CourtListener 10759410•Chazanas v. Hakopian CA2/3
Testo completo
Filed 12/16/25 Chazanas v. Hakopian CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ARI CHAZANAS et al., B339179
Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants, (Los Angeles County
and Respondents. Super. Ct. No. 21STCV22304)
v.
VAZGEN HAKOPIAN,
Defendant, Cross-Complainant,
and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael P. Linfield, Judge. Affirmed.
Vazgen Hakopian, in pro. per., for Defendant, Cross-
Complainant, and Appellant.
AXS Law Group LA, James K. Kawahito, and Brian R.
Tinkham, for Plaintiffs, Cross-Defendants, and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendant and cross-complainant Vazgen Hakopian1
appeals from a trial court order denying his motion for relief from
a default judgment. The trial court entered the default judgment
after Hakopian failed to comply with a discovery order and failed
to appear at a sanctions hearing and a subsequent order to show
cause hearing. Four months later, Hakopian moved to set aside
the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473,
subdivision (b), on the basis that it resulted from his excusable
neglect.2 The trial court found Hakopian’s explanations not
credible and denied the motion. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In June 2021, Ari Chazanas filed a complaint against
Vazgen Hakopian for breach of contract, fraud, negligence,
restitution, and money had and received. The complaint alleged
that Chazanas hired and paid Hakopian to remodel a kitchen.
The parties agreed that the remodel would take 45 days.
However, after four months, Hakopian had finished less than half
the job and the craftsmanship and materials were of lower
quality than Chazanas had requested. Chazanas later learned
that Hakopian had falsely represented that he was a licensed
contractor. Chazanas paid another contractor to demolish and
1 The underlying lawsuit was filed against “Vazgen
Hakopian, aka Vazgen Hakobian,” and documents included in the
record use both spellings. For simplicity and consistency, we
refer to appellant as Hakopian.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
2
replace Hakopian’s work, and sought to recover the cost of that
work from Hakopian.
In November 2021, Hakopian filed a cross-complaint
against Chazanas for failure to pay wages and overtime; failure
to provide wage statements, meal periods, and rest periods; and
unfair competition.3
On March 11, 2022, Chazanas served discovery requests on
Hakopian’s counsel. Hakopian’s responses to these requests were
due on April 11, 2022.
On March 24, 2022, Hakopian filed a substitution of
attorney form indicating that he would be representing himself.
Later that day, Chazanas’s counsel contacted Hakopian by email,
recommended that he hire a new attorney, and informed him that
his responses to discovery requests would be due April 12, 2022.
On March 25, 2022, Chazanas served Hakopian with
another set of discovery requests. Hakopian’s responses were due
on April 29, 2022.
On May 2, 2022, Chazanas sent a letter to Hakopian by
certified mail and email seeking to meet and confer regarding the
outstanding discovery requests. Chazanas informed Hakopian
that if he did not respond to the requests by May 10, 2022,
Chazanas would move to compel responses and seek sanctions.
Hakopian did not respond to the discovery requests. On
May 25, 2022, Chazanas moved to compel responses to the
requests and moved for $1,935 in monetary sanctions based on
the time spent preparing the motions and the associated filing
fees. Hakopian did not respond to the motions.
3 The cross-complaint also named three additional cross-
defendants who are not parties to this appeal.
3
On June 21, 2022, Hakopian filed a substitution of attorney
form indicating he would now be represented by a new law firm.
His new counsel appeared at the June 24, 2022 hearing on
Chazanas’s motion to compel. At the hearing, the trial court
found that the discovery requests were properly served and that
Hakopian failed to timely respond. It ordered Hakopian to
respond to the requests and awarded sanctions in the amount of
$1,680.
In August 2022, criminal proceedings were initiated
against Hakopian based on the same facts underlying the dispute
in this case. On September 12, 2022, pursuant to the parties’
stipulation, the trial court in this case stayed all proceedings and
set a status conference for March 2023.
On July 13, 2023, at a hearing at which Hakopian was
represented by counsel, the court lifted the stay. The court set a
status conference for September 11, 2023.
Meanwhile, on June 9, 2023, Hakopian’s attorney had
moved to be relieved as counsel, citing irreconcilable differences
with his client. The court granted the motion on July 17, 2023.
Hakopian did not appear at the September 11, 2023 status
conference and did not file a status report in advance of that
hearing. The court scheduled a jury trial for February 2024.
