CourtListener 10749187•Khalil v. Steiner CA6
Testo completo
Filed 12/8/25 Khalil v. Steiner CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
SARA KHALIL et al., H052541
(Monterey County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. No. 24CV001104)
v.
MAX STEINER,
Defendant and Appellant.
On October 12, 2023, Sara Khalil, her teenage sister Maryam1 Khalil,
and their sister-in-law Pearl Warrick (together, plaintiffs), constructed a
“ ‘Free Palestine’ ” sign out of shrubs and seaweed on a sand dune near Sand
City known as “Scribble Hill,” where it was visible from Highway 1 and the
pedestrian path below the dune. Max Steiner, who was cycling on the path,
stopped his bicycle, climbed the dune, and began dismantling the sign while
1 For clarity due to their shared surname, we refer to the younger
Khalil by her first name, Maryam, and other all other parties by last name.
(See, e.g., In re Marriage of Leonard (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 546, 550, fn. 2.)
Two different spellings for Maryam appear in the record and briefing.
Consistent with the complaint and trial court’s order, we use the spelling
“Maryam.”
engaging in a heated verbal exchange with the young women. Each side
accused the other of “supporting terrorism,” and the women began recording
the encounter on a cell phone. They retreated down the dune and kicked
sand on Steiner’s bicycle. Steiner followed, grabbed the cell phone from
Maryam—allegedly also grabbing and restraining her in the process—and
threw the phone toward the street, breaking it. After Steiner departed,
plaintiffs reported the incident to the police and posted an edited version of
the cell phone video to their social media.
Plaintiffs sued Steiner asserting causes of action for negligence,
assault, battery, and violations of the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act (Bane Act)
(Civ. Code, § 52.1) and the Ralph Civil Rights Act (Ralph Act) (Civ. Code,
§ 51.7). Steiner brought an anti-SLAPP motion2 to strike the complaint, in
its entirety, under Code of Civil Procedure3 section 425.16. The trial court
denied the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that the negligence and Bane Act
claims survived at the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, while the
Ralph Act, assault, and battery claims did not arise from any speech or
activity protected by section 425.16.
Exercising our independent review of the trial court’s ruling and the
appellate record, we conclude that the alleged acts forming the basis of
plaintiffs’ claims are not protected activities under the anti-SLAPP statute.
Therefore, we affirm the order denying the special motion to strike.
2 An anti-SLAPP motion is “a special motion to strike a ‘strategic
lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).’ ” (Parrish v. Latham &
Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767, 773–774.)
3 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4
Plaintiffs, born and raised in the United States, are Muslim. They
were each wearing hijabs on the day in question. Khalil and her younger
sister Maryam are of Palestinian descent. Khalil and Warrick are in their
20s, Maryam is a teenager, and all three of them are small in stature.
On the afternoon of October 12, 2023, plaintiffs met friends at the sand
dune located near the Sand City exit of Highway 1. The sand dune is known
locally as “ ‘Scribble Hill’ ” because it is a popular spot to engage in public
forms of expression. Plaintiffs’ friends had written “ ‘Free Gaza’ ” on the sand
dune using sticks, shrubs, and plant debris. After their friends departed,
plaintiffs stayed and changed the message to “ ‘Free Palestine’ ” to draw
attention to “escalating events in the occupied West Bank.”
Steiner was riding his bicycle on the path and saw three individuals
assembling a large “ ‘Free Palestine’ ” sign using seaweed, sticks, and
driftwood near the top of the dune. Steiner is a military veteran and former
Congressional candidate who at the time was stationed at the Presidio of
Monterey. Steiner stopped his bicycle at the bottom of the dune.
According to plaintiffs, Steiner began yelling and gesturing at them.
He “began rapidly charging up the hill” toward them, calling them terrorists
and accusing them of beheading children and supporting Hamas. Steiner
4 We draw the following facts from the pleadings and declarations
submitted in the trial court, excluding any evidence to which the court
sustained objections. We accept as true plaintiffs’ submissions concerning
the facts upon which liability is based for the purpose of resolving whether
the court erred in its denial of the anti-SLAPP motion and consider only
whether any contrary evidence from Steiner establishes his entitlement to
prevail as a matter of law. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park); Laker v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 745, 754 (Laker).)
3
“seemed frantic,” and Khalil felt “terrified.” Warrick was “very afraid.”
Khalil tried to diffuse the situation by introducing herself and asking Steiner
his name, but he refused and responded, “ ‘So you terrorists can blast me?!
You guys are supporting terrorism.’ ”5 Steiner told plaintiffs they “were
fortunate to drive [their] ‘nice BMW in the land of the free’ ” and said it was
“ ‘peak Palestinian’ ” and they could be “ ‘sending [their] money to refugees’
instead.” While arguing, Steiner began dismantling plaintiffs’ sign with his
hands.
Plaintiffs deny making antisemitic remarks during the encounter.
Steiner disputes plaintiffs’ characterization of the encounter. He states that
he told plaintiffs their message “was inappropriate given the recent October
7, 2023, attack by Hamas on Israel,” to which they responded with “anti-
Semitic remarks, claiming the attacks were justified. They stated, ‘the Jews
deserved it’ and ‘resistance is justified.’ ” Steiner states that he walked up
the dune and began removing the plant debris that formed their message, at
which point plaintiffs began recording him with a cell phone.6 Both sides
stated that they would return the next day to erect, and erase, respectively,
the message.
Plaintiffs began retreating down the sand dune while Steiner continued
to dismantle their sign. At the base of the dune, plaintiffs kicked and pushed
5 The quoted language is taken from the declarations of Khalil and
Warrick, submitted in opposition to the motion to strike. The verbal
exchange captured in the video and transcription, provided to the police by
plaintiffs and submitted as an exhibit to Steiner’s declaration in support of
his motion to strike, differs slightly, with Steiner refusing to give his name
and stating “Why the fuck would I do that? So some fucking terrorists can
Dox me? . . . You guys are supporting terrorism.”
6 As noted ante (fn. 5), the recording captures a portion of the exchange
between Steiner and plaintiffs and is included in the record on appeal, along
with a transcription of the audio.
