Thang v. Thang CA2/3

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Filed 12/22/25 Thang v. Thang CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

AH JUNG YIN THANG et al., B342406

Plaintiffs and Respondents, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
v. 21STCV30526,
22STCV02161
LEVI SAP NEI THANG et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court,
Los Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.

Rutan & Tucker and Proud Usahacharoenporn for
Defendants and Appellants.

Thaler Law and Jesse J. Thaler for Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
_________________________
Defendants Levi Sap Nei Thang and a group of related
limited liability companies appeal a judgment rendered on a
statement of decision after a bench trial.1 The trial court found
defendants liable for negligent misrepresentation and intentional
fraud based on representations Thang made to 21 individual
plaintiffs to solicit their investments in certain oil and gas leases
and related assets. Defendants contend (a) the judgment on the
negligent misrepresentation claim should be reversed because
plaintiffs failed to prove defendants owed them a legal duty
in connection with the transaction; (b) the judgment on the
negligent misrepresentation claim should be reversed because
the claim is barred by the economic loss rule; (c) the evidence
was insufficient to support the judgment on both the negligent
misrepresentation and intentional fraud claims; and (d) the
evidence was insufficient to support alter ego liability against
the entity defendants.
We conclude defendants have failed to establish error
with respect to the intentional fraud claim. Because the
fraud claim independently supports the judgment, we need
not address defendants’ contentions regarding the negligent
misrepresentation claim. Further, although defendants
challenge the alter ego determination, they do not address the
trial court’s primary ground for holding the entity defendants
liable as direct participants in the fraudulent scheme. We affirm.

1 Thang is the sole owner and employee of the limited
liability companies. We refer to the companies as “entity
defendants.”

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PRINCIPLES OF APPELLATE REVIEW
“The most fundamental rule of appellate review is that the
judgment or order challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct,
and it is the appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate
error.” (Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc. (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 822, 833, citing Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th
594, 608–609.) “ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged
to support [the judgment] on matters as to which the record is
silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) This includes the
presumption “ ‘that the record contains evidence to support every
finding of fact.’ ” (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25 Cal.3d 877,
887.) “[T]he burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that
the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of
the judgment.” (Jameson, at p. 609; accord Denham, at p. 564.)
Thus, “ ‘an appellant who contends that some particular finding
is not supported is required to set forth in his brief a summary
of the material evidence upon that issue. Unless this is done,
the error assigned is deemed to be waived.’ ” (In re Marriage
of Fink, at p. 887.)
Before turning to the underlying facts, we must emphasize
that defendants have failed to provide a reporter’s transcript of
the trial proceedings and testimony. Accordingly, the only record
we have of this evidence is the summary set forth in the trial
court’s statement of decision. “Where no reporter’s transcript
has been provided . . . it is presumed that the unreported trial
testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate
of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992 (Estate of Fain), citing
Ehrler v. Ehrler (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 147, 153–154.) “The effect

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of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but
supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising
an argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Estate of
Fain, at p. 992, citing Sui v. Landi (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 383,
385–386; National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlick (1989)
210 Cal.App.3d 510, 521–522.) In accordance with these
principles, we draw our recitation of the facts from the court’s
statement of decision and presume the evidence was sufficient
to support every factual finding stated in it.
BACKGROUND
The parties waived jury trial and tried the negligent
misrepresentation and intentional fraud claims to the court.2
Defendant Thang and all 21 plaintiffs testified. The court found
defendants liable on both claims based on the following evidence.3

2 The parties entered into a stipulation of facts; however,
defendants have failed to include the stipulation in their
appellant’s appendix. While the court accepted the stipulation,
it clarified that it would have reached “the same decision even
if it disregarded the parties’ stipulation of fact because Plaintiffs
testified to the dispositive facts contained within the stipulation.”
3 Defendants filed objections to the trial court’s proposed
statement of decision. Most of these objections disputed only the
evidentiary bases for the court’s factual findings. As we have
discussed, because defendants have failed to provide a reporter’s
transcript, we must presume the unreported testimony supports
every factual finding that the trial court made. (See Estate
of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Apart from the
evidentiary disputes, defendants’ objections largely focused on
their contention that plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied
on oral representations that purportedly contradicted the express
terms of the parties’ written contracts. We address this issue