On October 4, 2023, Chazanas contacted Hakopian by
email to remind him of the court’s June 24, 2022 order compelling
Hakopian to respond to discovery requests. Chazanas informed
Hakopian that he would file a motion for terminating sanctions if
the responses were not received by October 21, 2023. Chazanas
sent Hakopian a reminder email on October 11, 2023. Hakopian
did not respond.
4
On October 17, 2023, Chazanas filed a motion for
terminating sanctions based on Hakopian’s failure to comply with
the court’s order compelling responses to discovery. Hakopian
did not respond to the motion. Following a November 9, 2023
hearing at which Hakopian did not appear, the trial court
granted the motion and dismissed Hakopian’s cross-complaint
with prejudice. It scheduled an order to show cause hearing
regarding the entry of a default judgment.
Hakopian did not appear at the December 21, 2023 order to
show cause hearing. The court entered a default judgment
against Hakopian. The court clerk served Hakopian with notice
of the entry of judgment on December 22, 2023. Chazanas
assigned his interest in the judgment to respondent Modern
Adjustment Bureau.
On March 27, 2024, Hakopian filed a motion, through
counsel, for relief from the default judgment under section 473,
subdivision (b), on the ground that it resulted from inadvertence,
surprise, mistake, or excusable neglect. The motion argued that
Hakopian had been proceeding pro per and did not receive notice
of Chazanas’s motion for terminating sanctions, and that he was
incapacitated in a June 18, 2023 car accident.
Chazanas’s opposition argued that Hakopian was properly
served with the motion for terminating sanctions. The opposition
attached a sworn declaration from a process server who had
personally served the motion at Hakopian’s home address on
October 17, 2023. The process server declared that a person who
identified himself as Hakopian answered the intercom speaker
and asked the process server to leave the documents on the
porch. The opposition further argued that Hakopian had
produced no evidence supporting that he was incapacitated at the
5
time of the November 2023 hearing on Chazanas’s motion or the
December 2023 order to show cause hearing.
On May 2, 2024, the court denied Hakopian’s motion for
relief from the default judgment. The court identified three
problems with Hakopian’s arguments. First, even assuming that
Hakopian was truly incapacitated and did not receive notice of
any court proceedings in the second half of 2023, Hakopian failed
to explain why he made no attempt to contact the court to notify
it about his incapacitation. The court found that this “greatly
diminish[ed]” his credibility. Second, the court concluded that
Hakopian’s own evidence did not support that he was so
incapacitated that he could not participate in the litigation. For
example, Hakopian visited a doctor and communicated through
an interpreter in September 2023, some two months before the
hearing on Chazanas’s motion. This established that Hakopian
was not physically or mentally incapacitated and could have
participated in litigation. The court determined that this
“further diminishe[d] his credibility.” Third, the court found the
process server credible and, in turn, found that Hakopian was
personally served with the motion for terminating sanctions.
Because Hakopian was aware of the motion and able to respond
to it, the court determined that his failure to attend the
November and December hearings was intentional, and not the
result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.
On June 17, 2024, Hakopian filed a notice of appeal from
the November 9, 2023 order granting terminating sanctions and
striking Hakopian’s answer to the complaint, the December 22,
2023 default judgment, and the May 2, 2024 order after judgment
denying Hakopian’s section 473 motion.
6
DISCUSSION
I. Timeliness of appeals
“The time for appealing a judgment is jurisdictional; once
the deadline expires, the appellate court has no power to
entertain the appeal.” (Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v.
Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15
Cal.4th 51, 56 (Van Beurden); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.60(d),
8.104(b).)
Hakopian’s notice of appeal purports to appeal from the
December 22, 2023 default judgment. “Unless a statute or rules
8.108, 8.702, or 8.712 provides otherwise, a notice of appeal must
be filed on or before the earliest of: [¶] (A) 60 days after the
superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal
a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of judgment or a filed-
endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was
served . . . .” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).) The
clerk’s transcript in this case includes a file-stamped copy of a
notice of entry of judgment and a file-stamped certificate of
mailing reflecting that the notice was served on Hakopian by
mail on December 22, 2023. Hakopian’s appeal from the
judgment therefore needed to be filed within 60 days, or by
February 20, 2024. (Alan v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 894, 903 [60-day time to appeal is triggered
“when the clerk has sent a single, self-sufficient document
satisfying all of the rule’s conditions”].)