4
sand onto Steiner’s bicycle. Steiner yelled at them to stop. When they did
not respond, he approached and grabbed Maryam from behind, with one arm
around her neck and the other arm around her waist, restraining her, then
grabbed the phone and threw it to the ground, where it shattered. Maryam
was “light-headed and crying” after the incident. Steiner denies that he
grabbed or physically attacked anyone but admits “removing a phone from
the hand of the person who was filming the vandalism of [his] bicycle by the
others.”
After Steiner left on his bicycle, plaintiffs reported the incident to the
police, who obtained the video footage from Maryam’s cell phone. Plaintiffs
posted a “video compilation of the altercation” to their social media, leading
to additional events not at issue in this appeal.
In March 2024, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Steiner. It alleged
that on October 12, 2023, Steiner confronted plaintiffs as they constructed
their message on the sand dune, called them terrorists, accused them of
killing babies and beheading children, and of being members or supporters of
Hamas, and told them they were fortunate to be in America driving a BMW
as Palestinians. It alleged that Steiner started “violently dismantling
[plaintiffs’] sign and charged directly at the girls while continuing to threaten
them.” It further alleged that as plaintiffs were recording the encounter,
Steiner “accosted 13-year-old plaintiff Maryam [], grabbed her around the
neck and waist, and threw her cell phone on the bike path, shattering it in
the process.” Plaintiffs alleged economic and emotional harm as a result of
Steiner’s conduct. The complaint asserted causes of action for (1) negligence;
(2) violation of the Bane Act by threats, intimidation, or coercion; (3) violation
of the Ralph Act by having committed a violent act motivated by the
5
perception of plaintiffs’ national origin, race, citizenship, and political
affiliation; (4) assault; and (5) battery.
Steiner responded with an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the complaint
in its entirety. Steiner argued that plaintiffs’ complaint should be stricken
because the claims alleged are based on “Steiner’s exercise of his
constitutionally protected rights of free speech and petition concerning a
public issue: the political and social discourse surrounding the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.” Steiner further asserted that plaintiffs cannot
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on their claims “due to the
inconsistencies in their allegations, lack of credible evidence, and their own
egregious misconduct.” The motion was accompanied by declarations and
exhibits.
Steiner asserted in his declaration that after expressing his view that
their message was inappropriate given Hamas’s attack on Israel, plaintiffs
made antisemitic remarks, apparently presuming Steiner was Israeli or
Jewish, although he is neither. Steiner stated that “[d]espite the barrage of
anti-Semitic comments, [he] did not address the three individuals in a
threatening manner.” Steiner believed the encounter was over after both
sides stated their intent to return over the following days; however plaintiffs
began kicking his bicycle and sand into the gears and his helmet. They
continued to damage his property after he shouted for them to stop, at which
point he “took steps to protect [his] bike” by “removing a phone from the hand
of the person who was filming the vandalism of [his] bicycle by the others”
and throwing the phone toward plaintiffs’ vehicle. Steiner later learned that
plaintiffs had called the police and “falsely alleged that [he] physically
attacked and strangled one of them without provocation.” He received
6
“hundreds of death threats via online messenger apps and by phone” after
plaintiffs’ social media post and received a separation from the Army.
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion and objections
to Steiner’s declaration. They also sought sanctions against Steiner, arguing
the motion was frivolous. Plaintiffs asserted their claims were not based on
Steiner’s constitutionally protected speech, but on “the assault and battery of
three Palestinian girls, one a minor, while they exercised their right to
express themselves regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” They argued
that Steiner “targeted” them on the basis of their ethnicity and religious
identity, intending to threaten and intimidate them because he did not agree
with their message, and though his speech “was objectively offensive,” it was
his “actions culminat[ing] in physical violence” for which they seek redress.
Khalil and Warrick submitted nearly identical declarations in support of
plaintiffs’ opposition.
Steiner filed a reply brief and evidentiary objections to the Khalil and
Warrick declarations.
The trial court made oral findings at the hearing and later filed a
written order denying Steiner’s anti-SLAPP motion. The court sustained
certain evidentiary objections on both sides and overruled the remaining
objections. It observed that the case “involves a mix” of both “expressive and
non-expressive elements” and “speech and conduct,” making more difficult
the determination of whether the lawsuit arises out of protected conduct.
The court found that Steiner’s “speech and expressive conduct,” including
dismantling the sign, were statements made at a place open to the public in a
public forum and came within section 425.16, subdivision (e)(3) and (4), but
that the expressive conduct did not extend to grabbing a person and throwing
their phone.
7
As to the specific causes of action, the trial court concluded that
although Steiner may have satisfied his initial burden as to the negligence
and Bane Act claims, plaintiffs had met their responsive burden based on the
court construing the complaint liberally “to include the assault and battery
conduct” in the allegations. This was despite finding it “arguable that the
available video evidence contradicts [p]laintiffs’ characterizations of
[Steiner]’s conduct.” As to the Ralph Act, assault, and battery causes of
action, the court found that the conduct giving rise to those claims did not
arise out of activity protected by section 425.16. The court denied the request
for sanctions, finding the motion was “not entirely devoid of merit” and
noting that “several causes of action only survive the anti-SLAPP as a result
of liberal interpretation of [p]laintiffs’ allegations.”
Steiner filed a timely notice of appeal of the trial court’s order.
II. DISCUSSION
Steiner contends that the trial court erred in denying his anti-SLAPP
motion. He maintains that he met his threshold burden under the anti-
SLAPP statute because plaintiffs’ complaint expressly linked his alleged
liability to his expressive conduct and there is “no evidence” to support
plaintiffs’ assertion that he engaged in physical violence. Steiner also
challenges the court’s evidentiary ruling on his objections to the Khalil and
Warrick declarations.
Plaintiffs counter that Steiner’s motion is premised on his version of
events and improperly seeks adjudication of the credibility of the allegations
against him. Plaintiffs argue that even if Steiner could meet his threshold
burden to demonstrate the challenged claims arise from protected activity,
the evidence submitted in opposition to the motion—even accounting for
Steiner’s objections—demonstrates a reasonable probability of prevailing.
8
A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute
Section 425.16, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute, “is
designed to protect defendants from meritless lawsuits that might chill the
exercise of their rights to speak and petition on matters of public concern.”
(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884 (Wilson).)
