CourtListener 10758525•Turner v. Insight Global CA4/3
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Filed 12/15/25 Turner v. Insight Global CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
JON TURNER,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064160
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01330331)
INSIGHT GLOBAL, LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Theodore R. Howard, Judge. Affirmed.
Seyfarth Shaw, Geoffrey C. Westbrook and Emily Nahan for
Defendant and Appellant.
Odell Law, Robert Odell; Rissell Law Firm, Melody Ruby Rissell;
Gelb Law and Yisrael Gelb for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Insight Global, LLC (Insight Global) appeals after the
trial court denied its motion to compel to arbitration the claims brought
against it by former employee Jon Turner. As explained post, Insight Global
met its initial burden of producing prima facie evidence the parties had
entered into an agreement to arbitrate Turner’s claims, thereby shifting the
burden of producing evidence disputing its existence and/or enforceability to
Turner. After Turner produced evidence disputing the parties had entered a
valid arbitration agreement, including evidence raising a factual issue
regarding the authenticity of his signature on the agreement, the burden of
production shifted back to Insight Global to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. Insight Global failed
to carry its burden of proof. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
TURNER INITIATES THIS ACTION AGAINST INSIGHT GLOBAL
Turner was jointly hired by Insight Global and Peraton State &
Local, Inc. (Peraton) to provide desktop support/information technology
services to the City of Irvine. After Turner’s employment with Insight Global
and Peraton was terminated, Turner initiated this action against Insight
Global, Peraton, and the City of Irvine. He asserted claims against Insight
Global for violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act
(Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq); wrongful termination in violation of public policy;
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; unfair business practices (Bus.
& Prof. Code, § 17200); waiting time penalties (Lab. Code, §§ 201–203); and
failure to permit inspection of employee records (id., § 226).
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II.
INSIGHT GLOBAL MOVES TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Insight Global filed a motion to compel arbitration under the
Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) (the FAA) and the California
Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq) (the motion to compel), based
on its contention Turner entered a written agreement to submit employment-
related disputes with Insight Global to binding arbitration.1 In support of its
motion to compel, Insight Global produced an unsigned copy of an agreement
entitled “Contract Employee Agreement” (CEA) it asserted had been entered
by Insight Global and Turner.
Paragraph 21 of the CEA included an arbitration provision which
states in part: “[I]n the event of any dispute or claim arising out of or relating
to [c]ontract [e]mployee’s application for employment with Insight Global,
[c]ontract [e]mployee’s employment with Insight Global, the termination of
[c]ontract [e]mployee’s employment, or otherwise relating to this
[a]greement . . . , [c]ontract [e]mployee and Insight Global agree that all such
[d]isputes shall be fully, finally and exclusively resolved by confidential,
binding, individual arbitration before the American Arbitration Association
(‘AAA’). Contract [e]mployee and Insight Global agree that a confidential
arbitration, as contemplated by the [FAA] and related case law, is the sole
and exclusive forum for resolution of any and all [d]isputes and hereby
mutually waive their right to trial before a judge or jury in federal or state
court in favor of arbitration under this [a]greement.”
The motion to compel was supported by the declaration of Insight
Global’s Senior Associate General Counsel William H. Rooks. In his
1 Peraton filed a notice of joinder in the motion to compel but did
not appeal from the denial of that motion.
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declaration, Rooks stated that “all new hires [of Insight Global] must review
and execute the [CEA], which includes an arbitration agreement” as a
condition of employment. He stated: “A new hire’s employment with Insight
Global officially begins only after [he] has signed and returned all required
documents.”
Rooks further stated in his declaration that, on April 30, 2021, at
4:07 p.m., as part of the onboarding process, Turner “accessed the CEA via
Insight Global’s onboarding platform with his personal email address and
electronically signed the CEA.” He stated Turner thereby “agreed to pursue
all claims arising out of or relating to his employment through final and
binding arbitration.”
