People v. Salabert CA2/2

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Filed 12/19/25 P. v. Salabert CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B338199

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA483444)

LUIS FERNANDO SALABERT,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark Hanasono, Judge. Affirmed.

Michael C. Sampson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________
Luis Fernando Salabert (Salabert) was convicted by a jury
of murder, attempted murder, shooting at an occupied building,
and possession of a firearm by a felon. He argues the trial court
committed instructional error when it deviated from the
statutory definition of reasonable doubt and failed to instruct the
jury on a lesser included offense. He also contends his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a statement made
by the prosecutor during closing argument.
We affirm.

I.
BACKGROUND
On November 17, 2019, Salabert went to the Las Palomas
Bar (bar) in Los Angeles. He left after being “very rude” and
“demanding.” He returned to the bar about 30 minutes later with
his neighbor, Jonathan Guerrero (Guerrero). Salabert wanted to
order beers for himself and Guerrero, but Guerrero did not have
identification and unsuccessfully attempted to use Salabert’s. A
waitress and Hector M. (Hector) told the men to leave. Salabert
and Guerrero responded with expletives and threats.
On his way out of the bar, Salabert bumped into Alejandro
Bautista Coronado (Coronado). Coronado said, “ ‘Hey, watch
out.’ ” Hector later saw Salabert, Guerrero, and Coronado
“getting into it” outside of the bar. Salabert threatened Coronado
that he was going to be sorry. Salabert took out a gun and
started firing. Hector was shot in the leg. Coronado was shot in
the chest and abdomen. The abdomen wound was fatal.

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The jury found Salabert guilty of first degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 deliberate and premeditated attempted
murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), shooting at an occupied building
(§ 246), and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)). On the murder and attempted murder verdict, the
jury found true that Salabert personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death.
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) As to shooting at an occupied building,
the jury found true that Salabert personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (c).) On the attempted
murder and shooting at an occupied building, the jury found true
allegations that the crimes involved great violence, great bodily
harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness; and that Salabert
was armed with or used a weapon. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1)-(2).)
Salabert was sentenced to a total term of 84 years to life in
prison. His appeal is timely.

II.
DISCUSSION
A. Instructional Error on Reasonable Doubt
During voir dire, the trial court told prospective jurors:
“The legal definition of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is proof
that leaves you with an abiding conviction of the truth of the
charge. . . . What is an abiding conviction? A conviction is a
strongly held belief. What [does it] mean to be abiding? Abiding
means lasting. It is so strong it stays with you forever. So . . . to
return a verdict of guilty, you must feel so comfortable, so certain

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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that you would reach the same decision 10 minutes after the
verdict to 10 years after the verdict, and unless you feel that
strong and that certain, you must return a verdict of not guilty.”
Salabert contends these remarks “significantly misstated
and undermined the beyond a reasonable doubt standard”
because they deviated from the statutory definition of reasonable
doubt. According to Salabert, the court’s statements allowed the
jurors to find him guilty so long as they were “ comfortable with
their decision for at least 10 minutes after the verdict, but not
necessarily more than 10 years after the verdict[.]” We review
this claim of instructional error de novo (People v. Mitchell (2019)
7 Cal.5th 561, 579), “evaluating whether the jury could have
applied the challenged instruction in an impermissible manner.
[Citation.]” (People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12
Cal.5th 719, 790.)2
The trial court did not err. Having just told the jury that
“guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge” and that an abiding
conviction “is so strong it stays with you forever[,]” no reasonable
juror could have interpreted the statement that “to return a
verdict of guilty, you must feel so comfortable, so certain that you
would reach the same decision 10 minutes after the verdict to 10

2 The People argue that Salabert forfeited his claim of
instructional error by failing to object to the trial court’s
statements. Although the failure to object to an instruction
generally forfeits the issue on appeal (see People v. Lee (2011)
51 Cal.4th 620, 638), that rule does not apply here. Salabert’s
“claim that the instruction is not legally correct and therefore
violates his right to due process of law ‘is not of the type that
must be preserved by objection.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Hin
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 492.)