It affords defendants the opportunity to bring a special motion to strike a
cause of action arising from constitutionally protected speech or petitioning
activity. (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2 Cal.5th 318, 320 (Barry);
Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 759–760.) “If a claim arises out of an ‘act
. . . in furtherance of [a] person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in
connection with a public issue,’ the claim must be stricken unless the
nonmoving party establishes ‘a probability that [it] will prevail on the
claim.’ ([]§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Guracar v. Student Loan Solutions, LLC
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 330, 341 (Guracar).)
The trial court evaluates a section 425.16 motion to strike in two steps.
First, the court examines the nature of the conduct that underlies the
plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether it is protected by section 425.16;
next, the court assesses the merits of the plaintiff’s claim. (Barry, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 321; Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 760.)
In the first step, the trial court determines whether the defendant has
shown the allegations underlying the plaintiff’s claim are in furtherance of
the right of petition or free speech as expansively defined by the anti-SLAPP
statute (§ 425.16, subd. (e)) and thus a “protected activity” under one or more
of the four categories of protected acts set out in section 425.16, subdivision
(e) (section 425.16(e)). (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) The defendant
must also show that the claim at issue “ ‘aris[es] from’ ” such protected
activity – a burden that courts have recognized “is not always easily met.”
9
(Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 66.) “[A]
claim does not ‘arise from’ protected activity simply because it was filed after,
or because of, protected activity,” much less because protected activity
“provides evidentiary support or context for the claim.” (Rand Resources,
LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610, 621.) Instead, the protected
activity “must ‘supply elements of the challenged claims.’ ” (Ibid.; see also
Wilson, at p. 884 [“To determine whether a claim arises from protected
activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the
basis for liability.’ ”].)
If the defendant prevails at the first step, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the
challenged claim or claims. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 884.) To establish a probability of prevailing, the nonmoving party—here,
plaintiffs—“must demonstrate that the claim is ‘legally sufficient and
factually substantiated’—that is, the claim has ‘ “minimal merit” ’ and the
factual showing supporting it, if accepted, ‘would be sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment.’ ” (Guracar, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 341; see also
Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 291.)
A trial court at the second step “does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has
stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence
as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats
the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th
376, 384–385 (Baral).) “If the plaintiff is unable to demonstrate that his or
her claim has at least minimal merit, then the trial court should deem the
10
cause of action a SLAPP and should strike it.” (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th
at p. 760.)
B. Standard of Review
“We review de novo the grant or denial of any anti-SLAPP motion.
[Citation.] We exercise independent judgment in determining whether, based
on our own review of the record, the challenged claims arise from protected
activity.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) We consider the pleadings and
declarations, accepting as true the evidence that favors the plaintiff and
evaluating the defendant’s evidence “ ‘ “ ‘only to determine if it has defeated
that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.’ ” ’ ” (Barry, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 321.)
If we conclude that the trial court did not err in its resolution of the
first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, we may affirm the court’s order without
considering the second step of the anti-SLAPP framework. (See Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1061; Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer &
Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 110 (Optional).)
C. Evidentiary Objections
Steiner contends the trial court erroneously overruled certain
objections to the Khalil and Warrick declarations and suggests the improper
consideration of plaintiffs’ evidence constituted prejudicial error. Plaintiffs
respond that Steiner has shown no abuse of discretion in the court’s rulings,
and even if this court were to consider only the evidence to which there were
no objections made, that would be sufficient to defeat the motion to strike.
We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings in connection with an
anti-SLAPP motion for an abuse of discretion. (Morrow v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1424, 1444.) To be considered for
purposes of deciding the anti-SLAPP motion, the statements at issue must be
11
“ ‘capable of being admitted at trial, i.e., evidence which is competent,
relevant and not barred by a substantive rule.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High
School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 947 (Sweetwater).)
That is, the court may consider a plaintiff’s declaration “if it is reasonably
possible the proffered evidence set out in those statements will be admissible
at trial.” (Id. at p. 949.) The court abuses its discretion only when its
decision “exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it
being considered.” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.)
Regarding the declaration of Khalil, the trial court sustained several of
Steiner’s objections on grounds of speculation and lack of foundation.
However, it overruled those objections pertaining to Khalil’s statements
about her fear and intimidation, which the court found were relevant to
certain causes of action. The court similarly sustained certain objections to
the declaration of Warrick, which was substantively almost identical to that
of Khalil. However, the court overruled two objections because they
described party statements.
Steiner asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his objections
(Nos. 10 and 12) challenging Khalil’s statement about her belief as to why
Steiner confronted plaintiffs and, in her words, “ ‘physically and verbally
attacked’ ” them. Her declaration stated, “ ‘It is my belief that [d]efendant
confronted us because we were wearing hijabs, because we were young
women, and because of what our sign read. It is my belief that [d]efendant
acted with the intention to intimidate us and cause harm, both physical and
emotional.’ ” Further, “ ‘It is my belief that [d]efendant physically and
verbally attacked us because we were Palestinian and for writing “Free
Palestine” on Scribble Hill.’ ” Steiner contends that his objections should
12
have been sustained on grounds of speculation because the statements opine
on Steiner’s state of mind and intentions, which Khalil could not know.
“ ‘ “A lay witness may express an opinion based on his or her
perception, but only where helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s
testimony (Evid. Code, § 800, subd. (b)), ‘i.e., where the concrete observations
on which the opinion is based cannot otherwise be conveyed.’ [Citation.]”
[Citation.] Such a situation may arise when a witness’s impression of what
he or she observes regarding the appearance and demeanor of another rests
on “subtle or complex interactions” between them [citation] or when it is
impossible to otherwise adequately convey to the jury the witness’s concrete
observations. [Citations.] A lay witness generally may not give an opinion
about another person’s state of mind, but may testify about objective behavior
and describe behavior as being consistent with a state of mind.’ ” (People v.
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 456 (Sanchez); see People v. Guenther (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 483, 527–528 (Guenther).)
Khalil’s statements are lay witness opinion based on her perception
and observations of Steiner’s perceived intent, not factual statements of
Steiner’s actual intent. The Evidence Code does not bar admission of such
opinion testimony. (See Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 456; Guenther,
supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 528.) The factual underpinnings of Khalil’s
statements (i.e., the women were wearing hijabs and the content of their
sign) are not contested. In the emotionally charged context of the parties’
interaction, Khalil’s opinion based on her firsthand perception of Steiner’s
conduct and demeanor involves the complex influences of social cues, body
language, and past experience. Under these circumstances, we discern no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling as to objection Nos. 10 and 12 to
13
the Khalil declaration, nor to objection Nos. 6, 9, and 10 of the substantively
identical Warrick declaration.