The notice of appeal also purports to appeal from a
November 9, 2023 order granting terminating sanctions and
striking Hakopian’s answer to the complaint. This order is not
independently appealable. However, the order became
appealable after the judgment was entered, and therefore any
7
appeal was due by February 20, 2024. (§ 904.1, subd. (b); Nickell
v. Matlock (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 934, 940.)
Hakopian’s notice of appeal was filed on June 17, 2024,
nearly four months after the February 20 deadline to appeal from
the judgment. Because no party addressed this issue in the
appellate briefing, we invited the parties to submit supplemental
briefs as to the timeliness of an appeal from the judgment and
from the interlocutory order granting terminating sanctions.
Hakopian’s supplemental brief asserts that there is no
evidence in the record that he was served with a signed copy of
the judgment. However, the 60-day timeline to appeal is
triggered once “the superior court clerk serves on the party filing
the notice of appeal a document entitled ‘Notice of Entry’ of
judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment . . . .” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A), italics added.) As we have
discussed, the clerk’s transcript establishes that the superior
court clerk served Hakopian with a file-stamped notice of entry of
judgment on December 22, 2023. Thus, Hakopian had 60 days to
appeal from the judgment, or until February 20, 2024, even if he
never received a signed copy of the judgment.
Hakopian argues that any presumption that the notice of
entry of judgment was properly mailed may be “rebutted by
evidence supporting denial of receipt.” (Wolstoncroft v. County of
Yolo (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 327, 350.) But Hakopian has not
identified any such evidence. For the first time in his letter brief,
Hakopian contends that he never received the notice. But this
contention is irrelevant, as it is “ ‘axiomatic that statements
made in briefs are not evidence . . . .’ ” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 697.)
8
Hakopian’s supplemental brief also contends that his time
to appeal from the judgment was extended pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 8.108(c), because he filed a motion to set
aside the judgment. But that subdivision only extends the
deadline to appeal if the appellant moved to vacate the judgment
“within the time prescribed by rule 8.104 to appeal from the
judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.108(c).) As we have
discussed, Hakopian had 60 days to appeal from the judgment
under the circumstances of this case. (Id., rule 8.104(a)(1)(A).)
He moved to set aside the judgment on March 27, 2024, or 96
days after the judgment was entered. Hakopian’s motion
therefore did not extend the time to appeal from the judgment.4
Finally, Hakopian notes that Chazanas has not argued that
the appeal is untimely as to the judgment. Even so, once the
time to appeal has expired, “the appellate court has no power to
entertain the appeal.” (Van Beurden, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 56.)
Because Hakopian did not timely appeal from the judgment or
the interlocutory order granting terminating sanctions, we lack
jurisdiction to consider these aspects of his appeal.
4 Hakopian’s appellate briefing also mentions a June 21,
2024 motion to set aside the judgment under section 473,
subdivision (d). Hakopian asserts that this motion “was never
heard because of the appeal filing.” To the extent Hakopian
means to argue that the trial court erred by failing to resolve the
motion, we lack jurisdiction to resolve his challenge because his
notice of appeal, which is dated before the motion was filed, did
not purport to appeal from an order denying the motion. (Colony
Hill v. Ghamaty (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1171 [appellate
court lacks jurisdiction to consider order not identified in notice of
appeal].)
9
However, Hakopian also appealed from the May 2, 2024
order denying his motion to set aside the default judgment. That
order is independently appealable as an order made after
judgment. (Shapiro v. Clark (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1137;
§ 904.1, subd. (a)(2).) The appeal is timely as to that order
because the June 17, 2024 notice of appeal was filed within 60
days thereof. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(A) & (e).) We
therefore consider the merits of Hakopian’s challenge to the order
denying his motion to set aside the judgment.5
II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Hakopian’s motion for relief from the
default judgment
Hakopian moved for relief from the default judgment under
the discretionary aspect of section 473, subdivision (b), which
provides that the trial court “may, upon any terms as may be
just,” relieve a party from a judgment “taken against him or her
through his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect.” As “the party moving to set aside the default,”
Hakopian “has the burden of showing good cause for relief.”
(Shapell SoCal Rental Properties, LLC v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 198, 212.)
5 We deny Hakopian’s motion to augment the record with a
non-file-stamped copy of his notice of appeal, the docket from his
criminal proceedings, and a July 2, 2024 request for judicial
notice of certain documents in support of Hakopian’s June 21,
2024 motion to set aside the default judgment. These materials
are not relevant to any issue on appeal. (Guarantee Forklift, Inc.
v. Capacity of Texas, Inc. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1066, 1075.)
