People v. Acuna CA3

CourtListener 10761923Calctapp19 dic 2025

Testo completo

Filed 12/19/25 P. v. Acuna CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----

THE PEOPLE, C102180

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 95F01592)

v.

GONZALO ACUNA,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 1996, a jury found defendant Gonzalo Acuna guilty of robbery and first degree
murder and found true the robbery-murder special circumstance and the personal firearm
use enhancement. The trial court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of life
without the possibility of parole plus 10 years in prison.
Defendant now appeals from the trial court’s 2024 order denying his resentencing
petition after an evidentiary hearing. He contends: (1) the trial court violated his federal
and state due process rights by giving preclusive effect to the jury’s personal firearm use
enhancement true finding; (2) the trial court’s finding that he was still guilty of murder

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under current law was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the People have
forfeited their eligibility challenge and, in any event, he is entitled to relief as a matter of
law.
The People concede that the trial court erred in applying issue preclusion to the
jury’s personal firearm use true finding but argue the error was harmless.
We conclude that (1) defendant is eligible for relief because the jury’s robbery-
murder special circumstance true finding did not necessarily mean it concluded defendant
aided and abetted the killing; (2) Penal Code section 1172.6 creates a liberty interest, and
the trial court’s erroneous application of issue preclusion violated defendant’s federal due
process rights; (3) the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial
court conducted a separate totality of the evidence review including credibility
determinations in finding defendant was the actual killer; and (4) based on the totality of
the evidence, the People have presented substantial evidence showing defendant was the
actual killer. The trial court’s order is affirmed.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Trial
One afternoon in 1995, brothers Christopher and Allen pulled into a gas station
convenience store parking lot to ask for directions. As soon as they stopped, Christopher
saw three men armed with guns running out of the convenience store toward a red car and
drive away. Allen wrote down the license plate number.
A police officer arrived at the convenience store and found Boravong
Phanvongsa’s body, one bullet casing in the open cash register drawer, and one bullet
casing on the floor near the sales counter. A bullet was also found on the floor behind the
sales counter. Christopher told the officer that the three men fled in a red car and gave
her the license plate number.

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Police officers discovered that the registered owner of the red car was defendant’s
mother-in-law and waited near her house. They approached a red car as it pulled into the
driveway and saw defendant get out from the driver side and codefendant Ivan Galvan
from the passenger side. The officers found a Cobray pistol on the ground under the
driver side door and a Lorcin pistol on the ground under the passenger side door. They
also found an empty magazine clip fitting the Cobray pistol in defendant’s pocket.
Defendant’s friend identified the Cobray as defendant’s gun, and Galvan testified that
defendant had the Cobray with him on the day of the killing.
Phanvongsa suffered two gunshots: one to the back of his head and one that
entered and exited his chest before entering and exiting his arm. Both gunshots caused
Phanvongsa’s death. A bullet was found in Phanvongsa’s throat. The People’s expert
witness determined that the bullet in Panvongsa’s throat and one of the bullet casings
found inside the convenience store were fired from the Cobray, and the bullet found on
the floor behind the sales counter was fired from the Lorcin.
Galvan testified that on the day of the killing, he, defendant, and two other men
went to test Galvan’s newly purchased Lorcin near a river. After they fired some shots by
the river, defendant drove the group away with Galvan in the front passenger seat and the
other two men in the back seat. Defendant and Galvan put their guns under their
respective seats but the guns were accessible from both the front and back seats. The
group went to get beer from the convenience store but neither Galvan nor defendant went
inside. Galvan did not see the two men take the guns when they went inside the
convenience store. But when they returned, Galvan saw one of them put something
under the driver seat. Defendant and Galvan dropped the two men off before they
returned to defendant’s mother-in-law’s house.
Both Allen and Christopher picked out Galvan from a photo lineup as one of the
men they saw leaving the convenience store. Christopher initially testified that Galvan
got in the passenger side of the red car. But he later testified that he saw Galvan carrying

