People v. Sloop CA6

CourtListener 10761009Calctapp18 dic 2025

Testo completo

Filed 12/18/25 P. v. Sloop CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H053084
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24CR005785)

v.

JAMES PATRICK SLOOP,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant James Patrick Sloop appeals his conviction for arson of property (Pen.
Code, § 451, subd. (d)) on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to establish his
identity as the perpetrator of the crime. We hold sufficient evidence supports the jury’s
finding that Sloop was the arsonist and therefore affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 1, 2024, at approximately 3:54 a.m., the victim Dean Burnam woke up to
find his two vehicles engulfed in flames in the driveway of his home, which is located on
the corner of Highland Street and Plumas Avenue1 in Seaside. A neighbor called 911 and
the fire department extinguished the fire. Home surveillance videos from Burnam’s
home captured the arson. The videos showed that at approximately 3:46 a.m., an
unknown suspect approached Burnam’s driveway from Plumas Avenue wearing a

1
Plumas Avenue runs east to west.
sweater with a hood, which covered the suspect’s face, long pants, and gloves. The
suspect then opened a container, poured a liquid on the windshield of Burnam’s Honda
Pilot SUV, and ignited the flame. At approximately 3:49 a.m., there was a bright flash,
and a fire erupted immediately after. The flames engulfed the Honda and also burned the
car parked directly next to it. Seconds later, the perpetrator fled eastbound on Plumas
Avenue.
A neighbor who lives on the corner opposite the victim, near Plumas Avenue and
Mescal Street,2 also captured the suspect’s movements on home surveillance videos. The
videos showed a dark-colored vehicle driving southbound on Mescal Street and turning
onto Plumas Avenue at approximately 3:41 a.m. The suspect then parked and turned off
the vehicle at about 3:42 a.m. At 3:45 a.m., the suspect walked westbound on Plumas
Avenue towards Burnam’s house. At 3:49 a.m., there was a bright light from the vehicle
explosion. Moments later, the same suspect ran eastbound on Plumas Avenue towards
the parked car and threw an unidentified object alongside the road; the object was never
recovered. At 3:50 a.m., the suspect’s vehicle fled northbound on Mescal Street. The
race and gender of the arson suspect was not discernable from any of the surveillance
videos.
Following the incident, police discovered that a Flock camera—a license plate
reading system—took a photograph of the last three digits of the dark-colored sedan’s
temporary paper license plate as it drove towards Burnam’s house at 3:39 a.m. Police
also recovered surveillance video footage from C.K., who lives on Mescal Street. One of
the surveillance videos showed a dark-colored vehicle approaching Mescal Street at
about 3:39 a.m.;3 flashes from the Flock camera taking a picture of the sedan’s temporary

