CourtListener 10747033•People v. Valenzuela CA6
Testo completo
Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Valenzuela CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052929
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 24CR001786)
v.
NICOLAS UBALDO VALENZUELA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Nicolas Ubaldo Valenzuela appeals from a final judgment in a criminal
action. Appointed counsel filed an opening brief summarizing the case but raising no
issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf.
Defendant responded by filing a one-page handwritten supplemental brief.
Pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, we independently reviewed the entire record. Finding an arguable issue
concerning the trial court’s decision not to dismiss defendant’s prior strike conviction, we
invited supplemental briefing from both counsel. In this opinion, we discuss defendant’s
contentions and explain why we will affirm the judgment.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
In February 2024, defendant led officers on a high-speed chase after they
attempted to conduct a traffic stop on his car. During the chase, he reached a speed of
130 miles per hour. When officers eventually stopped the car and arrested defendant,
they found a loaded gun on the floor of the car and drugs in defendant’s socks.
Defendant was charged with possessing a controlled substance with a firearm
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1), possessing a firearm as a convicted
felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and reckless evasion of a peace officer
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 3). It was alleged that defendant had a prior strike
conviction. Five aggravating circumstances were also alleged: (1) that the crime
involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great bodily harm, or other acts
disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(1)); (2) that defendant was armed with a weapon when the crime was committed
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2)); (3) that defendant’s prior convictions as an adult
or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings were numerous or of
increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)); (4) that defendant had
served a prior prison term (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)); and (5) that defendant’s
prior performance on probation, mandatory supervision, post-release community
supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(5)).
After a motion to suppress evidence was denied, defendant pleaded no contest to
counts 2 and 3. He admitted the prior strike conviction and one prior prison term. He
also waived the right to appeal his convictions and any orders issued before the date of
the plea. The parties stipulated that defendant could move to dismiss his prior strike
conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero).
As the trial court and the parties described the agreement, defendant would receive a
sentence of up to four years in prison if the court denied his Romero motion; if the court
granted the Romero motion, it could impose a sentence of up to four years in prison or
place defendant on probation.
At the hearing on the Romero motion, defense counsel informed the trial court that
defendant recently married; his wife and mother were present at the hearing; he was
participating in various programs; and he was working in construction. Defense counsel
argued: “And so our position is that, hopefully, the Court will give him a chance, just
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give him a chance at probation. In the past, he did have a case where he was sentenced
on, but that one was—my understanding was on remittitur. It was completely
dismissed.”1 The prosecutor argued in response: “The People believe, despite that
reverse[d] conviction, the Defendant’s prior criminal record speaks for itself, and he is
within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law.”
In ruling on the motion, the trial court noted that defendant had “fled, in heavy
traffic, at speeds up to 130 miles per hour, which was an extreme danger” to the public,
defendant, and the pursuing officers. Officers then found a “loaded ghost gun,
methamphetamine, and cocaine” in defendant’s possession. Although defendant declined
to discuss the offense in detail with the probation officer, he denied having possessed
drugs at the time of his arrest. The court expressed its belief that defendant’s statements
to the probation officer showed “a lack of remorse and understanding.” The court also
noted defendant had “a history of untreated substance abuse” and had told the probation
officer that “he would accept outpatient, suggesting that he wouldn’t accept residential.”
He had only recently sought treatment after requesting that the sentencing hearing be
continued, which the court viewed as showing “somewhat dishonest efforts … to affect
the Court, as opposed to address actual substance abuse.” Defendant denied “any
association with criminal street gangs,” but the court observed that he was “covered in –
1
In 2019, defendant pleaded no contest to possessing a firearm as a convicted
felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)), possessing ammunition as a convicted felon
(Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)), misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), and misdemeanor resisting an officer (Pen.
Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). The underlying incident took place in 2017. Those
convictions were reversed on appeal in 2020 after a different panel of this court found
officers’ detention and search of defendant to have been unlawful. (See People v.
Valenzuela (Sep. 25, 2020, H046675) [nonpub. opn.].) The 2024 probation report listed
the reversed convictions as part of defendant’s criminal record. It also listed three other
felony convictions (all for offenses committed in 2005), as well as various misdemeanors
committed between 2002 and 2016.
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obvious – in reported gang tattoos” and had been housed at the jail “with fellow gang
members, upon his request.”
