CourtListener 10758528•People v. Morales CA6
Testo completo
Filed 12/15/25 P. v. Morales CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051640
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR00218)
v.
GUSTAVO MATIAS MORALES,
Defendant and Appellant.
Late one night in February 2022, Officer Jorge David Alvarado stopped a car
driven by Gustavo Matias Morales. Morales exited the car, walked to the officer’s car,
and, before the officer could open his door, fired multiple gunshots through the driver’s
side window into the officer’s head and neck, killing the officer. As two bystanders
witnessed the shooting, which also was captured in part by Officer Alvarado’s body
camera, and physical evidence tied Morales to the shooting, Morales did not dispute that
he shot and killed Officer Alvarado. Instead, Morales contended that he acted in self-
defense out of fear of the police. The jury was not persuaded and convicted Morales of
first-degree murder and other crimes, and Morales was sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole.
On appeal, Morales challenges his convictions on two grounds. First, he argues
that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting to the admission of
statements made to an undercover informant that he shot Officer Alvarado in anger.
Second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a formal police
department photograph of Officer Alvarado in uniform. As explained below, we
conclude that there was no ineffective assistance of counsel or abuse of discretion and
uphold Morales’ convictions.
Morales also argues that the abstract of judgment and the minute order for his
sentencing both contain an error: They include a parole revocation fine that the trial
court did not pronounce at the sentencing hearing. The People concede this error, and we
accept that concession.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment but direct the trial court to correct both the
abstract of judgment and the sentencing minute order to omit the parole revocation fine.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting
On February 25, 2022, around 10:30 p.m., Officer Alvarado stopped Morales’ car.
Before Officer Alvarado could exit his car, Morales left his own car, walked to the
officer’s car, and fired multiple shots in rapid succession. Officer Alvarado’s body
camera shows that he was trying to open the door when shots were fired, shattering the
glass, and afterwards Officer Alvarado fell out the open door. Morales drove off, and a
bystander called 911.
When other police officers arrived, they found Officer Alvarado hanging out the
driver’s side door. As one arriving officer’s body camera showed, Officer Alvarado’s
face was covered in blood, and he had a dozen gunshot wounds in the head, neck,
shoulder, and upper body. Officers tried CPR, but Officer Alvarado did not respond.
Soon thereafter, Officer Alvarado was taken to the hospital where he was pronounced
dead.
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Officers searching the scene found 13 nine-millimeter shell casings, and two
.45-caliber casings, the latter of which appeared to be from the pistol issued to Officer
Alvarado. Officers also found a single black slipper.
B. The Arrest and Investigation
After evading a bystander who attempted to block him, Morales drove to his
parents’ house. When Morales arrived, he was barefoot, and one hand was bleeding.
Morales’ father drove him to the hospital, but Morales refused to enter, saying he feared
the police. Morales later asked a friend to drive him to Mexico but eventually decided to
go to another hospital, where police apprehended him.
When Morales’ father returned home, he retrieved a gun from the front seat of
Morales’ car and hid it in a dresser. Police investigating the murder found the gun, and
ballistics testing demonstrated that the gun had fired the nine-millimeter shells found at
the shooting. In Morales’ car, police also found a blood-stained slipper matching the one
found at the shooting. DNA testing showed that blood at the scene of the crime and on
the slipper in Morales’ car were from Morales, as was DNA on one of the bullets found at
the shooting.
C. Morales’ Statements to the Informant
After Morales was arrested, he was placed in a holding cell, and while Morales
was there, the police put a confidential informant into the cell. As the informant entered
the cell, an officer mentioned that he was “another southerner.” After the officer left, the
informant asked if Morales was a Sureño gang member, and Morales responded that he
was a “paisa,” that is, he was not affiliated with the Sureños or their rival, the Norteños.
After verifying that Morales was not a gang member, the informant said “nice to
meet you,” and Morales told the informant “I got one of those guys.” Morales also said
that he tried to go to Mexico but had lost a lot of blood and went to the hospital where he
was arrested. After talking about the sentence that he supposedly faced, the informant
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asked what prompted Morales to shoot the officer, and Morales replied that it “was just a
reaction.” Later Morales similarly said the shooting was “pure intuition” and “impulse.”
However, when the informant again asked Morales why he did it, Morales replied that he
was “already angry” when the officer stopped him. Morales also said that he “had had a
few beers,” and the shooting “just happened.”
