CourtListener 10763083•Zack v. Stickells CA3
Testo completo
Filed 12/22/25 Zack v. Stickells CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Mono)
----
ANDREA ZACK, C100675
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Super. Ct. No. CV190128)
v.
PETER STICKELLS et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Andrea Zack sued Peter Stickells, Sierra Alfalfa, LLC (Sierra Alfalfa), and Zack
Ranch, LLC (Zack Ranch) (collectively, defendants) for breach of fiduciary duty,
declaratory relief, and involuntary dissolution of a limited liability company.1 The
lawsuit pertains to Andrea’s asserted membership interest in Zack Ranch. Andrea
appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, in which the
1 Because some of the parties share the same last name, we refer to them by their first
names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.
1
trial court found Andrea lacked standing to pursue her claims because she is not a
member of Zack Ranch, and her claims had to be brought as a derivative rather than
individual action.
Andrea asserts the trial court erred in finding she is not a member of Zack Ranch,
or, in the alternative, in failing to recognize she alleged an individual claim for breach of
fiduciary duty with respect to her personal property interest in Zack Ranch. Finding no
merit in these arguments, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I
Legal Background
The California Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (Act; Corp.
Code,2 § 17701.01 et seq.) applies “to all domestic limited liability companies existing on
or after January 1, 2014” (§ 17713.04, subd. (a)) and governs acts or transactions by a
limited liability company or its members on or after that date (§ 17713.04, subd. (b)).
A member is “a person that has become a member of a limited liability company under
Section 17704.01 and has not dissociated under Section 17706.02.” (§ 17701.02,
subd. (p).) Section 17704.01, subdivision (c) provides, in pertinent part, that after
formation of a limited liability company, a person becomes a member as provided in the
operating agreement or with the consent of all the members. (§ 17704.01, subd. (c)(1),
(3).) Each membership interest includes a transferable interest, a voting/management
right, and a right to information. (§ 17701.02, subd. (r).) A member’s transferable
interest is personal property, which may be transferred. (§§ 17705.01, 17705.02, subd.
(a)(1).)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Corporations Code.
2
A person is dissociated as a member of a limited liability company when the
individual dies. (§ 17706.02, subd. (f)(1).) When a person dissociates as a member of a
limited liability company, “[t]he person’s right to vote or participate as a member in the
management and conduct of the limited liability company’s activities terminates” and,
subject to certain provisions, “any transferable interest owned by the person immediately
before dissociation in the person’s capacity as a member is owned by the person solely as
a transferee.” (§ 17706.03, subd. (a)(1), (3).) A transferee is “a person to which all or
part of a transferable interest has been transferred, whether or not the transferor is a
member.” (§ 17701.02, subd. (ab).)
A transferable interest entitles the person holding the interest to receive
distributions from the limited liability company in accordance with the company’s
operating agreement. (§ 17701.02, subd. (aa).) When a person receives a transferable
interest as a transferee, the transfer does not entitle the transferee to “[v]ote or otherwise
participate in the management or conduct of the activities of a limited liability company”
or to “have access to records or other information concerning the activities of a limited
liability company,” except as otherwise provided in section 17704.10, subdivision (c).
(§ 17705.02, subd. (a)(3).) When a member dies, “the member’s executor, administrator,
guardian, conservator, attorney-in-fact, or other legal representative may exercise all of
the member’s rights for the purpose of settling the member’s estate or administering the
member’s property, including any power the member had under the articles of
organization or an operating agreement to give a transferee the right to become a
member.” (§ 17706.03, subd. (c).)
II
Factual Background
Andrea alleged the following in her operative complaint. Zack Ranch is a
California limited liability company. In 1997, Milton Zack, Ann Zack, and Sierra Alfalfa
entered into the Zack Ranch, LLC Operating Agreement (1997 Operating Agreement).
3
The 1997 Operating Agreement was later amended to change the membership interests to
equal shares between Sierra Alfalfa and Ann, and to appoint Stickells as the sole manager
of the company. Upon Ann’s death on December 16, 2015, Andrea acquired a 14.04
percent interest in Zack Ranch.3 In addition to Sierra Alfalfa, the other current members
of Zack Ranch are Andrea’s siblings—Frederick Zack, Jane Zack Simon, Kathryn Zack,
and Thomas Zack. Andrea alleged that she has been a member of Zack Ranch since
December 16, 2015.