The trial court went on to describe defendant’s criminal history, which it said
consisted of “five prior felony convictions” including a strike conviction for a 2005
residential burglary. Defendant “was initially placed on probation” for the strike offense,
but was sent to prison after violating probation; he also violated parole four times after
being released from prison. In addition to other convictions and probation violations, the
court referred to a 2017 incident for which it said defendant “was placed on probation as
recently as 2019.” The court described that incident as defendant “involving himself in
guns, and drugs, and showing a threat to the public by possession of firearms.” Based on
its review of all the circumstances, including defendant’s criminal history, the court
denied the Romero motion.
Before the trial court sentenced defendant, defense counsel alerted the court to the
2019 convictions appearing in the probation report as part of defendant’s criminal record
despite the charges being dismissed after reversal on appeal. Counsel asked that the
reference to that case—which the court had mentioned in its Romero ruling—be stricken
from the probation report. The court then sentenced defendant to four years in prison,
consistent with the plea agreement. Defendant was (incorrectly) awarded five days of
presentence custody credit, consisting of three actual days and two days of conduct
credit. He timely appealed, indicating on the notice of appeal that he was challenging
“the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the
plea.”
In March 2025, while this appeal was pending, appointed appellate counsel wrote
to the trial court requesting correction of an apparent error in the calculation of
defendant’s presentence custody credit. Counsel noted that defendant had spent four
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days in custody and was therefore entitled to an additional day of credit.2 In the same
letter, counsel asked the court to “rule on defense counsel’s request at the sentencing
hearing to strike the inclusion of an April 19, 2017 offense in the probation report
because the matter was ultimately dismissed.” In August 2025, the trial court amended
the judgment to reflect six days of presentence custody credit, consisting of four actual
days and two days of conduct credit. The court also modified the probation report as
requested by counsel, striking the reference to the 2019 convictions (for offenses
committed in 2017) that had been reversed on appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. FACTORS CONSIDERED IN RULING ON ROMERO MOTION
We review the trial court’s denial of defendant’s Romero motion for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) A trial court is permitted to
strike one or more prior felony conviction allegations under Penal Code section 1385 for
sentencing purposes, but a “court’s discretion to strike prior felony conviction allegations
in furtherance of justice is limited.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) In exercising
its discretion, a trial court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions,
and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the [Three Strikes] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should
be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or
violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) A trial court may
abuse its discretion if it considers “impermissible factors” in declining to dismiss a prior
strike. (Carmony, at p. 378.)
2
We note the fourth day of actual custody credit remedied the previous
inconsistency with Penal Code section 4019 due to the award of conduct credits on fewer
than four days’ actual custody.
5
We invited supplemental briefing on the question of whether the trial court
considered impermissible factors in ruling on defendant’s request to dismiss his prior
strike conviction. Specifically, we asked the parties to address whether the court
improperly considered what it considered defendant’s two most recent felony convictions
from 2019, despite the parties’ agreement that those convictions were reversed on appeal
and were no longer part of defendant’s criminal record. In supplemental briefing,
defendant argues reversal is required because the court in part based its denial of the
Romero motion on the reversed convictions. The Attorney General contends the court
did not base its decision on those convictions and, even if it did, any error was harmless.
(We also invited the parties to address whether defendant forfeited the issue by not
specifically objecting after the trial court announced its reasons for not dismissing the
prior strike. As to that question, the Attorney General acknowledges that defense
counsel’s comments sufficiently “brought the error to the court’s attention” and therefore
does not assert forfeiture.)
In discussing defendant’s criminal history, the trial court referred to defendant’s
“five prior felony convictions” without acknowledging that two of those felonies had
been reversed. The court specifically mentioned the 2017 incident that resulted in the
reversed convictions, and noted the conviction offenses in that case. It described the
incident as defendant “involving himself in guns, and drugs, and showing a threat to the
public by possession of firearms.”
After the trial court announced its reasons for not dismissing the prior strike,
defense counsel alerted the court to the error in the probation report’s description of
defendant’s criminal record and asked that it be corrected. Based on that exchange, the
Attorney General asserts the court “impliedly reiterated its ruling” and “presumably
denied the Romero motion without relying on” the 2019 convictions, which the Attorney
General acknowledges the court should not have considered. We see no indication in the
record that the court actually revisited its Romero analysis after being alerted to the error.