An unsigned copy of the CEA was identified in and attached to
Rooks’s declaration. Although Turner’s signature did not appear in the copy
of the CEA attached to his declaration, Rooks also stated, “[Turner]’s
signature is authenticated by his [d]ocument [h]istory [l]og,” a copy of which
was also attached to Rooks’s declaration.
Rooks added: “At no point during the onboarding process or
during his employment with Insight Global did [Turner] refuse to enter the
[a]rbitration [a]greement or seek clarification of its terms. At all relevant
times, [Turner] had online access to his CEA via Insight Global’s onboarding
platform.”
The motion was also supported by the declaration of Insight
Global’s attorney Michael Thomas. After determining that all of Turner’s
claims “entirely arise out of, relate to, and/or connect with his employment
with Insight Global,” and thus should have been submitted to binding
arbitration, Thomas stated he asked Turner’s counsel to meet and confer
regarding the arbitration of such claims. Thomas stated he provided Turner’s
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counsel a copy of Turner’s “executed [a]rbitration [a]greement” and requested
that Turner stipulate to arbitrate his claims.
Thomas further stated in his declaration that after Turner
“questioned the authenticity of his signature on the [a]rbitration
[a]greement,” meet and confer efforts “regarding the authenticity of
[Turner’s] signature” continued. Thomas also stated that although Insight
Global “provided [Turner’s] [d]ocument [h]istory [l]og authenticating [his]
signature,” Turner “refused to stipulate to arbitration despite the
authentication of [Turner]’s signature.” Insight Global thereafter filed the
motion to compel.
III.
TURNER OPPOSES THE MOTION TO COMPEL
Turner filed an opposition to the motion to compel in which he
argued: (1) Insight Global failed to produce a copy of an arbitration
agreement signed by Turner or evidence Turner signed such an agreement;
and (2) the arbitration provision contained in the CEA is unenforceable
because it is both substantively and procedurally unconscionable. In support
of the opposition, Turner filed his own declaration in which he stated in
relevant part: “I was not aware that these onboarding agreements contained
any arbitration agreements, and even if I were aware, I did not know what
that meant or how this would impact my employment or afterwards. I do not
recall seeing, reviewing, signing or agreeing to any arbitration agreement
during my onboarding process with Insight Global or at any time thereafter.”
Turner also filed evidentiary objections to portions of Rooks’s
declaration.
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IV.
INSIGHT GLOBAL FILES A NOTICE OF ERRATA, A REPLY, AND EVIDENTIARY
OBJECTIONS TO TURNER’S DECLARATION
The day after Turner filed his opposition, Insight Global filed a
notice of errata stating it had inadvertently attached an unsigned version of
the CEA to the motion to compel. Attached to the notice of errata was what
Insight Global asserted was a “true and correct copy of the CEA signed by
[Turner].” The notice of errata further stated that months earlier, Insight
Global had e-mailed to Turner’s counsel a copy of that signed agreement. The
notice of errata concluded with the statement: “In light of the need to file a
notice of errata, [Insight Global] is agreeable to continuing the hearing date
to allow [Turner] time for supplemental briefing regarding the signature on
the CEA.”
Insight Global later filed a reply brief in support of the motion to
compel as well as evidentiary objections challenging portions of Turner’s
declaration.
V.
THE TRIAL COURT DENIES THE MOTION TO COMPEL
The trial court denied the motion to compel and Peraton’s
corresponding joinder in that motion. The court sustained Turner’s objection
to a particular paragraph in Rooks’s declaration on the ground it lacked
foundation. The court otherwise overruled Turner’s and Insight Global’s
respective objections. In denying the motion to compel, the court concluded
Insight Global had failed to meet its burden of establishing the parties had
entered a valid arbitration agreement. Consequently, the court did not reach
Turner’s arguments the proffered arbitration provision in the CEA was also
unconscionable.
