People v. Sanchez CA5

CourtListener 10765591Calctapp26 dic 2025

Testo completo

Filed 12/26/25 P. v. Sanchez CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088440
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. DF016978A)
v.

RAY ANTHONY SANCHEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Tiffany Organ-
Bowles, Judge.
James Bisnow, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and
Paul E. O’Connor, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
In 2024, defendant Ray Anthony Sanchez was convicted by jury of one count of
making criminal threats against his former girlfriend. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).)1 In a
bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found that defendant had prior convictions from
2006 for attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), and from 2016 for active participation
in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)), for purposes of Three Strikes law
sentencing (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)), and prior serious felony
conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). The trial court also found true allegations
that “defendant’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile
delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness,” and “defendant has
served a prior term in prison or county jail under section 1170[, subdivision ](h),” but
found not true the allegation that “The crime involved great violence, great bodily harm,
threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
or callousness.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)–(3), (a)(1).)
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike one
or both of his prior convictions under Romero2 and sentenced him to 25 years to life, with
an additional five years for a prior felony conviction enhancement.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. He claims the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to preclude a witness from testifying as a discovery
sanction and when it denied his Romero motion.
He also claims, in supplemental briefing, entitlement to relief from the court’s
prior strike and enhancement allegation findings based on his 2016 gang offense
conviction in light of Assembly Bill No. 333, which altered elements under the gang

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Section 422 was amended,
effective January 1, 2026, but those changes are not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.
(Assem. Bill No. 352 (2025–2026 Reg. Sess.).)
2 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).

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statute to heighten the showing required for a conviction or enhancement finding.3
(Assem. Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333).)
The People dispute any entitlement to relief.
We reject defendant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to exclude witness testimony as a discovery sanction. However, in light of the
California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fletcher, we vacate the trial court’s
findings that defendant’s 2016 conviction for violating section 186.22, subdivision (a),
constituted a prior serious felony conviction for purposes of Three Strikes sentencing and
imposing a prior serious felony conviction enhancement. (People v. Fletcher (2025) 18
Cal.5th 576, 583 (Fletcher).) Defendant’s sentence is vacated and this matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This renders defendant’s
Romero claim moot and we do not reach it. Except as modified, judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
Defendant and U.M. were friends from high school. More than 15 years later,
they began dating after defendant was released from prison. He moved in with U.M. and
her children, and they remained a couple for one to two years. During their relationship,
defendant became controlling, possessive, and “a scary person.” In January 2021, they
married, which U.M. testified was against her will and due to defendant threatening her.4
In February, U.M. broke off the relationship. Defendant refused to move out after U.M.
ended things, so he was still in the house in February and March, but they were no longer
together.

3 After filing the supplemental opening brief, defendant’s appellate counsel requested to
expand appointment of counsel to include filing a petition for writ habeas corpus challenging
defendant’s 2016 convictions in case No. F074329 based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In
a separate order issued concurrently with this opinion, we denied the motion.
4 All further dates are from the year 2021 unless otherwise noted.

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On March 25, defendant removed U.M.’s home surveillance cameras, broke her
vacuum cleaner, bleached her clothes, threw food everywhere and shot a bullet through
her television. He texted her photos of the damage and she saw the damage herself when
she returned the next day to pick up some clothes. She was terrified and felt her life was
threatened.
On April 9, U.M. received a call from an unknown number while she was at work.
She answered and the caller was defendant, who was angry. He told her he was coming
for her and her body was going to end up in a trash can, which she interpreted as a threat
to kill her. She hung up and called police. Officer Nino spoke with U.M. over the phone.
She reported criminal threats by her ex-boyfriend and requested action be taken. She told
Nino defendant became argumentative when they were talking; he asked personal,
intrusive questions; and he told U.M. her body was going to end up in a trash can.
On the night of April 23, defendant showed up at U.M.’s house in a hat and mask.
He wanted her to come outside, but she refused and then went to stay with her mother.
At around 7:00 p.m. on April 24, while at her mother’s house, U.M. received a call from
an unknown number. She answered and the caller was defendant. He was upset and told
her he was going to find her, or he knew where she was, and he was going to put her in a
dark room and then put her body in a trash can.5 U.M. interpreted his statement as a
threat to kill her, and she hung up and called 911. In the recorded call, which was played
for the jury, U.M. told the dispatcher her ex-boyfriend just called and threatened to kill
her.
Officer Ortega, with the Delano Police Department, responded to U.M.’s mother’s
house following the 911 call. U.M. reported she and defendant had been separated for
two months; he called from an unknown number; and he said he was going to put her in a

5 The charge of criminal threats was based on this incident. The other incidents were
admitted under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 1109.

