People v. Daniels CA4/1

CourtListener 10764912Calctapp24 dic 2025

Testo completo

Filed 12/24/25 P. v. Daniels CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083366

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE409964)

MARK JAMISON DANIELS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
John M. Thompson, Judge. Affirmed.
Susan L. Ferguson for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, A.
Natasha Cortina and Elizabeth M. Renner, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Mark Jamison Daniels of 12 lewd acts against his
daughter. Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, Daniels
claims the sexual intent and victim age requirements of the offenses were not
established. Daniels further contends that by instructing the jury that the
offenses allegedly occurred “on or about” specific dates (CALCRIM No. 207),
the trial court eliminated the offenses’ age elements and permitted the jury to
convict Daniels twice for the same acts. Finding sufficient evidence for each
count and no instructional error, we affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND
During her childhood, E. lived with her father, Daniels, her mother
(Mother), and her younger brother (Brother) and sister. When E. was 11 or
12 years old, Daniels began touching E.’s buttocks. Daniels then started
touching E.’s breasts when she was 13 or 14. Both acts continued frequently
through the time E. was 18.
E. eventually reported Daniels to the police when she was 19, leading
to Daniels’s arrest. The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office charged

Daniels with four counts of lewd acts on a child under 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 288,
subd. (a)), and eight counts of lewd acts on a child 14 or 15 years of age
(§ 288, subd. (c)). Prosecutors alleged the following acts and time periods for
the offenses:
Counts 1 and 2: buttocks touching when E. was 12
(April 24, 2013, through April 23, 2014);
Counts 3 and 4: buttocks touching when E. was 13
(April 24, 2014, through April 23, 2015);
Counts 5 and 6: buttocks touching when E. was 14
(April 24, 2015, through April 23, 2016);
Counts 7 and 8: breast touching when E. was 14
(April 24, 2015, through April 23, 2016);
Counts 9 and 10: buttocks touching when E. was 15
(April 24, 2016, through April 23, 2017);

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Counts 11 and 12: breast touching when E. was 15
(April 24, 2016, through April 23, 2017).

At trial, E. testified that Daniels would grab, fondle, and grope her
buttocks for “long durations.” E. also told the jury that Daniels would
squeeze or run his hands down the sides of her breasts. According to E.,
Daniels began touching E.’s buttocks on a weekly basis when she was 11 or
12. When she was and 13 or 14, the touching began happening multiple
times a day and expanded to her breasts. Both types of acts continued
regularly until E. turned 18. Although Daniels would sometimes be discrete,
this touching commonly happened in other family members’ presence, like
when Daniels would give E. long hugs upon arriving home from work.
E. testified that while Daniels committed these acts, he made moaning,
sexual noises. Daniels also made comments about E.’s body, such as telling
E. that she was “hot” and “sexy,” and her breasts were nice. Daniels also
touched E. under her clothes at times, unhooking her bra to rub her back and
requesting that she wear leggings because they provided easy access.
E. also told the jury about numerous other instances of Daniels’s
sexually inappropriate behavior. E. testified that on at least one occasion
Daniels put his face in E.’s breasts when she was 15 or 16. E. also described
an incident when she was 15 or 16 where Daniels “grind[ed]” on E.’s leg and
vaginal area with an erection. E. also said that while she was in high school,
Daniels frequently made sexual jokes and comments about E. and acted like
E. was his wife when they were in public.
On two occasions when E. was 16, she called Child Protective Services
(CPS) to report Daniels. The first time she got scared and hung up. The
second time, she gave a fake name (Jazz Thompson) and reported that

