CourtListener 10763287•Cooper v. Optum Services CA2/1
Testo completo
Filed 12/22/25 Cooper v. Optum Services CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
TAWANA JEAN COOPER, B345296
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24NWCV02923)
v.
OPTUM SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Raul A. Sahagun, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Tawana Jean Cooper, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Jackson Lewis, Ellen E. Cohen, Erica T. Khaine and Dylan
B. Carp for Defendants and Respondents.
____________________
Plaintiff and appellant Tawana Jean Cooper challenges the
trial court’s order dismissing with prejudice the complaint she
filed against her former employer, defendant and respondent
OptumRx, Inc. (OptumRx), as well as its corporate affiliates,
defendants and respondents Optum Services, Inc. and United
Healthcare Services, Inc. We affirm the order for the reasons we
explain below.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Cooper alleges she was employed as a pharmacy customer
service representative for OptumRx from December 2019 until
she was terminated in April 2021. She filed suit in Orange
County Superior Court in January 2022 alleging 10 causes of
action, including employment discrimination on the basis of race,
age, and disability, as well as wrongful termination.1
The defendants moved to compel arbitration. They claimed
that when Cooper was hired, she signed an agreement to
arbitrate all employment-related disputes. The Orange County
Superior Court denied the motion without prejudice, finding the
defendants had failed to produce sufficient evidence that Cooper
signed the agreement. The defendants filed a renewed motion
accompanied by additional evidence that Cooper had indeed
signed an arbitration agreement, and in January 2023, the court
granted the motion.
Despite the court’s ruling, neither party filed a demand for
arbitration for the following 18 months. At an alternative
dispute resolution review hearing in August 2024, after Cooper
1 The defendants filed a motion to augment the appellate
record to include the complaint in the Orange County case, along
with other relevant documents. We grant the motion.
2
told the Orange County Superior Court she did not intend to
participate in arbitration, the court instructed the defendants
that they would need to act to avoid waiving their right to
arbitrate. The defendants filed a demand for arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association on August 23, 2024.
Two weeks later, on September 3, 2024, Cooper filed a new
complaint against the same defendants, this time in Los Angeles
County Superior Court. In the operative first amended complaint
(FAC), Cooper alleged causes of action for forgery and intentional
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Virtually all the
factual allegations in the complaint recounted events in the
Orange County case, in particular the litigation regarding the
motion to compel arbitration. Cooper claimed the defendants
forged her handwriting on the arbitration agreement filed with
the court, and her claims of emotional distress were based on her
reaction upon receiving a copy of the defendants’ demand for
arbitration.
The defendants filed a special motion to strike under the
anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)2 in November
2024, alleging that all of Cooper’s causes of action were based on
activity protected under the statute, i.e., the filing of the demand
for arbitration in response to the court’s instructions in the
Orange County case. The defendants argued further that Cooper
could not establish a probability of prevailing on the merits
because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded her claims.
The trial court issued a tentative ruling granting the
motion. The court concluded that all of Cooper’s causes of action
2 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Code of Civil Procedure.
3
arose from protected activity; although it found the initiation of
arbitration was not generally protected under the statute, here
the filing of a demand for arbitration constituted protected
petitioning activity because it came in response to a court order.
In the court’s view, Cooper could not show a probability of
prevailing because the litigation privilege (see Civ. Code, § 47,
subd. (b)) barred her from seeking damages for the defendants’
actions in complying with a court order.
After a hearing, the trial court issued a minute order
affirming its tentative ruling. The court stated that Cooper’s
“first amended complaint is [d]ismissed with [p]rejudice.” The
court also issued a separate order of dismissal, which stated in
part, “On the motion of the court, . . . [¶] it is hereby ordered that
the within action is dismissed [¶] . . . with prejudice as to [¶] . . .
[¶] . . . Optum Services, Inc., . . . et al.” (Capitalization omitted.)
Cooper has filed three notices of appeal from the trial
court’s actions. We previously dismissed two of the appeals, one
because the notice of appeal was untimely, and the second
because the order from which Cooper purported to appeal was not
appealable.3 The current appeal was filed in a timely manner
from an appealable order.