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dark room, put her body in a bag, and put the bag in a garbage can. U.M. told Ortega
defendant had previously threatened her and she was going to get a restraining order.
Ortega did not follow up with U.M. regarding a restraining order, but she was aware
U.M. had reported to the Tulare Police Department that defendant showed up at U.M.’s
residence the night before, unannounced.
U.M.’s mother, M.M., testified she was with U.M. when defendant called on
April 24. M.M. could hear the phone call and she recognized defendant’s voice.
Defendant told U.M. he was going to put her in a dark room and throw her in the trash
when he was done with her. U.M. was very upset and crying.
U.M. also testified that defendant had been violent toward her, but she never
reported it to the police. Officers Ortega and Nino stated that U.M. did not report to them
any physical domestic violence.
Jurors saw several text messages from defendant to U.M. that U.M. interpreted as
threats, and jurors saw a photo of a tattoo on his hand, which consisted of “R.I.P.” above
U.M.’s name. U.M. testified he added R.I.P. after they broke up and she interpreted it as
a death threat.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Motion to Exclude M.M.’s Testimony as a Discovery Sanction
A. Procedural Background
Prior to jury selection, U.M. testified at an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to
determine the admissibility of the prior incidents involving defendant. On the morning of
that hearing, U.M.’s mother, M.M., informed the prosecutor she had information about
the case, which the prosecutor was previously unaware of. The police report mentioned
the incident underlying the charge against defendant occurred at M.M.’s house, but M.M.
was not interviewed by police, there was no indication in the report that she was home at
the time, and U.M. never mentioned M.M. heard the call. Although defense counsel
neither claimed a willful discovery violation by the prosecutor nor identified any

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prejudice, he argued lack of due diligence and requested M.M.’s potential testimony be
excluded as a sanction for the untimely disclosure.
The trial court took the matter under submission and then denied defendant’s
request to preclude M.M. from testifying. The court found no “malfeasance” on the part
of the prosecution or law enforcement, and concluded there was no indication in the
record either that M.M. was present when U.M.’s report was taken or that M.M. was a
witness.
On appeal, defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude
M.M.’s testimony. He argues the error was prejudicial because he had “to contend with
two percipient witnesses rather than [one] to the alleged crime, with less than a day to
prepare for [M.M.’s] cross-examination,” and without her testimony, some jurors would
have had reasonable doubt about his guilt.
B. Legal Principles
“Section 1054 et seq. govern discovery in criminal cases and aim at flushing out
the truth early and avoiding the element of surprise (on both sides) in criminal trials.
‘“The purpose of section 1054 et seq. is to promote ascertainment of truth by liberal
discovery rules which allow parties to obtain information in order to prepare their cases
and reduce the chance of surprise at trial. [Citation.] Reciprocal discovery is intended to
protect the public interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical facts, to promote the
People’s interest in preventing a last minute defense, and to reduce the risk of judgments
based on incomplete testimony.”’” (People v. Hughes (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 257, 278
(Hughes), quoting Thompson v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 480, 487.)
Relevant to the claim in this case, section 1054.1 requires the prosecutor to
disclose “names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at
trial” (§ 1054.1, subd. (a)), if “in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or if the
prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the possession of the investigating agencies”
(§ 1054.1). “Upon a showing that a party has not complied with Section 1054.1 or