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the Cobray, and that the individual carrying the Cobray got in the driver side.
Christopher admitted that his “eyes were more on the guns than they were the
individuals” and that he did not remember which side of the car which person got in.
The trial court gave the jury the following instruction on the robbery-murder
special circumstance: “If you find a defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first
degree, you must then determine if the following special circumstance is true or not true:
[¶] That the defendants were engaged in the commission of a robbery. [¶] . . . [¶] If you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was either the actual killer or an aider
or abett[o]r, but you are unable to decide which, then you must also find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant with the intent to kill aided and abetted an actor in
commission of the murder in the first degree in order to find the special circumstance to
be true. . . . [¶] On the other hand if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was the actual killer, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a
human being in order to find the special circumstance to be true.”
As to first degree felony murder, the jury was instructed: “The unlawful killing of
a human being . . . which occurs [during the commission . . .] of [robbery] is murder of
the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime.” And
“[if] a human being is killed by any one of several persons engaged in the commission
. . . of robbery, all persons, who either directly and actively commit the act constituting
such crime . . . are guilty of murder of the first degree.”
In closing, defense counsel explained to the jury the difference between felony
murder and robbery-murder special circumstance: “To find somebody guilty of felony
murder, a person does not have to have the intent to kill. In order to find special
circumstance you have got to find that [defendant] intended this man’s death.” The
prosecutor also told the jury even if it did not find defendant shot Phanvongsa, it could
still find true the robbery-murder special circumstance if it found defendant “aided and
abetted the murder with the intent to have a murder committed.”

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The jury found defendant guilty of robbery (§ 211) and first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)) and found true the robbery-murder special circumstance allegation as to first
degree murder (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). It also found true that defendant personally used
a firearm in committing both crimes (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced
defendant to an indeterminate term of life without the possibility of parole plus 10 years
in prison.
B. Senate Bill No. 1437
In 2018, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended section 189,
subdivision (e) on felony murder and added section 1172.6 which provides a procedure
for those convicted of murder or felony murder and who could not be convicted under the
new law to petition for resentencing. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.)
Under section 1172.6, once a petitioner establishes his prima facie entitlement to relief,
the prosecution bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is
guilty of murder or felony murder under the new law. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).)
C. Resentencing
In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 and the
trial court issued an order to show cause in January 2023. At the 2024 evidentiary
hearing, defendant denied ever entering the convenience store.
The trial court denied the petition, finding that the existing record established
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the actual killer. In so finding, the trial
court stated it was bound by the jury’s firearm use finding. The trial court then went
through the evidence and made credibility determinations. The trial court noted it was
undisputed that the Cobray was defendant’s gun, that defendant carried the Cobray on the
day of the killing, that defendant drove after the killing, and that a bullet fired from the
Cobray killed Phanvongsa. It further credited Christopher’s testimony that the person
carrying the Cobray got in the driver side of the red car and discredited defendant’s and
Galvan’s testimonies. After recounting all this evidence, the trial court stated it “finds the

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totality of the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] was the actual
killer . . . .”
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
Eligibility for Relief
The People contend that the jury’s robbery-murder special circumstance true
finding renders defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the jury
necessarily found defendant either was the actual killer or aided and abetted the robbery
with the intent to kill. We disagree and conclude the new felony murder rule’s actus reus
for aider and abettor liability is aiding the killing.
A. Additional Background
In July 2024, the People advised the trial court of new significant authority on
issue preclusion, People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451. In their supplemental
brief, the People raised another new argument that defendant was also ineligible for relief
as a matter of law, citing People v. Morris (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1016, review granted
July 17, 2024, S284751 (Morris). The People stated they did not seek to reopen the
prima facie proceeding but asked the trial court to find defendant ineligible for relief at
the evidentiary stage. Defendant did not seek to file a supplemental brief addressing
Morris.
At the evidentiary hearing, the People acknowledged that the trial court rejected
their eligibility challenge by issuing the order to show cause but proceeded to argue
defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. Defendant did not address the
eligibility issue at the hearing.
B. Analysis
As an initial matter, we reject defendant’s contention that the People forfeited this
issue. The People argued defendant was ineligible for relief both in their supplemental

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brief and at the evidentiary hearing, citing new authority published after the issuance of
the order to show cause. Although the People did not seek to reopen the prima facie
proceeding, they sought denial of the petition on the basis of ineligibility—a result
functionally equivalent to a denial at the prima facie stage. Defendant had the
opportunity to but did not respond to the eligibility issue. We thus conclude the People
preserved the issue for review. We now turn to defendant’s eligibility for relief under
section 1172.6.
The bar for establishing a prima facie case for resentencing under section 1172.6 is
very low. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) The trial court must issue an
order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing unless the record of conviction
conclusively establishes the defendant is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law.
(Id. at p. 971.) To find a defendant ineligible for resentencing, “the record of conviction
must establish the jury made all of the findings necessary to support a conviction for
murder or attempted murder under current law. [Citation.] This requires proof the jury
found the defendant harbored the necessary intent and he committed the necessary act or
acts to be guilty under a presently valid theory of liability.” (People v. Kelly (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 162, 170, review granted Nov. 26, 2024, S287341 (Kelly).)
Courts are split on interpreting the actus reus requirement for an aider and abettor
under the new felony murder rule. Morris held “the actus reus . . . is simply aiding the
enumerated felony.” (Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026.) Kelly held the required
actus reus is aiding in the murderous act. (Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 167.) We
agree with Kelly.
We begin by examining the plain language of section 189, subdivision (e). As
amended, the statute provides: “A participant in the perpetration . . . of a felony . . . in
which a death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: (1) The
person was the actual killer. (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent
to kill, aided, abetted . . . the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.