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That the court did not correct the probation report until August 2025—prompted by a
further request from appellate counsel—makes even less clear that it took the correction
into account when deciding the Romero motion.
We therefore examine whether consideration of the 2019 convictions should lead
to reversal on this record. In their supplemental briefs, the parties appear to disagree
about the prejudice standard we should apply. Defendant cites People v. Gutierrez
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391, which discusses the standard that applies when a trial court
is not aware of the full scope of its sentencing discretion. In that context, the California
Supreme Court has “held that the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing
unless the record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (Ibid.) The Attorney
General cites People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492, which states that where “a trial
court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentence choice, a reviewing
court will set aside the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court would
have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were improper.”
Here it is clear that the trial court knew the scope of its discretion as to both the Romero
motion and the range of available sentencing options. The question is not how the court
would have ruled if it understood the full scope of its discretion, but whether it may have
exercised its discretion differently had it not considered the inaccurate information about
the status of defendant’s criminal record. We therefore adopt the standard for assessing
prejudice as proposed by the Attorney General. (See, e.g., People v. Leonard (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 465, 503 (Leonard).)
Under that standard, defendant has not shown prejudice. We acknowledge that the
reversed convictions were the most recent prior offenses mentioned by the trial court in
support of its ruling, and they represent the only two felony offenses since 2005. Had the
trial court based its denial of the Romero motion exclusively or even primarily on
defendant’s criminal history, reversal might be required. But before addressing
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defendant’s criminal history, the court mentioned that by his conduct in the current case
defendant placed himself and others in “extreme danger” and that he had shown “a lack
of remorse and understanding” about the seriousness of the events in his interview with
the probation officer. The court mentioned additional factors including defendant’s
“history of untreated substance abuse,” the self-serving “last minute” timing of his efforts
to address that issue, and his denial of “any association with criminal street gangs”
despite his request to be housed with a particular gang in the jail. Those factors provide
independent support for the trial court’s decision. (See Leonard, supra,
228 Cal.App.4th at p. 503.) Even limiting the analysis to only those factors and the
offenses that properly remained part of defendant’s criminal record at the time of the
court’s ruling, on this record we see no reasonable probability that the court would have
dismissed the prior strike.
In his handwritten brief (supplementing counsel’s opening brief and filed before
we invited further briefing from counsel), defendant contends the trial court “stereotype[d
him] for a tattoo” on his right cheek that the court misinterpreted as gang-related. We
note that defendant did not object at the time to the court’s consideration of his “reported
gang tattoos” and thus forfeited the issue. But even assuming the court’s characterization
and consideration of defendant’s tattoos was incorrect, we would find no prejudice under
the applicable standard. The court mentioned defendant’s tattoos only briefly as one of
two reasons it did not find defendant’s denial of “any association with criminal street
gangs” to be credible. The other, more compelling reason was, as the court described it,
defendant being housed at the jail “with fellow gang members, upon his request.” We
acknowledge the possibility that a tattoo may be misinterpreted and that even gang-
related tattoos may not reflect a defendant’s current gang affiliation. But in light of all
the factors properly noted and weighed by the trial court, we see no reasonable
probability that the court’s assessment of defendant’s facial tattoo materially affected the
outcome of the Romero motion.
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B. REMAINING ISSUES
Defendant also states in his handwritten supplemental brief that he was
“manipulated” into signing a form containing an appellate waiver that he believed to be a
different document that had reflected a more favorable disposition. That assertion is not
supported by the record. At the time of his plea, defendant confirmed to the court that he
understood and accepted the terms of the plea agreement. He also answered affirmatively
when specifically asked by the court whether he understood he was “waiving [his] state
and federal writs and appeals rights.” Defendant does not raise an arguable issue with
respect to his waiver of certain appellate rights.
In our request for supplemental briefing, we asked counsel to notify us of any
action taken by the trial court to correct apparent errors in the probation report and
presentence custody credits raised by defendant’s appellate counsel in a March 2025
letter to the trial court. As we have discussed, the trial court made both requested
corrections in August 2025, and the parties agree that the amended abstract of judgment
now accurately reflects the six days of presentence credit to which defendant is entitled.
We will therefore affirm the judgment as modified by the trial court.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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____________________________________
Grover, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
____________________________
Lie, J.
H052929
The People v. Valenzuela
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