3 In her appellate brief, Cooper requests we transfer the
case to a different court because we have shown bias against her.
We denied the same request when Cooper filed a letter brief to
the same effect in one of her other appeals, and we see no basis
for revisiting that decision. We understand that Cooper may
disagree with our prior rulings, but the fact we have ruled
against her does not demonstrate bias. (In re M.V. (2025) 109
Cal.App.5th 486, 517.)
4
DISCUSSION
Cooper does not challenge the trial court’s decision on the
anti-SLAPP motion on the merits. Indeed, she claims she is not
appealing from the denial of that motion at all, but rather from
the court’s subsequent order dismissing the case. Cooper alleges
the trial court “on its own motion and without any party’s
request[ ] issued an [o]rder of [d]ismissal.” She claims further
the court lacked statutory authority to dismiss the case on its
own motion, and as a result, its dismissal order is void.
We disagree. The record shows unequivocally that the
dismissal order was a direct consequence of the order granting
the anti-SLAPP motion. In their motion, the defendants
“request[ed] that the [c]ourt grant [the] motion to strike and
dismiss [Cooper]’s claim with prejudice.” (Italics added, boldface
omitted.) In its tentative decision, the court wrote that the
“[d]efendants’ special motion to strike the FAC pursuant to . . .
section 425.16 is granted. [Cooper]’s FAC is dismissed with
prejudice.” (Capitalization omitted.) The court then issued a
minute order affirming the tentative decision and stating once
again that Cooper’s “first amended complaint is [d]ismissed with
[p]rejudice.”
Section 581 gives the trial court the authority to “dismiss
[a] complaint as to [a] defendant . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [a]fter a
motion to strike the whole of a complaint is granted without leave
to amend and either party moves for dismissal.” (Id., subds. (f) &
(f)(3).) The court acted pursuant to that authority, and its
dismissal order is not void. In this context, the court’s statement
in the separate dismissal order that the case was dismissed “[o]n
the motion of the [c]ourt” is a clerical error and does not reflect a
sua sponte dismissal; it reflects the court implementing the
5
dismissal it had already granted. The existence of such a clerical
error does not render the dismissal order void or reversible. (E.g.,
F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108; Aspen Internat.
Capital Corp. v. Marsch (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1199, 1204 [a
court has inherent power to correct a clerical error at any time “to
conform its records to the truth”].) To correct the clerical error,
we instruct the trial court on remand to issue a dismissal order
nunc pro tunc confirming that the case was dismissed as a
consequence of the court granting the defendants’ anti-SLAPP
motion.
In lieu of a reply brief, Cooper filed a letter brief arguing we
lack jurisdiction to consider the defendants’ appellate brief. She
notes that the caption of the brief does not list the 50 unknown
“Doe” defendants whom Cooper named in her complaint. In
Cooper’s view, these Doe defendants are “indispensable parties to
this appeal” and the failure to list them in the caption of the brief
is a “core jurisdictional defect.” We disagree. We see no
indication in the record that Cooper identified any initially
unknown defendants, or later named them in lieu of a Doe
defendant. The failure to list parties that never appeared as
defendants in the caption of the defendants’ brief provides no
basis for us to disregard an appellate brief. Further, even if we
were to disregard defendants’ brief, it remains Cooper’s burden
as the appellant to affirmatively demonstrate error (Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 764, 777), and she has not done so.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed with directions to issue a
dismissal order nunc pro tunc confirming that the case was
dismissed as a consequence of the court granting the defendants’
6
anti-SLAPP motion. Defendants are awarded their costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
7
Ti chiedi come si applica questo testo alla tua situazione?
Consulenza gratuita, senza impegno
Descrivi la tua situazione. Il nostro team ti ricontatterà via e-mail per la tua consulenza.
Continua la tua ricerca in ChatGPT o Claude
Collega Omnilex per cercare nel corpus legale dal tuo assistente IA.