CourtListener 10747030•People v. White CA2/7
Testo completo
Filed 12/3/25 P. v. White CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B331879
Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BA498963)
v.
MARTEL LATRICE WHITE,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Shelly Torrealba, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
John Lanahan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
Martel Latrice White appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered after a jury found him guilty of the voluntary
manslaughter of Johnathan McGhee. White contends on appeal
that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on
justifiable homicide based on defense of others and defense of
property. We conclude there was not substantial evidence to
support those instructions and any error in not instructing was
harmless.
White also argues the court erred by imposing upper term
sentences on the manslaughter conviction and firearm
enhancement because White did not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial on the alleged
aggravating factors. The Attorney General concedes and we
agree that White did not personally waive his right to a jury trial
on the aggravating factors that supported imposition of the upper
term, and the error was prejudicial. We affirm the conviction,
vacate the sentence, and remand for the People to have an
opportunity to try the aggravating factors before a jury and for
the court to resentence White.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Evidence at Trial
On July 28, 2021 White borrowed a car from Kayla
Thomas, with whom White had one child. White drove Thomas’s
car to the home of Deona Jackson to pick up Jackson and their
two children, a three-year-old boy and a one-year-old girl. White
2
and Jackson dropped their son at school and then drove to
White’s apartment. White parked Thomas’s car in his apartment
building’s parking lot and left Thomas’s keys in his apartment.
White and Jackson then took White’s car to get his windshield
fixed, run errands, and pick up their son at school. White was
carrying a gun in his pocket that day because he recently had
been followed by an unknown person.
While White and Jackson were running errands, Thomas
called White twice, asking him to return her car. White told
Thomas that he would meet her at his apartment to return her
car. After the second call from Thomas, however, McGhee called
White and yelled at him to “give [Thomas] her shit back.”1
McGhee sounded “angry and very hostile.” White told McGhee he
would bring the car out of the parking lot and leave it on the
street for Thomas with the keys in the car. But because of
McGhee’s hostile tone, White told him not to come to the gate of
White’s apartment building.
White and Jackson returned to White’s apartment building
with their two children. White parked his car in the building’s
parking lot, which was accessible by a gated driveway. As they
were getting the children out of the car, Jackson noticed McGhee
walking up the driveway toward them. When McGhee was only a
few feet away from White, McGhee began aggressively yelling,
1 White testified that he first met McGhee when White was a
teenager and dating Thomas. At the time, McGhee was Thomas’s
downstairs neighbor, and McGhee was angry that White was
dating her. On one occasion when White was leaving Thomas’s
apartment, McGhee swung at him, and the two fought. White
did not see McGhee again until about a month before the
shooting.
3
“Where the fuck the keys at?” and “I’ma beat your ass for this
car.” White replied, “I’m finna give you the key. . . . My kids is
right here, like, there’s no need for—like, just chill out.” White
was surprised McGhee had come into the parking lot because
White had told him to wait on the street.
At this point, White saw Romeo Morris walk up the
driveway. White knew Morris was McGhee’s friend. Morris had
both hands in his pockets, and White saw that Morris was
holding a gun in his right pocket. McGhee gestured for Morris to
stay back, and Morris retreated to about 10 to 15 feet away from
White and McGhee.
White tried to get into his apartment, but his key would not
work in the lock. A neighbor saw White and told him the
building manager had changed the locks earlier that day and
White would need to contact the manager for a new key. White
explained to McGhee that Thomas’s car keys were inside his
apartment and White would need to call the building manager to
retrieve them, but McGhee was still angry. McGhee told White,
“I’m going to beat your ass.” Jackson, who was holding their one-
year-old, stepped between the two men in an attempt to diffuse
the situation. She said, “It’s not going to be no fighting. My kids
right here.” McGhee aggressively slapped her hand away and
said, “Fuck them kids. I don’t give a fuck, I’ll slap you and those
kids.” Jackson walked away with the children toward the door of
the apartment building. When she turned to get her son, she saw
Morris point a gun at White. She grabbed her children and ran
between two cars “for cover.” She heard gunshots but could not
see who was shooting because she was “cover[ing]” her children,
and she did not come out from “ducking” behind the car until
after the shooting.
