People v. Jevarian CA1/2

CourtListener 10761185Calctapp18 dic 2025

Testo completo

Filed 12/18/25 P. v. Jevarian CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170585
v.
SUSAN BURNHAM JEVARIAN, (Napa County Super. Ct.
No. 22CR001698)
Defendant and Appellant.

Susan Burnham Jevarian appeals from a judgment sentencing her to
six years in state prison after she pled “open” to the court, admitting guilt for
felony gross vehicular manslaughter, driving under the influence causing
injury, and driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 percent causing injury,
as well as misdemeanor battery upon a nurse and multiple enhancements.
Jevarian contends that the trial court: (1) abused its discretion in denying
her probation by inappropriately considering the seriousness of the crimes
and vulnerability of the victims and in failing to adequately consider
Jevarian’s childhood trauma; (2) erred by failing to apply the low term
sentencing presumption pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6); and (3) erred in considering the victims to be “particularly vulnerable”

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

1
as a circumstance in aggravation under California Rules of Court, rule2
4.421(a)(3), and sentencing her to the middle term. Jevarian further
contends that the cumulative impact of these errors requires remand for
resentencing. We disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND3
On the evening of July 23, 2022, the now-deceased Amanda Peters
invited her childhood friend Jevarian to come to her house in Sonoma to
drink alcohol. Peters was 21 years old, and Jevarian was 20. Jevarian drove
over in her burgundy Cadillac; Peters’s friend and neighbor saw Jevarian
arrive around 7:00 p.m. and retrieve a bottle of Patron tequila from her trunk
before entering the house. In her 2024 statement to the probation
department made in advance of sentencing, Jevarian represented that while
at the house, she and Peters drank several shots of whiskey and tequila and
smoked marijuana.4 Jevarian denied bringing any liquor to the house but
explained she would often binge drink and, because she was only a “few

2 Further undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of

Court.
3 Consistent with the appellate briefing, the facts are drawn from the

Napa County probation officer’s report and recommendation prepared in
advance of sentencing and dated April 15, 2024.
4 The morning after the accident, a second neighbor came over to feed

Peters’s animals and observed a bottle of tequila and a bottle of whiskey in
the living room. “[T]he whiskey was about half full and the tequila bottle was
almost empty with maybe one or two shots left in it. There were shot glasses
and jar of pickles on the coffee table next to the bottles. . . . [T]here was small
jar of marijuana on a side table in the living room and he saw a marijuana
bong across the room.” According to the first neighbor, Peters “would do a
thing” called “ ‘Pickle Back’ ” and described it as “chasing shot of alcohol with
shot of pickle juice.”

2
months shy of the legal drinking age,” she would “ ‘go all out’ to increase her
tolerance for alcohol in preparation for her 21st birthday.”
Jevarian represented that her memory of the evening was
“inconsistent” and could not recall what led Peters and her to leave the
house. Jevarian stated that Peters wanted to get her tongue pierced;
Jevarian may have recommended the Galaxy Smoke Shop in Napa because
she had received piercings there before, but she did not recall saying they
should go that evening. Jevarian did not remember leaving the house but
drove because Peters did not have a car. A worker at the smoke shop
confirmed Jevarian and Peters arrived approximately 8:30 p.m. and received
$200 worth of piercings; he believed they were “impaired” but did not smell
the odor of alcohol on either of them.
Jevarian told probation that, after she and Peters left the smoke shop,
she had intended to drive back to Sonoma so drove to State Route 29 via
Imola Avenue. Jevarian “was unaware she had entered the highway going
the wrong way,” and only remembered “laying her head back,” looking up and
seeing “ ‘a streetlight and the Imola sign’ ” pass over the vehicle. Soon after,
Peters “looked at her and screamed, ‘Suzie!’ ” Jevarian said it was “ ‘lights
out’ ” after that and her next memory was in the hospital.
A witness who called 911 after avoiding a collision reported that he had
been traveling northbound in the number two lane of State Route 29 and saw
the accident. He observed a Cadillac, with its headlights on, travel the wrong
way on the off-ramp and into the number one lane. He estimated that the
Cadillac was “traveling quickly, approximately 50-60” miles per hour. He
saw a Toyota swerve toward the left in an effort to avoid crashing into the
Cadillac and a Tesla ahead of him swerve to the right, the same direction he
swerved.

3
Another witness traveling northbound in the number one lane also
observed vehicles swerving on the roadway to avoid a “vehicle approaching
wrong way approximately 30 feet away, traveling approximately 50” miles
per hour. He swerved left into the median and the vehicle passed by him.
At approximately 10:13 p.m., California Highway Patrol officers
responded to a head-on collision on northbound State Route 29. Jevarian’s
Cadillac had collided with two vehicles: the Toyota Corolla driven and solely
occupied by Jose Puebla and the Tesla driven by Dennis Totah with three
passengers in the vehicle.
Puebla explained in his statement to responding police officers that he
had been driving northbound on Route 29 in the number one lane
approximately 65 to 70 miles per hour. He observed headlights approaching
him quickly, was struck, and swerved to the left; his vehicle came to a stop in
the center median. Puebla’s car sustained serious damage, which included a
“broken windshield, detached headlights, detached front bumper, crumpled
hood, crumpled right fender, and torn front, right door.” He was assisted out
of his vehicle and had “suffered lacerations to his arms and complained of
pain to his neck and chest.” Puebla was transported to the hospital by
ambulance; no fractures were found, but he was in pain and missed a week of
work.
In his statement to police officers that night, Totah said he had been
driving north in the number two lane approximately 65 to 70 miles per hour
when he observed the Cadillac approaching and traveling between the
number one and two lanes. He saw the Cadillac crash into the passenger
side of the Toyota, which propelled the Cadillac into the number two lane
immediately in front of his Tesla. Totah attempted to brake and swerved to
the right but was unable to avoid crashing into the Cadillac. The Tesla went

