People v. Rosas CA2/2

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Filed 12/11/25 P. v. Rosas CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B337322
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. XNVPA062569)

RALPH DOMINIC ROSAS,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David Walgren, Judge. Affirmed.
Verna Wefald and Steven A. Brody, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M. Smith,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
Ralph Dominic Rosas appeals the trial court’s denial of his
Penal Code1 section 1172.6 petition for resentencing on the
ground he was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. We perceive
no error, and we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Christopher Rosas, Ralph’s brother, co-owned Mugsy’s Bar
in Los Angeles with his best friend, Louis Campanelli.2 The bar
opened in November 2005, and Ralph was there every day.
Campanelli lived on the premises. Ralph became angry when
Campanelli refused his offer to purchase Campanelli’s ownership
share in the bar. In the months after Mugsy’s opened,
Christopher communicated to two witnesses that he wanted
Campanelli killed.
The bartender working at Mugsy’s on February 25, 2006,
heard Christopher tell Ralph “ ‘tonight was the night,’ ” and
Ralph later explained to her they planned to kill Campanelli.
Around 1:45 a.m. on February 26, Christopher instructed the
bartender to close early. While she put money from the cash
register into the back office, Christopher and Ralph started

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 As Ralph Dominic Rosas shares the same surname as his
brother and former codefendant, Christopher Rosas, we refer to
them both by their first names for clarity and intend no
disrespect.
This factual summary is provided for context and is drawn
from our prior opinion affirming Ralph’s conviction (People v.
Rosas (Oct. 23, 2013, B233478) [nonpub. opn.]) (Rosas I)). (See
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 222, fn. 2.) However,
“our consideration of whether [Ralph] is entitled to [resentencing]
relief . . . is based on our independent review of the record of
conviction.” (Ibid.)

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“ ‘ripping apart the ATM machine,’ ” broke lights in the bar, and
threw things around in the back office to make it look like it had
been ransacked. They wore extra clothing and gloves and
obscured their faces. Ralph told the bartender they planned to
kill Campanelli when he returned with his girlfriend,
Jennifer H.,3 and Christopher told the bartender to watch the
surveillance monitor to alert them to Campanelli’s arrival.
When Campanelli and Jennifer returned around 2:30 a.m.,
Christopher and Ralph attacked them and beat them with pool
cues. Campanelli begged for them to stop, but they continued to
beat him, and Jennifer heard a “fire hydrant being sprayed” and
“stabbing sounds.”
The bartender was in the back office during the attack; she
heard Jennifer scream, heard Campanelli say “ ‘you were
supposed to be my best friend,’ ” and heard him “ ‘plead[] for his
life gurgling through his blood.’ ” When the bartender was
brought out from the back office about 20 minutes later, she saw
Campanelli’s still body on the floor; Christopher shoved a fire
extinguisher hose down his throat and turned it on. Christopher,
Ralph, and the bartender left.
Christopher later returned to take Jennifer’s cell phone and
car keys, but she was able to escape and flag down a passing
motorist to call the police.
Police recovered evidence incriminating Ralph from the
scene and later obtained incriminating statements he made to
others after the crime.
The medical examiner testified at trial Campanelli died
from “blunt cranial facial trauma or trauma to the head and face”

3 We refer to the surviving victim by her first name and last
initial. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)

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and “multiple sharp force injuries were contributing factors to his
death.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Christopher and Ralph were charged in a two-count
indictment on May 8, 2009. Count 1 charged each with the
murder of Campanelli and included two special circumstances
allegations of lying in wait and personal use of a deadly and
dangerous weapon. (See §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(15),
12022, subd. (b)(1).) Count 2 charged them with assault with a
deadly weapon upon Jennifer. (See § 245, subd. (a)(1).)
I. Relevant Jury Instructions
Ralph’s jury received a number of instructions to guide
their deliberations and decision making, including those
described below.4
A. Aiding and Abetting
The jury was instructed with a modified version of CALJIC
No. 3.005 that principals in the commission of a crime include
“1. Those who directly and actively commit the act constituting
the crime, or [¶] 2. Those who aid and abet the commission of the
crime.” For the crime of murder in particular, “the aider and
abettor’s guilt is determined by the combined acts of all the
participants as well as that person[’]s own mental state.” (See
ibid.) As to aiding and abetting, the jury was informed “[a] person
aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she: [¶]
(1) With knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator,

4 Ralph and Christopher were both tried in the same trial
but with separate juries.
5 Unless otherwise indicated, citations to the CALJIC
instructions are to the versions in effect at the time of Ralph’s
trial.