4
White testified that he had again explained he was trying
to get the car keys from inside his apartment when he saw
McGhee turn and look over his shoulder toward Morris. White
saw Morris take his gun out of his pocket and raise it to his chest.
McGhee told White not to “try anything” or he “was going to die.”
McGhee started to raise his arm to swing at White. Jackson had
grabbed their son, and she had backed up. White jumped back
out of the sight of Morris’s gun sight, removed his gun from his
pocket, and fired two shots at McGhee. At the same time Morris
was shooting at White. McGhee fell to the ground, and Morris
ran away up the driveway. White ducked, and he and Jackson
got into the car with the children and drove away.
McGhee was shot twice, once in the shoulder and once in
the head. He was pronounced dead at the scene.
White also testified regarding his state of mind during the
confrontation. He said that when he first saw McGhee, it seemed
like McGhee wanted to fight. Morris showed up with a gun, and
White was “terrified” and “didn’t know what to think.” White
assumed McGhee had a gun because he saw that Morris had a
gun. After realizing he was locked out of his apartment, White
was “terrified because this man is still aggressively angry about
me getting these keys and I can’t get him what he wants.”
McGhee was “at an extreme level of anger.” When White saw
Morris take out his gun, White “had to make the best options I
thought, to save my life.” After firing at McGhee, White wanted
“to get [his] kids to safety” before Morris came back. White
testified that he shot McGhee because “I felt, in my heart, I was
going to die.”
5
B. The Jury Instructions, Verdict, and Sentencing
The trial court instructed the jury on first and second
degree murder (CALCRIM Nos. 520 and 521), as well as
justifiable homicide based on self-defense (CALCRIM No. 505)
and voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense
(CALCRIM No. 571).
The jury found White guilty of voluntary manslaughter
(Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a))2 and found true the special allegation
White personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The jury
also found White guilty of assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1)).
In a bifurcated bench trial on the alleged aggravating
factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421,3 the trial
court found true that the offenses involved great bodily harm and
exhibited a high degree of callousness, viciousness, and cruelty
(rule 4.421(a)(1)), the offenses indicated a serious danger to
society (rule 4.421(b)(1)), and White had served a prior prison
term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). The court sentenced White to an
aggregate term of 21 years in state prison. The court imposed on
count 1 for voluntary manslaughter the upper term of 11 years,
plus the upper term of 10 years for the firearm enhancement.
The court imposed on count 2 for assault with a firearm a one-
year term (one-third the middle term of three years), plus eight
months on count 3 for possession of a firearm by a felon (one-
third the middle term of two years). The court ordered the
2 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 Further references to rules are to the California Rules of
Court.
6
sentences on counts 2 and 3 to run concurrent to the sentence on
count 1.4 White timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Not Instructing the Jury on
Defense of Others and Defense of Property, and Any Error
Was Harmless
1. Governing law and standard of review
A trial court in a criminal case has a duty to instruct on
general principles of law applicable to the case that are “‘“‘closely
and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which
are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’”’” (People
v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115; accord, People v. Young
4 The trial court appears to have imposed a consecutive
sentence (one-third the middle term) to run concurrent to the
voluntary manslaughter count. However, as the Court of Appeal
explained in People v. Neely (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787, 799, if a
court elects “to run one or more of the determinate terms
concurrently, it would impose the full selected base term and
order it to be served concurrently with the principal term.” (See
§§ 669, subd. (a) [“When a person is convicted of two or more
crimes, . . .[the] judgment upon which sentence is ordered to be
executed shall direct whether the terms of imprisonment or any
of them to which he or she is sentenced shall run concurrently or
consecutively”]; 1170.1, subd. (a) [“The subordinate term for each
consecutive offense shall consist of one-third of the middle term of
imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction for
which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed”].)
Accordingly, at resentencing, if the court imposes concurrent
terms on counts 2 and 3, it needs to impose a full base term (not
one-third the middle term) after selecting the base term
consistent with then-current sentencing laws.
7
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1200.) This obligation includes a sua
sponte duty to instruct the jury on “any affirmative defense for
which the record contains substantial evidence [citation]—
evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in favor of the
defendant [citation]—unless the defense is inconsistent with the
defendant’s theory of the case.” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th
967, 982; accord, People v. Mentch (2008) 45 Cal.4th 274, 288;
People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157.)