4
off the roadway and down an embankment; all the airbags deployed, and it
sustained major crash-related damage, including a “broken front bumper,
crumpled hood, detached front headlights, crumpled left and right-side
fenders.”
Totah and the passengers crawled out of the Tesla and awaited
emergency personnel. All four complained of pain but declined medical
treatment at the scene, instead seeking treatment for their injuries in the
following days. Totah suffered a bruised wrist and had lower back pain
requiring chiropractic treatment. The passengers sought treatment for
physical pain, bruising, and soft tissue injuries; one passenger sought
therapy for the “emotional trauma suffered from this incident,” and another
passenger missed work and “has been suffering from paranoia ever since the
collision and has a very hard time riding [as a] passenger in a car now,
especially at night.”
Jevarian’s Cadillac also sustained “major crash damage” as a result of
the collisions.5 Jevarian had been ejected from the vehicle and was found
lying face down on the highway in the number one lane. Arriving officers
observed that she was “injured, sobbing, visibly shaken, and her speech was
slurred.” At the scene, Jevarian admitted to driving her vehicle but could not
recall being in the car or with anyone. In a California Highway Patrol

5 The damage included a “broken windshield, crumpled hood, broken

front bumper, detached right headlight, shredded right fender, crumpled
passenger side door, dented roof, partially detached driver side door,
crumpled left rear half, collapsed left rear wheel, and broken rear bumper.”
A later-conducted vehicle mechanical inspection determined “the contact
damage occurred to the front bumper, hood, passenger side door and fender.
Contact damage was also noted on the driver side quarter panel, wheel, roof,
and frame. The entire front end was pushed in and to the passenger side of
the vehicle and the entire rear of the vehicle was pushed in toward the
passenger side of the vehicle.”

5
helicopter on the way to the hospital, Jevarian told personnel that she
“consumed six to seven shots of alcohol.” When told she had been involved in
a collision, Jevarian stated, “ ‘Oh my god, why would anyone let me drive?’ ”
Jevarian’s injuries included “bruising along her left shoulder and chest area
consistent with a driver side seat belt injury. . . . [She] was treated for
superficial head injuries to include facial lacerations and abrasions with no
broken bones or fractures.”
Peters was found trapped inside the Cadillac, extracted, and taken to
the hospital by ambulance, having sustained major injuries including:
“fractures to her upper extremities and rib cage, facial lacerations and
contusions to her upper body, . . . a collapsed lung and major lacerations to
her spleen and liver. . . . [H]er brain had swelled due to having shifted from
center.” Peters died three days later as a result of her injuries.
Officers at the scene observed several containers of Modelo beer lying
on the roadway and adjacent to the Cadillac, but it was unclear if they had
been empty or full before the collision. In the Cadillac, they located two vape
pens, cartridges with marijuana leaves on them, a glass smoking pipe with
marijuana residue, and a torn piece of a cardboard Modelo beer container on
the passenger seat.
At the hospital, officers attempted to question Jevarian, who then said
that she “had been drinking tequila and rum and believed she had consumed
two shots of each” but was “in and out of consciousness.” Due to her medical
condition, the officers were unable to perform any field sobriety tests or
obtain Jevarian’s clear consent to a blood alcohol test, so they secured a
warrant for a nonconsensual blood draw.
A little after 2:00 a.m., Jevarian regained consciousness and initially
declined to talk to the officers, but later asked, “ ‘Am I, like, going to jail.’ ”

6
The officers explained that she had been involved in a car collision that she
had caused, “due to being under the influence of alcohol and had caused
multiple injuries.” Jevarian responded that she was “very, very against that
shit.” Then, Jevarian became “increasingly agitated.” She started crying
“uncontrollably” and began screaming and bemoaning that she would be
going to jail. When the blood draw technician arrived around 2:13 a.m.,
Jevarian directed her verbal aggression toward the officers. After the blood
sample was taken, Jevarian continued screaming loudly while getting up
from the bed and began slamming her head on the left side rail. Officers
grabbed her, and a nurse in the room, Joe Parker, requested Jevarian lay
down. Jevarian refused to comply and began flailing and kicking her legs.
When Parker assisted officers attempting to hold Jevarian against the bed,
Jevarian kicked and tried to bite him.
The results of Jevarian’s blood draw showed her blood alcohol content
to be 0.17 percent; her blood sample also contained cannabis and ketamine.6
On August 3, 2022, Jevarian was charged by criminal complaint with
felony gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a);
count 1); felony driving under the influence causing injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (a); count 2); felony driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08
percent causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b); count 3); and
misdemeanor battery upon a doctor or nurse (§ 243, subd. (b); count 4).
Jevarian was also charged with three special allegations: great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a); counts 2 & 3); excess blood alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23578;
counts 1 & 2); and bodily injury to more than one victim (Veh. Code, § 23558;
counts 2 & 3).