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Insight Global filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial
court’s order denying the motion to compel. The court found the motion for
reconsideration did not meet the requirements of section 1008, subdivision (a)
of the Code of Civil Procedure and denied that motion.
Insight Global filed a notice of appeal in which it stated it was
appealing from both the order denying the motion to compel and the order
denying its motion for reconsideration. In its appellate briefs, however,
Insight Global only challenges the denial of the motion to compel and does
not provide legal analysis challenging the trial court’s determination the
motion for reconsideration failed to meet the requirements of section 1008,
subdivision (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. As Insight Global has
abandoned its challenge to the order denying the motion for reconsideration,
we do not address it further.
DISCUSSION
I.
GOVERNING LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“‘Both the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et
seq.) and the FAA . . . recognize “‘“arbitration as a speedy and relatively
inexpensive means of dispute resolution”’ . . . intended ‘“to encourage persons
who wish to avoid delays incident to a civil action to obtain an adjustment of
their differences by a tribunal of their own choosing.”’ [Citation.]” [Citations.]
The fundamental policy underlying both acts “is to ensure that arbitration
agreements will be enforced in accordance with their terms.” [Citations.] [¶]
Arbitration is therefore a matter of contract.’” (Franco v. Greystone Ridge
Condominium (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 221, 226–227, italics omitted.) While
“[p]ublic policy favors contractual arbitration as a means of resolving
disputes,” it is also true ‘“‘a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute
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that he [or she] has not agreed to resolve by arbitration.’”’” (Espejo v.
Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047,
1057.)
“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the
existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party
to the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order
the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists.” (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1281.2.) The trial court is to employ a summary process in determining
whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate their dispute (Gamboa v.
Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 164 (Gamboa)), “‘“in
which . . . ‘the trial court sits as a trier of fact, weighing all the affidavits,
declarations, and other documentary evidence, as well as oral testimony
received at the court’s discretion, to reach a final determination’”’” (Doe v.
Second Street Corp. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 552, 564). While “the burden of
persuasion is always on the moving party to prove the existence of an
arbitration agreement with the opposing party by a preponderance of the
evidence,” the burden of production, however, may shift in a three-step
process. (Gamboa, supra, at pp. 164–165.)
“First, the moving party bears the burden of producing ‘prima
facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy.’
[Citation.] . . . If the moving party meets its initial prima facie burden and
the opposing party does not dispute the existence of the arbitration
agreement, then nothing more is required for the moving party to meet its
burden of persuasion.” (Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
If the party moving to compel arbitration meets its initial prima
facie burden, and the opposing party disputes the existence of an agreement
8
to arbitrate the controversy, then in the second step, the burden shifts to the
opposing party to “‘identify a factual dispute as to the agreement’s existence’
and . . . present admissible evidence to support the existence of that factual
dispute.” (Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
821, 832, citing Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755
(Iyere).) “If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence, then in
the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible evidence a
valid arbitration agreement between the parties.” (Gamboa, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at pp. 165–166.)
“‘“There is no uniform standard of review for evaluating an order
denying a motion to compel arbitration. [Citation.] If the court’s order is
based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial evidence standard.
[Citations.] Alternatively, if the court’s denial rests solely on a decision of
law, then a de novo standard of review is employed.”’” (Franco v. Greystone
Ridge Condominium, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 227.)
II.
INSIGHT GLOBAL MET ITS INITIAL BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE OF THE
PARTIES’ AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE TURNER’S CLAIMS
In moving to compel arbitration, Insight Global met its initial
burden of production under the Gamboa burden-shifting framework by
producing a copy of the CEA it asserts Turner signed, which contains an
arbitration provision that covers Turner’s claims. At this stage of the
analysis, it is of no moment Insight Global did not attach to its moving
papers a signed copy of the CEA or authenticate Turner’s signature on such
an agreement.
