People v. Long CA5

CourtListener 10750904Calctapp10 dic 2025

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Filed 12/10/25 P. v. Long CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088792
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F13907709)
v.

PHILLIP GEROME LONG, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. F. Brian
Alvarez, Judge.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Christopher J. Rench and
Rachelle A. Newcomb, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Hill, P. J., Franson, J. and Peña, J.
INTRODUCTION
We previously reversed defendant Phillip Gerome Long’s judgment and remanded
for resentencing. On remand, the trial court denied defendant’s request to strike his prior
serious felony conviction. Defendant appeals and argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when denying his request because it failed to apply Penal Code section 1385,
subdivision (c)1 when deciding whether to strike his prior serious felony conviction. We
reject defendant’s argument and affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A jury convicted defendant on March 15, 2019, of oral copulation with a child
10 years old or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 1–3), lewd acts upon a child under
14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 5–8, 10–11), and possession of child pornography
(§ 311.11, subd. (a); count 12). As to counts 5 through 11, the jury found true the “One
Strike” law allegation that defendant committed the offenses against more than one
victim. (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4).) After waiving his right to a jury trial as to the
allegations, defendant admitted he had a prior “strike” conviction within the meaning of
the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) as to all counts.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
On April 26, 2019, the trial court sentenced defendant to total term of 396 years to
life in prison, including consecutive terms of 50 years to life (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (j)(2);
667, subd. (e)(1))2 for counts 5 through 8, 10, and 11; 30 years to life as to counts 1
through 3,3 six years as to count 12,4 and various fines, fees, and assessments.
Defendant appealed and argued, in part, that the trial court violated his right to due
process by sentencing under the provisions of section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2) because
it had not been specifically alleged in the amended information. We affirmed defendant’s
judgment but, after transfer back from the California Supreme Court, reconsidered our
decision in light of In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706, reversed defendant’s sentence
on counts 5 through 8, 10, and 11, and remanded the matter for resentencing. (People v.
Long (June 24, 2024, F079251) [nonpub. opn.]).
On October 11, 2024, the trial court denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior
serious felony conviction and sentenced him to consecutive terms of 30 years to life for
counts 1 through 3, 5 through 8, 10, and 11 (§§288.7, subd. (b), 288, subd. (a), 667.61,
subd. (b), 667, subd. (e)(1)) and four years as to count 12 (§§ 311.11, subd. (a), 667,
subd. (e)(1)), for a total term of imprisonment of 274 years to life. The trial court also
ordered defendant to pay victim restitution (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), a $300 restitution fine
(§ 1202.4), and a stayed $300 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45, subd. (a)).
Defendant filed this timely appeal on October 14, 2024.

2 The court sentenced defendant pursuant to section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (j)(2),
which provide for a sentence of 25 years to life, and section 667, subdivision (e)(1) provides that
any determinate term or minimum indeterminate prison term must be twice the term otherwise
provided as punishment.
3 Section 288.7, subdivision (b) provides for a punishment of 15 years to life in prison,
doubled pursuant to section 667, subdivision (e)(1).
4 The court selected the three-year upper term provided by section 311.11, subdivision (a)
and section 18, subdivision (a), doubled pursuant to section 667, subdivision (e)(1).

3.
FACTS5
In 2011, defendant and his ex-wife would often watch A.A., who was six or seven
years old, while her mother was working. During such times, A.A.’s cousins, A.B.
(seven or eight years old), A.C. (five years old), and D.M. (10 years old) would visit A.A.
while she was at defendant’s residence. Defendant put his hand on A.A.’s vagina,
masturbated, forced her to swallow his sperm, forced her to touch his penis until he
ejaculated on multiple occasions, pushed her to the floor and forced his penis a small way
into her vagina and/or anus several different times, used his tongue to lick her vagina, and
made her lick his penis. When A.B. would visit A.A. at defendant’s residence, defendant
would remove their clothing, touch their vaginas, chase them, and when they were on the
floor, pull them to him by their feet, remove their underwear, and touch them.
Defendant also would “tickle” A.C. and A.A. when they visited, at times touching
their vaginas over their underpants and other times making them disrobe, spread their
legs, and touching them directly. D.M. described an incident when she was in the car
with defendant and he slid his hand up her leg, touching her vagina inside her shorts and
underwear. Two other times, defendant touched D.M.’s vagina when she was at
defendant’s residence.
In August 2013, detectives executed a search warrant at defendant’s residence and
seized a laptop computer containing 900 images of child nudity or pornography depicting
“mostly prepubescent undeveloped children” “engaged in sexual activity or focussing
[sic] on the child’s genitalia,” and a desktop computer containing nine images of child
pornography.