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years after the verdict” as diluting the burden of proof. (See
People v. Gonzales (2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 940 [“It is fundamental
that jurors are presumed to be intelligent and capable of
understanding and applying the court’s instructions”].) Nor did
the court’s statements permit the jurors to find Salabert guilty,
even if they thought they would lack confidence in their decision
after 10 years. (See People v. Stone (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 323,
331 [“[A] jury instruction cannot be judged on the basis of one or
two phrases plucked out of context”].)
The trial court’s comments about the reasonable doubt
standard are markedly different from those found to be improper
in People v. Johnson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 976. In that case,
the trial court’s comments during voir dire “authorized the
prospective jurors to find [the defendant] guilty even if they were
to have ‘some doubt’ about his guilt and characterized a juror who
renders a guilty verdict with ‘no doubt’ about his guilt as ‘brain
dead[.]’ ” (Id. at p. 980; see also People v. Johnson (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1171–1172 [reversal required where trial
court suggested that the reasonable doubt standard was akin to
the deliberative process of those planning vacations and getting
on airplanes].)
Moreover, a judge’s comments while conducting voir dire
“ ‘[are] not intended to be, and [are] not, a substitute for full
instructions at the end of trial.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Seaton
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 636.) Accordingly, we treat the trial
court’s comments during voir dire as part of, and in the context
of, the complete instructions given to the jury. (See People v. Holt
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677 [“Whether instructions are correct and
adequate is determined by consideration of the entire charge to
the jury”].)

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After both sides had rested, the trial court instructed the
jury with CALCRIM No. 220, which “describe[d] the presumption
of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, and provide[d] the legislatively approved definition of
reasonable doubt” set forth in section 1096. (People v. Aranda
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 353 (Aranda).)3 By doing so, the “court
satisfie[d] its statutory obligation to instruct on these
principles . . . .” (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 353.) The
statements made by the court during voir dire did not conflict
with or undermine its CALCRIM No. 220 instruction.
B. Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense
Salabert next argues that the trial court erred by failing to
instruct the jury, sua sponte, on grossly negligent discharge of a
firearm (§ 246.3), a lesser included offense of shooting at an
occupied building (§ 246).
A trial court must instruct on a lesser included offense
when there is substantial evidence that a defendant is guilty only
of the lesser offense. (People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal.5th 793, 827.)
“The ‘substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by “ ‘any
evidence . . . no matter how weak,’ ” but rather by evidence from
which a jury . . . could conclude “that the lesser offense, but not

3 As given, CALCRIM No. 220 provides, in part: “A
defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This
presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must
prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable
doubt unless I specifically tell you otherwise. [¶] Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding
conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not
eliminate all possible doubt because everything in life is open to
some possible or imaginary doubt.”

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the greater, was committed.” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Nelson
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 513, 538.) We review de novo “the failure by the
trial court to instruct on an assertedly lesser included offense.
[Citation.]” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1218.)
Grossly negligent discharge of a firearm (§ 246.3) is a lesser
included offense of shooting at an occupied building (§ 246).
(People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 983 (Ramirez).) “Both
offenses require that the defendant willfully fire a gun. Although
the mens rea requirements are somewhat differently described,
both are general intent crimes. The high probability of human
death or personal injury in section 246 is similar to, although
greater than, the formulation of likelihood in section 246.3[,
subdivision (a).]” (Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 990.) The
difference between the crimes is that shooting at an occupied
building requires that the target—that is, the occupied building—
be within the defendant’s firing range. (People v. Bell (2019)
7 Cal.5th 70, 108 (Bell); Ramirez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 990;
People v. Overman (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1362.)
Thus, to find Salabert guilty of grossly negligent discharge
of a firearm, but not shooting at an occupied building, “the jury
would have had to find that [Salabert’s] shots were not aimed at
or ‘ “in close proximity to” ’ ” the occupied building. (Bell, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 109.) The jury could not have made such a
finding. As Salabert concedes, “the evidence presented at trial
showed that [Salabert] fired a gun directly at two people who
were standing outside of a building.” A detective testified that
the firearm that ejected the “cartridge casing was fired
somewhere near or at the Las Palomas Bar[.]” The record
contains no substantial evidence that Salabert “fired aimlessly or
into the air.” (Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 110; see also Ramirez,