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Daniels had been sexually abusing her for years, but ultimately was too
fearful to pursue it.
E. acknowledged having a foggy memory of some of Daniels’s acts,
which she documented in a letter she wrote to police. E. attributed her
memory problems to the trauma she experienced, noting she also has poor
memory from when she was approximately 9 and 10 years old due to Celiac
disease.
The trial court also admitted E.’s private diaries from when she was
approximately 16 to 19 years old. One entry stated, “ ‘My dad just f------ said
he wants to grab my “T&A” and that they’re perfect. I asked him what that
meant and he said, “tits and ass” and grabbed my ass.’ ” A separate entry
stated, “my dad alternates between sexually abusing me and being mean to
me . . . . He keeps asking me to shower with him saying he’ll pay me as much
as I want.” Another stated, “my dad texted me that I make him hard and
that when he was holding me, he told me I should appreciate that he’s not
playing with my nipples.”
E.’s diaries also mentioned her mental health struggles, repeatedly
referencing self-harm and suicide. The diaries also described sexual abuse
from five other men.
Texts exchanged between Daniels and E. from late 2019 and early 2020
were also admitted. In these messages Daniels commented about E.’s body
and sent her sexually explicit material. For example, in response to a picture
of E., Daniels said, “ ‘[o]h damn, that’s hot,’ ” and E.’s “ ‘eyes look stunning.’ ”
Other examples include a message where Daniels attached a dildo meme and
asked E. if she needed one. Another text from Daniels stated that a link to
“ ‘Welcome to Anal Sex 101’ ” is what every teen wants for Christmas.

4
Brother testified, describing an inappropriate relationship between
Daniels and E. starting when E. was around 12 or 13 years old. Daniels and
E. would spend long hours together late into the night, they made explicit
sexual jokes, and when Daniels arrived home from work, he would give E.
long hugs and rest his hand on her buttocks. Brother stated Daniels’s
strange and uncomfortable acts were normalized through repetition, he asked
E. about it numerous times when she was 18, and once E. finally confirmed
the inappropriate relationship, Brother reported it to the police.
Mother testified as well, stating Daniels started spending an inordinate
amount of time with E. when she was 12 or 13. Mother noticed that when E.
was 15 or 16 Daniels would frequently graze E.’s buttocks and breasts after
long embraces. Mother also told the jury about an incident when E. was 16
or 17 where Daniels and E. were watching a movie behind a closed door and
when Mother entered the room “it appeared [to her] that they both jumped
apart, like you would expect to see maybe two teenagers do.” By the time E.
started high school, Mother began worrying that Daniels was treating E. as
his wife, and she confronted Daniels about it when E. was around 16 to 18
years old. Mother explained that Daniels’s acts were gradual, and she
credited Daniels’s innocent explanations while doubting herself. Mother
confirmed that in hindsight, Daniels’s behavior was obviously inappropriate.
The People also offered expert testimony from forensic interviewer,
Christina Schultz. Schultz testified that child abuse perpetrators often
progressively increase their inappropriate behavior to hide it, making it
difficult for others to detect. Schultz also opined that child sex abuse victims
often delay disclosure, and they usually do not recall the details of each
incident when the abuse continues over years.

5
Detective Anthony Allmon testified similarly, stating that while E. had
difficulty remembering specific individualized incidents, which may happen
with victims of long term abuse, E. consistently reported that Daniels
continuously touched her buttocks and breasts. Detective Allmon confirmed
that a report had been made to CPS under the name Jazz Thompson.
Two of E.’s friends, A. D. and A. A., testified that E. disclosed sexual
abuse by Daniels. A. D. was one of the men E. accused of sexual abuse in her
diary; he denied any such abuse occurred. A. D. was, however, concerned E.
would make a false sexual abuse allegation against him.
For the defense, Daniels’s aunt and uncle testified, stating that Daniels
and E. had a good relationship. Daniels’s uncle never saw anything
inappropriate between Daniels and E. and his aunt doubted E.’s sexual abuse
allegations. Daniels testified on his own behalf, acknowledging he should not
have sent E. sexually explicit material, but otherwise denying any
wrongdoing.
The jury found Daniels guilty of all 12 counts. The trial court

sentenced Daniels to eight years in prison.2 Daniels’s timely appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Sufficient Evidence Established That Daniels Repeatedly Touched E.
With Sexual Intent When She Was 12 to 15 Years Old
Daniels argues there was not substantial evidence proving that he
touched E. with sexual intent, or that the acts occurred when E. was under
16 years old. Daniels claims E.’s testimony regarding the offenses lacked
specificity, and there were equally plausible innocent explanations for his
acts. Daniels asserts none of the people who observed the acts raised any

