CourtListener 10761192•Gutierrez v. ACSC Management Services CA2/4
Testo completo
Filed 12/18/25 Gutierrez v. ACSC Management Services CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
BLANCA GUTIERREZ, et al., B321079
Plaintiffs and (Los Angeles County
Respondents, Super. Ct. No. 19STCV44116)
v.
ACSC MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants and
Respondents;
VICTOR ESTRADA,
Appellant;
JONATHAN TERCERO,
Appellant.
APPEALS from judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Teresa A. Beaudet, Judge. Appeals
dismissed.
Becerra Law Firm and Joseph R. Becerra; Gleason &
Favarote, Torey J. Favarote and David H. Danning for Appellant
Victor Estrada.
Law Offices of Todd M. Friedman, Todd M. Friedman and
Adrian R. Bacon for Appellant Jonathan Tercero.
David Yeremian & Associates, David Yeremian; D. Law,
Emil Davtyan and Natalie Haritoonian; Law Offices of Sahag
Majarian II, Sahag Majarian II; Law Office of Neal J. Fialkow,
Neal J. Fialkow for Plaintiffs and Respondents Blanca Gutierrez
and George Lawson.
CDF Labor Law, Timothy M. Freudenberger, Ashley A.
Halberda, and Brian E. Cole II for Defendants and Respondents
ACSC Management Services, Inc., Auto Club Enterprises, and
Automobile Club of Southern California.
__________________________
The Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab.
Code, § 2698 et seq.) allows aggrieved employees, acting as the
agent of the state’s labor enforcement agencies, to bring an action
against their employers to recover civil penalties for violations of
the Labor Code.1 Overlapping PAGA actions are sometimes
simultaneously prosecuted by different employees who allege the
same violations and use the same theories. This appeal involves
three such actions.
1 Undesignated statutory references in this opinion are to the
Labor Code.
2
Respondents Blanca Gutierrez and George Lawson (the
Gutierrez plaintiffs) prosecuted the underlying PAGA action
against respondents ACSC Management Services, Inc. (ACSC),
Auto Club Enterprises (Enterprises), and Automobile Club of
Southern California (AC So. Cal.) (the Auto Club defendants).
Simultaneously, appellants Victor Estrada and Jonathan Tercero
were each prosecuting their own PAGA actions against
AC So. Cal.
The Gutierrez parties settled, and their agreement included
a release that encompassed appellants’ PAGA claims against
AC So. Cal. The state agency charged with oversight and review
of PAGA settlements received multiple notices detailing the
alleged PAGA violations and copies of the settlement and
judgment. It declined to involve itself in the case or object to the
settlement. The trial court approved the settlement and entered
judgment. The state agency cashed the settlement check.
Seeking to unwind the settlement, appellants Estrada and
Tercero both moved to intervene in the Gutierrez action, and
Tercero moved to vacate the judgment and settlement approval
order. The trial court denied these motions. Estrada appeals
from the order denying his motion to intervene, and Tercero
appeals only from the order denying his motion to vacate.
Appellants lacked standing to make these motions and to appeal,
and accordingly, we dismiss the appeals.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Gutierrez Action
In October 2019, Gutierrez submitted a written notice to
the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(“LWDA”) stating her intent to bring a PAGA action against
3
ACSC and Enterprises on behalf of herself and other aggrieved
employees. She described alleged violations of the Labor Code
that included the defendants’ failure to pay minimum wages, to
pay wages and overtime, to provide lawful meal and rest breaks,
to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and to timely pay
final wages upon termination or separation. The LWDA did not
express its intent to prosecute the action.
In December 2019, Gutierrez submitted a first amended
PAGA notice to the LWDA. She filed her initial complaint
against ACSC and Enterprises alleging causes of action for
(1) failure to pay minimum wages (§§ 1194, 1197); (2) failure to
pay wages and overtime (§ 510); (3) meal period liability
(§§ 226.7, 512); (4) rest break liability (§ 226.7); (5) failure to
furnish accurate itemized wage statements and keep accurate
payroll records (§§ 226, subd. (a), 1174); (6) failure to timely pay
final wages upon termination or separation (§§ 201, 202, 203, and
204) and (7) failure to pay reporting time pay. A first amended
complaint was filed in October 2020.