Steiner also contends the trial court also erred in overruling his
objection Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 to the Khalil declaration, as well as the parallel
objection Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9 to the Warrick declaration. He asserts that the
video evidence directly contradicts the subject statements in plaintiffs’
declarations regarding what Steiner said, and the court should have
sustained his objections on the ground that the statements violate the “best
evidence rule” (citing Evid. Code, § 1523) and misquote Steiner’s speech
(citing Evid. Code, §§ 210, 352, 403).
We are not persuaded that the trial court abused its discretion in
overruling these objections. The record establishes that only portions of the
interaction were recorded by cell phone video. The video appears to begin
when Steiner is already on top of the dune and dismantling plaintiffs’ sign.
As to statements in the Khalil and Warrick declarations concerning Steiner’s
alleged language as he “ ‘began rapidly charging up the hill’ ” toward them
and as he “ ‘climbed further up the sand dune calling us terrorists,’ ” it is
unclear whether these alleged statements may have been made prior to the
start of the recording. Thus, they are not excluded by the general prohibition
against oral testimony to prove the content of a writing (or, in this case, a
video recording). (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 475 (Panah)
[treating videotape as a “writing” for purposes of best evidence rule].)
Moreover, to the extent the quoted language in the declarations differs
from the video evidence, as with respect to Steiner’s alleged reference to
plaintiffs being Hamas supporters and “ ‘killing babies,’ ” the contents of the
statements themselves are not directly at issue in the anti-SLAPP motion.
(Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 475 [explaining the best evidence rule
14
“ ‘applies only when the contents of a writing are at issue’ ”].) Steiner’s
potential liability with respect to plaintiffs’ claims does not hinge on the
words that were spoken in his oral exchange with plaintiffs but on his
physical conduct and the inferences of threat, intimidation, and/or fear of
imminent harm and offensive contact that may reasonably be drawn from
that evidence. The court “may consider” a plaintiff’s declaration “if it is
reasonably possible the proffered evidence set out in those statements will be
admissible at trial.” (Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 949.) Moreover, we
agree with plaintiffs that even assuming this evidence to be inadmissible
under the standard articulated in Sweetwater, the exclusion of those
statements does not alter our first step anti-SLAPP analysis, which focuses
primarily on the claims and allegations in the complaint, and on limited
evidence in the declarations establishing the context of the interaction and
each side’s perception of what transpired. We decide any abuse of discretion
with respect to the trial court’s rulings on these evidentiary objections is
harmless. (Panah, at p. 475.)
D. Application of the Anti-SLAPP Statute to Plaintiffs’ Claims
Steiner bears the initial burden to demonstrate that plaintiffs’
negligence, Bane Act, Ralph Act, and assault claims arise from protected acts
under section 425.16(e). He does not challenge the trial court’s decision as to
plaintiffs’ battery cause of action.
“To demonstrate that the ‘challenged allegations or claims “aris[e]
from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged’ [citation],
[Steiner] must first make a prima facie showing that [his] conduct falls
within one of the categories set out in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Laker,
supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 762–763.) Steiner contends that his conduct
falls within the final two statutory provisions of section 425.16(e).
15
Section 425.16(e)(3) defines protected activity to include “any written or
oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum
in connection with an issue of public interest.” Section 425.16(e)(4) defines
protected activity to include “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.”
For purposes of section 425.16(e)(3), “[a] public forum is a place open to
the use of the general public ‘ “for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” ’ ” (Weinberg v.
Feisel (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1130.) Although not defined by statute,
courts have interpreted the phrase “issue of public interest” to refer to
“something of concern to a substantial number of people” (id. at p. 1132) with
“some degree of closeness between the challenged statements and the
asserted public interest.” (Ibid.) As the phrase “in connection with . . . an
issue of public interest” also applies to section 425.16(e)(4), we address the
“issue of public interest” together. (See Bernstein v. LaBeouf (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 15, 22.) With respect to section 425.16(e)(4), a court “must
consider the context as well the content of a statement in determining
whether that statement furthers the exercise of constitutional speech rights
in connection with a matter of public interest.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149 (FilmOn).)
We agree with the trial court’s assessment that “much of” Steiner’s
“speech and activity in taking down the message on the sand dune is
protected under the First Amendment.” Steiner’s initial conduct during the
encounter at Scribble Hill consisted of (1) engaging in a heated oral exchange
with three individuals about their public display of support for the
Palestinian cause during a time of heightened public awareness and debate
16
over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and (2) physically disassembling the
sticks and shrubs that made up the disputed message.
The timing of these acts shortly after the October 7, 2023 attack by
Hamas on Israel, the publicly accessible and highly visible location on
Scribble Hill, and the subject matter of the dispute, place Steiner’s oral
statements and conduct dismantling plaintiffs’ sign within the statutory
framework for “statement[s] . . . made in a place open to the public or a public
forum in connection with an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16(e)(3).)
Further, the close nexus between Steiner’s exercise of his right of free speech
and the asserted issue of public interest (disagreeing and attempting to undo
the “ ‘Free Palestine’ ” message visible to passersby) fulfills the “ ‘in
connection with’ requirement” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149) for
purposes of section 425.16(e)(4).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that certain aspects of Steiner’s conduct
challenging plaintiffs’ political speech, such as by engaging in a heated oral
exchange about the sign’s message, come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP
statute. They assert that their claims “are not based on” Steiner’s protected
speech insofar as they “do not seek to hold Steiner liable because he
decimated their sign or shouted Islamophobic rhetoric at them.” Rather, they
maintain the allegations concerning Steiner’s speech and conduct
dismantling the sign are provided merely to describe the context and motive
for the intimidating and threatening language and physical attack that
followed—demonstrating that Steiner targeted plaintiffs “because they are
Muslim and supporters of Palestine.”