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and [¶] (2) With the intent or purpose of facilitating the
commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) By act or advice, aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
(See CALJIC No. 3.01.)
B. Murder
As to murder, the jury was given the CALJIC No. 8.10
instruction defining murder, informing them “[d]efendants are
accused in Count one of having committed the crime of murder, a
violation of section 187 of the Penal Code. [¶] Every person who
unlawfully kills a human being is guilty of the crime of murder
. . . . [¶] A killing is unlawful, if it was neither not justifiable nor
excusable. [¶] In order to prove this crime, each of the following
elements must be proved: [¶] 1. A human being was killed; [¶]
2. The killing was unlawful; and [¶] 3. The killing was done with
malice aforethought.” (See ibid.) Malice was further defined as
being “express or implied,” and the jury was told “[m]alice is
express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to kill
a human being.” (See CALJIC No. 8.11.) And “[w]hen it is shown
that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with
express or implied malice, no other mental state need be shown
to establish the mental state of malice aforethought.” (See ibid.)
Implied malice was not defined.
The jury was further informed “[a]ll murder which is
perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing with express malice aforethought is murder of the first
degree.” (See CALJIC No. 8.20.) “To constitute a deliberate and
premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the
question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice
and, having in mind the consequences, he decides to and does
kill.” (See ibid.)

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Moreover, a “[m]urder which is immediately preceded by
lying in wait is murder of the first degree.” (See CALJIC No. 8.25;
see also § 189, subd. (a).) “ ‘[L]ying in wait’ [means] waiting and
watching for an opportune time to act, together with a
concealment by ambush or by some other secret design to take
the other person by surprise[.] The lying in wait need not
continue for any particular period of time provided that its
duration be substantial, that is, an amount of time that shows
the killer had a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or
deliberation.” (See CALJIC No. 8.25.)
By contrast, “[m]urder of the second degree is also the
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought when
the perpetrator intended unlawfully to kill a human being but
the evidence is insufficient to prove deliberation and
premeditation.” (See CALJIC No. 8.30.)
C. Lying-in-wait Special Circumstance
The jury was also instructed regarding the special
circumstance of lying in wait. (See §§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15), 190.4,
subd. (a).) Among other things, the jury was told if it determined
Ralph “was not the actual killer” and instead was “an aider and
abettor,” it could not “find the special circumstance to be true as
to [Ralph] unless [it was] satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that [Ralph] with the intent to kill aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted any actor
in the commission of the murder in the first degree.” (See
CALJIC No. 8.80.1.)
II. Ralph’s Conviction
In April 2011, Ralph was convicted of first degree murder
and assault with a deadly weapon. The jury also found both
special circumstances allegations to be true. In that regard, the

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jury expressly found Ralph “intentionally killed [Campanelli] by
means of lying in wait.”
Ralph was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
on count 1, one consecutive year for the weapons use allegation,
and one consecutive year on count 2. The judgment was affirmed
by this court in Rosas I, supra, B233478.
III. Ralph’s Resentencing Petition
On November 28, 2023, Ralph filed a section 1172.6
resentencing petition on a preprinted checkbox form and
requested appointment of counsel. The trial court appointed
counsel to represent him and ordered the People to respond. The
People argued Ralph was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
because he “was not convicted under a felony murder theory or a
natural and probable consequences theory . . . and . . . could still
be presently convicted” of murder despite the changes made to
sections 188 and 189. They maintained no instructions were
given on those abrogated theories, and Ralph was instead
prosecuted and convicted as “a direct perpetrator and direct aider
and abettor who acted with express malice.” The response brief
filed by Ralph’s counsel made no additional arguments on his
behalf.
On March 19, 2024, the trial court denied Ralph’s petition
because he failed to make a prima facie showing he was entitled
to relief. Ralph timely appealed. (See (§ 1237, subd. (b); Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).)
DISCUSSION
I. General Principles of Section 1172.6 Resentencing
Relief
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a), allows criminals “convicted
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is

7
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in
a crime” to file a resentencing petition in certain circumstances.
(Ibid.) “[T]he section 1172.6 petitioning ‘process begins with the
filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements
for eligibility are met ([§ 1172.6], subd. (b)(1)(A)), including that
“[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . .
because of changes to Section 188 or 189.” ’ ” (People v. Antonelli
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724 (Antonelli); see also § 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).)
The changes to sections 188 and 189 “altered the
substantive law of murder in two areas”: they “narrowed the
application of the felony-murder rule” and “imposed a new
requirement that ‘a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449
(Curiel); see also §§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).) That latter
change had the effect of “eliminat[ing] liability for murder as an
aider and abettor under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.” (Curiel, at p. 449.) Nevertheless, it “[did] not eliminate
direct aiding and abetting liability for murder because a direct
aider and abettor to murder must possess malice aforethought.”
(People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848 (Gentile), abrogated
on other grounds by § 1172.6, subd. (g); see also Curiel, at p. 462
[“Murder liability requires a . . . valid theory, such as direct
aiding and abetting.”].)
When a petitioner files a facially adequate section 1172.6
petition, the trial court “afford[s] the parties an opportunity to
submit briefing [and] ‘hold[s] a hearing to determine whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.’ ” (Antonelli,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 724.) To evaluate the petitioner’s showing,
“ ‘ “ ‘the court takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and
makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the