4
Plaintiffs testified that defendant Thang solicited their
investments in oil leases, which she represented would be
drilled and operated by her younger brother. Thang, by
contrast, testified that she was selling land that may or may
not contain oil, and that plaintiffs misunderstood the nature of
the transaction. Each plaintiff’s testimony was consistent in
establishing that they were Burmese immigrants with limited
English proficiency, that Thang was a known figure in the
Burmese-American community, and that plaintiffs learned of
the investment opportunity through Thang’s Facebook posts and
livestreams. Plaintiffs uniformly believed they were investing in
oil leases, and testified that Thang held herself out as an expert
in oil and gas, described the leases as high-quality, and assured
them that her brother would operate the wells if they lacked
sufficient funds, with costs to be repaid from oil profits. No wells
were drilled or operated, plaintiffs received no profits, and none
of their funds were returned. Plaintiffs further testified that
Thang deleted all relevant Facebook content after they filed suit.
Several witnesses stated that Thang claimed she was selling
the leases at cost to help impoverished Burmese immigrants
become wealthy, and that they relied on her representations
due to their inability to understand the written contracts.
Many were familiar with Thang because of her purported
charitable donations to disaster relief efforts in Burma.
The court expressly found plaintiffs were credible and
Thang was not. The statement of decision explains: “The Court
finds that Plaintiffs testified credibly. Plaintiffs testified

when we discuss defendants’ appellate arguments regarding
the reasonable reliance element of plaintiffs’ fraud claim.

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consistently with each other, and the Court had an opportunity
to observe their manner of testifying and body language, which
support the Court’s credibility determination. Conversely, the
Court found that Levi Sap Nei Thang did not testify credibly.
The Court believed Plaintiffs’ testimony concerning Thang’s
representations. Moreover, Thang’s testimony demonstrated
that some of her representations to Plaintiffs were false. For
example, Plaintiffs testified that Thang claimed to have extensive
experience in the oil and gas industry, and Thang’s testimony
belied those representations. The Court also bases its adverse
credibility determination against Thang [on] having observed
her testimony during the trial.”
The court found plaintiffs had met their burden to prove
“Thang made several material misrepresentations, any one
of which would support the Court’s judgment in this case.”
Those misrepresentations were (a) “Thang misrepresented
her qualifications and experience in the oil and gas industry,”
including claiming “to have strong expertise and extensive
experience in the oil and gas industry over the course of
many years”; (b) “Thang misrepresented that she would assist
the investors and would ‘take care of everything,’ ” including
promising that “her younger brother would handle the drilling
and operation of the oil wells; Plaintiffs could pay the costs
after they harvested and sold the oil; and Thang’s brother’s
work would create a passive stream of income for the investors”;
(c) “Thang misrepresented the quality and profitability of the
leases,” including “definitive statements concerning the quality
of the oil leases and the existence of oil on the land”; and
(d) “Thang misrepresented the nature of the investments to
Plaintiffs.” The court found “Thang knew her misrepresentations

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were false” and plaintiffs “reasonably relied on these
misrepresentations, which gave rise to their damages.” In sum,
the court found: “Thang acquired the leases and ‘dumped’
them on Plaintiffs by misrepresenting her qualifications and
experience, as well as the nature and value of the investments.
Thang promised to help Plaintiffs drill and operate the oil wells.
Once she sold the leases and took Plaintiffs’ money, she
abandoned them in contravention of her promises.” In making
these findings, the court reiterated that it “credits Plaintiffs’
testimony and discredits Thang’s testimony.”
As for the entity defendants, the court found the companies
were liable on both claims “based upon two independent
theories.” The court explained: “First, the entity defendants
were direct participants in the scheme. The entity defendants
were referenced in the contracts as contracting parties, and
Plaintiffs proved that Levi Sap Nei Thang was their agent
for purposes of transacting ‘business’ with Plaintiffs. Because
corporations necessarily act through their agents, they are liable
in this case. [¶] Second, in the alternative, the Court finds that
the entity defendants were alter egos of Levi Sap Nei Thang.”4