Substantial evidence in this context is evidence “‘“sufficient
‘to deserve consideration by the jury,’ not ‘whenever any evidence
is presented, no matter how weak.’”’” (People v. Wilson (2005)
36 Cal.4th 309, 331.) An instruction is not required where only
“[s]peculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence” supports the
instruction. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132, 134.) In
deciding whether to give a defense instruction, the court must
“view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
We review a defendant’s claims of instructional error de
novo. (People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 133; People v. Posey
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
2. Substantial evidence did not support an instruction
on defense of others
As discussed, the trial court instructed the jury on self-
defense as a complete defense to murder with CALCRIM No. 505,
which the jury rejected in favor of finding White guilty of
voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. White
contends the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on
defense of others as a complete defense because substantial
evidence supported a finding that White was reasonable in
8
believing there was an imminent threat to his children. White’s
contention lacks merit.
With respect to homicide, “[s]elf-defense, when based on a
reasonable belief that killing is necessary to avert an imminent
threat of death or great bodily injury, is a complete justification,
and such a killing is not a crime.” (People v. Elmore (2014)
59 Cal.4th 121, 133-134; see § 197, subds. (1) & (2); CALCRIM
No. 505.) “‘For killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must
actually and reasonably believe in the need to defend.’” (People v.
Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082; accord, People v. Horn
(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 672, 682; People v. Rodarte (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1168 [“Perfect self-defense requires that a
defendant have an honest and reasonable belief in the need to
defend himself or herself.”].)5
5 A murder charge may alternatively be mitigated by
imperfect self-defense, reducing the offense (as the jury did here)
to voluntary manslaughter. “If the belief [in the need to defend
oneself] subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, there
is ‘imperfect self-defense,’ i.e., ‘the defendant is deemed to have
acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder,’ but can
be convicted of manslaughter.” (People v. Humphrey, supra,
13 Cal.4th at p. 1082; accord, People v. Horn, supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at p. 682; see People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th
141, 182 [“Imperfect self-defense is the killing of another human
being under the actual but unreasonable belief that the killer was
in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.”];
CALCRIM No. 571.)
9
Justifiable homicide on the basis of defense of others
consists of substantially the same elements as self-defense. The
jury must find: (1) the defendant reasonably believed that
someone else was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering
great bodily injury; (2) the defendant reasonably believed the
immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against
that danger; and (3) the defendant used no more force than was
reasonably necessary to defend against that danger. (CALCRIM
No. 505; see also People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 868
[“[B]oth self-defense and defense of others . . . require an actual
fear of imminent harm.”].)
Substantial evidence did not support an instruction on
defense of others. Both White and Jackson testified McGhee
threatened to beat up or kill White, but McGhee did not threaten
the children with serious harm. After McGhee slapped Jackson’s
hand away, he said, “Fuck them kids. I don’t give a fuck, I’ll slap
you and those kids.” However, Jackson was able to immediately
grab the children and walk with them toward the apartment
building and away from the altercation. As soon as she saw a
gun, she was able to hide behind a car with the children, and she
did not come out until the shooting stopped. There was no
testimony that anyone pointed a gun at the children or
threatened to kill or seriously harm them. These facts do not
support an inference the children were in imminent danger.
Further, there was no evidence White had an actual belief
that his children were in imminent danger. White testified
multiple times that he was afraid for his own life, but he never
stated he feared McGhee or Morris would kill or seriously harm
his children. The only time in his testimony that White
mentioned “getting his children to safety” was after he shot
10
McGhee and wanted to flee to avoid potential retribution from
Morris. (See People v. Viramontes (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1256,
1262 [instruction on defense of others requires “evidence from
which the jury could find that appellant actually had such a
belief” in the need to defend against imminent peril].)
3. Even if the trial court erred in not instructing on
defense of others, any error was harmless
The Attorney General contends that even if the trial court
failed to instruct the jury on defense of others, the error was
harmless under the standard for state law error set forth in
People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, because it is not
reasonably probable the defendant would have obtained a more
favorable outcome had the error not occurred. White argues we
should apply the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard
applicable to federal constitutional error under Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman), because the failure
to instruct on defense of others violated his federal constitutional
rights.