D. The Proceedings Below
1. The Charges
In August 2022, Morales was charged with four crimes. The information charged
Morales with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder of Officer Alvarado in
violation of Penal Code section 187. (Subsequent undesignated statutory references are
to the Penal Code.) The information also alleged enhancements for intentional discharge
of a firearm resulting in death in violation of section 12022.53, subdivision (d) as well as
murder in order to avoid arrest in violation of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(5) and
murder of police officer in violation of section 190.2, subdivision (a)(7). The information
also charged Morales with four additional crimes: (1) shooting at an occupied vehicle in
violation of section 246, (2) assault on a police officer with a semiautomatic firearm in
violation of section 245, subdivision (d)(2), (3) unlawful use of a firearm by a person
convicted of domestic battery in violation of section 29805, and (4) unlawful carrying of
a loaded firearm in a public street in violation of section 25850, subdivision (a).
2. The Motions in Limine
Before trial, Morales filed a motion in limine seeking, among other things, to
exclude photographs from Officer Alvarado’s autopsy, pictures of Officer Alvarado from
the crime scene, and video clips from the officer’s body camera. Among other things, the
autopsy photos showed Officer Alvarado with numerous steel probes through his head
depicting the trajectory of the bullets that penetrated his skull, brain, facial bones, and
spine as well as several other vital organs. Finding that the probative value of the
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autopsy and crime scene photographs as well as the video clips outweighed their potential
prejudice, the trial court denied the motion and held this evidence admissible.
In addition to moving in limine to admit autopsy and crime scene photographs, the
prosecutor moved in limine to admit a police department photograph showing Officer
Alvarado in uniform standing before flagpoles with the United States and California
flags. Morales objected on the ground that identification was “not an issue” because
“[i]t’s going to be very clear who the decedent and the victim is in the case,” and he
argued that therefore photograph would be more prejudicial than probative. The trial
court disagreed. It ruled that the photograph was relevant to establishing the ability of
witnesses to identify Officer Alvarado, to show malice (by comparing the department
photo with photos after the shooting), and to establish that he was a peace officer. The
court also found that this probative value outweighed the potential for undue prejudice
because the department photo did not portray Officer Alvarado with little children, at a
church, or with his family and was not “particularly calculated to elicit sympathy.”
Instead, the court reasoned, the photograph merely showed the officer in his uniform.
3. The Evidence Presented at Trial
At trial, the prosecutor presented testimony from the two eyewitnesses who saw
Morales shoot Officer Alvarado and the officer who arrived at the scene and found
Officer Alvarado hanging out of the driver’s side door. The prosecutor also showed
video footage from Officer Alvarado’s body camera showing the shooting, as well as
evidence that the gun taken from Morales’ car fired the nine-millimeter bullets that killed
Officer Alvarado. Additionally, the prosecutor presented evidence that the blood-stained
slipper found in Morales’ car matched the slipper discovered at the scene of the crime
and that Morales’ DNA was on the slipper found in Morales’ car, blood found at the
scene of the shooting, and a .45-caliber bullet found there.
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Morales testified in his defense. He admitted shooting Officer Alvarado.
However, he claimed that he did so out of a belief that he needed to defend himself.
Morales explained that in a prior encounter the police had beaten him, and he claimed
that, once he was pulled over, “my body went into auto mode” and “everything just
happened automatically.”
On cross-examination, Morales admitted he had been convicted several times for
lying to police officers. He also acknowledged that in this case he initially told officers
that he blacked out and did not remember the shooting, but denied that this was a lie.
Morales also denied that he was angry or frustrated when he shot Officer Alvarado. In
response, the prosecutor introduced an excerpt of a transcript of Morales’ statement to the
undercover informant that he was angry when Officer Alvarado stopped him and shot the
officer out of impulse. Morales said that he lied to the informant because he did not want
the informant to be suspicious about his gang status. (Morales testified earlier that at one
point he became a Sureño gang associate to protect himself, but later left the gang and
was worried that he would be attacked if the informant learned that he was a drop-out.)
To impeach Morales’ testimony about fearing the police, the prosecutor called
Morales’ cousin, Juanita Perez, who testified Morales had a violent temper when he was
drinking. The prosecutor also presented testimony from Morales’ former girlfriend that
he was a violent drunk who repeatedly choked her and knocked her unconscious even
while she was pregnant and again while breastfeeding their then three-month-old baby.
4. The Verdict
The jury found Morales guilty on all counts, including the first-degree murder of
Officer Alvarado. The jury also found true all the alleged special circumstances,
including that he had discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death,
intentionally killed an on-duty peace officer, and committed murder to avoid arrest.
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5. The Sentence
On the first count of first-degree murder, the trial court sentenced Morales to life
in prison without the possibility of parole. The court also imposed a consecutive term of
25 years to life for the firearm discharge enhancement. On the remaining four counts, the
trial court sentenced Morales to middle terms but stayed the sentences pursuant to
section 654.