2
Mescal Street runs north to south, and the southernmost corner of Mescal
naturally turns into Plumas Avenue.
3
At trial, C.K. testified that the timestamp on his home surveillance videos were
29 minutes slow. The People therefore obtained the correct time by adding 29 minutes to
the video timestamp.
2
license plate can be seen in the background at the same time. At about 3:50 a.m., C.K.’s
surveillance cameras captured the same dark-colored vehicle traveling northbound on
Mescal Street at a fast rate of speed; no other vehicles traversed Mescal Street between
3:39 a.m. and 3:50 a.m. Police later determined a Black Mercedes sedan registered to
Sloop matched the temporary paper license plate ending in -M03 captured by the Flock
camera. After conducting a records search for addresses associated with Sloop, police
discovered he lived seven miles north of Burnam in Marina—the drive time between the
two homes is about 15-17 minutes.
On May 7th, police arrested Sloop at his home in Marina, seized his cell phone,
and impounded his Mercedes. At the time of the arrest, Sloop did not have any burn
marks on his face or body. During a search of Sloop’s home, police seized a black
sweater with a white mark on the right arm sleeve as they suspected it might be a burn
mark, but found no accelerants or any other evidence that Sloop was planning or
preparing the car fire. Police also recovered surveillance videos from Sloop’s home that
showed he left his house at 12:07 a.m. on May 1st wearing a black sweater and long
pants and returned later that morning at 4:04 a.m. wearing the same clothes. In a
recorded post-arrest interview, Sloop stated no one besides him drove his Mercedes.
On May 17, Officer Christopher Van Cor used his K-9 partner Ranger to conduct
a sniff test of Sloop’s Mercedes to detect the presence of ignitable liquids and explosives.
During the search, Ranger gave an alert when he sniffed the front passenger floorboard
and the center console “where the driver would put their right arm.” Following the sniff
search, officers recovered two lighters, cigarettes, and marijuana from the center console
of the Mercedes. Police also found a beanie and a pair of black gloves in the passenger
compartment of the vehicle, as well as a pair of white gloves in the trunk that had a
strong chemical smell and appeared singed.
Thereafter, Sloop was charged with arson of property (Pen. Code, § 451,
subd. (d)), with sentencing enhancement allegations that he suffered three prior strikes
3
(id., §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12), and two prior conviction enhancements (id.,
§ 667.5, subd. (a)(1)).
Before trial, police obtained a search warrant for forensic extraction of data from
Sloop’s cell phone. The search warrant in this case included location data for call detail
records because there was no ping location data available.4 Call detail records placed
Sloop’s cell phone in Marina on May 1st at 12:07 a.m. and just after 4:00 a.m. Digital
forensics also showed the device was plugged into an AC adapter at 3:42 a.m., 3:50 a.m.,
and 4:04 a.m. However, the digital forensics investigator found no evidence in Sloop’s
cell phone showing he was planning or preparing a car fire and there was no location data
placing Sloop in Seaside on May 1st. A forensic chemist tested the two sets of gloves
found in Sloop’s Mercedes but was unable to detect the presence of ignitable fluids in
either pair of gloves.
The trial hinged on the identity of the arsonist. The People introduced into
evidence the surveillance videos police recovered and called several witnesses to testify
in their case-in-chief. As relevant here, the forensic chemist who analyzed the gloves
found in Sloop’s Mercedes testified that even though the lab tests did not detect the
presence of ignitable liquids, it did not mean the substance was never on those items.
The forensic chemist explained that ignitable liquids could evaporate or consume if they
are not stored properly, which can result in a “non-detect.” The forensic chemist opined
it was possible that any measurable ignitable liquids on the gloves evaporated since they
were stored in open air inside a vehicle for five or six days.
Officer Van Cor similarly testified that with each passing day, ignitable liquids
can degrade quickly to a point below detection. Officer Van Cor also opined that the
arson suspect wore long sleeves and pants for thermal protection which would make it