5 We provide only a short summary of the facts set forth in our prior opinion as defendant
raised only sentencing issues. (People v. Long, supra, F079251.)

4.
DISCUSSION

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion
to strike his prior strike conviction.

A. Sentencing Background
Defendant filed a sentencing brief and argued that the trial court should strike his
prior serious felony conviction pursuant to section 1385 and People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Defendant argued that he is outside the spirit of the
Three Strikes law in light of the nature and circumstances of his present and prior serious
felonies, as well as his background, character, and prospects. He characterized his prior
criminal history as minimal considering his strike conviction (involving domestic
violence and criminal threats) had occurred 21 years previously and he was discharged
from parole as to those offenses in 2010. Defendant also listed several mitigating factors
as set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b), including: (1) defendant has an
insignificant record of criminal conduct; (2) defendant experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma including abuse, neglect, sexual violence, or exploitation
that was a factor in the crime; (3) the enhancement would result in a sentence in excess of
20 years; (4) several enhancements are alleged in a single case; (5) application of an
enhancement could result in a discriminatory racial impact; and (6) the enhancement is
based on a conviction more than five years old.
Defendant’s sentencing brief described his social history, including that he was the
youngest of five children and adopted by a neighbor when three months old because his
birth mother was unable to care for him. By age 10, defendant was essentially caring for
himself because his adopted mother had serious medical issues. His mother’s caregiver
sexually abused him for one and a half years when he was 12 years old. He bragged to
his peers because he thought it was “cool” at the time, and did not realize the damage it
caused him. He now believes that the inappropriate sexual experiences caused him to
lack empathy for others, become self-focused, and be unable to properly process difficult

5.
experiences. Defendant previously joined the military for three years and left to care for
his birth mother who was dying of cancer. He also worked as a peace officer for a
community college.
While most recently in prison, defendant continued his education through a
community college, studied substance use disorder, which affected his birth mother, and
now realizes that his own drug and alcohol use desensitized him to his own feelings.
Defendant was president of the Men’s Advisory Committee in prison and served as a
liaison between the inmates and staff.
On October 11, 2021, the trial court considered defendant’s motion to strike his
prior serious felony conviction. The court stated that it had received defendant’s
sentencing brief and read and considered the new report from the probation officer.
Defense counsel requested that the court once again consider the motion to strike
defendant’s prior serious felony, recognizing that the motion had been made during the
original sentencing hearing.
Defendant reminded the court that it originally denied his request because
defendant’s current offenses were too close in time to his prior conviction, but five years
has passed since the court made that finding. Defendant advised that he had made
progress by gaining insight, empathy, and understanding as to the cause and factors that
caused him to commit the offenses. According to defendant, he was a changed man after
engaging in much self-reflection and self-help and had completely removed himself from
antisocial behavior as evidenced by his lack of disciplinary record, active leadership in
the prison community, and attendance at church.
The prosecutor opposed defendant’s motion to strike based on the offenses
involving sex abuse against three children, which occurred only one year after he was
discharged from parole from the strike offense. Defendant’s offenses involved forcing
children to orally copulate him while exhibiting pornography to them. When arrested