In December 2017, Stickells, as manager of Zack Ranch, presented a Zack Ranch,
LLC Operating Agreement (2017 Operating Agreement) to Andrea and her siblings for
consideration and execution. Andrea referred to the 2017 Operating Agreement as the
“Invalid Operating Agreement” and “unenforceable Invalid Operating Agreement.”
Sierra Alfalfa and Andrea’s siblings signed and executed the 2017 Operating Agreement,
but Andrea did not. Andrea alleged she was not provided adequate notice to consider the
2017 Operating Agreement in violation of the notice provisions in the 1997 Operating
Agreement and section 17704.07, subdivision (h). Andrea further detailed substantive
differences between the 1997 Operating Agreement and the 2017 Operating Agreement
and asserted the company’s operating agreement could not be amended without
unanimous consent by its members, as provided in the 1997 Operating Agreement.
The operative complaint states that Stickells and Sierra Alfalfa engaged in
mismanagement and/or abuse of authority as majority members and co-owners of Zack
Ranch by: (1) improperly entering into loan transactions on behalf of Zack Ranch
following the “purported signing” of the 2017 Operating Agreement; and (2) failing to
transfer a parcel from Sierra Alfalfa into the name of Zack Ranch, as previously agreed to
between Sierra Alfalfa and Ann, and using the parcel as collateral for loan(s) obtained in
3 Ann was Andrea’s mother.
4
the names of Sierra Alfalfa and Zack Ranch. The operative complaint further states that
Stickells engaged in mismanagement and/or abuse of authority by advising Andrea that
he would be debiting her equity capital account on a monthly basis for rent and living
expenses because she was suing Zack Ranch.
In her breach of fiduciary duty cause of action, Andrea asserted that, since
execution of the 2017 Operating Agreement, Stickells and Sierra Alfalfa have purported
to act as co-managers of Zack Ranch; as managers and/or purported co-managers of Zack
Ranch, Stickells and Sierra Alfalfa are fiduciaries to Zack Ranch and its members,
including Andrea, owe duties of loyalty and care to Zack Ranch and all of its members,
including Andrea, and are obligated to act in good faith and engage in fair dealing to
avoid taking action harmful to Zack Ranch and its members, including Andrea.
She alleged that Sierra Alfalfa and Stickells breached their duty of loyalty to Zack
Ranch and its members by: (1) managing Zack Ranch for the primary benefit of majority
member Sierra Alfalfa, as the alter ego of Stickells, for personal gain; (2) failing to
accurately account to Zack Ranch and its members the property, profit, or benefit derived
by Sierra Alfalfa and Stickells as co-managers in conducting the activities of or in their
use of Zack Ranch; (3) “owning and controlling [Andrea’s] residence, disproportionately
retaliating against [her] and no other [m]embers, including but not limited to, threatening
to debit [Andrea’s] equity account as a result of the filing of this lawsuit and taking
actions in violation of Civil Code [section] 1942.5”; (4) using income and/or capital of
Zack Ranch to make personal purchases for Stickells and his family in order for Sierra
Alfalfa (and therefore Stickells and his family) to gain favorable tax treatment to the
detriment of Zack Ranch; and (5) refusing to provide adequate and required distributions
from Zack Ranch to its members. Andrea alleged that, as a result of the foregoing
actions, Sierra Alfalfa and Stickells had a direct and explicit conflict of interest with Zack
Ranch as to their duties as managers and fiduciaries of Zack Ranch.
5
Andrea further alleged that Sierra Alfalfa and Stickells breached their duty of care
to Zack Ranch and its members by: (1) mispresenting to Zack Ranch’s members that
unanimous consent was not required to operate Zack Ranch under the 2017 Operating
Agreement; (2) “securing and causing all [m]embers of Z[ack] R[anch] except [Andrea]
to sign and rely on” the 2017 Operating Agreement; (3) maintaining that the 2017
Operating Agreement is valid; (4) acting without authority under the 2017 Operating
Agreement in taking actions, including entering into loan transactions; (5) creating false
Zack Ranch documents; (6) refusing to provide adequate distributions to Zack Ranch and
its members for members’ tax liabilities; and (7) representing that they are co-managers
of Zack Ranch with powers not authorized under the 1997 Operating Agreement.