4
According to the prosecution’s digital forensic expert, police can obtain a search
warrant to locate a device in real-time by requesting that a carrier send a ping to the cell
phone of interest, for a specified interval.
4
possible for the person to walk away without any burn marks. Officer Van Cor further
stated the white marks on Sloop’s sweater were consistent with thermal damage he had
seen on other garments in his career but acknowledged he could not say with certainty
without testing. With respect to the sniff search of Sloop’s Mercedes, Officer Van Cor
testified his K-9 partner Ranger was trained to alert when he detected the presence of
ignitable liquids and that Ranger had a 98 percent accuracy rating. Officer Van Cor
explained that Ranger alerted when he sniffed the right front floorboard area of the
passenger side and again when he sniffed over the center console where the lighters were
found. On cross-examination, Officer Van Cor admitted he could not say with certainty
whether Ranger detected something other than the lighters when he alerted to the
presence of ignitable fluids during the sniff search.
The digital forensic investigator who reviewed Sloop’s cell phone data also
testified. The digital forensic investigator explained that although the forensic data did
not show Sloop was in Seaside on May 1st, call detail records only show location
information when a call is made using the carrier’s network and would not give location
information if a user connected to the internet or a third-party application.
Following the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the defense presented alibi testimony
from Sayla Born, a card dealer at a casino club Sloop frequented. Born stated she started
her shift at 8:00 p.m. on May 1st and testified Sloop was there that night until the
following morning, May 2d. On cross-examination, Born admitted she did not remember
whether she worked the night of April 30th to May 1st, that she talked to Sloop every day
while he was in jail, gave him money every week, and told him she would “try everything
to make him happy.”
In closing, defense counsel argued the People failed to meet their burden of
showing that Sloop was the perpetrator of the arson. Counsel emphasized Sloop had no
burn marks when he was arrested a few days after the crime, cell phone location data did
not place him in Seaside on the night of the arson, the gloves found in his car tested
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negative for ignitable fluids, the sweater found in Sloop’s home was never tested to
determine whether the white mark was in fact a chemical burn, there was no evidence
that Sloop was planning a fire, police found no accelerants in Sloop’s home or car, and
claimed Sloop used the lighters found inside his Mercedes to smoke cigarettes and
marijuana. Defense counsel also highlighted Sloop had an alibi for the night of the arson,
the prosecutor provided no motive explaining why Sloop committed the crime, and that
Sloop did not know or have any prior contact with Burnam before the incident.
The jury found Sloop guilty as charged. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court
found true that Sloop suffered three prior strikes and two prior conviction enhancements.
At sentencing, the trial court denied Sloop’s Romero motion (People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) to dismiss two of his three prior strike convictions. The
trial court sentenced Sloop to 25 years to life for arson (under the “Three Strikes” Law),
consecutive to five years for one of the two prior conviction enhancements; the trial court
dismissed the other prior conviction enhancement.
Sloop timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Sloop contends his arson conviction should be reversed because the evidence was
insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime. We disagree.
“In addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a
conviction, the reviewing court must examine the whole record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—
evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The appellate
court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could
reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citations.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th
978, 1053 (Kraft).) “ ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the
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trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the
facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility
issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s
verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).)
“The same standard applies when the conviction rests primarily on circumstantial
evidence. [Citation.] Although it is the jury’s duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the
circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which
suggests guilt and the other innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that must be
convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (Kraft, supra,
23 Cal.4th at pp. 1053-1054.) We “must accept logical inferences that the jury might
have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.” (People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342,
396.)
“Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to establish culpability for arson.
[Citation.]” (People v. Belton (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 376, 379-380.) “[T]he very nature
of the crime of arson ordinarily dictates that the evidence will be circumstantial.”
(People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 449 (Beagle), abrogated on other grounds by
People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1176, 1190.) Arson is typically “committed in stealth,
without warning and often under the cloak of darkness,” and therefore “perpetrators of
such clandestine acts frequently escape detection by human eye.” (People v. Andrews
(1965) 234 Cal.App.2d 69, 75, italics omitted.) “Consequently, the lack of an eyewitness
placing defendant at the scene or other direct evidence to establish his guilt does not