6 As noted in her sentencing brief, Jevarian had been given ketamine at

the hospital, approximately three hours before the blood draw.

7
On the date scheduled for the preliminary hearing, February 8, 2024,
Jevarian agreed to an “open plea” and pled guilty to all four counts and
admitted the three special allegations. The parties stipulated there was a
factual basis for the plea. Jevarian waived her right to be sentenced by the
same judge who took her plea, and the matter was scheduled for sentencing
before a different judge.7
Prior to sentencing, the probation department submitted a presentence
report recommending probation be denied. The People’s sentencing brief
requested Jevarian be sentenced to the midterm of six years in state prison
for the gross vehicular manslaughter (count 1), with time for the remaining
counts and allegations being run concurrently if not stayed.8 Jevarian’s
sentencing brief and statement of mitigation requested probation because
Jevarian’s extensive childhood trauma, which included physical, emotional,
and sexual abuse beginning as a baby and subsequent mental health
diagnoses were a significant factor in her decision to drink and drive.9
At the sentencing hearing held on April 15, 2024, the court stated it
had read the probation report and sentencing briefs, including their exhibits,
and had considered the photographs of the collision, Jevarian’s written and

7 People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 756–757.

8 The People quoted rule 4.420, which includes the low term

presumption pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), and stated “the
court must determine the appropriate term between the lower and middle
terms of imprisonment” but did not make specific argument concerning
Jevarian’s childhood trauma. Instead, the People wrote, “the court is not
required to impose the low term based on [Jevarian’s] age.”
9 Jevarian’s sentencing brief did not cite section 1170 or argue that her

childhood trauma triggered the low term presumption; rather, she argued
that her childhood trauma should be a mitigating factor in favor of probation
(see rule 4.414(a)(7)) and to be generally considered. (See rule 4.423(b)(4).)

8
oral statements to the court, the letters that Jevarian wrote to the victims
and their families, and the victim impact statements (written and orally
presented in court). The court discussed each probation factor set forth in
rule 4.414 before stating it “cannot in any way justify a probation sentence in
this case.” The court noted Jevarian’s “rough upbringing” but found Peters
“was extremely vulnerable as she was the passenger in this car” and
sentenced Jevarian to the midterm of six years for the gross vehicular
manslaughter (count 1), two years for driving under the influence with injury
(count 2) stayed pursuant to section 654,10 the midterm of two years for
driving with a blood alcohol level above 0.08 percent (count 3) to be served
concurrently with count 1, and three one-year terms also to be served
concurrently with count 1 for the Vehicle Code section 23558 enhancements.
The court further stated Jevarian “may participate in a counseling or
education program having a substance abuse component while imprisoned,”
and ordered her to pay a court assessment fee, a DUI fine, and restitution
fund fine, and restitution in amounts to be determined for all of the victims.
Jevarian, who had been released on bail in 2022, was remanded to the
custody of the sheriff.
On April 25, the court held a further hearing to “Clarify [the] Sentence”
“based upon my not making very clear what was happening with the special
allegation of great bodily injury, Penal Code 12022.7 subsection A” and to
address the time that “still needs to be imposed on count 2, but then stayed
pursuant to 654 along with the GBI allegation.” Defense counsel also
“invite[d] the court to reconsider the sentence.” The court declined to make

10 Section 654, subdivision (a) prohibits the imposition of multiple

punishments for “an act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law . . . .”

9
any sentence modifications but clarified that it had imposed the midterm of
six years for count 1 and the midterm of two years for count 2, but stayed the
sentence on count 2 pursuant to section 654. For count 3, the court imposed
the midterm of two years to run concurrently with count 1. Considering
Jevarian’s age, the court dismissed “in the interest of justice and pursuant to
Penal Code 1385” the special allegations for blood alcohol in excess of 0.15
percent (Veh. Code, § 23578) and great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The court
also ordered the three years associated with the multi-victim special
allegation (Veh. Code, § 23558) to run concurrently with count 1. Last, the
court confirmed that it had already ordered restitution.
Jevarian timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
Jevarian articulates four grounds for her appeal: (1) the trial court
abused its discretion in denying her request for probation; (2) the trial court
“was unaware” of its obligation to apply and failed to apply the low term
presumption pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (b)(6); (3) in sentencing
her to the middle rather than low term, the trial court erred in relying on the
particular vulnerability of the victims as an aggravating circumstance under
rule 4.421(a)(3); and (4) the cumulative impact of the trial court’s errors
requires remand for resentencing. We address each ground in turn.
I. Denial of Probation
Jevarian contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying her
request for probation because the court improperly considered the
seriousness of the crime and the vulnerability of the victim (see rule