The trial court also imposed a fine and two assessments. Specifically, the court
imposed a restitution fine of $10,000 under section 2102.4, subdivision (b)(2), $200 in
court operations assessments under section 1465.18, subdivision (a)(1), and $150 in
assessments under Government Code section 70373. The trial court did not impose a
parole violation restitution fine, presumably because such fines are not authorized for
sentences of life without parole. (People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 380.)
Morales filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Morales’ Statements to the Undercover Informant
On appeal, Morales does not dispute that he shot and killed Officer Alvarado.
Instead, he contends that his defense that he acted out of fear of the police was
undermined by the admission of his statements to the undercover informant, which his
trial counsel should have tried to exclude on the ground that the statements were coerced
and involuntary. We are not persuaded. Although the use of undercover informants is
deceptive, it is well-settled that such ploys are not inherently coercive, and the informant
here did not make any threats that coerced Morales into admitting that he was angry, not
fearful, when he shot Officer Alvarado.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We begin by discussing the standards governing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
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The Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution guarantees counsel for criminal
defendants, and this guarantee is violated if an attorney makes professional errors so
serious and damaging that the attorney is not truly functioning as counsel. (Strickland v.
Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) To prevail on such a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must establish two things: (1) counsel’s
performance was deficient and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
(Ibid.; see also id. at p. 697 [ineffective assistance claims may be rejected for not
satisfying either requirement].) In determining whether counsel’s performance was
deficient, courts examine whether counsel’s conduct “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. (Id. at p. 688.) Moreover, “there is
a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.’ ” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 925 (Weaver).)
Under prevailing professional norms, defense counsel may refrain from raising meritless
objections: “Counsel is not required to proffer futile objections.” (People v. Anderson
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 587.)
A criminal defendant’s burden with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel is
“ ‘difficult to carry on direct appeal.’ ” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.)
“On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the
record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged
act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there
simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.) Outside of these circumstances, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “more
appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
Morales contends that his trial counsel’s performance was deficient because
counsel failed to object to admission of his statements to the undercover informant posing
8
as his cellmate. In particular, Morales contends that his trial counsel should have
objected that these statements should have been excluded because they were coerced and
involuntary. As explained below, we disagree.
“An involuntary confession . . . is inadmissible under the due process clauses of
both the Fourteenth Amendment [citation] and article I, sections 7 and 15” of the
California Constitution. (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 778; see People v.
Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 411.) In determining whether confessions were
involuntary, and thus inadmissible, courts examine “ ‘ “whether defendant’s choice to
confess was not ‘essentially free’ because his [or her] will was overborne.” ’ ” (People v.
Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576.) For example, a confession is involuntary “ ‘ “if
extracted by threats or violence, obtained by direct or implied promises, or secured by the
exertion of improper influence.” ’ ” (People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146, 1176.) By
contrast, “[p]olice trickery . . . does not, by itself, render a confession involuntary”
because “subterfuge is not necessarily coercive.” (People v. Chutan (1999) 72
Cal.App.4th 1276, 1280.) Consequently, use of confidential informants is not inherently
coercive, and confessions obtained by informants are considered voluntary unless the
informant actually coerced the defendant into making the confession. (See Illinois v.
Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292, 296-300 (Perkins); but see Arizona v. Fulminante (1991)
499 U.S. 279, 285-288 (Fulminante) [holding confession involuntary based on threats by
confidential informant].)
For example, in Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. 292, police placed an undercover officer
in a cellblock with the defendant, and in purporting to plan an escape, the undercover
officer interrogated the defendant about a murder, asking questions about the victim, the
crime scene, the weapon used, and the defendant’s motive. (Id. at p. 295; id. at p. 305
(dis. opn. of Marshall, J.).) The Supreme Court held that the defendant’s answers to these
questions “were voluntary, and there is no federal obstacle to their admissibility at trial.”
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(Id. at p. 300.) The Supreme Court reasoned that “[w]hen a suspect considers himself in
the company of cellmates,” the atmosphere is not coercive (id. at p. 296), and in that
situation there is no basis for assuming that “a suspect will feel compelled to speak by the
fear of reprisal for remaining silent or in the hope of more lenient treatment should he
confess” (id. at pp. 296-297; see also id. at p. 297 [“When the suspect has no reason to
think that the listeners have official power over him, it should not be assumed that his
words are motivated by the reaction he expects from his listeners.”].).