2 Daniels received six years for count 1, two years for count 2, concurrent
six-year terms for counts 3 and 4, and concurrent two-year terms for counts 5
through 12.
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concerns, Mother did not see any inappropriate behavior until E. was 15 or
16, and there was no independent evidence that he was a pedophile. Finally,
Daniels challenges E.’s credibility, asserting that E. reported memory
problems, she suffered from mental illness, and she accused several other
men of assaulting her.
1. Section 288
To commit a lewd act under section 288, the perpetrator must act “with
the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual
desires of” the perpetrator or the victim. (§ 288, subd. (a).) The victim must
be under the age of 14 for a violation under subdivision (a) of the statute.
(§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1–4.) And to violate subdivision (c), the victim must

be either 14 or 15 years old. (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 5–12.)3
Generic testimony may suffice to establish these elements; however:
The victim, of course, must describe the kind of act or
acts committed with sufficient specificity, both to assure
that unlawful conduct indeed has occurred and to
differentiate between the various types of proscribed
conduct (e.g., lewd conduct, intercourse, oral copulation or
sodomy). Moreover, the victim must describe the number of
acts committed with sufficient certainty to support each of
the counts alleged in the information or indictment (e.g.,
“twice a month” or “every time we went camping”). Finally,
the victim must be able to describe the general time period
in which these acts occurred (e.g., “the summer before my
fourth grade,” or “during each Sunday morning after he
came to live with us”), to assure the acts were committed
within the applicable limitation period. Additional details
regarding the time, place or circumstance of the various
assaults may assist in assessing the credibility or
substantiality of the victim’s testimony, but are not

3 Daniels also had to be at least 10 years older than E. to violate
section 288, subdivision (c)(1), but that element is not in dispute.
7
essential to sustain a conviction. (People v. Jones (1990)
51 Cal.3d 294, 316.)

2. Standard of Review
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
a conviction, “ ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the
judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is,
evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th
719, 780.) We do “ ‘ “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer (2024)
15 Cal.5th 622, 646.)
3. Analysis
E. described the kind of acts committed (groping, fondling, grabbing,
and squeezing her buttocks and breasts), the number of acts (starting weekly
and progressing to multiple times a day), and the general time period in
which these acts occurred (buttocks starting when E. was 11 or 12, breasts
starting when she was 13 or 14, and both continuing to through the age of
18). E. also explained that Daniels made sexual noises and comments while
committing these acts, and he occasionally touched her underneath her
clothes. We therefore disagree that E.’s testimony was not specific enough to
sustain the convictions for each count.
The jury also heard about Daniels’s numerous other uncharged acts
through E.’s testimony, E.’s diary, and Daniels’s texts. This evidence was
probative of Daniels’s sexual intent, absence of mistake, and propensity to
commit sexual offenses. (Evid. Code, §§ 1101, subd. (b), 1108.)
Although Daniels’s behavior occurred in front of family members and
went unreported for years, both Mother and Brother started noticing an
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unusual relationship between Daniels and E. when E. was approximately
12 or 13. Mother and Brother also testified Daniels’s acts were gradual and
normalized over the years, with Mother acknowledging that in hindsight
Daniels’s behavior was obviously inappropriate. Schultz testified that this is
common in child abuse cases, where perpetrators progressively increase their
inappropriate behavior to hide it, and the abuse is not evident to others. As
such, even though Mother did not notice Daniels grazing E.’s buttocks and
breasts until E. was 15 or 16, a jury could reasonably conclude that both
Mother and Brother’s observations were consistent with E.’s testimony and a
typical residential molest case.
Finally, E.’s credibility is not a matter that we reevaluate on appeal.
(People v. Helzer, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 646.) Although E. suffered from
mental illness and accused several other men of sexual abuse, defense
counsel extensively cross-examined E. on those and other issues and the jury
nonetheless found her credible. Further, nothing about E.’s testimony was
impossible or inherently improbable. (See, e.g., People v. Elliott (2012)
53 Cal.4th 535, 585 [“Unless it describes facts or events that are physically
impossible or inherently improbable, the testimony of a single witness is
sufficient to support a conviction.”].) E.’s testimony was also corroborated by
her documented attempt to report Daniels to CPS, as well as Schultz’s and
Detective Allmon’s testimony that child sex abuse victims usually do not
recall all details of continuous abuse and often delay reporting the
perpetrator.
Based on the foregoing, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to
conclude that Daniels committed each lewd act with sexual intent and that E.
met the age requirements for each offense.