render the jury’s verdict of guilty of arson constitutionally deficient. [Citation.]” (People
v. Solis (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1002, 1010.)
Applying the foregoing standards, we hold substantial evidence supports Sloop’s
arson conviction. We acknowledge this was a close case since, as Sloop notes, there
7
were no eyewitnesses to the crime, the arsonist’s identity is not discernable from the
surveillance videos, there was no forensic evidence directly linking him to the crime, and
Sloop had no motive to commit the seemingly random crime. However, merely because
the evidence in this case may lead to alternative inferences does not render the evidence
insufficient. (See Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 358 [“Where the circumstances
reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not
warrant the judgment’s reversal”], citation omitted; see also Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at
p. 450 [“Motive . . . is not an element of arson . . .”].) Viewing the evidence most
favorable to the judgment, we conclude the jury reasonably found Sloop was the
perpetrator of the crime.
First, the jury reasonably found Sloop committed the arson based on the
circumstantial evidence. (See People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933
[“ ‘Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to connect a defendant with the crime and
to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”], citations omitted.) The evidence
adduced at trial showed Sloop left his home just after midnight on May 1st in his black
Mercedes sedan, which had a temporary paper license plate ending in -M03. At
approximately 3:39 a.m., 10 minutes before the arson, C.K.’s home surveillance video
caught a dark-colored sedan driving southbound on Mescal Street—the direction of
Burnam’s house. At the same time, a Flock camera captured a partial picture of the dark-
colored sedan’s paper license plate that matched the last three digits of the temporary
license plate on Sloop’s Mercedes. At 3:41 a.m., surveillance video from Burnam’s
neighbor on Plumas Avenue—who lives down the street from C.K.—showed the same
dark-colored sedan turning onto Plumas Avenue from Mescal Street. The suspect then
parked and turned off the car at about 3:42 a.m. At 3:45 a.m., four minutes before the
fire, the suspect walked towards Burnam’s house wearing a dark-colored hoodie, which
covered the suspect’s face, dark pants, and gloves. A few minutes later, the suspect
8
poured an ignitable liquid on Burnam’s Honda Pilot SUV and ignited the flame which
caused a bright flash. Immediately after the bright flash, surveillance videos captured the
same suspect running back towards the dark-colored sedan parked on Plumas Avenue.
At approximately 3:50 a.m. the suspect’s vehicle was captured fleeing northbound on
Mescal Street at a high rate of speed. Notably, no other vehicles traveled down Mescal
Street during the period the arson was committed. At 4:04 a.m. Sloop arrived home in
his Mercedes wearing a black hoodie and long pants, the same type of clothing the arson
suspect wore. Significantly, Sloop lives north of Burnam, the time he arrived home is
consistent with the 15-minute time period it would take to drive the seven-mile distance
between Burnam’s house and Sloop’s house, and Sloop admitted no one besides him
drove his car the morning of May 1st. Lastly, though Sloop did not have any visible burn
marks on him days after the fire, Officer Van Cor testified the arsonist would not have
suffered any burns since the suspect was wearing protective clothing.
The physical evidence also corroborates the jury’s finding that Sloop was the
arson suspect. Sloop’s cell phone records show he plugged in his phone at 3:42 a.m.,
3:50 a.m., and 4:05 a.m., which corresponds to the times the suspect turned the car on and
off at Plumas Avenue, and when Sloop arrived home. Additionally, police found a
beanie, lighters, and singed gloves that had a strong chemical smell in Sloop’s Mercedes
six days after the arson. While the gloves tested negative for ignitable fluid, the forensic
chemist testified it was possible any testable residue had dissipated since the gloves were
exposed to open air inside Sloop’s car for several days. Officer Van Cor similarly
testified that detectable ignitable fluids can dissipate quickly if not stored properly.
Further, though Sloop’s black zip-up hoodie was not tested, Officer Van Cor opined the
white marks on the sweater were consistent with thermal damage he had seen on other
garments in his career.
Finally, the jury was entitled to discount Born’s testimony, Sloop’s alibi witness.
(See People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955 [“It is not our function to reweigh
9
the evidence, reappraise the credibility of witnesses, or resolve factual conflicts, as these
are functions reserved for the trier of fact”].) The jury could have reasonably determined
Born was not a credible witness given her apparent bias towards Sloop. Indeed, Born
testified she talked to Sloop every day while he was in jail, gave him money, and
admitted she would “try everything to make him happy.” In any event, Born could not
account for Sloop’s location on the morning of the arson. Born testified that she saw
Sloop at the casino on the night of May 1st—several hours after the arson was
committed—and stated she could not remember whether she worked on the morning of
May 1st. (See People v. Riggs (2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 311 [“The evidence indicating that
[the] defendant [was guilty], was entirely overwhelming, especially in comparison to the
exceedingly dubious alibi testimony provided by [the] defendant’s [witnesses]”].)
Because the physical and circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the
jury’s finding that Sloop was the arsonist, we must affirm Sloop’s conviction.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
Danner, J.

______________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H053084 People v. Sloop

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