CourtListener 10768977•In re E.K. CA4/1
Testo completo
Filed 1/5/26 In re E.K. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re E.K., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D086664
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521570)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
B.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniela Reali-Ferrari, Judge. Affirmed.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
David J. Smith, Acting County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief
Deputy County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
B.S. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings
adjudicating E.K. (Child), a dependent of the court under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1).1 Mother asserts substantial
evidence does not support the court’s jurisdictional findings. We disagree and
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2025, Mother went into preterm labor at 29 weeks―medical
providers attributed her early labor to likely cocaine consumption. Mother
and Child were transported to the hospital, where Mother tested positive for
marijuana and cocaine and Child was admitted to the neonatal intensive care
unit for respiratory failure. Mother asserted sexual contact with Father
caused her early labor and positive cocaine drug test. Medical providers
rejected the possibility that Mother tested positive for cocaine as a result of
unprotected sexual contact. Mother admitted consuming marijuana
products, including those containing THC,2 while pregnant, but stated she
had been “sober from any drugs or alcohol since June of 2024.” Because
Child was born at home, medical providers did not collect and test an
appropriate sample for cocaine exposure, but he tested positive for marijuana
exposure at the hospital.
Although she also tested positive for cocaine use approximately six
months before Child’s birth, Mother repeatedly denied ever consuming
cocaine. She initially offered to take a hair follicle test but declined to do so
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
code.
2 THC, tetrahydrocannabinol, is the principal psychoactive constituent of
cannabis.
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when provided with the opportunity. For his part, T.K. (Father),3 admitted
monthly cocaine use, including in the days before Child’s birth. Both parents
denied having issues with drug or alcohol dependency. However, Mother
admitted herself to outpatient substance use services in September 2024; she
was discharged for failing to participate.
Child remained in the neonatal intensive care unit for approximately
eight weeks. During that time, both parents declined voluntary services.
On March 6, the San Diego Health and Human Services Agency
(Agency) filed a petition on Child’s behalf under section 300, subdivision
(b)(1). The petition alleged that the parents were unable to care for Child due
to their substance abuse.
At the detention hearing on March 10, the court appointed counsel for
the parents and Child, found Father to be a presumed parent, made a prima
facie finding on the petition, and ordered placement with the parents.
Mother expressed that she did not understand what precipitated the Agency’s
involvement with the family. A social worker observed that the parents “lack
insight into how the child tested positive for substances at birth.” Mother
completed an outpatient program and tested negative for substances until
June, when Mother failed two drug tests and tested positive for marijuana
while breastfeeding Child.
At the subsequent contested trial on jurisdiction, Mother offered
stipulated testimony that she used a marijuana product in her vape pen for
“back pain,” asserting she mistakenly used a THC vape. The parents
requested the court dismiss the petition and allow them to engage in
voluntary supervision. Rejecting voluntary supervision, the court observed
3 Father is not party to this appeal. We therefore focus our discussion on
the facts relevant to Mother’s appeal.
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that both parents missed drug tests, that Father was only newly sober and
that Mother had recently again exposed Child to marijuana by nursing him.
Accordingly, the court determined both parents made minimal progress on
the causes necessitating placement. Consequently, the court found the
allegations true, sustained the petition and declared Child a dependent.
DISCUSSION
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order for substantial
evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (In re I.J.).) The burden of
proof for jurisdictional findings is preponderance of the evidence. (Cynthia D.
v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 249.) When applying the substantial
evidence standard of review, we make all reasonable inferences from the
evidence to uphold the dependency court’s findings and orders. (In re I.J., at
p. 773.) We review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s
decision and recognize the court is responsible for determining issues of fact
and credibility. (Ibid.) Accordingly, we do not reassess the evidence or make
independent judgments; we assess whether the facts are sufficient to support
the juvenile court’s findings. (Ibid.)
To establish jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), the
Agency must show: “(1) the parent’s . . . neglectful conduct or failure or
inability to protect the child; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or
illness or a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Cole L.
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591, 601.) A court “need not wait until a child is
seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to
protect the child.” (Id. at p. 602.) A parent’s past behavior can be relevant to
current circumstances if there is reason to believe that the behavior will
continue. (Ibid.) To establish a clear risk of harm at the time of the hearing,
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there must be more than mere speculation that the behavior will happen
again. (Ibid.)
The petition alleged a substantial risk existed that Child will suffer
serious physical harm based on the parents’ substance abuse. (§ 300,
subd. (b)(1).) Mother claims insufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional
finding because the Agency did not prove that she and Father used
substances to excess and because she would not again confuse derivatives of
marijuana. In sum, she argues that Child was not at substantial risk of
suffering serious physical injury and therefore should not be a dependent of
the court.
The record belies her claims. Mother has not provided a reasonable
explanation for how cocaine and marijuana were present in her system
during Child’s birth. In fact, she averred she had not consumed marijuana
after discovering she was pregnant and had never consumed cocaine.
Contrary to those assertions, she had also tested positive for cocaine in the
months preceding Child’s birth and admitted using marijuana products—
including “THC rollers”—while pregnant. While engaging in services,
Mother again tested positive after ingesting THC products. Nevertheless,
she now contends she will not mix up THC products and non-THC products
for a third time.
Although Mother signaled her willingness to comply with the Agency
and the court, she exposed Child to the psychoactive component of marijuana
through breast milk. It is not clear on the record before us to what extent
Child consumed contaminated breast milk, so it is not immediately clear if
Child has suffered actual injury from Mother’s substance use. But the court
need not wait for the risk of harm to ripen into actual injury before asserting
jurisdiction. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Indeed, Mother’s
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persistent denial of any substance use gave the juvenile court adequate
grounds to believe that a substantial risk existed that she would be unable to
protect Child from her consumption of substances. (See In re Gabriel K.
(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197 [“One cannot correct a problem one fails to
acknowledge.”]; In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial
is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify
their behavior in the future without court supervision”].) Mother’s positive
drug tests, Child’s exposure to contaminated breast milk and Mother’s
implausible explanations regarding her substance use justify the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction. The record supports the juvenile court’s
preponderance of the evidence finding that Child remained at risk of physical
harm and in need of juvenile court intervention.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the court’s jurisdictional finding.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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