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(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” Murder is further defined as the unlawful killing of a human
being with malice aforethought and murder committed during a robbery is first degree
murder. (§§ 188, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a).) Read together, the plain language of these
provisions requires a nonkiller defendant to aid in the unlawful killing committed during
a robbery with the intent to kill. (Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 172.) The plain
meaning of the statutory language controls. (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125,
1131.)
Morris departs from the plain meaning of section 189, subdivision (e)(2) by
holding that its requisite actus reus “is simply aiding the enumerated felony.” (Morris,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026.) Such a holding impermissibly broadens the statute’s
“scope by reading into it language it does not contain [and] by reading out of it language
it does.” (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 253; accord, Morris, at
pp. 1031-1032 (Moore, J., dissenting).)
Moreover, the Legislature adopted Senate Bill No. 1437 to, among other things,
narrow the felony murder rule. (See Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Under the
former felony murder rule, “[a]ll persons aiding or abetting the commission of burglary
or robbery are guilty of first degree murder when one of them kills while acting in
furtherance of the common design.” (People v. Dickey (2005) 35 Cal.4th 884, 900.) The
Legislature narrowed the rule as it applies to nonkiller aiders and abettors by requiring
they aid and abet (1) the “actual killer” and (2) with the intent to kill. (§ 189, subd.
(e)(2).)
We must give effect to the term “actual killer” as it was chosen by the Legislature.
(Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993)
6 Cal.4th 821, 826 [“the words the Legislature chose are the best indicators of its intent”];
accord, Morris, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1033 (Moore, J., dissenting).) This is
especially true when the felony-murder special circumstance statute, amended in the

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same year as section 189, requires only that a nonkiller defendant aids “any actor” in the
commission of first degree murder with the intent to kill. (§ 190.2, subd. (c); Sen. Bill
No. 1494 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) § 43, subd. (c).) When “the Legislature uses materially
different language in statutory provisions addressing the same subject or related subjects,
the normal inference is that the Legislature intended a difference in meaning.” (People v.
Trevino (2001) 26 Cal.4th 237, 242.) By requiring the nonkiller defendant to aid the
actual killer instead of any actor, the Legislature meant to “require a closer nexus
between the defendant’s actions and the actual killing” than is required in the felony
murder special circumstance. (Kelly, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 174.) Also, if the
Legislature wanted the actus reus to be aiding the underlying felony, it could have said so
as it did in subdivision (e)(3). Instead, it required the defendant to aid in the commission
of first degree murder where a killing necessarily took place. (Kelly, at p. 172.)
Here, the jury was instructed that to find the robbery-murder special circumstance
true, it must find defendant either was the actual killer or aided and abetted an actor in the
commission of first degree murder, the latter presumably with the intent to kill.1 It was

1 As noted, the court gave the jury the following instruction on the robbery-murder
special circumstance: “If you find a defendant in this case guilty of murder of the first
degree, you must then determine if the following special circumstance is true or not true:
[¶] That the defendants were engaged in the commission of a robbery. [¶] . . . [¶] If you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was either the actual killer or an aider
or abett[o]r, but you are unable to decide which, then you must also find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant with intent to kill aided and abetted [an actor in]
commission of the murder in the first degree, in order to find the special circumstance to
be true. [¶] On the other hand, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was the actual killer, you need not find that the defendant intended to kill a human being
in order to find the special circumstance to be true.”

Our Supreme Court has held this instruction is ambiguous: “The flaw in this
instruction . . . is that it failed to instruct the jury explicitly that, under [then-existing] law,
an aider and abettor must have had the intent that the victim be killed in order for the
special circumstance allegation to be true. [Citation.] The jury was told that if it

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further instructed that all participants of a robbery would be guilty of first degree murder
if any one of them killed during the robbery. Thus, by finding true the robbery-murder
special circumstance, the jury did not necessarily find defendant aided and abetted the
killing, but merely that he aided and abetted the robbery where the killing occurred. The
actus reus requirement under section 189, subdivision (e)(2), i.e., aiding and abetting the
killing, was “never considered, deliberated upon, or found true by the jury.” (Morris,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1032 (Moore, J., dissenting).) Defendant is eligible for
relief.
II
Issue Preclusion, Due Process Violation, and Substantial Evidence
Defendant contends, and the People concede, the trial court erred by applying
issue preclusion to the jury’s personal firearm use enhancement true finding at the section
1172.6 evidentiary hearing. Defendant further argues that the trial court’s error violated
his federal due process rights by denying him independent fact finding provided by
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). We agree the trial court erred by applying issue
preclusion but find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the trial court