Andrea alleged that by taking the foregoing actions, Sierra Alfalfa and Stickells
violated their fiduciary duties to Zack Ranch and its members, including Andrea,
resulting in damage to Andrea and Zack Ranch.
In her declaratory relief cause of action, Andrea alleged an actual controversy
existed between her, on the one hand, and defendants, on the other hand, in that Andrea
contends the 2017 Operating Agreement “is invalid and non-operative,” whereas
defendants claim the 2017 Operating Agreement is the current valid and operative
agreement for Zack Ranch. Andrea requested a judicial determination as to the
enforceability of the 1997 and 2017 Operating Agreements, and her and all members’
rights and legal interests in Zack Ranch.
Finally, in her involuntary dissolution of limited liability company cause of action
(involuntary dissolution claim), which was asserted against Zack Ranch, Andrea alleged
that, as a result of defendants’ actions described in the complaint, it was not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business of Zack Ranch in conformity with the 1997 Operating
Agreement and/or the 2017 Operating Agreement; dissolution of the company was
necessary to protect her rights or interests; management of Zack Ranch was deadlocked
or subject to internal dissension; and Stickells and Sierra Alfalfa were guilty of, or
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knowingly countenanced, mismanagement and/or abuse of authority. Andrea requested a
decree winding up and dissolving the company.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment (motion) on the grounds that: as
to all causes of action, Andrea lacked standing because she was not a member of Zack
Ranch; as to the breach of fiduciary duty and declaratory relief causes of action, the
claims belonged to Zack Ranch and its members and could only be brought as a
derivative and not an individual action; as to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action,
defendants owed Andrea no duty regarding the matters alleged; and as to the declaratory
relief cause of action, Andrea was not a party to either the 1997 Operating Agreement or
the 2017 Operating Agreement.
On October 16, 2023, Andrea filed an opposition to the motion. In the opposition,
Andrea argued, among other things, that she was a member of Zack Ranch because she
had paid taxes on income reported on Schedule K-1 tax documents and was listed as a
member on Zack Ranch’s applications submitted to the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA). Andrea further detailed instances in which Zack Ranch purportedly
used the word “member” in reference to her status with Zack Ranch.
In her response to defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts, Andrea
stated it was undisputed that her claims were based on allegations that: (1) Ann
conveyed Andrea’s membership interest in Zack Ranch to Andrea under Ann’s trust;
(2) Ann’s trust documents caused Andrea to inherit the membership interest in Zack
Ranch; and (3) Andrea received her membership interest in Zack Ranch immediately
upon Ann’s death as a result of Ann’s estate documents and the 1997 Operating
Agreement. Andrea also did not dispute that, in her deposition, she testified that she
inherited her share of Zack Ranch immediately upon Ann’s death. Andrea further
admitted that she did not sign the 2017 Operating Agreement.
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Andrea did not submit her own statement of undisputed material facts in
opposition to the motion. On November 3, 2023, Andrea filed a declaration requesting
additional time to respond to the motion and a second opposition to the motion, wherein
she requested leave to file an amended complaint. Andrea also filed various exhibits.
During the hearing on defendants’ motion, the trial court first considered Andrea’s
motion to file an amended complaint and her request to continue the hearing. The trial
court denied the request to amend the complaint. As to the request to continue the
hearing, the trial court detailed prior requests for continuances that had been granted and
noted its tentative ruling was to deny the request. The trial court gave Andrea an
opportunity to argue and then explained that it had reviewed Andrea’s submissions and
found the documents irrelevant to the question of standing, i.e., whether she was a
member of Zack Ranch. The trial court asked Andrea what evidence she believed
supported her claim that she had standing to pursue the complaint. Andrea responded
that she had tax documents spanning several years in which she was listed as a member
of Zack Ranch. The trial court asked, if it were to grant Andrea’s request for a
continuance of four weeks, what evidence other than the tax documents Andrea intended
to provide to prove that she was a member of Zack Ranch. Andrea responded that she
intended to produce additional USDA applications for grants and funding for Zack
Ranch, which she signed as a member. The trial court sought to clarify that Andrea’s
position was that she considered herself to be a member of Zack Ranch because she was
identified as such in the tax and USDA documents. Andrea responded in the affirmative
and added that she had received e-mails from Stickells referring to her as a member as
well.