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supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 987 [“The bill enacting section 246.3 was
introduced in response to the phenomenon of celebratory
gunfire”].)
Because “[t]here was no substantial evidence that
[Salabert] was guilty only of a grossly negligent firearm
discharge[,] . . . [the trial] court had no sua sponte duty to
instruct on this lesser offense. [Citation.]” (Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 110.)
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Salabert claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the following statements made
by the prosecutor during closing argument: “Mr. Salabert was
presumed innocent until yesterday when I and the defense
rested. He’s not presumed innocent anymore. You’ve heard all of
the evidence. You have seen all the testimony. You’ve seen the
videos. You heard the D.N.A. You heard the coroner. You heard
Hector, Hector who was present there during the actual shooting.
This evidence only has one reasonable conclusion, that he’s guilty
of murder. He’s not innocent anymore. The people have proved
their case.”
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that his attorney’s performance “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms” and resulting prejudice. (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “Unless a defendant establishes the
contrary, we shall presume that ‘counsel’s performance fell
within the wide range of professional competence and that
counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of
sound trial strategy.’ [Citation.] If the record ‘sheds no light on
why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,’ an

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appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be
rejected ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed
to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th
641, 746.)
Here, “the prosecutor . . . simply argued the jury should
return a verdict in [the People’s] favor based on the state of the
evidence presented.” (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 185
(Booker).) Competent defense counsel could reasonably decide
that an objection would be futile and only serve to bolster the
significance of the prosecutor’s comments in the eyes of the jury.
(See People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 509 [rejecting claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to alleged
prosecutorial misconduct where “reasonable counsel may well
have determined that an objection would be unwise, either
because the challenged conduct was not improper or because an
objection (and possibly an admonition as well) likely would have
served to highlight matter that might be unfavorable to [the]
defendant”].)
In reaching this strategic decision, trial counsel’s
performance aligned with cases, including those from the
California Supreme Court, that have rejected claims of
prosecutorial misconduct arising from remarks similar to those
made here. (See, e.g., Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 183–186
[prosecutor told jury that the presumption of innocence “ ‘isn’t an
automatic thing forever’ ” and “ ‘vanishes’ ” once the evidence
convinces the jury otherwise]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th
395, 462–463 [prosecutor argued that “the prosecution’s evidence
had ‘stripped away’ [the] defendant’s presumption of innocence”];
People v. Romo (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 682, 690–693 [prosecutor

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told jury “ ‘once the evidence proved to you beyond a reasonable
doubt that [defendant] committed the crime, there’s no
presumption of innocence’ ”], italics omitted; People v. Goldberg
(1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 170, 189 [prosecutor told jury that “ ‘once
the evidence is complete’ ” and the case had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, “ ‘[t]here is no more presumption of
innocence’ ”], italics omitted; but see People v. Dowdell (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1407–1409 [although harmless, prosecutor
misstated the law by telling jury that the presumption of
innocence was “ ‘over’ ” and that the defendant had “ ‘gotten his
fair trial’ ”].)
Salabert has not established that his trial counsel provided
inadequate representation for failing to object. (See People v.
Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 387 [“Counsel does not render
ineffective assistance by failing to make motions or objections
that counsel reasonably determines would be futile”].)

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III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

SIGGINS, J.*

We concur:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

RICHARDSON, J.

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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