People v. Montes CA2/6

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Filed 12/18/25 P. v. Montes CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B340663
(Super. Ct. No. 2023027068)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

RENE FRANCISCO MONTES,

Defendant and Appellant.

Here we hold that out-on-bail enhancements (Pen. Code1
§ 2022.1, subd. (b)) do not apply when the offense for which the
defendant was out on bail was reduced to a misdemeanor. We
also hold that under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i);
1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)), where strikes are dismissed for all but
one of multiple felony counts, all felonies not committed on the
same occasion and arising from the same set of operative facts
must be sentenced consecutively. (§ 667, subd. (c)(6).)

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We strike the out-on-bail enhancements, and remand for
resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTS
Rene Francisco Montes was convicted by a jury of three
counts of unauthorized use of personal identifying information.
(§ 30.5, subd. (a)) (counts 1-3). In a bifurcated proceeding,
Montes admitted six prior strikes pursuant to the Three Strikes
law. (§§ 667, subds. (c)-(e); 1170.12, subds. (a)-(c)) and two out-
on-bail allegations (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)).
On count 1, the trial court sentenced Montes to the middle
term of two years, doubled to four because of the prior strike, plus
a consecutive two years for the out-on-bail enhancement, for a
total of six years. On counts 2 and 3, the court struck the prior
strike enhancement and sentenced Montes to six-year terms
consisting of the two-year middle term doubled to four plus two
years for the out-on-bail enhancements concurrent with count 1.
DISCUSSION
I. Out-on-Bail Enhancements
The People concede the out-on-bail enhancements
constitute an unauthorized sentence and must be stricken. The
offenses for which Montes was out on bail had resulted in
misdemeanor pleas prior to the commission of the current
offenses.
Section 12022.1, subdivision (b) provides: “any person
arrested for a secondary offense that was alleged to have been
committed while that person was released from custody on a
primary offense shall be subject to a penalty enhancement of an
additional two years, which shall be served consecutive to any
other term imposed by the court.”

2
Section 12022.1, subdivision (a)(1) defines “primary
offense” as, “a felony offense for which a person has been released
from custody on bail . . . .” Section 12022.1, subdivision (a)(2)
defines “secondary offense” as, “ a felony offense alleged to have
been committed while the person is released from custody for a
primary offense.”
Here the two primary offenses were reduced to
misdemeanors prior to sentencing in this case. Under the
circumstance, section 12022.1 does not apply. (People v. Reyes
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1222, 1226-1227 [section 12022.1 does not
apply where the primary offenses are reduced to misdemeanors].)
Because the sentence is unauthorized, the two-year
enhancements under section 12022.1 must be stricken.
II. Sentences on Counts 2 and 3 May Not be Doubled
Montes contends the trial court erred in doubling the
terms on counts 2 and 3.
The trial court doubled the terms on counts 2 and 3 under
the Three Strikes law. The People concede that because the trial
court dismissed the strikes as to count 2 and 3, there is no basis
for doubling the terms on those counts.
III. Sentences on Counts 2 and 3 Must be Consecutive
Section 667, subdivision (c)(6), applicable to defendants
sentenced under the Three Strikes law, provides: “ If there is a
current conviction for more than one felony count not committed
on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of
operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant
consecutively on each count pursuant to subdivision (e).”
Section 667, subdivision (c)(7) has a consecutive
sentencing provision for a current conviction of more than one
serious or violent felony counts.

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Montes does not dispute that the three felony counts were
not committed on the same occasion and did not arise from the
same set of operative facts. Because the trial imposed a Three
Strikes sentence on count 1, section 667, subdivision (c)(6)
requires consecutive sentences for all counts.
With commendable candor, Montes’s counsel directs us to
People v. Casper (2004) 33 Cal.4th 38 (Casper). In Casper, the
defendant pled guilty to 35 felony counts. The trial court
dismissed Three Strikes allegations against all counts but one.
As to those remaining counts that occurred on separate occasions
the trial court stated that consecutive sentences were required,
but if it had discretion, it would sentence concurrently on some
counts. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the trial court
had discretion to sentence concurrently. Our Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeal, stating: “[B]y its terms, section 667,
subdivision (c)(6) requires consecutive sentences whenever a
defendant with one or more qualifying prior convictions is
convicted, as here, of multiple serious or violent felonies ‘not
committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same
set of operative facts.’ ” (Casper, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 42,
quoting People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508.)
Montes’s attempt to distinguish Casper is based on the
ground that Casper involved current serious and violent felonies.
But section 667, subdivision (c)(6) requires consecutive sentences
where “there is a current conviction for more than one felony
count.” It does not require that the current counts be serious or
violent felonies.
Montes also argues that dicta in People v. Henderson
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 34 (Henderson), shows Casper is limited to
serious and violent felonies. Henderson held that under the

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Three Strikes Reform Act for felonies committed on the same
occasion or arising from the same set of operative facts – where
section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (7), does not apply – the trial
court retains discretion to sentence concurrently or consecutively.
(Henderson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 56.)
In dicta, Henderson, supra, 14 Cal.5th 34, gives an
example of a defendant with two prior strikes. The defendant is
newly convicted of two robberies on two different days and two
unrelated counts of auto theft. The trial court dismissed one
strike. Our Supreme Court states that the robbery convictions
must be sentenced consecutively, and the auto theft conviction
sentences must be consecutive to the robbery sentences. But the
auto theft convictions may be sentenced consecutively or
concurrently to each other. (Henderson, at p. 56.)
Our Supreme Court cites no authority for its conclusion
that the auto theft conviction sentences may be concurrent with
each other. We wonder how this conclusion can be reconciled
with the requirements of section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and
Casper, supra, 33 Cal.4th 38.
Montes argues that Casper, supra, 33 Cal.4th 38 relied on
section 667, subdivision (c)(6), as applying to all felonies, and
subdivision (c)(7), as applying to serious and violent felonies. He
appears to conclude that section 667, subdivision (c)(6) does not
require consecutive sentences in the absence of felonies
qualifying under subdivision (c)(7). But nowhere does Casper or
Henderson, supra, 14 Cal.5th 34 say that. Casper relies on both
section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (7) for the simple reason that
the defendant pled guilty to 35 felonies, some of which are
governed by section 667, subdivision (c)(6), and others by
subdivision (c)(7). Nothing in the plain language of section 667,

5
subdivision (c)(6) makes its application contingent on subdivision
(c)(7).
Moreover, in Henderson’s example, the defendant’s two
new robbery convictions qualify for enhancement under section
667, subdivision (c)(7) as violent crimes. (See § 667.5, subd.
(c)(9).) The theft convictions in the example are governed by
section 667, subdivision (c)(6). Thus even under Montes’s theory,
the sentences for the theft convictions in the example must be
consecutive to each other.
We agree with the People. Either our Supreme Court’s
example in Henderson is mistaken, or the Supreme Court is
assuming that the two theft convictions were committed on the
same occasion and arose from the same set of operative facts.
Either way, the example has nothing to do with this case.
Section 667, subdivision (c)(6) mandates consecutive sentences.
We must remand for resentencing. But our Supreme
Court has cautioned that a defendant may not be prejudiced for
exercising his right to appeal, and the trial court on remand may
not impose an aggregate term greater than the one defendant
initially received. (Henderson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 56.)
DISPOSITION
The enhancements imposed pursuant to section 12022.1
are stricken and the matter is reversed and remanded for
resentencing. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

YEGAN, J. BALTODANO, J.

6
Robert J. Schuit, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

Michael H. Casey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R.
Maline, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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