The trial court noted that tax and USDA documents had already been submitted to
the court and again asked what other evidence Andrea intended to submit to support her
request to continue the hearing. Andrea responded that she would likely have additional
USDA applications and more e-mails regarding membership. The trial court asked:
8
“And what I understand right now is that you’re asserting a membership interest based on
[tax] and USDA documents and acknowledging or representing to me that you never did
sign the operating agreement that your siblings signed; is that correct?” Andrea
responded, “That’s correct.” The trial court then denied the request to continue the
hearing and moved to the merits of the motion.
The trial court found the uncontroverted evidence established that Andrea was not
a member of Zack Ranch and thus could not pursue her claims. The trial court explained
that Ann’s right to participate as a member of Zack Ranch terminated upon her death and
she became a transferee of transferable interests. Andrea accordingly inherited a
transferable interest from her mother’s estate and not a membership interest.
The trial court further found that Andrea’s breach of fiduciary duty and
declaratory relief claims belonged to Zack Ranch and had to be brought as a derivative
rather than individual action because she asserted defendants mismanaged Zack Ranch to
the company’s detriment, thereby damaging her interest in the company. The trial court
explained that an individual member may not maintain an action in an individual capacity
for destruction or diminution in the value of the membership interest.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in
favor of defendants. Andrea appeals.
DISCUSSION
“The purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is to permit a party to show that
material factual claims arising from the pleadings need not be tried because they are not
in dispute.” (Andalon v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 600, 604-605.) A trial
court may grant a motion for summary judgment “if all the papers submitted show that
there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) To make this
showing, a moving defendant must show either that one or more elements of the
plaintiff’s causes of action cannot be established or that there is a complete defense to the
9
plaintiff’s case. (Id., subd. (p)(2).) If the defendant meets this initial burden, the burden
then shifts to the plaintiff to show that at least one triable issue of material fact exists.
(Ibid.)
We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo. (Law Offices of
Dixon R. Howell v. Valley (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1092.) In that process, we
assume the role of the trial court by independently examining the record and evaluating
the correctness of the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale. (Moore v. William Jessup
University (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 427, 433.) We “ ‘liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc.
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 277, 286.)
I
There Is No Triable Issue of Fact as to Standing
Andrea argues she had standing to bring the claims because she became a member
of Zack Ranch by unanimous consent of the other members in accordance with
section 17704.01, subdivision (c)(3), when Sierra Alfalfa and her siblings signed the
2017 Operating Agreement. Defendants argue Andrea did not advance the unanimous
consent argument in the trial court and the argument should accordingly be deemed
forfeited on appeal. They further contend that this claim is forfeited because she failed to
set forth the allegedly disputed fact that she became a member by unanimous consent in a
separate statement of undisputed material facts. Andrea replies that the unanimous
consent argument was presented to the trial court because her position has consistently
been that she has been a member of Zack Ranch following her mother’s death and was
treated as a member. She asserts the 2017 Operating Agreement is evidence that she was
a member and everyone knew it. We are not persuaded by Andrea’s argument.
10
Principles of fairness generally militate against allowing a litigant to change his or
her position on appeal. (Brown v. Boren (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1316.) There are
exceptions to the rule such as when the new theory on appeal is purely a matter of
applying the law to undisputed facts, “[b]ut, even then, whether we will entertain a new
theory raised for the first time on appeal is strictly a matter of discretion.” (Department
of Corrections & Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th
607, 623.)
Within the context of this appeal, we note that “[a] defendant moving for summary
judgment need address only the issues raised by the complaint; the plaintiff cannot bring
up new, unpleaded issues in his or her opposing papers.” (Government Employees Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 95, 98-99, fn. 4; see Distefano v. Forester
(2001) 85 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264 [“[t]o create a triable issue of material fact, the
opposition evidence must be directed to issues raised by the pleadings”].) In her
complaint, Andrea alleged she became a member of Zack Ranch on December 16, 2015,
upon Ann’s death. In her response to defendants’ statement of undisputed material facts,
Andrea confirmed that her claims were based on the allegations that: (1) Ann conveyed
Andrea’s membership interest in Zack Ranch to Andrea under Ann’s trust; (2) Ann’s
trust documents caused Andrea to inherit the membership interest in Zack Ranch; and (3)
Andrea received her membership interest in Zack Ranch immediately upon Ann’s death
as a result of Ann’s estate documents and the 1997 Operating Agreement. Defendants
only had to address the standing issue raised by Andrea’s complaint—i.e., whether
Andrea became a member of Zack Ranch through her inheritance from Ann.