4 With respect to the alter ego determination, the court
found plaintiffs had met their burden to prove circumstances
warranting reverse piercing of the corporate veil. Specifically,
the court found (a) “the entity defendants have no legitimate
business operations and were used exclusively to perpetrate the
instant scheme”; (b) “there was a unity of interest and ownership
between the entity defendants and Levi Sap Nei Thang, because
she was the sole owner and employee of the entities and she used
them for her own purposes”; (c) “exempting the entity defendants
from liability would permit Levi Sap Nei Thang to shelter assets
from this judgment”; (d) “Plaintiffs’ funds went to these limited

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Thang moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
and a new trial. The court denied the post-trial motions.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
1. The Trial Court’s Findings Support the Judgment
on the Intentional Fraud Claim
Defendants contend the evidence was insufficient to
establish “key elements” of plaintiffs’ intentional fraud claim.
As discussed, because they have failed to provide a record of
the trial testimony, defendants are effectively precluded from
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial
court’s findings, and we must presume that “the unreported
trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate
of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) Accordingly, our review
is confined to determining whether the court’s factual findings
were sufficient to support the judgment.
Moreover, our power to reverse the judgment is limited
to prejudicial errors for which defendants—as appellants—have
shown a miscarriage of justice occurred. (Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13 [a reviewing court cannot set aside a judgment “unless,
after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,
the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of
has resulted in a miscarriage of justice”]; People v. Chun (2009)
45 Cal.4th 1172, 1201 [our state constitution “prohibits a
reviewing court from setting aside a judgment due to trial court

liability companies based upon Thang’s testimony and the
fact that the entity defendants were contracting parties, i.e.,
they held the leases”; and (e) “an injustice would result if the
judgment does not include the entity defendants, as Thang could
shelter her assets.”

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error unless it finds the error prejudicial”]; see also Code Civ.
Proc., § 475 [“No judgment . . . shall be reversed . . . unless it
shall appear from the record that such error . . . was prejudicial,
. . . and that a different result would have been probable if such
error . . . had not occurred.”].) Prejudice is not presumed. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 475.) On the contrary, “the appellant bears the
burden to show it is reasonably probable he or she would have
received a more favorable result at trial had the [purported] error
not occurred.” (Citizens for Open Government v. City of Lodi
(2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 296, 308 (Citizens for Open Government),
citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
To prevail on a claim for intentional fraud, a plaintiff
must prove “(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that
an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false;
(3) the defendant knew that the representation was false when
the defendant made it, or the defendant made the representation
recklessly and without regard for its truth; (4) the defendant
intended that the plaintiff rely on the representation; (5) the
plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff
was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s
representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm
to the plaintiff.” (Manderville v. PCG&S Group, Inc. (2007)
146 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1498, italics omitted; accord Engalla v.
Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 974.)
The trial court found defendants knowingly made the
following misrepresentations and plaintiffs were damaged
due to their reasonable reliance: (a) “Thang misrepresented
her qualifications and experience in the oil and gas industry”;
(b) “Thang misrepresented that she would assist the investors
and would ‘take care of everything’ ” related to “drilling and

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operation of the oil wells”; (c) “Thang misrepresented the quality
and profitability of the leases,” including “definitive statements”
concerning “the existence of oil on the land”; and (d) “Thang
misrepresented the nature of the investments to Plaintiffs.”
Defendants contend the trial court erred in finding that
their representations were false, that defendants knew the
representations were false when made, that plaintiffs reasonably
relied on the representations, and that plaintiffs were harmed
as a result. We can easily dispose of the first contention, as
defendants rely almost exclusively upon Thang’s testimony to
show that none of the representations was false.5 The obvious
problem with this approach is the trial court found Thang was
not credible, and we have no power to second guess the court’s
credibility determination. Defendants cannot demonstrate
that their representations were true by relying on testimony
that the trial court found to be false.6 (See Shamblin v. Brattain
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 479 [deference to trial court’s credibility