The Supreme Court has not yet decided which test for
prejudice applies to a failure to instruct on an affirmative defense
“such as self-defense.” (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186,
199 [“we have yet to determine whether a trial court’s failure to
instruct on a requested affirmative defense instruction supported
by substantial evidence is federal constitutional error or state law
error”]; compare People v. Villanueva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 41,
52-53 [failure to instruct on self-defense was reversible error
under Watson] with People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294,
303 [applying Chapman standard to erroneous self-defense
instruction]; cf. People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 254 [“a
trial court’s failure to instruct on imperfect self-defense amounts
11
to an incomplete instruction on the malice element of murder and
is therefore subject to Chapman review for constitutional error”].)
Even under Chapman’s more stringent standard, any error
was harmless. In applying Chapman’s beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard in the context of an instructional error that
“‘“misdescri[bes] . . . the elements”’ of the charged offense” (here,
not instructing on defense of others), we “‘“ask[] whether the
record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary
finding with respect to the omitted element.”’” (Schuller, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 261, quoting In re Lopez (2023) 14 Cal.5th 562,
581.) Applying this stringent standard, any error in not
instructing the jury on defense of others was harmless because
there is no evidence in the record that could have rationally
supported a jury finding that White killed McGhee in defense of
Jackson or the children.
As discussed, the trial court instructed the jury with
CALCRIM No. 505 on self-defense that White was not guilty of
murder or manslaughter if (1) he reasonably believed he was in
imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury,
and (2) he reasonably believed the immediate use of deadly force
was necessary to defend against that danger, and (3) he used no
more force than was reasonably necessary. The court also
instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 571 that a murder
is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant actually
believed he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering
great bodily injury, and he actually believed the immediate use of
deadly force was necessary to defend against the danger, but at
least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.
12
By finding White guilty of voluntary manslaughter, the
jury necessarily found White had an actual but not reasonable
belief he was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering
great bodily injury. Given that White had been the subject of
more violent threats from McGhee and was standing a few feet
from him, a rational jury could not have found the same
circumstances that led to his not having a reasonable belief of
harm to himself supported a reasonable belief that Jackson or the
children were in immediate danger of being killed or suffering
great bodily injury. As discussed, McGhee told White he was
“going to beat [his] ass,” and when Morris pulled out his gun,
McGee threatened that if White did anything, “[he] was going to
die.” McGhee then started to swing at White. By contrast, when
Jackson intervened and said there would be no fighting, McGhee
slapped her hand and said he would slap her and the children
(not kill or seriously harm them). In addition, McGhee was
standing only feet from White, and Morris had just pulled out a
gun when White responded by shooting McGhee, but by that
time, Jackson had moved with the children to take cover behind a
car. On this record, if the jury found White did not have a
reasonable belief that it was necessary to immediately use deadly
force to defend against the danger to himself, a rational juror
would not have found White had a reasonable belief that deadly
force was necessary to defend against any danger to Jackson and
the children.
13
4. Substantial evidence did not support an instruction
on defense of property
White also argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct
the jury with CALCRIM No. 506 regarding justifiable homicide
based on defense of property (the parking area in front of White’s
apartment building). Pursuant to section 197, subdivision (2),
homicide is justifiable “[w]hen committed in defense of
habitation, property, or person, against one who manifestly
intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony,
or against one who manifestly intends and endeavors, in a
violent, riotous, or tumultuous manner, to enter the habitation of
another for the purpose of offering violence to any person
therein.”
While this language appears to permit killing in defense of
property to prevent any felony, the Supreme Court in People v.