8
petitioner would be entitled to relief if [those] allegations were
proved.’ ” ’ ” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) If the court
concludes the petitioner has made a prima facie showing, it
issues an order to show cause, but “ ‘[i]f the petition and the
record . . . establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible
for relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition.’ ” (Antonelli, at
p. 724.)
In evaluating the record in cases involving “individuals
convicted following jury trials, the jury instructions [are] critical”
to determining whether the petition has potential merit at the
prima facie stage. (Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 731.)
Likewise, the jury’s factual findings in the underlying criminal
trial are “generally preclusive.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 453.)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Ralph’s
Petition
Ralph’s appeal turns on whether this record conclusively
established his ineligibility for resentencing relief as a matter of
law: that is, if it showed he was necessarily convicted of murder
based upon a currently valid theory of liability. (See Curiel,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 462.) If Ralph were convicted under a
theory of murder that remains valid, then he is ineligible for
relief, and the petition was properly dismissed. (See § 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).)
At the hearing on the petition, the trial court explained “[i]t
[was] abundantly clear . . . there were no instructions on natural
and probable consequences. There were no instructions on felony
murder. There was no prosecution theory relying on any theory of
imputed liability.” On the contrary, “[Ralph] was prosecuted as a
direct perpetrator and a direct aider and abettor with the
requisite intent in the commission of these crimes.” Thus, the

9
court determined Ralph was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as
a matter of law.
Ralph acknowledges the jury was not instructed on the
theories of felony murder or natural and probable consequences,
but he argues the trial court nevertheless erred in denying his
petition because his “jury was instructed on aiding and abetting,”
and thus, “he could have been convicted based on a theory under
which malice was imputed to him based on his participation in
the crime.”6 We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court’s denial of a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Hickman (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1268.)
B. The Record Conclusively Establishes Ralph’s
Ineligibility for Relief
First, it is undisputed Ralph was not prosecuted for felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
theory, and no jury instructions were given on those theories.
Thus, the changes wrought by the Legislature to the natural and
probable consequences doctrine and the felony-murder rule are
irrelevant here. (See People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941,
946 (Estrada) [“the changes in Senate Bill No. 1437 to the
natural and probable consequences doctrine do not apply to those

6 Ralph has not argued any other elements of the offense,
under a valid direct aiding and abetting theory, were absent.
(Cf. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 462–463 [a petitioner “puts at
issue all elements of the offense under a valid theory”].) We
therefore assume those were satisfied and do not discuss them
further. (See Pfeifer v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2012)
211 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1282 [“An appellate court ‘will not develop
the appellants’ arguments for them.’ ”].)

10
who act with malice in aiding and abetting”]; Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 848 [changes to felony-murder rule were not
applicable when the jury was not instructed on felony murder].)
Second, we acknowledge the jury instructions that were
given allowed the jury to find Ralph guilty of first degree murder
as an aider and abettor. But they also required his guilt for that
crime be based on his own mental state. And the instructions told
the jury that murder “perpetrated by any kind of willful,
deliberate and premediated killing with express malice
aforethought is murder of the first degree,” and that it had to find
Ralph had “the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime” of murder. On this
record and in light of all the instructions given, “ ‘the jury would
only find [Ralph] guilty of first degree murder, even as an aider
and abettor, if it concluded he acted willfully and with intent to
kill.’ ” (Estrada, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 945; see also People
v. Maldonado (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1257, 1263 (Maldonado)
[“Direct aiding and abetting an implied malice murder remains a
valid theory . . . .”].)
Moreover, this jury ultimately convicted Ralph of first
degree murder and expressly found he intentionally killed
Campanelli by means of lying in wait. (See §§ 187, subd. (a),
190.2, subd. (a)(15).) The jury’s intent to kill finding is entitled to
preclusive effect. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) Where, as
here, justification and excuse are not at issue, “[a]n intent to kill
is the equivalent of express malice.” (People v. Coley (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 539, 547 (Coley).) The jury plainly determined
Ralph personally acted with an intent to kill and thus, personally
acted with express malice. There is thus no possibility the jury
convicted Ralph under a now-invalidated theory of murder by
imputing malice to him. (Cf. Curiel, at pp. 462–463 [a petitioner