The same is true here. In this case, as in Perkins, an undercover agent was placed
in a cell with the defendant, the defendant talked with the agent, and in so doing the
defendant confessed to a murder. Consequently, as in Perkins, there is no reason to
assume that the defendant felt compelled to speak by fear of reprisals or in the hopes of
obtaining more lenient treatment. Indeed, the circumstances in this case are even less
coercive than in Perkins because in that case the undercover agent was a police officer,
and the officer interrogated the defendant about his crime. Here, by contrast, the
undercover agent was not a police officer, and the informant did not interrogate Morales.
To the contrary, before the informant even asked what Morales was charged with,
Morales offered that he “got one of those guys.” Moreover, while the informant asked
questions about the shooting—including why Morales shot the officer, the question that
prompted Morales to say that he was angry—nothing in the questions was threatening or
coercive. Consequently, Morales’ statements to the undercover informant in this case
were at least as voluntary as the confession in Perkins, and defense counsel reasonably
could have concluded that that it would have been futile to argue that Morales’
confession was involuntary or coerced.
In contending that his statements were involuntary, Morales argues that he
confessed to the informant because he is a gang drop-out and feared that he might be
attacked if the informant, whom the police identified as a Sureño gang member, learned
10
about this. In fact, Morales tried to protect himself from reprisals for being a gang drop-
out by claiming that he was not affiliated with the Sureños or the Norteños, and the
informant confirmed that he accepted that claim when he said “nice to meet you.” In
addition, while Morales contends that he boasted about his violent actions to impress the
informant, he does not explain why he chose to confess to the murder of Officer Alvarado
in order to do so, much less why he said that he shot the officer out of anger. In any
event, as the dissent in Perkins recognized, the defendant in that case had a similar
motive to demonstrate his toughness. (Perkins, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 307 (dis. opn. of
Marshall, J.) [“where the suspect is incarcerated, the constant threat of physical danger
peculiar to the prison environment may make him demonstrate his toughness to other
inmates by recounting or inventing past violent acts.”].) As a consequence, neither
Morales’ concern about being a gang drop-out nor his desire to appear tough
distinguishes this case from Perkins.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. 279 also
does not help Morales. Fulminante did not overrule Perkins or in any way suggest that
the use of undercover agents is inherently coercive. Fulminante merely recognized that,
if an undercover agent threatens a defendant in order to obtain a confession, the
confession may be coerced. In Fulminante, the undercover agent was a former police
officer masquerading as an organized crime figure. (Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at
p. 283.) The informant learned that the defendant was suspected of a murder, and after
other prisoners began to give the defendant “ ‘tough treatment,’ ” the informant offered to
protect the defendant if he admitted to the suspected murder. (Ibid.) The Arizona
Supreme Court held that the defendant’s subsequent confession was involuntary because
it was “ ‘obtained as a direct result of extreme coercion and was tendered in the belief
that the defendant’s life was in jeopardy if he did not confess.’ ” (Id. at p. 286.) In light
11
of these facts, the Supreme Court agreed that the defendant’s confession was “the product
of coercion.” (Id. at p. 288.)
This case is clearly distinguishable. First, although Morales was a gang drop-out,
he posed as a non-gang member, and he received no threats or “tough treatment.”
Second, the undercover informant did not offer to protect Morales or threaten to harm
him. Finally, and most fundamentally, the informant did not demand that Morales
confess to Officer Alvarado’s murder. Instead, he simply asked questions about the
shooting after Morales volunteered that he had shot the officer. Thus, none of the factors
that led the Supreme Court to find coercion in Fulminante are present here, and therefore
Morales’ trial counsel had no reason to believe that his statements to the undercover
agent were involuntary and inadmissible.
Accordingly, we conclude counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing
to object that Morales’ statements to the undercover agent were coerced and involuntary.
B. The Officer’s Department Photograph
In addition to arguing that his trial counsel should have challenged the admission
of his statements to the undercover informant, Morales challenges the admission of
Officer Alvarado’s official police department photograph. Morales argues the trial court
abused its discretion in admitting this photograph because it was irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial. We need not determine whether the photograph was properly admitted
because, even if the trial court abused its discretion in doing so, any such error was
harmless.
Where a party appeals a conviction based on the erroneous application of
California law, such as the improper admission of evidence under Evidence Code
section 352, the conviction will not be reversed unless “it is reasonably probable that a
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of
the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836; see Weaver, supra, 6 Cal.4th at
12
p. 934.) Mere speculation that admission of evidence prejudiced the appealing party does
not suffice. (Weaver, at p. 968.)
The photograph of Officer Alvarado at issue here was not particularly
inflammatory. It is an official police department photograph showing the officer in his
uniform standing in front of portions of the United States and California flags, apparently
hanging from indoor (vertical) flagpoles. In addition, the photograph was used only
briefly at trial for the limited purposes of allowing two witnesses to identify the officer.