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1054.3 and upon a showing that the moving party complied with the informal discovery
procedure provided in this subdivision, a court may make any order necessary to enforce
the provisions of this chapter, including, but not limited to, immediate disclosure,
contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the
presentation of real evidence, continuance of the matter, or any other lawful order.
Further, the court may advise the jury of any failure or refusal to disclose and of any
untimely disclosure.” (§ 1054.5, subd. (b).) However, “The court may prohibit the
testimony of a witness pursuant to subdivision (b) only if all other sanctions have been
exhausted.” (Id., subd. (c).)
“The trial court possesses the discretion to determine what sanction is appropriate
to ensure a fair trial” (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 466 (Mora and
Rangel)), and we review the trial court’s ruling for abuse of discretion (ibid.). “A
reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge, and discretion
is abused only if the trial court’s ruling exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the
circumstances being considered.” (Hughes, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 283, citing
People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 68, 72.) “To prevail on a claim alleging a violation
of discovery statutes, an appellant must show there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceedings would have been different.”
(Mora and Rangel, supra, at p. 467.)
C. Analysis
1. No Evidence of Willfulness or Prejudice
Defendant claims the trial court erred when it denied his request to exclude
M.M.’s testimony as a discovery sanction, but “absent a showing of significant prejudice
and willful conduct, exclusion of testimony is not appropriate as punishment.” (People v.
Gonzales (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1744, 1758 (Gonzales); accord, People v. Jordan (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 349, 358.) In this case, there is no evidence that the delay in disclosing
M.M. as a witness was willful. To the contrary, the record reflects the prosecutor

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disclosed the information that M.M. witnessed the phone call as soon as she became
aware of it prior to the evidentiary hearing. In the trial court, defendant conceded the
failure was not willful and he does not claim otherwise on appeal. Instead, as in the trial
court, he argues the prosecutor did not exercise due diligence. The trial court concluded
there was no willful discovery violation, however, and nothing in the record suggests this
finding was an abuse of discretion. (Hughes, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 283.)
Furthermore, defendant does not identify any articulable prejudice. Notably, the
only sanction defendant sought in the trial court was the exclusion of M.M.’s testimony
and he did not argue the late disclosure was prejudicial. This was not a complex case.
U.M. testified that defendant called her and threatened to put her in a dark room and then
put her body in a trash can. The jury heard U.M.’s 911 call, during which she reported
that defendant called and threatened to kill her; and the officer who took U.M.’s report
testified that she said defendant called and told her he was going to put her in a dark
room, put her body in a bag, and put the bag in a garbage can.
M.M. testified that she overheard the phone call from defendant and heard him
threaten to put U.M. in a dark room and then in a trash can when he was done. This
testimony corroborated U.M.’s version of events, but it did not add anything new or
unexpected to the evidence and, critically, we are unable to discern any specific prejudice
to the defense resulting from the late disclosure of M.M. as a witness. The fact that
defendant had to cross-examine two witnesses rather than one on the subject of the phone
call does not constitute prejudice attributable to the late disclosure, let alone “substantial
and irremediable” prejudice. (Gonzales, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1757.)
2. Jackson is Inapt
Defendant relies on Jackson for support, but we find that decision readily
distinguishable. (People v. Jackson (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1197.) In Jackson, the Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order precluding introduction of an exculpatory
statement by a witness who could not be located, where the statement was obtained three

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months before trial but not disclosed until after the prosecution rested. (Id. at pp. 1200–
1201.) The appellate court explained, “Here, because the testimony was allegedly
exculpatory, the trial court refused to believe defense counsel did not seriously consider
calling the witness until moments before he did. Even if withholding the identity of the
witness were not willful, lesser sanctions would not have been adequate. Immediate
disclosure or contempt of counsel would have been insufficient, because the People
would not have had a meaningful opportunity to rebut or impeach the statement.
Similarly, a continuance would have been inadequate, because the declarant’s
whereabouts were unknown and thus her unavailability precluded the People from cross-
examining her. The People would have been unduly prejudiced by admitting the
testimony without an opportunity for cross-examination, and the integrity of the
adversary process would have been compromised as parties with little to lose would be
encouraged to not comply with pretrial discovery rules.” (Id. at p. 1203.)
Here, as discussed, there is no evidence the prosecutor knew M.M. was a
percipient witness to the threat, but delayed disclosing the information until just prior to
jury selection. The trial court concluded the delay in disclosing M.M. as a witness was
not willful and we find no support in the record for defendant’s claim that this conclusion
was an abuse of discretion. M.M.’s testimony was brief and focused on the threat
allegedly made on April 24, and defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine M.M.
Counsel did not identify any prejudice to the defense flowing from the belated disclosure,
but in any event, nothing about these circumstances suggests this was a situation with no
adequate remedy other than witness preclusion. (See People v. Walton (1996) 42
Cal.App.4th 1004, 1017 [no abuse of discretion in letting late-disclosed witness testify;
“If appellant required additional time to prepare for the witness’s testimony he neglected
to request it.”], disapproved on another ground by People v. Cromer (2001) 24 Cal.4th
889, 901, fn. 3.)