11
convicted under the now-invalid natural and probable
consequences theory may be eligible for relief, notwithstanding
jury finding he acted with intent to kill].)
The record of conviction conclusively shows Ralph is
ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law.
C. Ralph’s Contrary Arguments Are Unpersuasive
Ralph argues People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972
(Langi), and Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th 1257,
demonstrate the jury may have imputed malice to him as an
aider and abettor. Those cases are inapposite and do not convince
us the trial court erred in denying his petition.
Langi concerned a petitioner’s “liability for second degree
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at p. 978.) The court concluded the standard
aiding-and-abetting instructions in use at the time of the
petitioner’s trial were “ill suited to the crime of second degree
murder” because CALJIC No. 3.01 “create[d] an ambiguity under
which the jury may find the defendant guilty of aiding and
abetting a second degree murder without finding that he
personally acted with malice.” (Langi, at p. 978.) Another
instruction was needed to “explain[] that, to be guilty as a direct
aider and abettor of second degree murder, an accomplice must
have acted with the mental state of implied malice.” (Id. at
p. 983.) Because no such instruction was given to the jury in that
case, it was possible “the jury found [petitioner] guilty of second
degree murder by imputing to him the implied malice of the
actual killer, without finding that he personally acted ‘with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life.’ ” (Id. at p. 984.)

12
Langi is not applicable here. As an initial matter, we doubt
its reasoning regarding an ambiguity in CALJIC No. 3.01 has the
same force in a case–like this one–where the jury convicted the
petitioner of first degree lying-in-wait murder and expressly
rejected second degree murder. But more importantly, the
instructions given to Ralph’s jury were crucially different from
those at issue in Langi. The court in Langi explained that after
that petitioner’s trial, former CALJIC No. 3.00 was changed to
provide, “ ‘[T]he aider and abettor’s guilt is determined by the
combined acts of all the participants as well as that person’s own
mental state.’ ” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983, fn. 13.)
The court suggested that new language could rectify the
ambiguity it had identified in CALJIC No. 3.01. (See Langi, at
p. 983 [“nothing in the [former version of the] aiding-and-abetting
instruction[s] . . . states that the accomplice himself must have
acted with such knowledge and conscious disregard”].) But the
jury in Ralph’s trial was given the 2010 revised CALJIC No. 3.00
instruction. (See CALJIC No. 3.00.) Thus, Ralph’s jury was told
he had to personally act with malice to be guilty of murder as an
aider and abettor. And this jury expressly found Ralph
“intentionally killed the victim,” which is the equivalent of
express malice. (Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 547.) Thus,
Langi does not help Ralph show he made a prima facie case for
section 1172.6 relief.
Nor does Maldonado support Ralph’s position. The court in
Maldonado applied the reasoning of Langi to a first degree
murder conviction because “first degree lying-in-wait murder can
be based on a theory that the perpetrator acted with implied
malice rather than an intent to kill.” (Maldonado, supra,
87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1267.) We need not parse Maldonado’s
reasoning in detail because there, “[t]he jury convicted [the

13
defendant] of first degree murder, but found the lying-in-wait
special circumstance not true.” (Id. at p. 1260.) Thus, that jury
“did not necessarily find [the defendant] intended to kill the
victim.” (Id. at p. 1262, fn. 3.)
By contrast, it is undisputed Ralph’s jury found the lying-
in-wait special circumstance to be true. That is, his jury
necessarily determined he acted with an intent to kill. (See
People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 630 [“A lying-in-wait
special circumstance can apply to a defendant who, intending
that the victim would be killed, aids and abets an intentional
murder committed by means of lying in wait.”].) Thus, this is not
a case like Maldonado where the jury failed to find the petitioner
harbored an intent to kill.
Ralph concedes his “jury was instructed that the lying in
wait special circumstance required an intent to kill,” but he
argues he can nevertheless make out a prima facie case for relief
according to the reasoning of Curiel. In that case, the Supreme
Court explained a jury’s finding of intent to kill “is only one
element” of the crime of murder and “does not by itself establish
any valid theory of liability.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463.)
Where a petitioner had been “convicted under an invalid theory
like the natural and probable consequences doctrine,” the jury’s
finding he harbored an intent to kill did not necessarily show he
was ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law. (Ibid.)
But we have already explained Ralph’s jury was not
instructed on any now-invalid theory of murder. Rather, Ralph
was prosecuted under a direct aiding and abetting theory, which
remains valid. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463; Estrada,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 946.) That, combined with the jury’s
express finding Ralph acted with the intent to kill Campanelli, is

14
fatal to Ralph’s efforts to make out a prima facie case for
section 1172.6 relief.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

SIGGINS, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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