10
4.414(a)(1), (3)), while failing to consider her childhood trauma (see rule
4.424(a)(7)). We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. . . .
[E]rror must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of
appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of
reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
This general rule applies with equal force to sentencing decisions. (See
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.)
In sentencing, “Probation is an act of leniency, not a matter of right.”
(People v. Walmsley (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 636, 638, disapproved on another
ground in People v. LaFantasie (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 758, 763–764.) “A trial
court has broad discretion to determine whether a defendant is suitable for
probation. [Citation.] . . . An appellant bears a heavy burden when
attempting to show an abuse of such discretion. [Citation.] To establish
abuse, the defendant must show that, under all the circumstances, the denial
of probation was arbitrary, capricious or exceeded the bounds of reason.
[Citation.]” (People v. Bradley (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 64, 89.) “ ‘ “In the
absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination
to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (People v.
Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377.)
Rule 4.414 lists aggravating and mitigating factors that the trial court
can consider in deciding whether to grant probation. Rule 4.414(a)(1)
expressly authorizes consideration of the “nature, seriousness, and
circumstances of the crime as compared to other instances of the same
crime,” and rule 4.414(a)(3) authorizes the court to consider the “vulnerability

11
of the victim” in its decision to grant or deny probation. “ ‘ “Vulnerability
means defenseless, unguarded, unprotected, accessible, assailable, one who is
susceptible to the defendant’s criminal act.” ’ ” (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57
Cal.4th 79, 154.) A single aggravating factor is sufficient to justify the denial
of probation. (See People v. Mehserle (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1158.)
The trial court may consider additional criteria not listed in the rules,
provided those criteria are reasonably related to that decision and they are
stated on the record by the sentencing judge. (Rule 4.408(a).)
B. Nature, Seriousness, and Circumstances of the Crime
Jevarian asserts the trial court abused its discretion in relying on the
nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the crime as a basis for denying
probation because, “Nothing in the record supports a finding that [Jevarian’s]
offense was significantly more serious or egregious than other instances of
the same crime.” She maintains that “the fact that a death occurred . . .
[cannot] serve as an appropriate basis for denying probation” because it is “an
element of [the] crime.” She argues that the court’s comment, “[a]nd we know
that this is -- can’t get much more serious when someone’s killed” means the
court improperly considered Peters’s death as a factor in aggravation when
the death was an essential element of count 1.
Considering “other instances of the same crime,” Jevarian cites the
Court of Appeal’s affirmance of a denial of probation in the gross vehicular
manslaughter case of People v. Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301 (Weaver)
overruled on another ground in People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, due to
its “horrific nature,” which bore “significant differences” from the instant
case. Jevarian instead compares her situation to the reversal in People v.
McNiece (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1048, 1060 (McNiece), disapproved on another
ground in People v. McFarland (1989) 47 Cal.3d 798, 805.

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In Weaver, the defendant drove at 1:00 a.m. in “the opposite direction of
oncoming traffic . . . at a high rate of speed,” estimated at different times to
be between 80 and 100 miles per hour. (Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1314, fn. 13.) She did not have her headlights on, and, before the fatal
crash, she caused one accident and almost caused another. (Id. at pp. 1307–
1308.) The defendant had a blood alcohol content of 0.151 percent, and she
tested positive for cocaine. (Id. at p. 1308.)
In McNiece, the defendant drove down a street around midnight,
traveling approximately 10 to 20 miles per hour above the speed limit.
(McNiece, supra, 181 Cal.App.3d at p. 1054.) The defendant “failed to slow
down or stop at the stop sign,” and when he entered the intersection, he
struck another vehicle, killing one occupant and “seriously” injuring another.
(Ibid.) The defendant’s blood test taken an hour after the accident showed a
blood alcohol content of 0.155 percent. (Ibid.)
Contrary to Jevarian’s assertion, the seriousness of this case exceeds
that of McNeice and closely parallels Weaver. As in Weaver, Jevarian was
driving down the wrong side of a highway late at night, here, around
10:13 p.m. (Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1308, 1314.) In an area
she was seemingly familiar with, Jevarian used an off-ramp to enter a
divided highway in the wrong direction, where she was estimated to be
driving approximately 50 to 60 miles per hour. Jevarian hit one car head-on,
causing substantial damage and injury, requiring the driver to be taken to
the hospital. She hit that first car with such force that her vehicle was
propelled into a second vehicle, forcing it off the road and down an
embankment, causing substantial damage to the vehicle and injuring its four
occupants. According to her own admissions, Jevarian, who was not yet 21
and “would ‘go all out’ to increase her tolerance for alcohol in preparation for