9
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury with CALCRIM
No. 207
Daniels argues the version of CALCRIM No. 207 used by the trial court
incorrectly stated that the offenses allegedly occurred “on or about” specific
dates instead of between specific date ranges. Daniels claims that as given,
CALCRIM No. 207 eliminated the age element of the offenses and permitted
the jury to convict him twice for the same acts because there was nothing

further to distinguish the offenses. We disagree.4
1. Additional Background
The written version of CALCRIM No. 207 used by the trial court states:
It is alleged that the crimes occurred on or about:
– Counts 1 & 2: April 24, 2013 and April 23, 2014;
– Counts 3 & 4: April 24, 2014 and April 23, 2015;
– Counts 5, 6, 7, & 8: April 24, 2015 and April 23,
2016;
– Counts 9, 10, 11, & 12: April 24, 2016 and April
23, 2017
The People are not required to prove that the crimes
took place exactly on those days but only that they
happened reasonably close to those days.

However, the trial court’s oral instructions stated: “it’s alleged in our
case the crimes occurred on or about — as to counts 1: April 24th, 2013,
through April 23rd, 2014. Counts 3 and 4: April 24th, 2014, through April
23, 2015. Counts 5, 6, 7, 8: April 24th, 2015, through April 23rd, 2016.
Counts 9, 10, 11, and 12: April 24th, 2016, through April 23, 2017.”

4 This issue has not been forfeited as asserted by respondent. Daniels’s
claim “is that the instruction misstated the elements of the crime, an
assertion that may be considered on appeal despite the absence of an
objection below.” (People v. Nelson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 543.)
10
The trial court also instructed on unanimity in accordance with
CALCRIM No. 3501 as follows:
The defendant is charged with committing a lewd act
upon a child under the age of 14 and committing a lewd act
upon a child 14 or 15 years of age. Counts 1 and 2 pertain
to conduct that occurred sometime during the period of
April 24, 2013 to April 23, 2014. Counts 3 and 4 pertain to
conduct that occurred sometime during the period of April
24, 2014 to April 23, 2015. Counts 5 through 8 pertain to
conduct that occurred sometime during the period of April
24, 2015 to April 23, 2016. Counts 9 through 12 pertain to
conduct that occurred sometime during the period of April
24, 2016 to April 23, 2017.
The People have presented evidence of more than one
act to prove that the defendant committed these offenses.
You must not find the defendant guilty unless:
l. You all agree that the People have proved that
the defendant committed at least one of these acts
and you all agree on which act he committed for
each offense;
OR
2. You all agree that the People have proved that
the defendant committed all the acts alleged to
have occurred during this time period and have
proved that the defendant committed at least the
number of offenses charged.

The trial court further explained pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3515 that
“[e]ach of the counts charged in this case is . . . separate. You must consider
each count separately and return a separate verdict for each one.”
As for the elements of the offenses, the trial court used CALCRIM
No. 1110 to instruct the jury that Daniels was “charged in counts 1–4 with
committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child under the age of 14 years,”
which requires that the People prove that the victim “was under the age of 14