5 With respect to the representations regarding the
“nature of the investments,” defendants argue there was no
misrepresentation because the “Purchase and Sale Agreements
that Plaintiffs signed were very clear as to what Plaintiffs
were purchasing.” The argument is a non sequitur. Regardless
of whether the agreements were “very clear,” if defendants’
statements misrepresented the nature of the investments
as set forth in those agreements, then the statements were
necessarily false.
6 As the trial court bluntly put it in denying defendants’
post-trial motions, “the court believed the victims and thought
that Levi Sap Nei Thang was lying during her testimony.”
(Italics added.)

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determination mandated for both oral testimony and written
affidavits].)
As for the knowledge of falsity element, defendants make
largely the same mistake. First, they mischaracterize the
trial court’s statement of decision by claiming the court found
knowledge of falsity only with respect to Thang’s promise to
assist the investors with operation of the oil wells. This ignores
the court’s express finding as to all of the “several material
misrepresentations” that “Thang knew her misrepresentations
were false or made the misrepresentations without any
reasonable grounds for believing their truth and with reckless
disregard for their truth.”7 Moreover, even as to Thang’s
misrepresentation about assisting with operations, defendants
exclusively rely on Thang’s declaration in support of their
post-trial motions, while again disregarding the trial court’s
credibility determination. Again, defendants cannot meet their
burden to establish reversible error by relying on post-trial
evidence from a witness who fabricated her trial testimony.
With respect to reasonable reliance, defendants focus on
the false promise to provide assistance with operation of the

7 We note that defendants did not object to the proposed
statement of decision on the ground that this finding was
ambiguous or that it omitted discussion of particular
misrepresentations. Accordingly, we must imply all necessary
findings to uphold the judgment with respect to the knowledge
of falsity element. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Motiska & Ford
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1291, 1300 [where the appellant fails to
object to a purported omission in the trial court’s statement of
decision, the reviewing court “must imply all necessary adverse
findings that will support a determination against him on the
issue he failed to raise”].)

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oil wells and the misrepresentation about the nature of the
investment. They argue plaintiffs could not have reasonably
relied on these misrepresentations because the contracts were
“very clear that Plaintiffs were simply getting leasehold interests
in land, and not any drilling or other services.” Because,
in defendants’ telling, the written contracts directly
contradict Thang’s oral misrepresentations, they contend
the misrepresentations are not actionable. (See, e.g., Kronsberg
v. Milton J. Wershow Co. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 170, 176 [a
fraud claim is actionable if based on a parol “promise made
with no intention of performing” that is “not inconsistent with
the writing” and “was the inducing cause” of it, while a claim is
not actionable if based on parol promises “which by their very
nature are superseded by the final writing” because they are
“inconsistent with it”].) The trial court rejected this argument
in its order denying defendants’ post-trial motions, reasoning
there were factual questions that the court had resolved against
defendants in finding plaintiffs reasonably relied on Thang’s
oral misrepresentations. (See, e.g., Apollo Capital Fund LLC
v. Roth Capital Partners, LLC (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 226, 241
[“The question whether the investors actually or reasonably
relied on the representations, in view of their own written
representation to the contrary in the purchase agreements,
is for the trier of fact.”].)
We need not resolve the dispute over plaintiffs’ reliance
on these misrepresentations to affirm the judgment, because
the misrepresentations about further assistance and the nature
of the investments were not the only misrepresentations that
defendants made. As the trial court also correctly recognized
in denying defendants’ post-trial motions, “there are two other