13
her 21st birthday” had already “consumed six to seven shots of alcohol” when
she sat behind the wheel. Witness statements suggest that Jevarian and
Peters consumed whiskey, tequila, and marijuana before the accident, and
empty beer containers and marijuana-laced vape pens were found in
Jevarian’s vehicle. The results of Jevarian’s blood draw taken approximately
four hours after the accident showed the presence of cannabis and a blood
alcohol level of 0.17 percent, over twice the legal limit. Accordingly, “The
trial court implicitly concluded, and we cannot presume otherwise, that ‘other
instances’ of section 191.5, subdivision (a) offenses do not involve the same
egregious circumstances as in this case.” (Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1317.)
Jevarian’s complaint of error in the court’s comment that an offense
“can’t get much more serious when someone’s killed” is similarly misplaced.
Although Jevarian is correct that the court may not consider an element of
the crime as a factor in denying probation (see, e.g., People v. Parrott (1986)
179 Cal.App.3d 1119, 1125 [“if an element of the crime could be used by the
court to deny probation, the court would in effect be finding that probation
ineligibility exists as the result of the commission of a crime, even if such
designation was not made by the Legislature”]), Jevarian’s argument ignores
the fact that Jevarian pled guilty to three additional crimes in which Peters’s
death was not an element of the offenses and therefore could be appropriately
considered as evidence of seriousness. In addition, the court’s statements at
sentencing indicate a consideration of more than death, specifically
Jevarian’s “actions have caused the greatest injury that there can be by the
fatality to [Peters] but also to her mother, to her brother, her friends,
employer, family, you know. And that pain just never goes away. . . . [¶] . . . .
The emotional injury is unimaginable.” The record evinces no error.

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C. Vulnerability of Victims
Next, Jevarian contends that the trial court abused its discretion when
it “ignored the circumstances leading to the accident” and considered Peters’s
vulnerability as a victim in denying probation. Jevarian argues that Peters
was not a more vulnerable victim because she “voluntarily drank with
[Jevarian] and voluntarily got into the car [she] was driving on two occasions
that night.” Jevarian repeats her argument before the trial court that
because Peters “was involved in the decisions that cost her life” and had “both
advance warning of the dangers related to drinking and driving and the
ability to avoid that danger,” Peters was not more vulnerable than any other
victim.
She relies on People v. Piceno (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1358
(Piceno), for the principle that because the “element of vulnerability is
inherent in the very crime of vehicular manslaughter caused by a driver
under the influence of alcohol . . . . [Citation.] [D]runk driving victims
should not be considered more vulnerable than victims in other cases.” (See
also People v. Bloom (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 310, 322 (Bloom).) Jevarian
again points to Weaver, which generally disagreed with Piceno but
distinguished victims who have “at least some advance notice or warning of
the imminent risk posed . . . should be considered less vulnerable.” (Weaver,
supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314–1316; see also People v. Nicolas (2017)
8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182 [holding that “a victim of gross vehicular
manslaughter who ‘has absolutely no advance warning or ability to attempt
to avoid’ a car that crashes into his or her vehicle may be characterized as a
‘particularly vulnerable’ victim”].)
But Jevarian’s argument parses the court’s words too narrowly and
ignores the other five victims and their vulnerability. At sentencing, the

15
court did find that “Peters was extremely vulnerable as she was the
passenger in this car. Once you took that wrong turn, there was nothing she
could do. And according to you, I think she screamed ‘Suzie’ when she saw
the lights coming and screamed it pretty loud, and then that was it.” That
language appropriately mirrors Weaver’s determination that a vulnerable
victim is one who has “absolutely no advance warning or ability to attempt to
avoid” the crash and is consistent with even Piceno’s acknowledgement that
“ ‘we can visualize extraordinary situations in which a drunk driving victim
might be considered to be “particularly vulnerable.” ’ ” (Piceno, supra, 195
Cal.App.3d at p. 1358.)
Notably, the sentencing court also later explained: “I understand your
counsel’s argument that . . . the fact that the victim in this case did get into
the car and, most likely, was intoxicated as well as you . . . besides the fact
that she died, there were five other people that were injured, and they have
no idea what was coming.” This statement shows that, regardless of whether
or not Peters’s “choice” to ride with her intoxicated friend made her less
vulnerable, the court also considered the plight of the five other people
injured when Jevarian caused the crashes of two separate vehicles, and none
of those victims had advance warning or the ability to avoid the collisions,
though they tried.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude there is sufficient
evidence supporting the trial court’s findings that all six people injured,
including Peters, were vulnerable victims of Jevarian’s criminal behavior.
(Rule 4.414(a)(3).) Before leaving Peters’s home, the underage Jevarian had,
per her own admission, consumed multiple shots of whiskey and tequila and
had smoked marijuana. Immediately after the accident, Jevarian
acknowledged her intoxication, exclaiming, “Why would anyone let me

16
drive?” Yet Jevarian had still decided to drive a motor vehicle. Despite
growing up in the area and visiting the smoke shop before, she drove “the
wrong way on the off-ramp” before crossing into the number one lane of the
highway that separated north and southbound traffic with a median, and
drove at a speed of approximately 50 to 60 miles per hour directly into
oncoming traffic. Even as Jevarian was “laying her head back,” as the driver
she was the person in complete control of Peters’s safety. Peters, whose
judgment was likely impaired by her own admitted consumption of alcohol,
did not have a car and seemingly trusted Jevarian, her childhood friend, to
ride back to Sonoma, when she got into the Cadillac after leaving the smoke
shop. Once a passenger in Jevarian’s car, Peters did not have any “advance
warning or ability to avoid” the accident. (Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1316.)
In addition, the other five victims had absolutely no knowledge of
Jevarian’s level of intoxication and bear no fault in the accidents. The cars
driven by Puebla and Totah were both traveling in the correct direction.
Puebla was driving northbound approximately 65 to 70 miles per hour when
he “observed headlights approaching him quickly in the number one lane.”
He was struck, and the vehicle came to a stop in the center median.
Similarly, Totah was driving northbound at 65 to 70 miles per hour when he
saw Puebla’s brake lights “ahead and to the left of him just before the
Cadillac crashed into the passenger side of the Toyota.” The Cadillac was
propelled sideways into the number two lane right in front of Totah; although
he applied the brakes and swerved to the right, he was “unable to avoid
crashing into the left, rear side of the Cadillac.” Totah’s car then went off the
roadway and down the embankment. Aside from the brief moment Totah
observed Puebla and Jevarian’s collision, the drivers of the other two vehicles