Gutierrez filed a second amended PAGA notice with the
LWDA in September 2021. This notice alleged that she and the
aggrieved employees “were jointly employed by” three entities—
ACSC, Enterprises, and AC So. Cal.
B. Settlement of the Gutierrez Action, Court Approval,
and Entry of Judgment
Gutierrez, Lawson, and the Auto Club defendants reached
a settlement in October 2021 following mediation before a private
neutral. The agreement was conditioned on court approval.
Their agreement defined “‘Aggrieved Employees’” as all non-
exempt and/or hourly employees in California (1) who worked for
4
the Auto Club defendants for any portion of the time period
between February 18, 2018 and court approval of the settlement;
and/or (2) who worked an on-call shift within one or more pay
periods during the time period between January 1, 2012 and
court approval. The settlement terms included a release of the
representative PAGA claims that were alleged and could have
been alleged in the case and indicated the plaintiffs would be
filing a second amended complaint. The Auto Club defendants
agreed to pay a total sum of $4.5 million, part of which would be
allocated to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney fees and costs, settlement
administration costs, and enhancement awards to Gutierrez and
Lawson. What remained (nearly $3 million) would be allocated
between the LWDA (75 percent) and the Aggrieved Employees
(25 percent).
The Guttierez plaintiffs filed a third amended PAGA notice
with the LWDA on October 28, 2021. The notice identified
Lawson as a plaintiff, and it described the Auto Club defendants’
failure to pay the Aggrieved Employees for time they were
required to be “‘on call.’”
On December 20, 2021, Gutierrez submitted a copy of the
proposed settlement agreement to the LWDA. The same day, she
filed a motion requesting, among other relief, that the trial court
approve the settlement and deem a proposed second amended
complaint filed as of the date of such approval. The motion was
supported by a 28-page declaration from Gutierrez’s counsel that
detailed the case’s procedural history, discovery efforts, the
settlement negotiations, and the terms of settlement. Counsel
represented that the extensive settlement negotiations were
conducted at arm’s length and in good faith. The declaration
described the strength of the plaintiffs’ case, the PAGA penalties,
5
and how these were calculated. It also described the attorney
fees and costs and how they were calculated, counsel’s experience
with employment matters and representative and PAGA cases in
particular, and the enhancement awards to the representative
plaintiffs. Gutierrez’s counsel attested that he had received
nothing from the LWDA indicating that the agency intended to
prosecute the action.
At a hearing in January 2022, the trial court granted the
unopposed motion. It approved the settlement agreement,
finding it “is, in all respects, fair, adequate, reasonable, and just
and is not arbitrary, oppressive or confiscatory . . .” and was
“reached as a result of informed and noncollusive arm’s-length
negotiations.” The court also found that the parties had
conducted “extensive investigation and research, and their
attorneys were able to reasonably evaluate their respective
positions,” and that “settlement now will avoid additional and
potentially substantial litigation costs, as well as delay and risks”
if litigation were to continue. Regarding the monetary recovery,
the court “recognize[d] the significant value accorded to Plaintiffs
and each Aggrieved Employee.”
The court also deemed the second amended complaint filed
that day. The second amended complaint added Lawson as a
representative plaintiff and AC So. Cal. as a defendant. It
alleged that the Auto Club defendants “employed or jointly
employed the Aggrieved Employees,” and it added allegations
concerning the defendants’ failure to compensate those employees
for the time they were required to be “‘on-call’” for 24-hour
periods.
6
On January 11, 2022, the trial court entered judgment. A
copy of the judgment was submitted to the LWDA on February
11, 2022.