Plaintiffs are correct that, to meet his threshold burden, Steiner must
not only show that his conduct falls within one of the categories set out in
section 425.16(e), but that each challenged “cause of action arises from that
17
protected conduct.” (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 763.) As explained in
Laker, “The California Supreme Court has clarified the test for determining
whether something arises from protected conduct. ‘[A] claim may be struck
only if the speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and
not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which
liability is asserted.’ (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) To determine
whether the speech constitutes the wrong itself or is merely evidence of a
wrong, ‘in ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion courts should consider the
elements of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply
those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ (Id. at
p. 1063.)” (Laker, at p. 763; accord, Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
We separately address the four claims at issue.
1. Negligence
The complaint alleged that on the date in question, Steiner “w[as]
negligent in that [he] carelessly failed to exercise due care by confronting and
engaging in a verbal confrontation with plaintiffs as alleged herein.” The
cause of action further “reallege[d] and incorporate[d] by reference” the
allegations previously set forth. These allegations included that Steiner
“approached the plaintiffs and called them terrorists,” “accused [them] of
being members or supporters of Hamas” and of “killing babies and be-heading
children,” “started violently dismantling their sign and charged directly at
the girls while continuing to threaten them,” and “accosted 13-year[-]old []
Maryam Khalil, grabbed her around the neck and waist, and threw her cell
phone on the bike path.”
“To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff must show
that the ‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that he breached that duty,
and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting
18
injury.’ ” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213 (Brown).)
“[N]ot every defendant owes every plaintiff a duty of care. A duty exists only
if ‘ “the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the
defendant’s conduct.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Civil Code section 1714 sets out the “ ‘general
rule’ governing duty.” (Brown, at p. 213.) It “establishes the default rule that
each person has a duty ‘to exercise, in his or her activities, reasonable care for
the safety of others.’ ” (Id. at p. 214.) This general duty obligates a person
“ ‘to exercise due care in his or her own actions so as not to create an
unreasonable risk of injury to others.’ ” (Ibid.)
Steiner contends that he owed plaintiffs no special duty beyond this
general duty of reasonable care, and the “dismantling of a political sign and
verbal disagreement on a publicly visible sand dune did not create a duty to
avoid confrontation.” Steiner points out that if participating in
constitutionally protected speech were to give rise to a duty to avoid
contentious political debate, it would create a substantial chilling effect.
Steiner further asserts there is no allegation to support the element of
breach, since plaintiffs’ “entire theory of breach rests on the claim that
Steiner’s verbal exchanges and expressive conduct during the debate
constituted negligence.” He maintains that although the cause of action
incorporates prior factual allegations, the “complaint on its face seeks to
impose liability based on [his] speech and expressive conduct.”
Plaintiffs counter that the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections do not
safeguard violent and threatening acts, even if conducted in the context of
political protest or speech. (See, e.g., Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832,
851–852 [affirming denial of anti-SLAPP motion to the extent causes of
action against Doe defendants arose from unprotected acts (including
19
accosting patrons and slashing car tires) conducted during protests against
restaurant hosting a North Vietnamese communist flag].)
Steiner’s narrow reading of the complaint overlooks the allegations that
form the basis for plaintiffs’ claim for damages and plaintiffs’ framing of the
conduct giving rise to the negligence claim. Courts have a duty to liberally
construe the allegations of the complaint “for the purpose of determining its
effect, . . . with a view to substantial justice between the parties.” (§ 452; see
also § 425.16, subd. (b)(2) [court shall consider the pleadings and affidavits in
considering the facts upon which liability is based].) To ignore the
allegations incorporated by reference under the negligence claim would
contravene this basic principle of law and negate the efficacy of a common
pleading practice. (See Kajima Engineering & Construction, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 921, 931–932; see also ComputerXpress,
Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1001 [considering whether
incorporation of cause of action into later cause of action in complaint was
sufficient for court to conclude the later-alleged cause of action arose from
protected activity].)
Construing the allegations of the complaint liberally (as we must) for
purposes of evaluating the facts upon which the negligence claim is based, we
read the negligence claim alleging a failure to exercise due care “by
confronting and engaging in a verbal confrontation with plaintiffs as alleged
herein” (italics added) as based upon the full range of conduct described in
the confrontation. This includes the allegations that Steiner “charged
directly” at plaintiffs “while continuing to threaten them” and “accosted”
Maryam by grabbing her and throwing and breaking her phone.
Furthermore, “ ‘[i]n deciding whether the “arising from” requirement is
met, a court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits
20
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b).)’ [Citation.] Thus, we are ‘not limited to examining the allegations
of the complaint alone but rather consider the pleadings and the factual
material submitted in connection with the special motion to strike.’ ”
(Optional, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 111.) The declarations submitted in
opposition to and in support of the motion characterize differently the nature
and intensity of the words that were spoken and Steiner’s physical conduct
but generally reinforce our conclusion that the confrontation encompassed
more than a heated exchange of words. According to plaintiffs, Steiner
rapidly ascended the hill and “charged directly” toward plaintiffs, dismantled
the “Free Palestine” sign while heatedly arguing and accusing plaintiffs of
supporting or being members of Hamas, and engaged in a physical
altercation that at a minimum consisted of Steiner wrenching the cell phone
from Maryam and throwing it to the street.
As our Supreme Court has explained, “a claim may be struck only if the
speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just
evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability
is asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) “A cause of action may be
‘triggered by’ or associated with a protected act, but it does not necessarily
mean the cause of action arises from that act.” (Kolar v. Donahue, McIntosh
& Hammerton (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1537 (Kolar); Park, at p. 1063
[“ ‘[T]he mere fact that an action was filed after protected activity took place
does not mean the action arose from that activity for the purposes of the anti-
SLAPP statute.’ ”].)
As alleged, Steiner’s expressions of disagreement with plaintiffs’
message by disputing and dismantling the sign did not occur in a vacuum but
unfolded concurrently with alleged unlawful conduct comprising physical
21
aggression and oral intimidation. Steiner’s speech, standing alone, provides
context and evidence for the claim of liability but that does not mean the
action arose from it for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statute. Instead, the
factual allegations that “supply [the] elements” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at
p. 1064) of plaintiffs’ negligence claim are those describing Steiner’s
aggressive and threatening conduct during the course of the verbal
confrontation, marked by Steiner allegedly yelling “ ‘I’m coming for you,’ ”
physically charging toward plaintiffs, pulling apart their sign while accusing
them of being terrorists or supporting terrorism, and grabbing Maryam.