6.
two years following the sexual abuse, defendant was found in possession of pornography
depicting prepubescent children engaged in sexual acts and focusing upon their genitalia.
The prosecutor also agreed with the court that it could factor defendant’s
postconviction rehabilitative efforts in formulating the sentence but argued that such
efforts were not sufficient to mitigate the circumstances of the offense or timing of
defendant’s conduct in relation to his prior conviction. Defense counsel argued that the
changes to defendant since his initial sentencing were relevant factors “to consider for the
Romero [motion].” (Italics added.)
The trial court stated that it remembered the facts of the trial, the testimony of the
victim witnesses, and the “child pornographies, and as I said earlier in the sentencing five
years ago, I’ll say it again here, that’s the kind of thing you can’t unsee. I mean, that stuff
is vile .…” The court noted the significant impact the crimes still had on the victims as
seen during their testimony, even though the offenses occurred several years before. The
trial court acknowledged that it had reviewed and considered defendant’s representations
and had reviewed the court’s own file and prior sentencing hearing. The court considered
defendant’s prior four-year military service and employment as a peace officer for a
community college and noted the latter occupation was not easy to obtain or undertake.
The court additionally recognized that defendant committed his strike offenses
involving domestic violence and making criminal threats in 2000 and was initially
afforded probation but later violated its terms and was sentenced to prison. Despite his
discharge on parole in 2010, defendant committed the instant offenses in 2011. The trial
court considered that defendant was a survivor of sexual abuse and had attempted to
rehabilitate himself in prison by continuing his education and incurring no disciplinary
proceedings, and that five years had passed since he was initially sentenced.
The trial court explained that it had to consider whether striking defendant’s prior
conviction would further the interest of justice, that is, consider both defendant’s rights
and the interests of society. The court recognized that it was required to look at the

7.
particular background, character and prospects of an individual to determine whether the
individual falls outside the Three Strikes law in whole or in part. The court stated it had,
in fact, considered defendant’s background, the nature of his present offenses, and other
individualized considerations. It further recognized that People v. Carmony6 reiterated
that the circumstances which would deem a career offender to fall outside the spirit of the
Three Strikes law must be extraordinary.
The trial court addressed Senate Bill No. 81’s (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) amendment
of section 1385, subdivision (c) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), noting that defendant was not
arguing that it applied to the Three Strikes law, finding that it only applied to the decision
to strike enhancements, and noting the Courts of Appeal had found that the Three Strikes
law is an alternate penalty scheme and not an enhancement. Neither party objected to the
court’s statement that section 1385, subdivision (c) was not applicable to defendant’s
motion to strike his prior conviction. Thereafter, the trial court denied defendant’s
motion: “[T]he Court’s going to deny the request for Romero and is still of the opinion
that given the gravity of the offenses here, given the relative recent change—length of
time, rather, that occurred between the offenses that occurred here and the discharge of
parole, that it would not be in a furtherance of justice to grant Romero leave in this
instance.” (Italics added.)
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1385 grants trial courts discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction if the
dismissal is in furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a); People v. Superior Court
(Romero), supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 504, 529–530.) “ ‘… A court’s discretion to strike [or
vacate] prior felony conviction allegations [or findings] in furtherance of justice is
limited. Its exercise must proceed in strict compliance with … section 1385[,
subdivision ](a) .…’ ” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158, third bracketed

6 People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony).

8.
insertion added (Williams).) The Three Strikes law “was intended to restrict courts’
discretion in sentencing repeat offenders.” (Romero, at p. 528; accord, People v. Garcia
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 501 [“a primary purpose of the Three Strikes law was to restrict
judicial discretion”].) The Three Strikes law establishes “ ‘a sentencing requirement to
be applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike’ ” unless
the sentencing court finds a reason for making an exception to this rule. (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) There are “stringent standards that sentencing courts must
follow in order to find such an exception.” (Ibid.) In order to dismiss a prior strike
conviction, “the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of [the defendant’s] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant
may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or
violent felonies.” (Williams, at p. 161.)
A trial court’s decision not to dismiss a prior strike conviction is reviewed under
the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) The
Three Strikes law establishes that not striking a prior strike conviction is the norm, and
there is a “strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to [the] sentencing norm[]
is both rational and proper.” (Id. at p. 378.) An abuse of discretion is established by
demonstrating “that the trial court’s decision was irrational or arbitrary. It is not enough
to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more of his
prior convictions.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 309–310.) “Where the
record is silent [citation], or ‘[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced
the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit of the
law,’ ” we are required to affirm the trial court’s ruling “ ‘even if we might have ruled
differently in the first instance.’ ” (Carmony, at p. 378, first bracketed insertion added.)