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misrepresentations that each support the court’s finding that
[defendants] engaged in fraud.” Because the trial court found
the misrepresentations about Thang’s “experience in the oil
and gas industry” and “the existence of oil on the land” each
independently “would support the Court’s judgment in this case,”
defendants cannot establish a prejudicial miscarriage of justice
by challenging plaintiffs’ reliance on only two of the four
misrepresentations that the trial court found to be fraudulent.
(See McPherson v. EF Intercultural Foundation, Inc. (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 243, 258 (McPherson) [the reviewing court must
“affirm a judgment if correct on any ground” put forth in the
trial court’s statement of decision].)
Finally, defendants argue plaintiffs were not entitled
to damages because they “were the cause of their own harm.”
Here, again, defendants rely on Thang’s declaration in support
of their post-trial motions, where she purports to recount the
admissions of “[n]ineteen out of twenty-one” plaintiffs who
supposedly “testified that they did not pay taxes on the
properties.” As we have repeatedly emphasized, it is defendants’
burden as the appellants to provide an adequate record
establishing prejudicial error. Defendants failed to provide
a reporter’s transcript of the trial testimony, and we are in no
position to accept the claims of a witness whom the trial court
found had fabricated her testimony.8 Absent an adequate record,

8 Defendants also challenge the amount of damages
awarded, pointing (again) to Thang’s post-trial declaration about
letters that she supposedly received from one of the plaintiffs
confirming that defendants cancelled one of his agreements
and returned $50,000 of his purchase money. The trial court
rejected this argument in its order denying the post-trial
motions, explaining: “This evidence was not presented at trial.

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we are compelled to presume the evidence was sufficient
to support the court’s finding that plaintiffs were damaged
due to their reasonable reliance on each of defendants’
misrepresentations. (Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th
at p. 992.)
Because defendants’ liability for intentional fraud is
alone sufficient to support the judgment, we need not address
defendants’ contentions that the court erred in finding them
liable for negligent misrepresentation. (See McPherson, supra,
47 Cal.App.5th at p. 258.)
2. Defendants Fail to Address the Entity Defendants’
Direct Liability
Defendants contend the trial court erred in holding the
entity defendants liable as alter egos of Thang. Contrary to the
trial court’s factual findings, they argue the entity defendants
“had legitimate business operations” in the “various states”
where they were registered as limited liability companies and
that “Thang does not own” the entity defendants but “was
merely employed as a manager.” They also say “half” the income
these businesses generated in 2020 “was donated to charity
organizations” or “used for legal bills,” rather than “for Thang’s
‘own purposes.’ ”
Here, again, as with so many of defendants’ other
arguments, they rely exclusively upon Thang’s declaration
in support of their post-trial motions to contest the trial court’s
factual findings. This, as we have now repeatedly emphasized,

Regardless, these letters merely demonstrate that [the plaintiff]
requested a return of funds, not that he received them. The court
credited his testimony at trial that Thang has not returned his
funds.” The court’s ruling was plainly correct.

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is improper and insufficient to satisfy defendants’ appellate
burden. Indeed, the trial court correctly rebuked defendants
along largely the same lines in denying their post-trial motions,
explaining: “Defendants attempt to present new evidence
disputing [the alter ego] finding . . . [¶] . . . in the form of Thang’s
declaration. This is not proper. Regardless, this new evidence
is not credible. Thang never disputed ownership at trial. . . .
There is no corroboration for Thang’s representations and
the court disbelieves the contents of this declaration, given
her lack of credibility during trial.” (Italics added.) We reiterate:
defendants cannot meet their burden to establish reversible error
by relying on post-trial evidence from a witness who fabricated
her trial testimony.
There is another problem with defendants’ argument
that is equally dispositive. In addition to alter ego liability,
the trial court also found the entity defendants liable as “direct
participants in the scheme.” As we have discussed, to meet their
burden as appellants defendants must show prejudicial error—
i.e., that “it is reasonably probable [they] would have received
a more favorable result at trial had the [purported] error
not occurred.” (Citizens for Open Government, supra, 205
Cal.App.4th at p. 308; accord Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Even if we agreed the entity defendants should not have been
held liable as Thang’s alter egos, this would have no effect
on the trial court’s direct liability finding, which stands as an
independently sufficient basis to support the judgment against
the entity defendants. Because they have not challenged the
direct liability finding, defendants cannot establish prejudicial
error.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.

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