Thus, it is the conduct that accompanied Steiner’s protected speech, including
the intimidating language, rapid approach and threat that he was “ ‘coming
for [them],’ ” and alleged physical escalation of the conflict, that gives rise to
the elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages. Plaintiffs might not
be “ ‘ “entitled to legal protection against” ’ ” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 213) a passerby engaging in offensive speech while criticizing a political
protest message, but they are entitled to legal protection from allegedly
threatening and intimidating conduct that escalates into a physical attack.
This court’s decision in Laker demonstrates the distinction between
protected speech that itself gives rise to the challenged claim and
“[a]llegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without
supporting a claim for recovery.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394.) Laker, a
university professor, sued the university and its associate dean for
defamation and retaliation in connection with internal investigations
conducted into complaints against the then-chair of the department, as well
as against Laker. (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at pp. 753–754.) As to the
retaliation cause of action, the appellate court recognized that the complaint
alleged retaliation arising from both protected and unprotected activity. (Id.
22
at p. 758.) We explained, “While Laker will no doubt need to use speech by
University employees as evidence to support his claims, the speech is not—by
itself—the basis of the claim.” (Id. at p. 773.) Instead, the court decided that
“Laker’s retaliation cause of action is premised on his allegation that the
University’s decision to pursue three ‘meritless’ investigations of Laker was
itself conduct in retaliation for” Laker’s actions in the prior investigation of
the department chair. (Id. at p. 776.) This court therefore affirmed the trial
court’s order denying the university’s anti-SLAPP motion against the
retaliation cause of action “insofar as it is based on the allegations that the
University pursued three meritless investigations of [Laker] and decided to
red flag him.” (Id. at p. 777.)
In this case, there is no question that plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in
response to protected speech activity, insofar as Steiner’s verbal
disagreement with plaintiffs about their sign and its significance in light of
the October 7 attack on Israel and war in Gaza constituted such protected
speech. Nevertheless, the claim for negligence falls outside of the anti-
SLAPP statute’s protection because it arises from Steiner’s unprotected
conduct with respect to his duty to not engage in threats, intimidation, or
physical violence while exercising his free speech right to disagree with
another’s public political statement.
Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is akin to the retaliation claim in Laker,
which in relevant part was not based on the university employees’ protected
statements during the investigation of Laker, but on the alleged retaliatory
and meritless investigations initiated by the university after the
investigation into the department chair. (Laker, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at
p. 777; see also Kolar, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1540 [affirming denial of
anti-SLAPP motion because plaintiffs’ attorney malpractice claim did not
23
arise from the attorney’s protected activity (litigating the client’s case) under
section 425.16(e) but on the “attorney’s incompetent handling” of that prior
representation].)
Steiner argues that the trial court erred by separating his conduct into
isolated moments and failed to consider the entire context of the incident.
Citing Baral, he asserts that courts must analyze whether the limited,
unprotected conduct (i.e., grabbing the phone) was “inextricably linked to the
protected expressive conduct and whether it was incidental or necessary to
effectuate the speech-related activity.” This argument misconstrues Baral.
In Baral, our Supreme Court clarified that when a cause of action is based on
allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the court at the first
step of the anti-SLAPP procedure disregards the unprotected activity to
decide only whether “relief is sought based on allegations arising from
activity protected by the statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) If relief
is indeed sought based on allegations arising from protected activity, the
second step is reached. (Ibid.)
Because plaintiffs’ negligence claim arises from Steiner’s alleged
threatening and physically aggressive conduct against plaintiffs that
accompanied the verbal confrontation and not from his triggering speech in
response to plaintiffs’ “Free Palestine” sign, Steiner has failed to meet his
burden at the first step of the anti-SLAPP procedure. We therefore affirm the
trial court’s denial of the anti-SLAPP motion as to the negligence cause of
action.
2. Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1)
Steiner contends that plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim “necessarily arises
from and relates to Steiner’s speech and expressive conduct.” Relying on the
trial court’s finding that he “ ‘may have satisfied his burden as to the [Bane
24
Act] causes of action,’ ” Steiner makes only a conclusory argument that “any
allegations related to” his “speech at the top of the dune necessarily stem
from speech-related activities and expressive conduct” and focuses on
plaintiffs’ burden at the second step to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on the merits. The conclusory argument that the claim
“necessarily stem[s]” from protected speech is insufficient to carry Steiner’s
burden. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948
[appellant must support each claim with meaningful analysis and citation to
legal authority].)
Drawing from his arguments relative to the second step analysis and
his points and authorities in support of his motion before the trial court,
Steiner maintains that plaintiffs’ characterization of his actions on the sand
dune as threatening is insufficient to avoid being stricken under the anti-
SLAPP statute because the interactions “while contentious, were protected
speech concerning a public issue.” Steiner asserts that his speech never
threatened violence, even in the video recordings, and the allegations of
physical contact do not support an inference of intent to suppress plaintiffs’
speech, since his grabbing of the phone occurred only in response to plaintiffs
kicking sand onto his bike and refusing to stop despite his demand to stop.
The Bane Act authorizes a private right of action for damages and
injunctive relief against a person, “whether or not acting under color of law,”
who “interferes by threat, intimidation, or coercion, or attempts to interfere
by threat, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or enjoyment . . . of
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the
rights secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” (Civ. Code, § 52.1,
subd. (b); Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 841.) The
California Supreme Court has explained that while “Civil Code section 52.1
25
was adopted ‘to stem a tide of hate crimes’ ” (Venegas, at p. 843), the statute
is not “limited to such crimes” (ibid.) and does not require a plaintiff to show
the alleged threat or intimidation had a discriminatory purpose. (Ibid.)
Nevertheless, speech alone is insufficient to establish a Bane Act violation
unless “the speech itself threatens violence.” (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (k)7;
Julian v. Mission Community Hospital (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 360, 395.)
“[T]he statute was intended to address only egregious interferences with
constitutional rights, not just any tort. The act of interference with a
constitutional right must itself be deliberate or spiteful.” (Shoyoye v. County
of Los Angeles (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959.)