9.
C. Analysis
Defendant requested that the trial court exercise its discretion to strike the prior
strike conviction. Defendant argues that his current offenses were neither serious nor
violent, his past record consisted mostly of nonviolent and/or drug-related offenses, and
the prior strike was remote in time, having occurred 10 years earlier.
At sentencing, the trial court had reviewed defendant’s motion, the probation
officer’s report, the court file, and the prior sentencing proceedings. The court found that
defendant did not fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law based upon his prior
strike, violation of probation, and his commission of the instant offenses within one year
of being discharged from parole. Because declining to strike a prior strike conviction is
the “norm,” we presume the trial court’s decision was proper. (See Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
Defendant argues, however, that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
strike his prior strike conviction due, in part, to the court’s failure to apply section 1385,
subdivision (c). Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides, in turn, that when exercising
its discretion to strike a sentence enhancement, the trial court must consider and give
great weight to evidence of the presence of nine mitigating circumstances, the following
of which defendant’s sentencing brief asserted were applicable: (1) application of the
enhancement could result in a discriminatory racial impact (id., subd. (c)(2)(A));
(2) multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case (id., subd (c)(2)(B));
(3) application of the enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years (id.,
subd (c)(2)(C)); (4) the current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood
trauma (id., subd. (c)(2)(E)); and (5) the enhancement is based on a prior conviction that
is over five years old (id., subd. (c)(2)(H)). “Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the
court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger

10.
public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would
result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
We decline to find section 1385, subdivision (c) applicable to a motion to dismiss
a prior strike pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a). “Whether the amendments to
section 1385 apply to prior strike convictions is a question of statutory interpretation
which we review de novo.” (People v. Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 242.) Burke
squarely rejected the application of section 1385, subdivision (c) to the decision whether
to dismiss or strike a prior strike conviction because “the Three Strikes law is not an
enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing scheme for the current offense” (Burke, at
p. 243), the “plain language of subdivision (c) of section 1385 applies only to an
‘enhancement,’ and the Three Strikes law is not an enhancement” (id. at p. 244). Since
Burke, every court that has addressed the issue has agreed with its holding. (See People
v. Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 247–248; People v. McDowell (2024)
99 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1155–1156; People v. Olay (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 68–69;
People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 776, fn. 2.) We decline to break with this
authority. Because a strike is not considered an enhancement, the trial court was not
required to consider section 1385, subdivision (c) in deciding whether to strike
defendant’s prior conviction.
We also note that the standard for dismissing an enhancement in section 1385,
subdivision (c) conflicts with the standard for applying section 1385, subdivision (a) in
the context of the Three Strikes law: The Three Strikes law establishes “ ‘a sentencing
requirement to be applied in every case’ ” unless the sentencing court finds a reason for
making an exception to this rule (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377), and the trial
court must find that defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in
part (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161), while section 1385, subdivision (c)(1)(2)
directs that the court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in furtherance of justice to do
so and afford great weight to evidence of mitigating circumstances.

11.
Nonetheless, the trial court discussed the nature of the offenses, the effect of
defendant’s offenses on the victims, and several of defendant’s mitigating factors in
acting to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives: defendant’s background, including his
former employment and military service; the age of his prior offenses; that he survived
childhood sexual abuse; and defendant’s attempts to rehabilitate himself in prison by
continuing his education and incurring no disciplinary proceedings. The court’s
discussion not only addressed defendant’s asserted mitigating circumstances, but did so
recognizing it was required to look at the particular background, character and prospects
of an individual to determine whether the individual falls outside the Three Strikes law in
whole or in part. The trial court record supports the court’s assertion that it had, in fact,
considered defendant’s background, the nature of his present offenses, and other
individualized considerations in reaching its decision.
Having taken the nature and circumstances of defendant’s instant offenses and
prior conviction as well as his background and prospects into account when it declined to
strike his prior strike conviction, we conclude that the trial court was aware of its
discretion and considered only permissible factors in reaching its decision. (See
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161 [“preponderant weight must be accorded to … the
nature and circumstances of the defendant’s present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects”].)
We conclude that defendant has failed to establish that the trial court’s denial of
his request to strike his prior strike conviction was outside the bounds of reason under the
facts and the law. We may not find an abuse of discretion unless the decision was so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it. And here, it was not.
On the record before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the
prior strike conviction and instant offense fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes law,

12.
and it properly considered defendant’s asserted mitigated circumstances to the extent it
was required to do so.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

13.

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