In early February 2022, the Auto Club defendants
delivered a $2,213,803.16 check to the LWDA, which the LWDA
cashed. The LWDA did not communicate any objection to the
settlement or judgment, and the register of actions indicates no
objection was filed with the court.
C. Tercero’s Motions to Intervene and to Vacate the
Judgment
In February 2022, Tercero filed two motions in the
Gutierrez action: a motion for leave to intervene and file a
complaint in intervention and a motion to vacate the judgment.
He described himself as the plaintiff in a PAGA action filed in
2019.2 He stated that the action alleged that AC So. Cal. failed to
pay overtime wages and wages owed upon termination, to provide
rest breaks and meal periods, to provide accurate wage
statements, and to comply with the Healthy Workplace Healthy
Families Act (§ 246).
Tercero argued that he had a direct interest justifying
intervention because he was pursuing overlapping PAGA claims,
and the Gutierrez settlement eliminated his individual wage and
hour claims and his right to attorney fees. Tercero argued that
2 Tercero v. The American Automobile Association, Inc., et al.
(Orange County Superior Court Case No. 30-2019-01052233-CU-OE-
CXC).
7
the settlement was collusive and the product a reverse auction.3
He asserted his interests were not adequately represented.
In his other motion, Tercero requested that the trial court
vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure,
section 663, because it was void. He argued that the motion to
approve the settlement was procedurally defective because
Gutierrez did not timely provide the LWDA with a copy of the
judgment, did not file a notice of related cases disclosing the
Tercero litigation, and did not comply with the notice
requirements that govern motions generally. He argued that the
judgment was void because (1) there were problems with the
scope of the settlement’s release; (2) the settlement was collusive
and the product of a reverse auction; (3) the trial court reviewed
the settlement agreement under an incorrect legal standard; and
(4) the trial court used the wrong test to determine that the
plaintiffs’ attorneys were entitled to their fee award. Tercero also
argued that the judgment was void because the settlement
deprived his attorneys of their substantive right to attorney fees
and costs.
The trial court denied the motion to vacate. It found
Tercero lacked standing to bring the motion, citing Turrieta v.
Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 955, 968 (Turrieta I),4 review
3 A reverse auction is said to occur when the defendant in a series
of class actions picks the most ineffectual class lawyers to negotiate a
settlement with, in the hope that the trial court will approve a weak
settlement that will preclude other claims against the defendant. (See
Amaro v. Anaheim Arena Management, LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
521, 544.)
4 In Turietta I, this division concluded that the appellants, PAGA
plaintiffs who desired to challenge the settlement reached in another
8
granted, Jan. 5, 2022, S271721, affd (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664
(Turrieta II).) Even if Tercero had standing, the court found, he
failed to show that vacating the judgment and approval order
was warranted. Tercero’s motion for leave to intervene was
denied as moot.
Tercero appealed from only the order denying his motion to
vacate the judgment.
D. Estrada’s Motion to Intervene
On March 11, 2022, Estrada filed a motion in the Gutierrez
action. Estrada described himself as the plaintiff in a PAGA suit
filed in 2013 5 that alleged AC So. Cal. “was utilizing an unlawful
on-call policy whereby [it] required its employees to work 7 day,
24-hour, shifts without compensation . . . .” That case had been
heavily litigated and was set for trial in four months. Estrada
argued that the Guttierez settlement was the result of a reverse
auction. He also argued that the Gutierrez plaintiffs lacked
authority to release PAGA claims related to Estrada because they
had not exhausted administrative remedies with respect to the
claims asserted in the second amended complaint. Estrada
further argued that there was no evidence Gutierrez ever worked
for AC So. Cal., and she therefore lacked authority to seek
penalties against that entity. Estrada’s notice of motion
PAGA plaintiff’s case, “lacked standing below to bring a motion to set
aside the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663,
and lack standing to appeal from the judgment for the same reasons.”
(Id. at p. 970.)
5 Estrada v. Automobile Club of Southern California (Orange
County Superior Court Case No. 30-2013-00637388-CU-WT-CJC).