17
and Totah’s passengers did not have “advance warning or ability to avoid
[her] oncoming car” as they lawfully drove on the correct side of the highway.
(Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316.) The trial court did not abuse its
discretion by relying on the vulnerability of the victims as a factor in denying
probation.
D. Childhood Trauma as a Mitigating Factor
Jevarian also contends that the trial court’s denial of probation was an
abuse of discretion because the court failed to properly consider her childhood
trauma as a factor in mitigation, citing rule 4.414(a)(7) (whether the “crime
was committed because of an unusual circumstance . . . which is unlikely to
recur”) and rule 4.423(b)(3) (the “defendant experienced . . . childhood
trauma . . . and it was a factor in the commission of the crime”) and (b)(4) (the
“commission of the current offense is connected to the defendant’s prior
victimization or childhood trauma”). Jevarian points to the court’s discussion
of the probation factors, arguing that because the court did not specifically
mention her childhood trauma, the court erroneously failed to “ ‘consider and
appreciate such evidence to have appreciable mitigating weight.’ ” We
disagree.
Prior to the sentencing hearing, Jevarian filed a 23-page sentencing
brief with 128 pages of exhibits. The submission is almost completely
devoted to detailing Jevarian’s tragic upbringing, which included physical
and sexual abuse and trafficking by her biological parents and others since
her infancy, her ensuing mental health issues (by “age six [Jevarian] was
profoundly damaged”), and substance abuse (she “began using drugs and
alcohol at age 12 and had become an addict by the time she was 13”). Most of
the supporting exhibits detail Jevarian’s mental health history, which
includes diagnoses for depression and posttraumatic stress disorder and

18
periods of self-harm. Exhibit 11 is a report prepared by Dr. Kevin Kelly, a
licensed psychologist retained by Jevarian’s attorney to conduct an
“Evaluation Confidential to Defense” on March 15, 2023, which concluded,
“On one hand, [Jevarian’s] acts reflect the immaturity and poor judgment
possible for some persons of age 20, and, in Ms. Jevarian’s case, her behavior
also reflects immaturity and poor judgment that was in consequence to
impaired psychological development due to depression and early traumas.”
Further connecting Jevarian’s upbringing to the convicted offenses, her
counsel asserted that Jevarian’s “depression, anxiety, and poly-substance
abuse exacerbated her decline even as they kept her from recognizing or
addressing it. The progression of her disease led to a serious car accident
that killed one of her best friends and injured several others, and
Ms. Jevarian takes full responsibility for her actions and for her failures to
act.”
Jevarian’s attorney repeated these arguments at the sentencing
hearing: “I’m not claiming on her behalf that her highly traumatic childhood
or the conditions that arose from that highly traumatic childhood are an
excuse,” but the “commission of the current offense is directly related to her
prior victimization. That’s a mitigating factor.” (See rules 4.414(a)(7) &
4.423(b)(3), (4).) The district attorney and probation department appeared to
disagree with defense counsel’s assertion of a causal connection. In her
presentencing memorandum, the district attorney asserted the accident was
not an “unusual circumstance unlikely to reoccur” explaining, “It appears
substance use and abuse has been an issue for defendant for many years.
There is zero evidence before the court that this was one-time binge drinking
episode. In fact, the opposite is true. [Jevarian] told Probation that at the
time of the offense she was few months shy of her 21st birthday and had been

19
going ‘all out’ in order to increase her tolerance for alcohol in preparation of
her birthday.” The probation report also referenced Jevarian’s childhood
trauma but concluded that rule 4.414(a)(7) did not apply; the probation report
did not reference rule 4.423(b)(2) or (b)(3).
At sentencing, the trial court said twice it had read and considered the
probation officer’s report,11 the briefing submitted by the parties, and the
arguments of counsel. The court also explicitly stated, “I’ve read the report
from Dr. Kelly, reviewed the school records,” both of which detailed instances
of childhood trauma, and Dr. Kelly’s report included the specific conclusion
that Jevarian’s childhood trauma “was a significant factor in Ms. Jevarian’s
poor judgment to use alcohol and to drive.” In declining to impose probation,
the court went on to explain, “I understand that you’ve had a rough
upbringing, but your decision to drive that night, you very well knew the
consequences of driving and what may happen.”
California Rules of Court generally do not require a sentencing judge to
state the reasons for denying probation (see rule 4.406.), and relevant factors
“will be deemed to have been considered unless the record affirmatively
reflects otherwise.” (Rule 4.409.) However, here, not only did the trial court
specifically reference Jevarian’s “rough upbringing” in denying probation, but
the fact that the pre-existing record almost entirely focused on Jevarian’s
childhood trauma renders implausible her current argument that her trauma
was erroneously overlooked. (Rule 4.409; see People v. Torres (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 984, 988–989 [an appeal that “ ‘ “merely affords an opportunity
for a difference of opinion” ’ ” does not mean an appellant has shown an abuse
of discretion]; see also Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318 [“we

11 The court also signed a statement attached to the report that the

judge “read and considered” the probation report.