11
years at the time of the act.” Similarly, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1112, the
trial court informed the jury that Daniels was “charged in counts 5–12 with a
lewd or lascivious act on a 14 or 15 year-old child,” under which the People
must establish that the victim “was 14 or 15 years old at the time of the act.”
Finally, the trial court informed the jury that “[t]he People presented
evidence of other behavior by [Daniels] that was not charged in this
case[ ]that [Daniels] touched the victim’s buttocks and breasts and grinded on
her when she was 16, 17, and 18 years of age, and sent text messages with
sexual content.” Using CALCRIM Nos. 1191A and 375, the trial court
instructed that these other acts may be used “to prove [Daniels’s] identity,
intent, motive, and lack of mistake or accident,” or “that [Daniels] was likely
to commit and did commit lewd and lascivious acts against a child under 14
and lewd and lascivious acts of a child of 14 or 15 years of age, as charged
here.”
In closing argument, the prosecutor stated, “Counts 1 through 4 is lewd
act upon a child under the age of 14,” “[s]o this is when [E.] is under the age
of 14, when she’s 12 and 13. Those are the dates that it ranges up to.” The
prosecutor also stated, “in counts 5 through 12, it’s a little different. You see,
now we’re at a little bit older of a kid, 14 to 15 years old. . . . [E.] was 14 or 15
years old at the time.” Continuously referencing E.’s age in relation to the
various counts, the prosecutor also explained that the People did not charge
Daniels for any of the acts that occurred when E. was 16 and older. The
prosecutor also reiterated that the jury had to find a separate act for each
count. For example, the prosecutor identified counts 1 and 2 as covering the
period of “April 24th, 2013, to April 23, 2014,” and stated, “for that year,
there is two charges. One time, he groped her buttocks with a sexual intent.
[And a]nother time. That is it.”

12
While deliberating, jurors sent two notes to the court. Neither
question concerned the law nor jury instructions.
2. Standard of Review
We independently review a claim of instructional error. (People v.
Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) “ ‘If a jury instruction is ambiguous, we
inquire whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood
and misapplied the instruction.’ [Citation.] In making this determination,
we consider the challenged language ‘ “in the context of the instructions as
a whole and the trial record.” ’ ” (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
90, 107.) Circumstances relevant to this determination include the
arguments of counsel, whether the jury sought clarification of the challenged
instruction, and whether defense counsel objected. (People v. Young (2005)
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1202–1203.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he absence of an essential element in one instruction may be
supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.’
[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] ‘Jurors are presumed able to understand and
correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court’s
instructions.’ ” (People v. Fiore (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1378.)
3. Analysis
The written version of CALCRIM No. 207 given to the jury did not
accurately state the dates alleged in the information. It stated the crimes in
the various counts allegedly occurred “on or about” two specific dates instead
of “on or about and between” those specific dates. The instruction was also
incomplete regarding the timing that the prosecution needed to establish. It
correctly stated that the precise date need not be proven but omitted the
required bookends for the offenses set by E.’s date of birth. Accordingly,
CALCRIM No. 207 by itself was ambiguous.

13
However, in assessing how the jury interpreted CALCRIM No. 207, we
must look at the entire record. (People v. Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at
p. 107.) The trial court’s unanimity instruction and oral recitation of
CALCRIM No. 207 correctly stated the date ranges alleged in the

information.5 These dates corresponded with E.’s birthday, limiting the
offenses in counts 1–4 to when E. was under 14 and the offenses in counts 5–
12 to when she was 14 or 15. Associating each count with time periods would
also be reasonable based on E.’s testimony, in which she described the lewd
acts occurring during certain periods of her life, as opposed to date-specific
incidents.
Additionally, four other instructions correctly informed the jury of the
offenses’ age requirements: CALCRIM Nos. 1110 and 1112 stating the
elements of the offenses, the unanimity instruction in CALCRIM No. 3501,
and CALCRIM No. 1191A regarding the uncharged sex offenses. The
prosecutor also reiterated that the offenses were age specific in closing
argument.
Regarding the various charged and uncharged acts alleged by the
People, the unanimity instruction (CALCRIM No. 3501) informed the jury
that they all had to agree either on a specific act for each offense, or that
Daniels committed all acts alleged. CALCRIM No. 3515 further advised the
jury that they must separately decide each count. The jury’s use of the
uncharged acts occurring when E. was 16 or older was also clarified by
CALCRIM Nos. 1191A and 375, which correctly informed the jury how to use
that evidence when considering the charged crimes. The prosecutor

