and which “endangers [his] physical health and safety and places
[him] at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger and
physical abuse.”
At the initial hearing on August 14, 2024, the juvenile court
found a prima facie case, ordered A.M. detained from mother, and
released him to father. The court also gave mother monitored

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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visits, to occur in Los Angeles if in person. Mother had already
moved to Florida at the time of this hearing.
On October 17, 2024, the juvenile court convened the
jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, at which A.M.’s counsel
urged the court to sustain the allegations but to change the
language from “physical abuse” to “inappropriate physical
discipline.” A.M’s counsel argued that jurisdiction was
appropriate because mother hit A.M. out of anger and in violation
of a family court’s order prohibiting corporal punishment, and
she had grabbed his wrist and thrown him to the ground on a
prior occasion. Mother’s counsel urged the court to dismiss both
counts based on the lack of any problems reported before the
parents separated and A.M.’s inability to recall details about
mother’s prior alleged physical discipline, all of which suggested
that A.M. was being placed in the middle of a contentious divorce
and pitted against mother by father. Father’s counsel urged the
court to sustain both counts, citing mother’s lack of remorse for
inflicting physical discipline on A.M., her placing the blame on
A.M. and father, characterizing both as narcissists, and A.M.’s
reports of feeling unsafe with mother.
The juvenile court dismissed the count under subdivision
(a) of section 300, but sustained the count under subdivision
(b)(1), as amended to replace “physical abuse” with
“inappropriate physical discipline.” It found a “real risk of
continued inappropriate discipline” based on mother’s view of
“herself as a victim of not just the father but her own son,” citing
her statements that she was afraid of son as he got older and
stronger and that “she has to be able to protect herself.” The
court observed that “something [is] going on with mother,”
“whether there is a mental health problem or some other issue,”

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where “mother sees herself as the victim and wants to blame the
child.” A.M. had expressed feeling unsafe around mother, which
the court found credible. The court sustained the petition as
amended, gave father sole physical custody, joint legal custody
(with father to have tie-breaking authority), and monitored visits
for mother. It then terminated jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION
1. Pertinent law
Dependency jurisdiction is appropriate under section 300,
subdivision (b)(1)(A) when a child “has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm
or illness” due to a parent’s “failure or inability . . . to adequately
supervise or protect the child.” A jurisdictional finding under
this provision requires the Department to prove three elements:
(1) the parent’s neglectful conduct or failure or inability to
adequately supervise or protect the child; (2) causation; and (3)
serious physical harm or a substantial risk of serious physical
harm. (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601 (Cole L.).)
A court does not need to wait until a child is seriously
abused or injured to assume jurisdiction. (In re S.F. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 696, 712; Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602.)
“A parent’s ‘ “[p]ast conduct may be probative of current
conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will
continue.’ ” (Cole L., at p. 602.) But to show a defined risk of
harm at the time of the hearing, “there ‘must be some reason
beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will
recur.’ ” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146.)
We review a finding of dependency jurisdiction for
substantial evidence, asking whether the record—when viewed
as a whole and drawing all inferences in support of the court’s

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findings—contains “ ‘ “sufficient facts to support” ’ ” the court’s
jurisdictional findings. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
2. Insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s
exercise of jurisdiction over A.M.
Because the family court’s order in place specifically
prohibited physical discipline, we agree with the juvenile court
that mother's hitting A.M.’s leg was an “inappropriate” method to
discipline him. However, the record fails to show that this
discipline caused “serious physical harm.” (see § 300, subd. (a)
[“serious physical harm” does not include reasonable and age-
appropriate spanking to the buttocks if there is no evidence of
serious physical injury]) Nor does it show a “substantial risk of
serious physical harm” to A.M. at the time of the jurisdictional
hearing.2 The record supports that on some prior occasion,
mother grabbed A.M.’s wrist, hurting him, and dragged him to
the ground. A.M. has also reported feeling unsafe with mother.
Even with these additions, the record falls short of showing a
substantial risk of serious physical harm. The absence of such
risk is highlighted by the fact that, at the time of the
jurisdictional hearing, mother had already moved to Florida, and
father had already been given full physical custody of A.M.3
In finding jurisdiction appropriate, the juvenile court
expressed that it was not relying on just the leg-slapping and
wrist-grabbing incidents. Rather, its “concern [was] mother’s

2 At the hearing, the juvenile court referred to a “real risk
of continued inappropriate discipline,” but the relevant risk is
that of serious physical harm.
3 It is unclear from the record whether the family court had
made any further orders regarding mother’s visits with A.M.

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view of her role as a mother.” The court went on to describe the
problematic way mother has spoken of A.M., describing him as a
narcissist and expressing her concern that she needs to protect
herself from him, which the court saw as evidence that
“something [is] going on with mother,” “whether . . . a mental
health problem or some other issue.” Mother’s mental or
emotional problems were not alleged as bases for jurisdiction in
the petition, however, and the Department never asked the
juvenile court to conform its petition to proof at the hearing.4 The
Department may not assert jurisdiction on a factual basis never
alleged any more than a prosecutor can obtain a conviction for a
crime never factually charged. Similarly, the juvenile court may
not craft, assert, and adjudicate allegations against mother based
on factual and legal theories not asserted in the dependency
petition. (In re G.B., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at pp. 488–489.)
Because any remaining custody and visitation issues
should be resolved in the family court, we remand the case to
that court for a hearing on custody and visitation. (In re Roger S.

4 Whether the grant of such request would have comported
with due process is an issue we do not address. (See In re G.B.
(2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 475, 485–486 [a juvenile court “may amend
the petition ‘to correct or make more specific’ the factual
allegations” when the nature of the charge remains unchanged,
but “ ‘[i]f a variance between pleading and proof . . . is so wide
that it would, in effect, violate due process to allow the
amendment, the court should, of course, refuse any such
amendment’ ”].) Nor do we opine on whether substantial
evidence would have supported jurisdiction based on mother’s
mental or emotional issues. (See In re A.G. (2013) 220
Cal.App.4th 675, 684 (A.G.) [it is the Department’s burden to
show how children have been or will be harmed, and it may not
be presumed from the mere fact of mental illness].)

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(2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583; A.G., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at
p. 686; In re John. W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 976 [remand to
a different court is unusual but “necessarily inherent in section
362.4, which expressly contemplates future proceedings in the
family courts”].)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding is reversed, and
the dispositional order is vacated. This matter is remanded to
the family court to address any remaining custody and visitation
issues.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

SIGGINS, J.*

*
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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