9
indicated he was seeking to intervene under theories of
mandatory and permissive intervention.6
Following a hearing, the trial court denied Estrada’s
motion, finding he lacked standing to intervene under Turrieta I.
The trial court also found Estrada did not provide any argument
to support permissive intervention, did not show that the
settlement was unfair, and did not show that the Gutierrez
plaintiffs were represented by “ineffectual lawyers or that the
parties in the instant action entered into a weak settlement.”
Estrada appealed from the order denying his motion.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law
1. PAGA Overview
“‘California’s Labor Code contains a number of provisions
designed to protect the health, safety, and compensation of
workers. Employers who violate these statutes may be sued by
employees for damages or statutory penalties. [Citations.]
Statutory penalties, including double or treble damages, provide
recovery to the plaintiff beyond actual losses incurred. [Citation.]
Several Labor Code statutes provide for additional civil penalties,
generally paid to the state unless otherwise provided. [Citation.]
Before PAGA’s enactment, only the state could sue for civil
6 Estrada’s notice of motion included a request that the court
vacate the judgment and its order approving the settlement. However,
his motion below and his opening brief on appeal did not analyze or
provide argument regarding the controlling statute, Code of Civil
Procedure, section 663. Accordingly, his arguments regarding vacatur
are forfeited. (Owens v. County of Los Angeles (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th
107, 130–131 [argument forfeited where not raised in motion in the
trial court or in opening brief on appeal].)
10
penalties.’ [Citation.]” (Turrieta I, supra, at p. 968.) “The
Legislature enacted PAGA in 2003 to allow aggrieved employees
to act as private attorneys general and recover civil penalties for
Labor Code violations.” (Ibid.) Its “declared purpose in enacting
PAGA was ‘to supplement enforcement actions by public
agencies, which lack adequate resources to bring all such actions
themselves.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
“PAGA deputizes ‘aggrieved’ employees to bring a
representative lawsuit on behalf of the state to enforce labor
laws.” (Turrieta I, supra, at p. 968.) “An ‘aggrieved employee’ for
purposes of bringing a PAGA claim is defined under the statute
as ‘any person who was employed by the alleged violator and
against whom one or more of the alleged violations was
committed.’” (Ibid., quoting § 2699, subd. (c).) “Although an
aggrieved employee is the named plaintiff in a PAGA action,
PAGA disputes are between the state and the employer, not
between the employee and the employer.” (Ibid.) “Thus, an
employee suing under PAGA ‘does so as the proxy or agent of the
state’s labor law enforcement agencies. . . . In a lawsuit brought
under the act, the employee plaintiff represents the same legal
right and interest as state labor law enforcement agencies—
namely, recovery of civil penalties that otherwise would have
been assessed and collected by the [LWDA].’ [Citations.]” (Id. at
pp. 968–969.)
“Before filing a PAGA lawsuit, an employee must provide
written notice to the LWDA and the employer of the specific
Labor Code violations alleged and facts and theories to support
the claims.” (Turrieta I, supra, at p. 969, citing § 2699.3,
subd. (a)(1)(A).) “‘If the [LWDA] elects not to investigate, or
investigates without issuing a citation, the employee may then
11
bring a PAGA action.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid; see § 2699.3,
subd. (a)(2)(A).)
“Overlapping PAGA actions may be brought by different
employees who allege the same violations and use the same
theories.” (Turrieta I, supra, at p. 969.) “However, because an
employee who brings an action under PAGA does so as the ‘proxy
or agent’ of the state, a judgment in an employee’s action under
PAGA ‘binds all those, including nonparty aggrieved employees,
who would be bound by a judgment in an action brought by the
government.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “[W]hen an employee plaintiff
prevails in a PAGA action, ‘[n]onparty employees may then, by
invoking collateral estoppel, use the judgment against the
employer to obtain remedies other than civil penalties for the
same Labor Code violations.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
“If the parties settle a PAGA claim, section 2699,
subdivision (l)(2) requires the plaintiff employee to
simultaneously submit the proposed settlement to the LWDA and
the court, and further requires that the court ‘review and
approve’ the settlement. As such, the court must ‘ensur[e] that
any negotiated resolution is fair to those affected.’ [Citation.]”