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We find no error in the trial court’s ruling and, therefore, we do not address
defendant’s claim that the alleged error was prejudicial. (See Mora and Rangel, supra, 5
Cal.5th at p. 467.)

II. Entitlement to Relief From Prior Conviction Findings Given Assembly
Bill 333’s Amendment of Section 186.22
“The Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 333[, effective January 1, 2022,] ‘to
narrow the definition of criminal street gang in order to focus on “true gang-related
crimes,” having determined that “in practice the original definition of a criminal street
gang was not narrowly focused on punishing true gang-related crimes.” [Citation.] …
[T]he Legislature in Assembly Bill 333 “redefined the term ‘criminal street gang’ so as to
truly target the population of criminals for which an enhanced punishment is
warranted.”’” (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 586, quoting & citing People v. Rojas
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 561, 576 & Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem.
Bill 333, as amended Mar. 30, 2021, p. 4 [Assem. Bill 333 “‘“ensur[es] gang
enhancements are only used when necessary and fair”’”].) “As noted, Assembly Bill 333
made significant changes to the elements of gang offenses and enhancements as defined
in section 186.22.” (Fletcher, supra, at p. 586, citing People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th
1169, 1206.)
Defendant was convicted of making criminal threats in this case more than two
years after the amendment of section 186.22, but for purposes of sentencing under the
Three Strikes law and imposition of a prior serious felony conviction enhancement, the
trial court found true that in 2016, defendant was convicted of active participation in a
criminal street gang, in violation of section 186.22, subdivision (a), which is a serious
felony. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)(28).) Courts of Appeal were split on
whether prosecutors were required to prove prior gang convictions under section 186.22
as amended by Assembly Bill 333 or whether it was sufficient to show a conviction under
the statute in effect at the time of the prior conviction. (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at

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p. 583.) Based on this split of authority, defendant claimed entitlement to relief from the
court’s findings related to his 2016 gang conviction because the conviction must meet the
elements of section 186.22, subdivision (a), as amended by Assembly Bill 333. The
People disputed any entitlement to relief.
In Fletcher, which was decided between the filing of the People’s opening brief
and defendant’s reply brief, the California Supreme Court resolved the split of authority
in defendant’s favor and held that “where a defendant has suffered a conviction under the
prior version of section 186.22, Assembly Bill 333 applies to the determination of
whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony conviction under
subdivision (c)(28) of section 1192.7 for purposes of the Three Strikes law and prior
serious felony enhancements.” (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 583.) Therefore, in
accordance with Fletcher, we vacate the trial court’s findings that defendant’s 2016
conviction for violating section 186.22 subdivision (a), is a serious felony within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law and for purposes of imposing a prior serious felony
conviction enhancement. (Fletcher, supra, at p. 608.) On remand, the People may elect
to retry the prior conviction allegations under section 186.22, subdivision (a), as amended
by Assembly Bill 333. (Fletcher, supra, at p. 608.)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s findings that defendant’s 2016 conviction for violating
section 186.22, subdivision (a), constitutes a prior serious felony conviction within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law and for the purpose of imposing a prior serious felony
conviction enhancement are vacated. Defendant’s sentence is vacated and this matter is

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remanded for further proceedings, to include the option to retry the allegations and for
resentencing. In all other respects, defendant’s judgment is affirmed.

MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

SNAUFFER, J.

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