Like plaintiffs’ negligence claim, the facts upon which the Bane Act
claim are based are not limited to the purely oral exchange or expressive
conduct (dismantling the sign) that occurred on top of the sand dune. The
Bane Act claim asserted in plaintiffs’ second cause of action alleged that
Steiner “engaged in threats, intimidation or coercion that caused plaintiffs to
reasonably believe that if they exercised their right to free speech and
expression, then [Steiner] would commit violence against them and that
[Steiner] had the apparent ability to carry out the threats.” It further alleged
that Steiner “acted violently against plaintiffs and their property to prevent
them from exercising their right to free speech and expression,” “violently
retaliated against plaintiffs for having exercised those rights,” and “engaged
7 Civil Code section 52.1, subdivision (k) states, “Speech alone is not
sufficient to support an action brought pursuant to subdivision (b) or (c),
except upon a showing that the speech itself threatens violence against a
specific person or group of persons; and the person or group of persons
against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that, because of the
speech, violence will be committed against them or their property and that
the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to carry out the
threat.”
26
in this conduct in violation of [p]laintiffs’ civil rights, including . . . the rights
afforded to them by [Civil] Code [section] 43 et seq. to be free from bodily
harm or insult.” It also realleged and incorporated the factual allegations
previously set forth.
The claim that Steiner engaged in threats and intimidation and acted
violently toward plaintiffs and their property to prevent them from exercising
their rights of speech and expression and/or in response to their having
exercised those rights must be construed together with the oral insults,
physical intimidation, and physical grabbing of Maryam alleged in the
complaint’s factual allegations. These allegations related to Steiner’s
physical actions undercut his argument that his oral debate with plaintiffs
concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and dismantling of their sign is the
wrong complained of, as opposed to “evidence of liability or a step leading to
some different act” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060) giving rise to the
liability asserted. While liability under the Bane Act cannot be based on
speech alone, it may be based on “a showing that the speech itself threatens
violence against a specific person or group of persons; and the person or
group of persons against whom the threat is directed reasonably fears that,
because of the speech, violence will be committed against them or their
property and that the person threatening violence had the apparent ability to
carry out the threat.” (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (k).)
Here, the interwoven nature of the allegations, which include both
protected speech and unprotected intimidation, aggression, and physical
violence, complicate the first step analysis. Nevertheless, by disregarding the
unprotected activity and looking only to whether “relief is sought based on
allegations arising from” protected activity (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396),
we conclude that the Bane Act claim does not seek relief based on Steiner’s
27
protected conduct. Instead, that conduct provides evidence supporting the
claim of liability. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) The factual allegations
that “supply [the] elements” of the Bane Act claim (id. at p. 1064) are those
focused upon the alleged act of charging at plaintiffs and accosting Maryam,
which given the context in which those acts occurred—including Steiner’s
alleged statements about support for terrorism, reference to plaintiffs as
Palestinians, and “violent[] dismantling” of their sign—gave rise to plaintiffs’
claim of intimidation and threat based on the exercise of their constitutional
rights. (Civ. Code, § 52.1, subd. (b).)
We decide that plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim arises from Steiner’s
unprotected conduct, not the speech and expressive conduct providing context
for and supporting the claim for liability. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
denial of the anti-SLAPP motion as to the Bane Act cause of action.
3. Ralph Act (Civ. Code, § 51.7)
Steiner contends the trial court erroneously denied the anti-SLAPP
motion with respect to plaintiffs’ Ralph Act claim. Steiner maintains that
insofar as the Ralph Act prohibits conduct similar to that of the Bane Act,
plaintiffs’ claim is also “based entirely on Steiner’s expressive conduct.” He
asserts that the “prolonged, nonviolent verbal disagreement” with plaintiffs
at the top of the sand dune “in which [plaintiffs]’ national origin and political
views were clear” took place “without violence or threats by Steiner.” He
further asserts that the record confirms that his statements “were political in
nature, directed at Hamas and the broader geopolitical conflict, rather than
at [plaintiffs] as individuals.”
It is Steiner’s burden as the appellant to demonstrate the trial court
erred in finding that the conduct giving rise to plaintiffs’ Ralph Act claims
28
was not protected by section 425.16. (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
616, 620.)
Under the Ralph Act, “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state
have the right to be free from any violence, or intimidation by threat of
violence, committed against their persons or property because of political
affiliation, or on account of any characteristic listed or defined in subdivision
(b) or (e) of [s]ection 51,[8] . . . or because another person perceives them to
have one or more of those characteristics. The identification in this
subdivision of particular bases of discrimination is illustrative rather than
restrictive.” (Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (b)(1).)
As with the Bane Act, a violation of the Ralph Act based on “[s]peech
alone” (Civ. Code, § 51.7, subd. (e)(1)) requires a showing that the offending
speech “itself threatens violence against a specific person or group of
persons.” (Id., subd. (e)(1)(A).) The plaintiff must show “all of” the
enumerated elements (id., subd. (e)(1)) including not only that the speech
threatens violence, but that the person threatening violence “is acting in
reckless disregard for the threatening nature of their speech” (id., subd.
(e)(1)(C)), “has the apparent ability to carry out the threat” (id., subd.
(e)(1)(D)), and that the person or group against whom the threat is directed
“reasonably fears that, because of the speech, violence will be committed
against them or their property” (id., subd. (e)(1)(B)).
8 Civil Code section 51, subdivisions (b) and (e) list and define certain
protected categories of persons for purposes of receiving equal
accommodations, privileges, or services in business establishments. These
categories include a person’s “sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, disability, medical condition, genetic information, marital status,
sexual orientation, citizenship, primary language, or immigration status.”
(Id., subd. (b).)
29
Steiner’s characterization of plaintiffs’ claim as based upon conduct
consisting entirely of political speech and expressive conduct, without
violence or threats, is contradicted by the complaint and plaintiffs’
declarations. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for
violation of the Ralph Act alleged that on the date of the incident, Steiner
“committed a violent act against [p]laintiffs and their property,” and a
“substantial motivating reason” for his conduct was his “perception of
[p]laintiffs’ national origin, race, citizenship, and political affiliation.” The
complaint further alleged that plaintiffs sustained economic and emotional
harm because of Steiner’s conduct. It also realleged and incorporated the
prior factual allegations.