(Turrieta I, supra, at p. 969.)
2. Motions to Intervene
Code of Civil Procedure section 387 allows either
mandatory or permissive intervention. (Turrieta I, supra, at
p. 975.) “A nonparty has a right to mandatory intervention
where ‘[t]he person seeking intervention claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the
action and that person is so situated that the disposition of the
action may impair or impede that person’s ability to protect that
12
interest, unless that person’s interest is adequately represented
by one or more of the existing parties.’” (Id. at pp. 975–976,
quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 387, subd. (d)(1).) “Thus, ‘the
threshold question is whether the person seeking intervention
has “an interest relating to the property [or] transaction which is
the subject of the action.”’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 976.)
“Permissive or discretionary intervention under Code of Civil
Procedure section 387, subdivision (d)(2) also requires a showing
that ‘the nonparty has a direct and immediate interest in the
action,’ among other criteria.” (Ibid., citation omitted.)
The Courts of Appeal are split as to the standard of review
governing orders denying mandatory intervention. (Turrieta I,
supra, at p. 976 [acknowledging that some courts review such
orders de novo, while others review for abuse of discretion].) The
denial of permissive intervention is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (Ibid.)
3. Motions to Vacate Judgments
“[P]ursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663, a ‘party
aggrieved’ may move for a judgment ‘to be set aside and
vacated . . . and another and different judgment entered, . . .
materially affecting the substantial rights of the party and
entitling the party to a different judgment.’” (Turrieta I, supra,
at pp. 970–971.) The motion may be granted for “‘[i]ncorrect or
erroneous conclusions of law not consistent with or not supported
by the findings of fact . . . .’” (Code Civ. Proc., § 663, subd. (1);
County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 738.)
A trial court’s order denying a motion to vacate a judgment
under section 663 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (Hearn
v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1207.)
13
B. Standing to Appeal, Turrieta I, and Turrieta II
Before we can address appellants’ claims of error, we must
resolve the threshold issue of their standing. (Librers v. Black
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 114, 124 [we do not address the merits of
litigation when the plaintiff lacks standing].) Respondents agree
with the trial court’s determination that appellants lacked
standing to move to intervene and vacate the judgment. They
similarly argue that appellants lack standing to bring this
appeal. Gutierrez and Lawson urge us to dismiss the appeals.
Applying the de novo standard to assess whether appellants had
standing, we agree with the trial court. (IBM Personal Pension
Plan v. City and County of San Francisco (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th
1291, 1299.)
In their opening briefs, appellants argued that the trial
court improperly relied on Turrieta I when it decided they lacked
standing to intervene and object to the settlement and judgment.
In that case, Turrieta filed a PAGA action against Lyft alleging
its failure to pay minimum wages, overtime premiums, and
business expense reimbursements. (Turrieta II, supra, at p. 676.)
Olson was pursuing his own PAGA case against Lyft that raised
the same violations. (Ibid.) Turrieta settled her case first.
(Ibid.) The trial court denied Olson’s motion to intervene,
approved the settlement, and later denied Olson’s motion to
vacate the judgment. (Ibid.) This division affirmed. (Ibid.) It
was “the state’s rights” that were “affected by a parallel PAGA
settlement . . . .” (Turrieta I, supra, at p. 972.) Olson could not
show “a direct and immediate interest in the settlement, which
would establish [his] entitlement to mandatory or permissive
intervention” under Code of Civil Procedure, section 387. (Id. at
p. 977.) He similarly was not aggrieved by the judgment, as
14
required by Code of Civil Procedure, section 902, and therefore
lacked “standing to seek to vacate the judgment or appeal.” (Id.
at p. 972.)