10
“A motion to vacate under section 473(b) ‘ “ ‘is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse . . . the exercise of that discretion will not
be disturbed on appeal.’ ” [Citations.] The appropriate test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds
of reason.’ [Citation.]” (Austin v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 918, 929 (Austin).)
“ ‘Credibility is an issue for the fact finder . . . ; we do not
reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.
[Citation.] . . . When . . . “the evidence gives rise to conflicting
reasonable inferences, one of which supports the findings of the
trial court, the trial court’s finding is conclusive on appeal . . . .”
[Citation.]’ ” (Cowan v. Krayzman (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 907,
915 (Cowan).)
Hakopian’s motion first argued that the default judgment
was the result of mistake or excusable neglect because he was
proceeding pro per and did not receive notice of Chazanas’s
motion for terminating sanctions. However, the trial court found
Hakopian was not credible and expressly credited the process
server. In turn, the court found that Hakopian was personally
served with the motion. We do not reweigh the trial court’s
credibility assessments, and we accept these findings as
conclusive. (Cowan, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 915.)
Hakopian’s assertion that he was not served therefore cannot
support his motion.
Hakopian’s motion also contended that the default
judgment was the result of mistake or excusable neglect because
he was incapacitated by a June 2023 car accident and was
thereafter unable to participate in the litigation. The trial court
also found that Hakopian was not credible on this issue, and we
11
cannot reweigh its credibility determination. (In re Marriage of
Diamond (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 550, 570 [rejecting testimony
that movant was “unable to function” based on trial court’s lack
of credibility finding].) Moreover, the evidence supports the trial
court’s finding that Hakopian was able to participate in the
lawsuit. Specifically, Hakopian submitted evidence that he
visited an orthopedic office and communicated with a surgeon
through an interpreter on September 12, 2023. Thus, substantial
evidence supports that Hakopian was not physically or mentally
incapacitated some three months after he was served with
Chazanas’s motion and two months before the hearing on the
motion.
Hakopian contends that the trial court order “does not at
all address” his argument that the default judgment resulted
from excusable neglect. He also asserts that the trial court did
not find that he intentionally failed to respond to Chazanas’s
motion.6 These arguments are unfounded. The trial court order,
which is three pages longer than Hakopian’s motion, addressed
and rejected Hakopian’s arguments at length. And the trial court
expressly found that Hakopian “intentionally stopped
participating” in the litigation and that the judgment was the
result of “his intentional avoidance of this litigation.” To the
extent Hakopian means to challenge the trial court’s findings as
unsupported by the evidence, we reject his argument. Hakopian
6 Hakopian’s briefing fails to explain the significance of this
point. However, we recognize that if the judgment resulted from
Hakopian’s intentional conduct, then it necessarily was not
caused by his excusable neglect. (Pagarigan v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare of California, Inc. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 38, 44
(Pagarigan).)
12
was served with notice of Chazanas’s motion and was physically
and mentally capable of participating in the litigation, yet he
failed to file an opposition to the motion, missed two court
hearings, and never contacted the court to seek a continuance.
This evidence supports a finding that Hakopian’s failure to
participate in the litigation was “deliberate rather than
inadvertent” and therefore not the result of excusable neglect.
(Pagarigan, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 45.)
Even if the evidence could support a finding to the
contrary, the evidence at best “ ‘ “gives rise to conflicting
reasonable inferences,” ’ ” and therefore the trial court’s findings
are conclusive. (Cowan, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 915.) The
trial court ruling did not exceed the bounds of reason, and it did
not abuse its discretion in denying Hakopian’s motion to set aside
the judgment. (Austin, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 929.)
Finally, for the first time on appeal, Hakopian appears to
assert that he was entitled to mandatory relief under section 473,
subdivision (b). In addition to the discretionary relief described
above, section 473, subdivision (b) provides that the court “shall”
vacate a default judgment when the movant’s application is
“accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or
her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (§ 473, subd. (b);
Luri v. Greenwald (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1124
[applications seeking mandatory relief must be accompanied by
attorney affidavit].) However, Hakopian’s motion was not
accompanied by an attorney’s affidavit. The mandatory relief
aspect of the statute does not apply.
13
DISPOSITION
The order denying Hakopian’s motion to set aside the
judgment is affirmed. Respondents to recover their costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
ADAMS, J.
14
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