Combined, this testimony occupies only six lines of the trial transcript.
Other evidence presented at trial was much more likely to evoke sympathy for
Officer Alvarado. For example, the trial court admitted video clips from Officer
Alvarado’s body camera, which recorded the shots fired at him while he was in the car,
the glass shattering, and the officer falling towards the pavement. The court also
admitted video clips of the responding officers, which showed Officer Alvarado on the
pavement with his face covered in blood as officers attempted to revive him as well the
autopsy photos, which showed Officer Alvarado’s body with steel probes placed in his
gunshot wounds to depict the trajectories of the bullets that struck him. As the court
observed, these photos were more likely to evoke sympathy for Officer Alvarado than the
two brief displays of his official department photo.
In addition, the evidence of Morales’ guilt was overwhelming. Two eyewitnesses
saw Morales shoot Office Alvarado. The shooting was recorded on the officer’s body
camera, and the recording was shown to the jury. In addition, there was physical
evidence tying Morales to the scene, such as his DNA, which was found at the scene and
on a bloody slipper that matched another slipper found at the scene, and ballistics testing
showing that the gun that Morales’ father took from Morales’ car fired the
13 nine-millimeter bullets found at scene. Furthermore, as discussed above, Morales
admitted to an undercover informant, that he shot Officer Alvarado, and that he did so out
13
of “impulse” and because he was “already angry” at the officer when he was stopped.
Morales also told the informant he had “a few beers” before the shooting, and two
rebuttal witnesses testified that Morales was extremely violent when drunk.
In light of this testimony, and Morales’ admissions that he had several convictions
for lying, it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have accepted Morales’
testimony that he shot Officer Alvardo out of fear for his life, if only the official
photograph of Alvarado had not been displayed briefly to two witnesses. Accordingly,
we conclude that, even if improper, admission of Officer Alvarado’s official photograph
was harmless.
Morales also argues that admission of Officer Alvarado’s photograph violated his
due process rights by leading the jury to infer that he was guilty through an emotional
response rather than reason and that Morales’ trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel by failing to raise a due process objection. However, as noted above, the
emotional impact of the brief testimony concerning Officer Alvarado’s photo was
limited, particularly in contrast to the other much more evocative evidence admitted at
trial. Consequently, admission of the photo was not “so prejudicial as to render the
defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair” (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913,)
and therefore Morales’ due process and related ineffective assistance claims fail.
C. Cumulative Error
Morales argues that, even if there was insufficient prejudice from admission of his
statements to the undercover informant and Officer Alvarado’s official department
photograph in isolation, his convictions should be reversed based on the cumulative
prejudice suffered from the errors below. (See In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720,
728.) This argument fails because there was no error in the admission of the statements
14
to the undercover informant and no prejudice in the admission of Officer Alvarado’s
photograph.
D. The Abstract of Judgment
Morales argues that, if his convictions are affirmed, the abstract of judgment and
the minute order for the sentencing should be corrected. In particular, he contends that
both the abstract and the order contain a $10,000 parole violation restitution fine that was
not included in the oral pronouncement of sentence. The People concede that this fine
was erroneously included, and we accept that concession.
After sentencing Morales to life imprisonment without parole plus a consecutive
indefinite term of 25 years to life, the trial court imposed one fine and two assessments: a
$10,000 restitution fine under section 1202.4, a $200 court operation assessment, and
$150 court facility assessment. The trial court did not orally impose a parole revocation
restitution fine. Nevertheless, the abstract of judgment includes a $10,000 parole
revocation restitution fine under section 1202.45 in addition to the $10,000 restitution
fine and the two assessments ordered by the trial court at sentencing. The sentencing
minute order similarly includes a $10,000 parole revocation restitution fine.
Because “[r]endition of judgment is an oral pronouncement,” the abstract of
judgment and the sentencing minute order should have included only the fines and
assessments orally pronounced by the trial court. (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466,
471, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Turner (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268; see also People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal. 4th 1059, 1070
[“[T]he abstract of judgment is not itself the judgment of conviction, and cannot prevail
over the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment to the extent the two conflict.”],
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Frahs (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 784, 795.) Accordingly, the abstract of judgment and the minute order
15
should be amended to strike the parole revocation restitution fine. (People v.
Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1027.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended
minute order and abstract of judgment removing the $10,000 parole violation restitution
fine. A certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment shall be forwarded to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
GREENWOOD, P. J.
____________________________________
DANNER, J.
People v. Morales
H051640
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