In their opening briefs, appellants argued that Turrieta I
conflicted with decisions in other districts, was wrongly decided,
and would be reversed by the California Supreme Court.
“[A]ssuming Turrieta is overturned,” it was argued, appellants
should have been permitted to intervene.
However, after appellants filed their briefs, our Supreme
Court affirmed Turrieta I, resolving the split among the Courts of
Appeal. It held “that an aggrieved employee’s status as the
State’s proxy in a PAGA action does not give that employee the
right to seek intervention in the PAGA action of another
employee, to move to vacate a judgment entered in the other
employee’s action, or to require a court to receive and consider
objections to a proposed settlement of that action.” (Turrieta II,
supra, at p. 716.) Intervention under these circumstances is
“outside the scope of [the proxy’s] authority to commence and
prosecute a PAGA action on the state’s behalf” and precludes that
proxy from “establish[ing] a cognizable interest to support
intervention under Code of Civil Procedure section 387 based on
his asserted authority, as the state’s proxy or agent, to assert any
state right to intervene.” (Id. at p. 705.)
Our high court also concluded that “[n]othing in PAGA’s
text, the statutory scheme, or the legislative history suggests the
Legislature understood or intended an aggrieved employee’s
authority to commence and prosecute a PAGA action on the
state’s behalf to include the power to move to vacate a judgment
obtained by another aggrieved employee — representing the
same state interest — after a proposed settlement has been
15
submitted for review to both the trial court and the LWDA, and
the court has determined that the proposed settlement ‘is fair to
those affected.’ [Citation.].” (Turrieta II, supra, at p. 711.)
In subsequent cases, PAGA plaintiffs have been
unsuccessful in limiting the holding in Turrieta II. In Moniz v.
Adecco USA, Inc. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 317 (Moniz), the
appellate court held a PAGA plaintiff does not have standing to
intervene or move to vacate judgment in an overlapping suit
based upon her private interest arising from the statute. (Id. at
p. 332.) It reasoned, “[T]he interest at stake in a PAGA action is
that of the state, not the employees themselves.” (Id. at p. 334.)
“If a PAGA plaintiff could obtain standing to intervene or move to
vacate in an overlapping suit merely by engaging in the semantic
exercise of relabeling his or her interest arising from the statute
as a private one rather than one as the state’s proxy,”
Turrieta II’s holding “would have no effect.” (Id. at
p. 332.) Another case, Brown v. Dave & Buster’s of California,
Inc. (Nov. 19, 2025, B339729) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2025 WL
3228867] (Brown), rejected the assertion that a PAGA plaintiff
can avoid claim preclusion resulting from the settlement of an
overlapping case by arguing the settling plaintiff failed to provide
the LWDA with sufficient notice before filing amended claims.
(Brown, supra, __ Cal.App.5th __ [2025 WL 3228867 p. 5].) It
observed, “The Supreme Court has firmly rejected the efforts of
PAGA plaintiffs ‘to file objections to the settlement reached by
another aggrieved employee representing the same state interest
and also acting on the state’s behalf.’” (Ibid.)
16
C. Analysis
We granted appellants leave to file supplemental briefs to
address Turrieta II. Both appellants point to footnote seven of
the opinion in their effort to distinguish the case. Our Supreme
Court noted that Olson, the nonparty seeking to intervene,
argued to the Court of Appeal that Turrieta had settled claims
she was not deputized to pursue. However, the Court of Appeal
concluded the issue had been forfeited due to Olson’s failure to
raise it properly before the trial court. (Turrieta II, supra, at
p. 684, fn. 7.) The court declined to discuss the argument because
it was beyond the scope of the issue identified in its order
granting review. (Ibid.)