There was no basis or opportunity for defendants to respond to or the trial court to
consider the argument advanced by Andrea on appeal. First, Andrea’s position in her
complaint was that the 2017 Operating Agreement was invalid and unenforceable.
Indeed, she referred to the 2017 Operating Agreement as the “unenforceable Invalid
Operating Agreement.” Andrea’s position on appeal that the 2017 Operating Agreement
11
is valid and enforceable as to the parties’ consent to her membership directly contradicts
the allegations in her complaint. Second, Andrea introduced no statement of undisputed
material facts in opposition to the motion indicating that there was a triable issue as to
whether the 2017 Operating Agreement constituted the other members’ consent to her
membership in Zack Ranch. Simply put, if a fact “ ‘is not set forth in the separate
statement, it does not exist.’ ” (United Community Church v. Garcin (1991) 231
Cal.App.3d 327, 337.) On appeal, the general rule is that we “ ‘will consider only the
facts before the trial court at the time it ruled on the motion’ for summary judgment.”
(North Coast Business Park v. Nielsen Construction Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 22, 30.)
As Andrea confirms in her reply brief, her position in her complaint and in
opposition to the motion was that she became a member of Zack Ranch prior to 2017.
Before the trial court, Andrea asserted standing as a member of Zack Ranch based on
Ann’s trust, tax and USDA documents, and purported e-mails. The trial court expressly
confirmed the basis for Andrea’s membership claim several times, and Andrea at no point
relied on the 2017 Operating Agreement as the basis for her becoming a member of Zack
Ranch. It would be unfair to the trial court and unjust to defendants for us to consider
Andrea’s new standing theory in light of the foregoing.
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to consider Andrea’s new standing theory
on appeal. (Arocho v. California Fair Plan Ins. Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 461, 470
[our de novo review of a grant of a motion for summary judgment includes “reviewing all
the evidence before the trial court and assessing whether there is any material triable
issue under any viable legal theory the pleadings present” (italics added)]; American
Continental Ins. Co. v. C & Z Timber Co. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1271, 1281 [“[p]ossible
theories that were not fully developed or factually presented to the trial court cannot
create a ‘triable issue’ on appeal”].)
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II
Andrea Did Not Allege an Individual Claim of Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Andrea argues in the alternative that, even if she is not a member of Zack Ranch,
she inherited personal property from her mother and may assert an individual claim for
breach of fiduciary duty as to the treatment of that property. She discusses general legal
concepts relating to fiduciary relationships and that a transferable interest is personal
property. She further asserts that her personal property “can be the subject of an action
for conversion” and “cannot be reduced to a debt.” As we can best glean, the foregoing
flows into her argument that Stickells and Sierra Alfalfa failed to address her individual
claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from their treatment of her transferable interest
in Zack Ranch because she alleged they controlled her residence, threatened to debit her
equity capital accounts for rent and living expenses, retaliated against her, made
purchases benefiting themselves while claiming there was insufficient money to
distribute to members to cover tax liabilities, and improperly gave themselves essentially
unchecked control over Zack Ranch. We discern no error with regard to the trial court’s
summary judgment order based on this argument.
The question is not whether Andrea’s allegations could give rise to an individual
cause of action based on her personal property interest in Zack Ranch but rather whether
there was a triable issue of material fact “within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”
(Orange County Air Pollution Control Dist. v. Superior Court (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 109,
113.) Andrea did not allege a cause of action for conversion, and she did not allege an
individual claim for breach of fiduciary duty as to her transferable interest in Zack Ranch.
The causes of action in the complaint were brought by Andrea in her alleged
capacity as a member of Zack Ranch. In her breach of fiduciary duty cause of action,
Andrea specifically asserted that each of the duties identified (i.e., duty of loyalty, duty of
care, and duty to act in good faith and engage in fair dealing) were to Zack Ranch and its
members, including Andrea. Andrea did not allege any duty owed to her as an individual
13
as a result of a personal property interest in Zack Ranch. Andrea’s allegations as to
breach of fiduciary duties identified in the complaint did not require defendants to
address a nonexistent claim of a fiduciary duty not alleged. Because Andrea has failed to
show a triable issue of material fact as to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of action as
alleged in the complaint, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment on that claim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).)
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.
We concur:
/s/
MAURO, Acting P. J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
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