determined one of the defendants was the actual killer, intent to kill was not required, and
that if it could not decide whether one of the defendants was the actual killer or an aider
and abettor, it must find intent to kill in order to make a true finding. The jury, however,
was not informed what was required in the event the jury determined that a particular
defendant was an aider and abettor. The omission of this third alternative made the
instruction ambiguous.” (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 180-181, fn.
omitted.) However, our Supreme Court also perceived “no reasonable likelihood the jury
was confused” there because it “could draw from the instruction as a whole the inference
that an aider and abettor was required to have an intent to kill” and “the prosecutor
presented a correct and complete statement of the law . . . .” (Id. at p. 182.) Similarly
here, both defense counsel and the prosecutor told the jury that if it found defendant was
an aider and abettor, it must also find defendant acted with the intent to kill to find true
the robbery-murder special circumstance. We thus assume, without deciding, that the
jury found defendant acted with the intent to kill.

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based the actual killer finding on the totality of the evidence analysis that went beyond
the jury’s personal firearm use finding.
A. Federal Due Process
We first determine whether the trial court’s error violated defendant’s federal due
process rights. Courts have uniformly held that a section 1172.6 petition is an act of
legislative lenity, not a criminal prosecution. (People v. Hill (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1055, 1067.) “An order to show cause under section 1172.6 does not vacate the
petitioner’s sentence but . . . sets in motion proceedings to determine whether the
petitioner is entitled to vacatur and resentencing.” (People v. Guillory (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 326, 335-336.) Thus, many federal constitutional protections do not
apply to this process, including the right to counsel, the right to trial by jury, the right
against double jeopardy, and the right against self-incrimination. (See People v. Mitchell
(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 588-589 [list of cases].)
But section 1172.6 also provides a procedure for resentencing and requires the trial
court to act as a fact finder to determine whether the petitioner is guilty under current law.
(People v. Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) This creates a liberty interest.
As our Supreme Court has observed, “ ‘[i]n an appeal from a denial of a section [1172.6]
petition, the private interests at stake are the liberty interests of the person who may be in
custody and seeking release.’ ” (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 229.)
“When . . . a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires fair
procedures for its vindication.” (Swarthout v. Cooke (2011) 562 U.S. 216, 220.) This
protection applies to prisoners when state law creates a liberty interest in parole.
(Swarthout, at pp. 219-220; see Betterman v. Montana (2016) 578 U.S. 437, 448 [“After
conviction, a defendant’s due process right to liberty, while diminished, is still
present.”].) It equally should apply to prisoners when state law creates a liberty interest
in resentencing. The arbitrary denial of a state-created right is a denial of due process.
(People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 850 [the trial court’s error in failing to submit

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the special circumstance allegation to the jury pursuant to section 190.4 implicated the
federal due process right].) Here, the trial court erroneously stated it was “bound” by the
jury’s finding that defendant personally used a firearm during the robbery and murder.
This error implicates the federal due process right.
The People contend that defendant is not entitled to independent fact finding on
his use of firearm because that finding is unnecessary to find him guilty of murder, as
Senate Bill No. 1437 made no changes to the firearm enhancement. We disagree. It is
true that section 1172.6 does not provide for a whole new trial and the trial court’s factual
determinations are limited to issues made relevant by the changes effected by Senate Bill
No. 1437. (People v. Rodriguez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 457.) But “[e]vidence that
defendant personally used a [weapon] was highly relevant to show that he was guilty of
murder.” (People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 922.)
B. Harmless Error Analysis
Because we conclude the trial court’s error implicated federal due process, we
evaluate the error under the standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18 and conclude it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because right after the court
stated it was “bound” by the jury’s finding that defendant personally used a firearm, it
conducted a separate totality of the evidence analysis and found that defendant was the
actual killer. Specifically, it considered undisputed evidence that the Cobray was
defendant’s gun, that defendant carried the Cobray on the day of the killing, that
defendant was the driver immediately after the killing, and that Phanvongsa died from a
gunshot wound from the Cobray. It credited Christopher’s testimony that the person with
the Cobray got in the driver side of the red car. And it discredited defendant’s and
Galvan’s testimonies that somebody other than defendant took the Cobray into the
convenience store. After recounting all this evidence, the trial court stated it “finds the
totality of the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] was the actual

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killer . . . .” We therefore conclude the trial court’s error stating it was bound by the
jury’s finding that defendant personally used a firearm was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.
It flows then that even without giving preclusive effect to the jury’s finding that
defendant personally used a firearm, there was substantial evidence that defendant was
the actual killer.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

/s/
RENNER, J.

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