20
presume the court did, in fact, consider those circumstances even though it
did not expressly restate, recite, or otherwise refer to each one”].) The trial
court’s consideration and rejection of Jevarian’s childhood trauma as a factor
in mitigation was not an abuse of discretion.
II. Presumptive Low Term Sentence
We next turn to Jevarian’s challenge to the court’s imposition of the
midterm rather than the low term sentence. Effective January 1, 2022,
Senate Bill No. 567 amended section 1170 to require that a trial court “shall,
in its sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(1); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Paragraph (2) then requires the
imposition of the lower term if any one of certain enumerated factors “was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense” unless “the imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) One such factor is a defendant’s
experience of “psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6)(A).) Thus, Senate Bill No. 567 “make[s] the middle term the
presumptive sentence” unless aggravating factors admitted or proved beyond
a reasonable doubt justify the upper term (People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 459, 464, disapproved on another ground in People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 769), or unless a defendant’s prior trauma contributed
to the commission of the offense and the court does not find the imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 423, quoting section 1170, subd. (b)(6).)
Jevarian contends that the trial court erred in failing to apply the low
term presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), which was triggered

21
by her sentencing brief arguing her childhood trauma contributed to her
commission of the offenses. Because “nothing in the record indicates the trial
court assessed whether the presumption applied or whether imposing the
lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice,” Jevarian argues that
the midterm sentence imposed was an abuse of discretion requiring remand
for resentencing.
In response, the Attorney General argues that Jevarian’s claim is
forfeited because defense counsel failed to specifically mention the
presumptive low term in its sentencing memorandum or at the sentencing
hearing and also failed to object to the trial court’s sentence on the basis of
section 1170(b)(6). Objection is necessary, the Attorney General argues,
citing People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, because any failure to make an
express finding could have been corrected at the hearing. We agree.12
The failure to object before the trial court generally forfeits an issue on
appeal, including “ ‘ “claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly
make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did not
object to the sentence at trial. ’ ” (People v. Scott, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 406.)
The rationale is that counsel is responsible for “ ‘understanding, advocating,
and clarifying permissible sentencing choices at the hearing. Routine defects

12 In the alternative, the Attorney General argues that the record

shows the trial court was aware of the low term presumption but was not
obligated to mention section 1170, subdivision (2) specifically; the judge’s
reference to Jevarian’s “rough upbringing” and additional comments
concerning Jevarian’s age show the court considered and rejected the low
term presumption, which the People had cited in their sentencing brief and
referenced at hearing when stating, “I believe it is possible to also get to a
six-year term or close to a six-year term if the court feels that it is bound by
imposing a mitigated sentence.” Because we find the low term presumption
argument forfeited, we do not address the Attorney General’s alternative
argument.

22
in the court’s statement of reasons are easily prevented and corrected if
called to the court’s attention.’ ” (People v. De Soto (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1,
8.) Counsel is obligated to call specific objections to the trial court’s attention
to allow it to correct any sentencing errors. (Id. at pp. 8–9.)
Here, Jevarian had not one, but two opportunities to assert her
section 1170 objection: at the initial sentencing hearing on April 15, 2024,
and at the clarifying hearing on April 25. Jevarian concedes that she failed
to raise a section 1170 objection at either hearing, despite the fact that her
2024 sentencing took place more than two years after section 1170’s relevant
amendment. However, she maintains that the lower term presumption is not
subject to forfeiture; because she made the requisite initial showing that the
presumption applied, the trial court was obligated to apply the presumption.
Jevarian acknowledges this court’s holding in People v. Achane (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 1037, 1044–1047, which applied the doctrine of forfeiture to a
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) low term presumption claim. (See also People
v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778 [defendant’s failure to seek lower
term, object to imposition of higher term, or argue mitigating factors under
amended § 1170, subd. (b)(6), forfeited claim on appeal].) Jevarian instead
asserts she is challenging the trial court’s “misapprehension of its sentencing
obligations” consistent with People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984,
994, footnote 8, which declined to apply forfeiture “where the defendant ‘does
not challenge the manner in which the trial court exercised its sentencing
discretion but rather its apparent misapprehension of statutory sentencing
obligations.’ ” (Id. at p. 994, fn. 8.)
But that distinction does not apply here. Ultimately, Jevarian’s claim
is no different from that in Achane where we explained: “A trial court’s
decision whether to apply this provision thus depends on both factual