The alleged conduct giving rise to plaintiffs’ Ralph Act claim is
unambiguously the commission of “a violent act” against plaintiffs and their
property. Construing the Ralph Act claim with the incorporated allegations,
plaintiffs have alleged that Steiner physically charged at them, grabbed
Maryam, and threw the cell phone to the ground, breaking it. Furthermore,
plaintiffs have alleged that this conduct was substantially motivated by
Steiner’s perception of plaintiffs as being Palestinian or of Palestinian
national origin, as also evidenced by Khalil’s and Warrick’s declarations that
as Steiner approached and dismantled the sign, he accused them of being
“ ‘peak Palestinian’ ” and of supporting terrorism and Hamas. Thus, the
claim for violation of the Ralph Act is based upon allegations that Steiner
made threatening advances toward plaintiffs and accosted Maryam in
substantial part because of their ancestry or national origin. (See Siam v.
Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1570 [affirming denial at first step of
anti-SLAPP motion based on claim for violation of Civil Code section 51.7,
30
where the complaint alleged “that defendant committed violence and made
threats of violence against plaintiff based upon his religion”].)
Given the nature of the alleged conduct underlying the cause of action,
Steiner’s contention that the claim is based solely on political speech and
expressive conduct is unpersuasive. Steiner has failed to show that the
challenged cause of action arises from his protected conduct debating
plaintiffs’ ideology and attempting to erase their public protest message, as
opposed to his alleged acts of physical aggression. (Laker, supra, 32
Cal.App.5th at p. 763; Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) Put differently,
Steiner’s expressions of political disagreement and identification of plaintiffs
as Muslim or Palestinian women did not give rise to the Ralph Act claim but
are arguably revelatory of his motive for attacking them. We conclude the
trial court did not err in denying Steiner’s motion as to plaintiffs’ Ralph Act
claim at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
4. Assault
Steiner contends the trial court erred in concluding that the anti-
SLAPP statute does not apply to plaintiffs’ assault claim. He asserts that
“the record contains no evidence that Steiner engaged in any threatening
conduct” to support the elements of assault. Specifically, he maintains the
record contains no suggestion that he made any threatening gestures,
advanced toward plaintiffs in an aggressive manner, or engaged in conduct
that could reasonably be construed as an attempt to instill fear of bodily
harm, and asserts that the only portion of the interaction in which plaintiffs
could plausibly claim to have experienced apprehension of imminent harm or
offensive contact occurred at the top of the sand dune.
We do not agree with Steiner’s characterization of the record or the
pleadings. Furthermore, plaintiffs’ evidentiary burden is not germane to the
31
test at the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. We do not, at this juncture,
consider the adequacy of evidence in the record to support a meritorious
claim, nor even whether plaintiffs can make a prima facie showing of their
likelihood of prevailing on the merits of the challenged claim. (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1); Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.) By focusing on the evidence
in the record, Steiner appears to conflate the parties’ burdens at the first and
second steps of the analysis. In so doing, Steiner does not meet his initial
burden of showing that the alleged conduct or speech underlying the
challenged claim—here, assault—falls within one or more of the categories of
protected acts he has identified under section 425.16(e). (Wilson, at p. 884.)
A civil assault claim “ ‘is based upon an invasion of the right of a person
to live without being put in fear of personal harm. Every person has “the
right of protection from bodily restraint or harm.” ’ ” (Plotnik v. Meihaus
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590, 1604.) Its elements are: (1) defendant acted
with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch
plaintiffs in a harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiffs reasonably believed
they were about to be touched in a harmful or offensive manner; (3) plaintiffs
did not consent to defendant’s conduct; (4) plaintiffs were harmed; and
(5) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiffs’ harm.
(So v. Shin (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 652, 668–669.)
Incorporating the allegations previously set forth in the complaint, the
cause of action for assault alleged that, by his actions, Steiner intended to
cause harmful or offensive contact and plaintiffs reasonably believed they
were about to be touched, without their consent, in a harmful and offensive
manner. Based on the incorporation by reference of the factual allegations of
the complaint, the allegation that plaintiffs reasonably believed they were
about to be touched in a harmful and offensive manner cannot reasonably be
32
construed as being based exclusively on Steiner’s protected speech or
expressive acts toward the sign.
As with plaintiffs’ Bane Act claim, the allegations underlying the
assault claim include both protected acts (Steiner’s allegedly offensive
rhetoric and “violent” dismantling of the “Free Palestine” sign) and
unprotected acts involving aggression and physical violence (Steiner’s alleged
acts of charging toward plaintiffs, grabbing Maryam, and throwing her phone
to the street with force enough for it to shatter). Steiner’s assertion that
plaintiffs’ reasonable apprehension of imminent harm or offensive contact
could only have taken place at the top of the dune while Steiner was
disassembling the sign and arguing with plaintiffs about their message is
contravened by the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint.
Disregarding Steiner’s unprotected acts of physical aggression and
looking only to whether “relief is sought based on allegations arising from”
his protected speech and expressive conduct (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 396), we conclude that the assault claim—like the cause of action for
violation of the Bane Act—does not arise from Steiner’s protected conduct,
though his speech and mannerisms at the top of the dune provides
explanatory context and arguable support for the alleged assault. (See Park,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) We will therefore affirm the trial court’s denial
of the anti-SLAPP motion as to the assault cause of action.
Having determined that none of plaintiffs’ claims at issue on appeal
arise from those aspects of Steiner’s alleged conduct constituting protected
speech activities under section 425.16(e)(3) and (4), we need not decide
whether plaintiffs have met their burden at the second step of the anti-
SLAPP procedure to establish a probability of prevailing on their claims.
(Optional, supra, 18 Cal.App.5th at p. 110.)
33
Our analysis herein should not be construed as offering any opinion on
the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. (D.C. v. R.R. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1190,
1225.) We have determined only that Steiner may not rely on the protected
nature of his initial conduct engaging in an argument with plaintiffs over
their public political views as grounds at this early stage to dismiss plaintiffs’
lawsuit by way of an anti-SLAPP motion, where the claims at issue do not
arise from that protected conduct but from the unprotected acts that
followed.
III. DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the special motion to strike under Code
of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover
reasonable costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)
34
______________________________________
Danner, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H052541
Khalil et al. v. Steiner
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