Pursuant to rule 3.1330 of the California Rules of Court, a party
moving to compel arbitration can meet its initial burden by either stating
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“verbatim” the provisions of the purported arbitration agreement or by
attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement to the petition and
incorporating it by reference. (See Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 569, 586 [“‘At this step, a movant need not “follow the
normal procedures of document authentication” and need only “allege the
existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in rule
[3.1330]”’”]; see also Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001)
88 Cal.App.4th 215, 218–219 [a petitioner seeking to compel arbitration is not
required to authenticate an opposing party’s signature on an arbitration
agreement to satisfy its initial burden].)
As Insight Global attached to the motion to compel a copy of the
CEA, albeit unsigned, which Insight Global asserts was signed by Turner at
the commencement of his employment, Insight Global met its initial burden
and the burden of producing evidence shifted to Turner, accordingly.
III.
TURNER MET HIS BURDEN OF SHOWING A FACTUAL DISPUTE REGARDING
WHETHER HE SIGNED ANY ARBITRATION AGREEMENT, INCLUDING THE
ARBITRATION PROVISION CONTAINED IN THE CEA
Once Insight Global met its initial burden, the burden of
production shifted to Turner “to identify a factual dispute as to the
agreement’s existence.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.) In his
declaration opposing the motion to compel, Turner declared he “d[id] not
recall seeing, reviewing, signing or agreeing to any arbitration agreement
during [his] onboarding process with Insight Global or at any time
thereafter.”
Insight Global argues Turner’s statement he did not recall
signing any arbitration agreement was insufficient to carry his burden of
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production in light of Insight Global’s position Turner had signed the CEA,
which contained an arbitration provision. Insight Global further argues
Turner failed to respond to its “prima facie evidence” of Turner’s purported
“unique, cursive” electronic signature on the CEA. But as discussed ante,
Insight Global did not produce a copy of the CEA bearing a purported
signature of Turner in its moving papers. Instead, after Turner filed his
opposition, Insight Global, without citations to legal authority supporting the
propriety of its action, first produced a copy of the CEA purportedly signed by
Turner by attaching it to a notice of errata.
In any event, assuming the signed copy of the CEA was properly
before the trial court in its consideration of the motion to compel, Turner’s
burden with respect to his purported signature was to offer admissible
evidence that created a factual dispute as to its authenticity. (See Ramirez v.
Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 833.) He did not
have the burden of proving his purported signature was not authentic. (Ibid.)
Instead, he had to “submit sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute and
shift the burden back to [Insight Global], who retain[ed] the ultimate burden
of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the authenticity of the
signature.” (Id. at pp. 833–834.)
We agree with the trial court Turner’s statement he did not recall
seeing, reviewing, signing, or agreeing to any arbitration agreement was
sufficient to create a factual issue disputing the authenticity of his purported
electronic signature on the CEA containing the arbitration provision. (See
Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 757 [“the individual’s inability to recall
signing electronically may reasonably be regarded as evidence that the
person did not do so”]; Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 167 [the plaintiff
“met her burden on the second step by filing an opposing declaration, saying
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she did not recall the agreement and would not have signed it if she had been
aware of it”]; Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto Group, Inc. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836,
846 [“In the face of [the plaintiff’s] failure to recall signing the [arbitration]
agreement, [the defendant] had the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that the electronic signature was authentic”].)
In its opening brief, Insight Global argues Turner’s statement is
insufficient because he does not address whether he recalled seeing,
reviewing, signing, or agreeing to the CEA (which contains the arbitration
provision Insight Global seeks to enforce), as opposed to “any arbitration
agreement.” In moving to compel arbitration, however, Insight Global itself
provided clarity on the subject by itself introducing evidence that Turner had
disputed the authenticity of his signature on the CEA. Specifically, in
Thomas’s declaration filed in support of the motion to compel, Thomas stated
that, before filing the motion, he provided Turner’s counsel a copy of Turner’s
executed agreement and requested that the parties stipulate to arbitrate
Turner’s claims. Insight Global’s notice of errata confirms that the same
signed copy of the CEA attached thereto (with Turner’s purported “unique,
cursive” electronic signature) was the version provided to Turner’s counsel in
those meet and confer communications regarding arbitration. In his
declaration, Thomas further specifically stated Turner “questioned the
authenticity of his signature on the [a]rbitration [a]greement,” which caused
meet and confer efforts “regarding the authenticity of [Turner’s] signature” to
continue.