23
determinations and the exercise of discretion. A sentence imposed without
consideration of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), is not one that ‘could not
lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case’ [citation]
and does not present a question of law that can be corrected ‘ “ ‘independent
of any factual issues presented by the record at sentencing’ ” and without
“remanding for further findings.” ’ ” (People v. Achane, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1044.) Indeed, “the remedy for a sentence imposed without
consideration of this provision is remand for resentencing.” (Ibid.) Thus, as
in Achane, Jevarian “cannot escape the consequences” of her failure to object.
(Ibid.) Because we conclude the issue is forfeited, we make no determination
as to whether the presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) applies.
III. Particularly Vulnerable Victims Aggravating Circumstance
Jevarian repeats many of her above arguments in contending that the
trial court prejudicially erred in relying on the victims’ “particular
vulnerability” (rule 4.421(a)(3)), to impose a midterm sentence.
But a trial court’s decision to impose a particular sentence is reviewed
for abuse of discretion and “will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing
that the court acted in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd way,
resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Blackwell (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 166, 199.) “In selecting between the middle and lower terms of
imprisonment, the sentencing judge may consider circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation, and any other factor reasonably related to the
sentencing decision.” (Rule 4.420(d).) Whether a victim was “particularly
vulnerable” is an aggravating circumstance. (Rule 4.421(a)(3).) A
particularly vulnerable victim is one who is vulnerable “in a special or
unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other cases.” (People v. Smith
(1979) 94 Cal.App.3d 433, 436.) We review the trial court’s aggravating

24
circumstances finding for substantial evidence. (People v. Morgan (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 488, 520, review granted Oct. 2, 2024, S286493, disapproved
on other grounds in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069.)
At the initial sentencing on April 15, the trial court called Peters
“extremely vulnerable” and concluded that the aggravating circumstance
applied: “Amanda is no longer here and that she was a passenger; she didn’t
have control of the vehicle, and you did. Your attorney has said over and over
again she got into the vehicle voluntarily. Yes. But you were the one who
was driving and it was on you to make the decision not to drive.” At the
clarifying sentencing hearing on April 25, the court further explained her
decision, “So the court imposed the midterm and the reasons I imposed the
midterm are for the following: I understand your counsel’s argument that
based upon the fact of your age, which is a factor to consider as far as
imposing the low term, the fact that the victim in this case did get into the
car and, most likely, was intoxicated as well as you; and for those reasons the
low term may have been imposed. But the reason I didn’t impose the [low
term13] is besides the fact that she died, there were five other people that were
injured, and they had no idea what was coming. [¶] Puebla . . . was taken to
the hospital . . . . [¶] The other four individuals who were injured were not
injured as severely, but sometimes the emotional injuries can last longer
than the physical injuries. Statements from some of the victims stated how
they were afraid to get in the car and how this affects them for years to come;
we don’t really know.” (Italics added.)
Jevarian argues that the trial court erred in relying on victim
vulnerability as an aggravating circumstance because, citing Bloom, Piceno,

13The word “midterm” rather than “low term” appears to have been
erroneously included in the reporter’s transcript.

25
and McNiece, discussed above, all victims of gross vehicular manslaughter
are vulnerable, thus rule 4.421(a)(3) is inapplicable as a matter of law. But
Bloom and McNiece acknowledge that there may be “extraordinary situations
in which a drunk driving victim might be considered to be ‘particularly
vulnerable.’ ” (Bloom, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 322.) As discussed above,
Jevarian overlooks the particular vulnerability of all six victims, as
referenced by the court: “there were five other people that were injured, and
they had no idea what was coming.” (See Weaver, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1316, 1321 [a victim of gross vehicular manslaughter who “has absolutely
no advance warning or ability to attempt to avoid” a car that crashes into his
or her vehicle may be characterized as a “particularly vulnerable” victim].)
We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s rejection of Jevarian’s
argument against vulnerability: “ ‘Then it was okay that I was driving under
the influence because [Peters] knew I was under the influence and she was
under the influence, too. And therefore, I’m not really responsible for that.’
Well, I don’t buy that.” The record presents substantial evidence that all six
victims had no ability to avoid the accidents caused by Jevarian’s misconduct
and therefore were particularly vulnerable; accordingly, the court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing the midterm. (Id. at pp. 1315–1316.)
IV. Cumulative Error
Last, Jevarian asserts that even if the aforementioned asserted errors
do not each individually require reversal, there is more than a reasonable
probability that she would have received a lesser sentence absent their
cumulative effect, thus remand is required.
“Cumulative error is present when the combined effect of the trial
court’s errors is prejudicial or harmful to the defendant.” (People v. Capers
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1017.) As stated, the trial court did not abuse its

26
discretion in denying Jevarian’s request for probation or sentencing her to
the midterm, and Jevarian forfeited any challenge to the application of the
low term presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), by not objecting
at either of the two sentencing hearings. As such, there is nothing to
cumulate. (See People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1094 [“we have
found no error to cumulate”]; see also People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146,
1197 [no cumulative error where defendant’s claims “were waived, forfeited,
invited or . . . meritless”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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DESAUTELS, J.

We concur:

STEWART, P. J.

MILLER, J.

People v. Jevarian (A170585)

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