5 “Although this court gives priority to the written version of an
instruction when a conflict exists between the written and oral versions, the
jury is not informed of this rule. It is thus possible the jury followed the oral
instruction.” (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 804.)
14
reinforced these principles, reminding the jury that it had to find separate
acts in order to convict defendant of each count, and that the acts occurring
when E. was 16 or older were not charged but may be considered in
determining the charged acts.
Finally, there is no indication that the jury was confused by CALCRIM
No. 207 as given. The jury’s deliberations were short, and they did not ask
the trial court any questions regarding the law or jury instructions.
Moreover, defense counsel did not object to the instruction. “[I]f the
instruction[] w[as] susceptible of the interpretation [Daniels] now asserts,
counsel likely would have objected at trial on this basis. Such an omission
suggests that ‘ “the potential for [confusion] argued now was not apparent to
one on the spot.” ’ ” (People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1203.)
In sum, the count specific time frames, age requirements, and separate
nature of each offense were explained in several jury instructions. These
principles were reiterated by the prosecutor in closing argument, and they
were consistent with the evidence presented. Nothing in the record indicates
the jury misunderstood these concepts. Under these circumstances, it is not
reasonably likely a juror would have concluded that: (1) acts occurring
“reasonably close to” but after E.’s 14th birthday would suffice to convict
Daniels of counts 1 through 4; (2) acts “reasonably close to” but before or after
the time E. was 14 or 15 were sufficient for counts 5 through 12; or (3), that
that one act could serve as the basis for more than one count.
We acknowledge that the bench notes for CALCRIM No. 207, state the
“instruction should not be given: (1) when the evidence demonstrates that
the offense was committed at a specific time and place and the defendant has
presented a defense of alibi or lack of opportunity; or (2) two similar offenses
are charged in separate counts.” Daniels cites the second situation from the

15
bench notes (similar offenses charged in separate counts) to argue CALCRIM
No. 207 was improperly given in this case.
Despite the superficial appeal of this argument, the five cases cited in
the bench notes to support CALCRIM No. 207’s limitations concern different
circumstances from those present here. The first three cases (People v.
Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 358–359; People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d
546, 557; People v. Barney (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 490, 497–498) deal with the
first situation referenced in the bench notes (alibi or lack of opportunity
defense), which is inapplicable to Daniels as he claimed no such defense.
The fourth and fifth cases (People v. Gavin (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d
408, 418–420; People v. Deletto (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 458, 474–475), as well
as the third case (People v. Barney, surpa, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 498 & fn. 10.)
address the scenario where a charged crime occurred on a specified date, but
the evidence suggested additional crimes on different dates. The concerns in
those cases were that the jury may not unanimously agree which act
constituted the offense or they might convict the defendant for an uncharged
act.
But here, any concerns regarding unanimity were “cured” by the
unanimity instruction given to Daniels’s jury. (People v. Gordon (1985)
165 Cal.App.3d 839, 857 [finding that the CALJIC counterparts to CALCRIM
Nos. 207 and 3501 “read in conjunction, . . . instruct a jury confronted with an
‘on or about’ allegation that while it need not find that the crime was
committed on the precise date alleged . . . it must nonetheless unanimously
agree that defendant committed the same act.”].) Additionally, for the
reasons discussed above, it is not reasonably likely the jury relied on
CALCRIM No. 207’s “on or about” language to convict Daniels for uncharged
acts when the other jury instructions and the prosecutor’s closing argument

16
clearly delineated the limitations of other acts evidence and the date and age
requirements for the charged offenses. Accordingly, the concerns supporting
the bench notes were not present in this case.
Based on the foregoing, it is not reasonably likely the jury
misunderstood CALCRIM No. 207 to eliminate the offenses’ age
requirements or to allow multiple convictions for the same act. We therefore
see no instructional error.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

IRION, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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