Appellants argue that Turrieta II presumed that Turrieta
had been property deputized by the LWDA to pursue and settle
claims. Footnote seven, they argue, leaves open the possibility of
standing for a PAGA plaintiff who seeks to unwind another
PAGA plaintiff’s settlement by arguing the settling plaintiff
lacked administrative authority. Estrada argues the Gutierrez
plaintiffs were not deputized by the LWDA to act as the state’s
proxy and release claims against AC So. Cal. He argues that
Gutierrez was not employed by AC So. Cal, and Lawson was not
identified as an employee of AC So. Cal during discovery in the
Estrada case. Estrada further argues that Lawson did not
provide LWDA with sufficient notice before “commencing” his
action.
For his part, Tercero argues in his supplemental brief that
the Gutierrez plaintiffs “lacked standing to have ever agreed to
17
this settlement.” However, he does not support his arguments
with citations to the record or legal authority.7
Appellants fail to persuade us that their motions and this
appeal fall outside of Turrieta II’s holding.
First, Turrieta II recognized that the PAGA statute, its
amendments, and its legislative history “suggest[] that the
Legislature contemplated formal oversight and review of
proposed settlements only by the LWDA and trial courts.” (Id. at
p. 694, italics added.) The 2016 amendments to PAGA, by which
the Legislature expanded judicial settlement oversight, added
provisions to facilitate and increase the LWDA’s involvement in
PAGA litigation, including the settlement process, and provided
LWDA with additional funds to perform its oversight
responsibilities. (Id. at pp. 696–697.) “These actions of the
Legislature and the explanatory comments in the legislative
history—which contain no mention or suggestion of oversight by
anyone else — indicate the Legislature does not share Olson’s
view that courts are not adequately equipped to ‘“sniff out bad
deals . . . .”’” (Id. at p. 697.) Rather, courts are capable of
“‘assess[ing] [the] fairness’ of proposed settlements.” (Ibid.)
Contrary to Olson’s assertions, the legislative history does not
show “that the LWDA’s financial ‘resources are inadequate to
7 At oral argument, Tercero argued Turrieta II is not dispositive of
this case because it did not decide whether a PAGA plaintiff has
standing to object in his individual capacity. As we have discussed, a
similar argument was rejected in Moniz. Turrieta II’s “concerns about
allowing intervention or vacatur by PAGA plaintiffs in overlapping
suits as state proxies apply with the same force when those same
individuals seek vacatur based on private interests under the same
statute . . . .” (Moniz, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 335.) We conclude
Tercero’s argument lacks merit.
18
fully’ perform its oversight functions, and that joint oversight by
courts and the LWDA is insufficient to fulfill the Legislature’s
purposes in enacting PAGA.” (Id. at p. 697.)
Appellants point to nothing in the statute or legislative
history indicating that the Legislature intended to treat disputes
over the settling plaintiff’s administrative authority differently
than other nonparty challenges to a PAGA settlement. They do
not contend that such disputes present issues that are so complex
or difficult that the LWDA and trial courts cannot adequately
resolve them as part of their statutory oversight functions. They
do not contend they were precluded from offering arguments and
evidence informally to aid the LWDA and courts in performing
their functions.8 Thus, we are unconvinced that Turrieta II
would afford special treatment to administrative authority
disputes and confer standing on other PAGA plaintiffs to assert
them.
The record in this case indicates that the LWDA and trial
court performed their oversight and review functions. The
undisputed evidence indicates that the LWDA received multiple
PAGA notices and copies of the settlement and judgment. The
agency did not object to the settlement or dispute the Gutierrez
plaintiffs’ authority to release claims, though “it had an
8 Indeed, though it denied intervention, the trial court considered
and found unpersuasive Estrada’s and Tercero’s arguments
concerning, e.g., the sufficiency of the discovery that had been taken
before settlement, the effectiveness of the Gutierrez plaintiffs’ counsel,
alleged collusion, and the scope of the release. (Turrieta II, supra, at
p. 706 [“Courts, in evaluating the adequacy and fairness of proposed
PAGA settlements, remain free to exercise discretion to consider
arguments and evidence informally offered by plaintiffs pursuing
overlapping PAGA claims in separate actions”].)