In light of the foregoing, the record supports the existence of a
factual dispute regarding the authenticity of Turner’s signature on the CEA,
drawing into question whether he had agreed to the arbitration provision it
contained.
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IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY CONCLUDING INSIGHT GLOBAL FAILED TO
PROVE TURNER SIGNED THE CEA AND THUS FAILED TO SHOW THE PARTIES
ENTERED INTO A VALID ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
“If the opposing party meets its burden of producing evidence,
then in the third step, the moving party must establish with admissible
evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.” (Gamboa, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.) In denying the motion to compel, the trial court
concluded Insight Global failed to meet its burden of proving, with admissible
evidence, the signature on the CEA was Turner’s or that Turner had
otherwise entered a valid arbitration agreement with Insight Global.
“‘“When, as here, the court’s order denying a motion to compel
arbitration is based on the court’s finding that [the moving party] failed to
carry its burden of proof [with respect to the ultimate question of whether an
agreement to arbitrate exists], the question for the reviewing court is
whether that finding is erroneous as a matter of law. [Citations.]
‘“Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant’s evidence was
(1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight
as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’”’” [Citation.] “‘“[U]nless the trial court makes specific
findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we presume the trial court found
the [party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the
burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no power on appeal to judge the
credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.”’ [Citation.] ‘The appellate
court cannot substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court;
it must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in
support of the judgment.’”’” (Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 587–588.)
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In its minute order denying the motion to compel, the trial court
concluded Rooks’s declaration, which was offered by Insight Global to
authenticate Turner’s signature on the CEA, failed to do so. The court
pointed out several deficiencies in Rooks’s attempt at such authentication,
including that Rooks did not explain: (1) how Turner’s purported printed
electronic signature or the date printed below that purported signature came
to be placed on the CEA; (2) how the date printed next to the electronic
signature indicated the date the electronic signature was made; (3) how
Rooks knew Turner’s personal e-mail address and that Turner accessed the
CEA using his personal e-mail address; (4) that only a person using Turner’s
personal e-mail address could have placed an electronic signature in his
name on the CEA; (5) how he concluded Turner was the person who
electronically signed the CEA; (6) that all Insight Global employees were
required to use their personal e-mail addresses when they accessed Insight
Global’s onboarding platform to sign electronic forms and agreements; or
(7) how the document history log produced by Insight Global worked to
authenticate Turner’s signature on the CEA.
In light of the foregoing, the trial court sustained Turner’s
objection to paragraph 8 of Rooks’s declaration as lacking foundation.
Paragraph 8 of that declaration stated: “As part of his onboarding, on April
30, 2021, at 4:07 p.m., [Turner] accessed the CEA via Insight Global’s
onboarding platform with his personal email address and electronically
signed the CEA. [Turner] agreed to pursue all claims arising out of or
relating to his employment through final and binding arbitration. A true and
correct copy of the CEA is attached as [e]xhibit A. [Turner]’s signature is
authenticated by his [d]ocument [h]istory [l]og, a true and correct copy of
which is attached as [e]xhibit B.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion
14
in sustaining Turner’s objection to paragraph 8 of Rooks declaration.
(Geragos v. Abelyan (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1005, 1021 [we review the trial
court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion].)
In light of the dearth of admissible evidence authenticating
Turner’s signature on the CEA, or showing he otherwise agreed to arbitrate
his claims, the trial court did not err by concluding Insight Global failed to
meet its burden of establishing it had entered into a valid arbitration
agreement with Turner.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, J.
GOODING, J.
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