Ceballos (1974) 12 Cal.3d 470, 478-479 held that “killing or use of
deadly force to prevent a felony was justified only if the offense
was a forcible and atrocious crime[,]” such as “murder, mayhem,
rape and robbery” or a felony that “threatened, or was reasonably
believed to threaten, death or serious bodily harm.” “Accordingly,
a homicide involving the intentional use of deadly force can never
be justified by defense of habitation [or property] alone. The
defendant must also show either self-defense or defense of others,
i.e., that he or she reasonably believed the intruder intended to
kill or inflict serious injury on someone in the home [or on the
property].” (People v. Curtis (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1360;
see Bench Notes to CALCRIM No. 506 [“[A]lthough the statute
refers to ‘defense of habitation,’ Ceballos requires that a person
be at risk of great bodily harm or an atrocious felony in order to
14
justify homicide. [Citation.] The instruction has been drafted
accordingly.”].)
In light of our finding that substantial evidence did not
support an instruction regarding defense of others (and the jury
found White did not have a reasonable belief in the need to use
deadly force in self-defense), it follows that there was not
substantial evidence to support a finding of defense of property
based on a reasonable belief by White of imminent danger to
himself, Jackson, or the children. And, as discussed, any error in
not instructing the jury on defense of others was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt under Chapman.
B. The Trial Court Erred by Imposing Upper-term Sentences
for Voluntary Manslaughter and the Firearm Enhancement
1. Procedural history
While the jury was deliberating, the trial court inquired of
the parties how they intended to proceed on the aggravating
factors alleged in the information. The court asked, “Is there
going to be a stipulation? Do you want to argue to the jury?”
White’s counsel responded, “The defense would waive jury for the
aggravating factors.” Three months later at the sentencing
hearing, the court stated, “I understand that Mr. White waived
his right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors.” After hearing
argument on the aggravating factors, the court found three of the
aggravating factors true and sentenced White to the upper terms
on voluntary manslaughter and the firearm enhancement.
2. White did not provide a valid waiver of his right to a
jury trial on the aggravating factors
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibits a court
from imposing a greater sentence “based on a fact, other than a
15
prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the
defendant.” (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270, 275;
accord, People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 776.) Rather,
“under the Sixth Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant
to a greater potential sentence must be found by a jury . . . and
established beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Cunningham, at p. 281;
accord, Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490.) This
includes the facts underlying aggravating factors, special
circumstance allegations, and sentencing enhancements. (See
People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1220 [upper term
sentencing enhancement violates Sixth Amendment if “none of
the aggravating factors on which the court relied to impose them
had been found true by the jury or admitted by [defendant]”].)
California’s determinate sentencing scheme incorporates
this constitutional principle. Section 1170, subdivision (b),
provides, “[w]hen a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed
and the statute specifies three possible terms,” “[t]he court may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) Notwithstanding these
provisions, “the court may consider the defendant’s prior
convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record
of conviction without submitting the prior convictions to a jury.”
(Id., subd. (b)(3).)
A defendant may waive his right to a jury trial on the
aggravating factors, provided he does so personally and
16
expressly. (See People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 308;
People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47 [jury trial on
aggravating factors “is guaranteed by the federal Constitution”
and thus “require[s] an express waiver”].) A jury trial waiver
must also be “‘knowing and intelligent, that is, “‘“made with a full
awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and
the consequences of the decision to abandon it,”’” as well as
voluntary “‘“in the sense that it was the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception.”’”’” (People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166.)
We review the validity of a jury trial waiver under “‘the totality of
the circumstances’ unique to each case.” (People v. Morelos
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 753; accord, Sivongxxay, at p. 167.)
White contends, the Attorney General concedes, and we
agree that White did not personally waive his right to a jury trial
or make a knowing and intelligent waiver of that right. The
Attorney General also concedes the violation of White’s right to a
jury trial on the aggravating factors is not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we must reverse White’s
sentence. (People v. Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.) “‘“The
proper remedy for this type of failure of proof—where . . .
[aggravating facts] were ‘never tried’ to the jury—is to remand
and give the People an opportunity to retry”’ the aggravating
facts.” (Ibid.) We therefore remand to allow the People an
opportunity to elect whether to retry the aggravating factors
before a jury.
17
DISPOSITION
The conviction is affirmed. The sentence is vacated and the
matter is remanded for the People to elect whether to retry the
aggravating factors before a jury. Following a retrial (or election
not to retry the aggravating factors), the court shall resentence
White in conformity with section 1170, subdivision (b), and any
ameliorative changes in the sentencing laws.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
STONE, J.
18
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