19
opportunity” to do so. (Brown, supra, __ Cal.App.5th __ [2025
WL 3228867 p. 5].) Instead, it accepted the settlement amount.
The LWDA has not sought to file a brief in this appeal.
Appellants offer no reason for us to conclude that they have
standing, as proxies for the state, to assert grievances that the
state itself elected not to assert.
Appellants also fail to address Turrieta II’s concern that
allowing other PAGA plaintiffs to intervene and vacate
settlement judgments would “curtail[] PAGA litigation by making
it more difficult.” (Turrieta II, supra, at p. 699.) Multiple proxies
and multiple lawyers, our Supreme Court anticipated, would
attempt to represent the same real party in interest—the state.
This would raise questions about which plaintiff would control
and direct the litigation and settlement process, whether all
plaintiffs would have equal authority, whether one could
unilaterally settle claims on the state’s behalf without the
agreement of or in the face of opposition from other plaintiffs, and
whether all plaintiffs could recover attorney fees and costs under
PAGA’s attorney fees provision. (Ibid.) Indeed, “counsel for the
plaintiffs in overlapping PAGA actions, concerned about their fee
recovery, may attempt to use intervention to derail settlement.”
(Id. at p. 703.)
The Supreme Court’s concerns have been realized in this
case. Both appellants argued that the Gutierrez settlement was
the product of a collusive reverse auction, and Estrada argued
that the settlement “offers insufficient consideration” to the
aggrieved employees and the state. In addition, it is reasonable
to anticipate vigorous disputes over attorney fees, as both
appellants sought such fees in their respective actions, and
Tercero asserted that the trial court “used the wrong test” when
20
it approved the fee award to counsel for the Gutierrez plaintiffs.
Appellants do not dispute that vacating the judgment and
permitting their participation would add layers of complexity to
this litigation. It could require collateral discovery and
evidentiary proceedings, a clawback of funds from the LWDA,
and prolong the resolution of the case indefinitely.
In sum, appellants have presented us with no persuasive
basis for departing from Turrieta II. Estrada lacks standing to
appeal from the order denying his motion to intervene.
(Turrieta I, supra, at p. 977; Code Civ. Proc., § 902.) Tercero
lacks standing to pursue an appeal from the order denying his
motion to vacate the judgment. (Id. at p. 972.) Dismissal of their
appeals is appropriate as neither plaintiff meets the
requirements of Code of Civil Procedure, section 902. (See Moniz,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 336 [dismissing nonparty PAGA
plaintiff’s appeals from judgment and order denying motion to
vacate the judgment]; In re Marriage of Tushinsky (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 136, 143 [where appellants were not “‘part[ies]
aggrieved’” by a judgment as required by Code Civ. Proc., § 902,
they had “no right, or standing, to appeal from the judgment,”
and the reviewing court “ha[d] no jurisdiction to consider their
appeal” and “must” dismiss it].)
Even if appellants had standing to appeal, they fail to
persuade us that the trial court erred. It is inappropriate to
consider the errors in the judgment asserted by Estrada because
he did not move to vacate it under Code of Civil Procedure,
section 663. Having failed to do so, he did not become a “party of
record and obtain the right to appeal from the judgment.”
(Turrieta II, supra, at p. 710.)
21
Tercero forfeited three of his four contentions of errors in
the judgment by failing to raise them properly in the trial court.
(Lee v. West Kern Water Dist. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 606, 635.) His
remaining argument—that the trial court ignored “[a]mple
[e]vidence of [c]ollusion” in the negotiation of the settlement—is
unsupported by citations to any such evidence in the record. The
argument, too, is forfeited. (See Professional Collection
Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970 [statements
in a brief concerning matters in the appellate record must be
supported by a citation to the record, and reviewing court has
discretion to disregard contentions unsupported by proper page
cites to the record].)
DISPOSITION
The appeals are dismissed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
MORI, J.
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
22
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